User:Valjean/Sandbox
Index.
| Page. | |||
| No. | I.—Introduction,— | 7 | |
| Necessity of a new constitution, | 7 | ||
| Obstacles to be encountered, | 7 | ||
| Inducements to moderation in controversy, | 8 | ||
| General propositions to be discussed, | 9 | ||
| II, III, IV, V.—Concerning dangers from foreign force and fluence,— | 10 | ||
| Inquiry into the importance of union, | 10 | ||
| Characteristics of our country and people, | 11 | ||
| History of the confederation, | 12 | ||
| How and by whom the new constitution was framed, | 12 | ||
| Propriety of candid deliberation as to its provisions, | 13 | ||
| Public safety an important object of government, | 14 | ||
| Union will diminish the causes of war, | 15 | ||
| Union will secure the election of capable men to office, | 15 | ||
| Union will lead to a readier settlement of differences with other nations, | 16 | ||
| Union will strengthen the nation so as not to invite hostility, | 17 | ||
| Dangers arising from conflicting interests of nations considered, | 18 | ||
| Comparison of the facilities for defence by a union, and by separate sovereignties, | 19 | ||
| Results of union illustrated by the history of Great Britain, | 21 | ||
| Danger of dissensions between separate confederacies or states, | 22 | ||
| Impossibility of lasting alliances between states whilst distinct, | 23 | ||
| VI, VII.—Concerning dangers from war between the states,— | 24 | ||
| Frequent contests would arise between the states, if separate, | 24 | ||
| Illustrations from history of other nations, | 24, 25 | ||
| The idea that the genius of republics and the influence of commerce will secure peace, chimerical, | 26 | ||
| Proofs from history, | 27 | ||
| Danger of territorial disputes, | 29 | ||
| Danger of competitions of commerce, | 31 | ||
| Danger of collisions arising from the apportionment of the public debt of the union, | 31 | ||
| Conflicts of laws, | 32 | ||
| Alliances between states, and with foreign nations, | 33 | ||
| VIII.—The effects of internal war in producing standing armies and other institutions unfriendly to liberty,— | 33 | ||
| Nature of the contests which would arise between states, | 34 | ||
| Such contests would result in standing armies and military establishments, | 34 | ||
| Consequent danger from military usurpation, | 36 | ||
| Union the only security against such dangers, | 37 | ||
| IX, X.—The utility of the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection,— | 38 | ||
| Distractions which agitated the republics of Greece and Italy, | 38 | ||
| Enlargement of the republic a safeguard against such distractions, | 39 | ||
| Views of Montesquieu, | 39, 40 | ||
| Perfect equality of states not essential in a confederacy, | 41 | ||
| Dangers of factions in popular governments, | 42 | ||
| The remedies or preventives discussed, | 43 | ||
| Impracticability of removing the causes of faction, | 44 | ||
| A pure democracy admits of no cure for faction, | 45 | ||
| Checks and safeguards in a republic, | 46 | ||
| Superiority of a large over a small republic, | 47 | ||
| XI.—The utility of the union with respect to commerce and a navy, | 48 | ||
| Jealousy in Europe of our commercial tendencies, | 48 | ||
| Union will increase our power to obtain commercial privileges from other nations, | 49 | ||
| Union will enable us to maintain a navy, | 50 | ||
| Weakness and insignificance will result from disunion, | 50, 51 | ||
| Effect of a navy on our fisheries, | 51 | ||
| Union will increase the aggregate commerce of the states, | 52 | ||
| Union will give us the ascendant in the affairs of this continent, | 53 | ||
| XII.—The utility of the union with respect to revenue, | 54 | ||
| Prosperity of commerce a source of national wealth, | 54 | ||
| Commerce increases the means of revenue, | 54 | ||
| Revenue from direct taxation impracticable, | 55 | ||
| Impost duties must be relied on for revenue, | 55 | ||
| Union will facilitate the collection of such duties, | 55, 56 | ||
| Difficulty of separate States collecting such duties, | 56 | ||
| Necessity of revenue to a nation, | 57 | ||
| XIII.—The same subject continued, with a view to economy, | 58 | ||
| Union favorable to economy in public expenditure, | 58 | ||
| Probable confederations in case of disruption of the union, | 59 | ||
| Increased cost of separate governments, | 60 | ||
| XIV.—An objection drawn from the extent of country answered, | 60 | ||
| Practicability of extending the limits of a republic, | 60 | ||
| Distinction between a republic and a democracy in this respect, | 61 | ||
| Extent of the union compared with that of European states, | 62 | ||
| Jurisdiction of the general government limited, | 62 | ||
| Facilities of intercourse will increase, | 63 | ||
| Border states will need protection from the union, | 63 | ||
| Disunion more dangerous than union, | 64 | ||
| XV, XVI.—Concerning the defects of the present confederation, in relation to the principle of legislation for the states in their collective capacities, | 65 | ||
