Unlawful Marriage/Chapter 10
CHAPTER X.
Marriage unlawful.—Rules of interpretation—proved to be correct.—Objections of Omicron and the Puritan answered.—Eight relations by affinity.
Omitting for the present the prohibition of this marriage found in the eighteenth verse of the chapter, we contend, that by a fair and just construction of the Levitical law, it is forbidden. To prove this, the following rules of interpretation are laid down as correct and true.
I. This law is to be interpreted in conformity with its general and permanent character.
Had it been delivered as a temporary and civil law, designed only for the government of the Hebrew commonwealth, it ought to receive a corresponding interpretation. But as it is a permanent, ecclesiastical law, designed for the Church in all ages, it must be interpreted accordingly.
II. This law settles the degrees of marriage; without specifying all the particular cases which come within the compass of these degrees.
This, with few exceptions, has been the judgment of the Church in every age. So thought the Jews. "The Jews," says Poole, "and even the Karaites, (who followed most rigidly the letter of the Scriptures,) admitted it to be correct to ascertain the cases not specified, by just reasoning."[1] If this rule were not allowed, neither marriage with a sister from the same father and mother, nor marriage with the wife of a mother's brother, nor marriage with a sister's daughter, could be proved to be unlawful; for neither of these cases are specified in the law. See vs. 9, 10, 11, 14. In this the law resembles the Decalogue; which lays down general principles to be applied to cases as they may arise. Had all the cases been specified, the law would have been unnecessarily prolix.
III. This law is addressed to women, as well as to men.
This rule is not regarded either by the Puritan, or by Omicron. They seem to think the law speaks only to men. A serious error that runs counter to the whole analogy of Scripture. All general laws are alike addressed to both sexes. "The Rabbins say, that whatsoever is forbid to men, in the negative precepts of the law, is also forbid to women." See Calmet's Dict. under Woman. Wild as they were in other matters, they were correct in this.
The first prohibition given to man, as a test of his obedience, seems to have been delivered to Adam before Eve was made—(Gen. 2:15–22;) yet our common mother knew it was imposed on her, as well as on her husband. (Gen. 3:1–3.) The Decalogue was addressed to men, just as this marriage law is; but who doubts it was addressed also to women? In the tenth commandment the Lawgiver says to man, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife;" and does He not, at the same time, say to woman, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's husband?" But Omicron objects, "The Hebrew wife was, in fact, comparatively little more than the husband's slave, whom he might dismiss at pleasure."—"It follows, from these considerations, that the Mosaic laws relative to marriage and the sexes, such as those in Levit. 18:6–18, (however we might understand them, if now first given to us in the present state of society,) were addressed only to Hebrew men. They could not have been intelligible as addressed to Hebrew women; because they had no voice or lot in carrying them into execution; but were themselves merely passive in the arrangements between one family and another." (P. 27, par. 3, 5, Appendix.)
In reply the following remarks are offered: 1. The inquiry before us is, What is the duty of Christian men and women? If "the Hebrew wife was little more than the husband's slave," a Christian wife is not the slave of her husband, nor can he dismiss her at pleasure. The law is intelligible to a Christian woman. What is her duty? Is she not bound to obey the marriage law? If a man be so wicked as to propose to marry his sister, can she consent without sin? Or if a man propose to contract any marriage within the Levitical degrees, can the female accept his proposals, and be free from guilt?
2. Why could not Hebrew women understand the law? Were they so stupid as to be incapable of instruction? Were not the precepts that prohibited a son to marry his mother, or a brother to marry his sister, as intelligible to Hebrew women as the precepts in the Decalogue, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife?"
3. The Hebrew women were not passive in marriage. They had a voice in forming this interesting contract. Rebecca was consulted in regard to her marriage with Isaac. This indeed occurred before the giving of the Mosaic law; but it indicates the custom among the ancient Hebrews. Ruth certainly was not passive in forming a matrimonial connexion with Boaz. She took decisive measures for effecting it. See Ruth, chap. 3. The childless widow was authorized by law to require her husband's brother to marry her, and to treat him with great indignity if he refused. (Deut. 25:5–10.) A daughter betrothed by her parents, was allowed, when she came of age, the privilege of refusing to consummate the marriage with the man selected, and afterwards forming a matrimonial connexion with any one she might choose. See the form of renunciation in Selden's Uxor Ebr. Lib ii., chap. 3.
4. "A Hebrew wife was, in fact, comparatively little more than the husband's slave!" So says Omicron; and the Puritan makes the same assertion. (P. 7, at the bottom.) What proof is offered? None by either writer, except the law of divorce. This we shall examine presently. In the meantime we deny the fact. In Christian lands some wives are treated by their husbands worse than slaves. But such cruel treatment is not authorized by the Divine law; nor does it affect the relation of women to its binding authority. Did Abraham, or Isaac, or Jacob, treat their wives little better than slaves? Did Moses and Aaron act thus towards their wives? Did Elkanah treat his wives as slaves? (1 Sam. 1:4–8.) Did King David so treat his wives?
The Hebrews did, it is allowed, in corrupt periods, act toward their wives with great cruelty. But such conduct was unauthorized by their laws. It was acting in opposition to the original design of the marriage institution. Woman was formed by the Creator to be "a help-meet" for man. (Gen. 2:18.) It was always His will that wives should be the companions of their husbands, (Deut. 24:5;) and the bill of divorcement which the law directed to be given to a woman, when put away by her husband, was allowed on account of the hardness of men's hearts.
5. Nor were the Hebrews authorized to put away their wives "at pleasure." Restraints were laid on them. Some wives they were forbidden to divorce. See Deut. 22:13–19, 28, 29. The text referred to by Omicron (Deut. 25:1) is altogether insufficient to sustain his sweeping assertion, that a "Hebrew husband might divorce his wife at any time, on slight grounds," and "at pleasure." (P. 27.) The "uncleanness" referred to in the text, was in the judgment of Scott, something that formed "a real grievance." Commentators, however, are divided in their opinions;[2] and so were the two famous Jewish schools in our Saviour's time.[3]
The lax interpretation should not be admitted for the following reasons:—1. The condemnation of it by our Great Teacher, when the Pharisees put to him this question: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" See Matt. 19:3–9. 2. The pungent rebuke of the licentious conduct of the Jews, by Malachi, God's last prophet under the Old Testament. The Jews had divorced their wives, and married other women; so that the altar of the LORD was covered "with tears, with weeping, and with crying out, insomuch that He regarded not the offering." "Yet ye say, Wherefore? Because the LORD hath been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously: yet she is thy companion, and the wife of thy covenant. And did he not make one? Yet had he the residue of the spirit. And wherefore one? That he might seek a godly seed. Therefore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth. For the LORD, the God of Israel saith, that he hateth putting away."
Compare this scripture with the above quotation. Omicron says, "The Hebrew wife was little better than her husband's slave?" God says she is his "companion, and the wife of his covenant." Omicron says, The husband could dismiss his wife "at pleasure;" God says, "He hateth putting away," and warns the husband not to "deal treacherously against the wife of his youth." Now, was the Hebrew wife, whom God denominates the companion of her husband, and whom He condescends thus to protect in the enjoyment of her rights, little better than his slave? If a wicked man treated her so, it was in opposition to Jehovah's known will.
6. That this Levitical law was addressed to Hebrew women, as well as to men, is plain from the twentieth chapter, which denounces the civil penalty equally against both sexes. See vs. 11, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21. If the law was not addressed to women, they were guiltless, and were not deserving of punishment. But, as they were to be punished for its violations, it is evident they were considered as guilty; and it follows that the law was addressed to them: for Paul says, "Where no law is, there is no transgression." And again, "Sin is not imputed when there is no law." Rom. 4:15, and 5:13.
7. The last proof of the correctness of this rule which we offer is, the interpretation which Jonathan, the son of Uzziel, has given of the seventh verse of this chapter. "He was," says Adam Clarke, in his Succession of Sacred Literature, (p. 50,) "brought up in the celebrated school of Rabbi Hillel, grandfather to Gamaliel, at whose feet St. Paul was brought up. Hillel died about the time of our Saviour's birth; and Jonathan, who was the most famous of all his scholars, and equalled by the Jewish Rabbins to Moses himself, continued to flourish a long time after." This famous Jewish Rabbi regarded the seventh verse as addressed directly to the woman, as well as to the man. His interpretation is this: "Turpitudinem patris tui et turpitudinem matris tuæ non contemnes: mulier non rem habebit cum patre suo, et vir non coibit cum matre sua; mater tua est, non revelabis turpitudinem ejus.[4]
Compare this with Omicron's assertion, (p. 27, 5th par.,) "that the Mosaic law relative to marriage and the sexes, such as those in Levit. 18:6–18, (however we might understand them, if now first given to us in the present state of society,) were addressed only to Hebrew men." How opposite to the views of this famous Jewish Rabbi!
Let us now exemplify the operation of this rule.
Does the law say to man, "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother?" (V. 7.) It says to woman, Thou shalt not cohabit with thy father.