| Insufficiency of the confederation to preserve the union, | 65 | ||
| Disastrous results of its defects, | 66 | ||
| Increase of power in the national government necessary, | 67 | ||
| National legislation must act on individuals instead of states, | 67 | ||
| A league or alliance of states will be inefficient, | 68 | ||
| What is implied in a government, | 69 | ||
| Necessity of a controlling head to the confederation, | 70 | ||
| In a league of states, the only remedy for disobedience is force, | 72 | ||
| Difficulties involved in this remedy, | 72 | ||
| A military despotism would result, | 73 | ||
| Impracticability of sustaining the union by such means, | 73 | ||
| Superior facility with which a national government would execute its laws, | 74 | ||
| Or repress commotions, | 75 | ||
| XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.—The subject continued, and illustrated by examples, to show the tendency of federal governments, rather to anarchy among the members, than tyranny in the head, | 76 | ||
| Danger of encroachment on states rights and powers, considered, | 76 | ||
| The danger of national weakness more to be feared, | 76 | ||
| Pervading influence of the local governments, | 77 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the feudal system, | 78 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Grecian republics, | 79 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Achæan league, | 81 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Germanic body, | 84 | ||
| Illustration from the history of Poland, | 87 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Swiss cantons, | 87 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the United Netherlands, | 89 | ||
| XXI, XXII.—Further defects of the present constitution, | 92 | ||
| Want of sanction to the laws, | 92 | ||
| Want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, | 93 | ||
| Regulating state contributions to the treasury by quotas, | 94 | ||
| The proper remedy for this defect, | 95 | ||
| The want of a power to regulate commerce, | 96 | ||
| Difficulties arising from separate state regulations, | 97 | ||
| The raising of troops by quotas, | 98 | ||
| The right of equal suffrage among the states, an evil, | 98 | ||
| Requiring a vote of two-thirds of the states is not a remedy, | 99 | ||
| This principle gives scope to foreign corruption, | 100 | ||
| Instances from history of officers of republics corrupted by foreign powers, | 101 | ||
| The want of a judiciary power a crowning defect, | 102 | ||
| Necessity of a supreme tribunal, | 102 | ||
| Present organization of congress unsuitable for an executive head, | 103 | ||
| Propriety of the constitution being ratified by the people rather than by the states, | 103 | ||
| XXIII.—The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, | 104 | ||
| Necessity of union for the common defence, | 104 | ||
| Power to raise armies and fleets necessary, | 104 | ||
| Powers of the present confederation insufficient, | 105 | ||
| A weak government unsafe, | 106 | ||
| The powers must be co-extensive, with the objects of government, | 107 | ||
| XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.—The subject continued, with an answer to an objection concerning standing armies, | 108 | ||
| The constitution vests the power of raising armies in the legislative and not the executive branch, | 108 | ||
| Standing armies not prohibited by the state constitutions, | 109 | ||
| Nor by the articles of confederation, | 109 | ||
| Dangers of invasion from foreign countries or savage neighbors, | 110 | ||
| Necessity of national troops to protect commerce, | 111 | ||
| Difficulty of separate states protecting the frontiers, | 112 | ||
| Armies of separate states more dangerous to liberty than those of the nation, | 113 | ||
| Objections to restrictions on the power of the government as to armies, | 113 | ||
| Militia cannot be relied upon alone for national defence, | 114 | ||
| Armies sometimes necessary in time of peace, | 115 | ||
| Danger of making the government too feeble by restrictions, | 116 | ||
| Vesting the power to raise armies in the legislature is a sufficient safeguard, | 117 | ||
| Effect of the limitation of appropriations to two years in the new constitution, | 118 | ||
| Liberty cannot be subverted, nor large armies raised, without time, | 119 | ||
| Dangers from armies less in a united than a disunited state, | 120 | ||
| The idea that the laws of the union cannot be executed without force unfounded, | 121 | ||
| The national government will be as well administered as state governments, | 121 | ||
| It will be strengthened by extending into internal affairs, | 122 | ||
| And by operating on individuals rather than states, | 123 | ||
| The force occasionally necessary to execute the laws, an argument for union, | 124 | ||
| The same necessity for force might exist in case of several confederacies, | 125 | ||
| Union the best safeguard against the representatives of the people usurping power, | 125 | ||