Does the law say to man, "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's sister?" (V. 12.) It says to woman, Thou shalt not cohabit with thy father's brother.
Does the law say to man, "Thou shalt not uncover thy father's brother's wife?" (V. 14.) It says to woman, Thou shalt not cohabit with thy mother's sister's husband.
Thus this marriage law accords with the moral law: for when the Decalogue says to man, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife;" it says to woman, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's husband.
IV. In interpreting the marriage law, we are to avail ourselves of the light of Christianity.
This seems so plain as to need no proof. But what says Omicron? "Some minds are doubtless led to look at the subject in a wrong light, by making no distinction between the relative position of man and woman, husband and wife, in our day, and their relative position under the Hebrew commonwealth. Because the two sexes stand on an equal footing in the eye of the law and in general usage, it is natural, though not correct, to regard them as having stood on the same ground in respect to Hebrew law and custom." (P. 26, Appendix.)
Is this in point? Had Omicron been called upon to frame an excuse for the conduct of the Jews in violating their law, this might be introduced with some plausibility. But, in debating the question, Whether it is now lawful for a Christian man, living under the light of the new dispensation, to marry his deceased wife's sister, what has it to do with the question? Are we to shut our eyes against the light of Christianity, and placing ourselves under the obscurity of the old dispensation, and viewing ourselves as citizens of "the Hebrew commonwealth," to interpret the law as a civil or judicial law, and thus ascertain our duty? Are we to look at this subject with Jewish, and not with Christian eyes? How unreasonable! The law laid down in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus, is a law, not of the Hebrew commonwealth, but of the Church of God in all ages. We are Christians; we live under the glorious light of the gospel; Jesus Christ has explained to us the law of marriage; He prohibits divorce, except for one cause: all this we are to remember, and to interpret the law in all the light which Christianity sheds upon it for ourselves.
But says Omicron, (p. 27,) "With us, indeed, this question assumes a somewhat different shape, in consequence of our Saviour's prohibition of divorce. Matt. 5:31, 19:6. But this, it must be remembered, was unknown to the ancient Hebrews." The declaration which God made by Malachi, "that he hateth putting away," was also unknown to the ancient Hebrews; but were the later Jews, who knew it, to pay no regard to it, in their interpretation of the law of divorce? Or are we, who not only know this, but what our Saviour has said of divorce and polygamy, and who enjoy the light which our Redeemer has shed upon all laws, not to avail ourselves of the light imparted to us in interpreting the law of incest and of marriage? What inexcusable ingratitude would this be! If the ancient Hebrews erred for want of light, we cannot plead the same excuse. We have ample light; let us walk in the light.
V. Affinity is as permanent as consanguinity.
This is denied both by Omicron, (p. 27,) and by the Puritan, (p. 9.) "The Hebrew," says the former, "at least would hardly have thought so, judging from the customs of his country, and from the provisions of the Mosaic law in respect to inheritance and other like matters. Yet so thought Maimonides, that learned and celebrated Hebrew scholar. 'Conjunctiones hic æque prohibentur cum propinquis affinitate et nuptiis atque cum propinquis sanguine, teste etiam Maimonide.'[5]
"Even Maimonides testifies, that conjunctions with relations by affinity and marriage, are as much prohibited as with relations by blood."
The death of a wife does not, as the Puritan supposes, (p. 9,) affect the affinity of her husband to her surviving kindred. Her mother is still his mother-in-law; her brothers and sisters are his brothers and sisters; and they are still the uncles and aunts of his children. Were it otherwise, were the affinity established by marriage dissolved by the death of a wife, there would exist, on the ground of relationship, no bar to his marriage with her daughter, or with her mother; but the first is expressly forbidden, (Levit. 18:17;) and the second was declared to be wicked and punishable with death. See Levit. 20:14.
If the Jews, by abusing the law of divorce, repudiated their wives frequently and for trifling causes, or, contrary to the original design of marriage, multiplied their wives, their unwise and sinful practices did not change the prohibitions of the Levitical law, nor alter the affinity created by marriage. The perplexities that may have arisen from their folly in interpreting the law in regard to themselves, are not to be brought forward to obscure its obvious meaning in application to Christians, to whom polygamy has been plainly interdicted, and who are permitted to divorce their wives for one cause only. The true question is, What does the law say to us? not What does it say to the ancient Hebrews?
In confirmation of his reasoning, Omicron says, just before the preceding quotation, "As a Hebrew, I might take a wife to-day, and divorce her to-morrow. I might take a second, and a third, yea, even a twentieth wife, and divorce them all." And does he really believe he could act in this licentious manner, under the sanction of a divine law? Does he believe he might, under a divine sanction, dismiss a wife for every trifle, and, to gratify his lusts, dismiss twenty wives?
Omicron goes on to inquire, "Am I to understand, that affinity arising from these precarious and transient connexions, was a bond as close, and valid, and permanent, as the ties of blood? and that the Hebrew was as strongly bound to all the various relatives of his twenty wives, as he was to his own blood-kindred of the like degree?" These are questions that might be asked by a Hebrew, who, to gratify his lawless passions, had divorced twenty wives, and then found himself involved in a maze of difficulties; but surely they do not become a Christian divine, who is discussing the duty, not of Jews, but of Christians.
The God of Israel had forbidden the king to "multiply wives to himself," (Deut. 17:17,) and prohibited to all Israel to form matrimonial alliances with other nations, (1 Kings 11:2;) yet Solomon had seven hundred wives, and three hundred concubines, (v. 3;) and among them were "many strange women, together with the daughter of Pharaoh, women of the Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, Zidonians, and Hittites." (V. 1.) The mournful consequences of such violations of the Divine law, are recorded in sacred history. See 1 Kings 11. Why did not Omicron bring forward this strong case of this licentious king of Israel, who had, besides three hundred concubines, thirty-five times twenty wives, and then triumphantly propose his questions about affinity!
The number of relations by affinity with whom we may not cohabit, specified in the law, are the following:
1. Step-mother, v. 8.
2. Father's brother's wife, v. 14.
3. Daughter-in-law, v. 15.
4. Brother's wife, v. 16.
5. Wife's daughter, v. 17.
6. Her son's daughter, v. 17.
7. Her daughter's daughter, v. 17.
8. Wife's sister, v. 18.
All these are obviously relations by affinity; and they are as numerous as the relations by consanguinity, specified in the law: so that it is very evident, from the explanation given by the Lawgiver himself of the general rule laid down in the sixth verse, that near of kin comprehends affinity as well as consanguinity.[6]
- ↑ Synopsis Crit. vol. I. Levit. 18:16.
- ↑ Poole on Deut. 25:1.
- ↑ Clarke on Matt. 19:13.
- ↑ See his Targum in the London Polyglott.
- ↑ Poole Synop. Lev. 18:14.
- ↑ The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has, by a recent decision, reversed that of an inferior court which had pronounced the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's daughter to be incestuous, on the ground that, by the death of his wife, the affinity between him and his wife's daughter entirely ceased; and therefore he could lawfully marry his step-daughter. So state the public papers.
Such is the decision of a Supreme Court in the land of steady habits—in the land of the descendants of the Puritans! This is the doctrine of the Puritan. See p. 9, paragraph next to the last. He will hail it as another advance of the public mind towards the truth!
Let us look at the consequences of this decision of the Supreme Court.
If the death of a wife dissolve the affinity between her husband and her daughter, it must dissolve the affinity between him and all her kindred. What follows?
1. A man marries a woman; and by his marriage he sustains affinity to all her kindred. Her mother becomes his mother-in-law; her father his father-in-law; her sons and daughters his step-sons and step-daughters; her uncles and aunts his uncles and aunts. She dies; and, according to the doctrine of the Supreme Court, all these relations, which had subsisted till the moment of her last breath, cease. The husband survives, and her blood kindred survive; but the relation which bound them together has vanished with her breath. Her mother and father were his mother and father-in-law, but they are so no longer. Her brothers and sisters were his brothers and sisters-in-law, but they are so no longer. Her sons and daughters were his step-sons and daughters, but they are so no longer. These endearing ties may have subsisted long, and strengthened with revolving years; but by her death, they have all been dissolved in a moment, and all these survivors are sundered apart, as if they had never been united. How revolting to common sense!
2. Let us see what marriages become lawful by this doctrine.
A man may marry his deceased wife's sister, her daughter, and her mother; although these marriages are prohibited by the law of God. See Levit. 18:17, 18, and chap. 20:14.
As the death of a husband must produce on affinity the same effect as the death of a wife, a man may, after the death of the husband, marry his brother's wife;—his father's brother's wife;—his daughter-in-law;—and his step-mother!—although these marriages are all expressly forbidden by the Divine law. See Levit. 18:8, 14, 15, 16.
Whither are we going? Of what advantage is the light of Divine revelation to civil Courts, if decisions which draw after them such consequences are to prevail? Has the spirit of the Puritans departed from the Courts of their descendants? "Tell it not in Gath; publish it not in the streets of Askelon!"