Venona: FBI Documents of Historic Interest/Belmont Memorandum 1952-05-23

by Alan Harnden Belmont

Office Memorandum ● UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TOP SECRET

TO:D. M. LADD DATE: May 23, 1952

FROM::A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: 
ESPIONAGE — R

 

PURPOSE:

To set forth the results of the conference held between the Central_Intelligence Agency and the Armed Forces Security Agency regarding the   materials, da obtained through liaison with AFSA.

DETAILS:

Mr. Oliver Kirby, who is the assistant head of the Russian Section at the Armed Forces Security Agency, which handles the material we call   was interviewed by Supervisors S. D. Ellis and R. J. Lamphere on May 22. 1952, Mr. Kirby said that on May 20, 1952, he and Captain Jeffrey Dennis, who is the head of the Russian Section, hod a conference with Mr. Jason Paige and William Harvey of the Central Intelligence Agency. You will recall that this conference was the one arranged between General Smith of CIA and General Canine of AFSA. Prior to the conference, Captain Dennis had been instructed by General Canine that no collateral inormation received by AFSA from the Bureau was to be shown to or discussed with the CIA representatives.

Therefore, at the meeting, CIA was shown a summary of the messages which did not include any identifications made by the Bureau. The CIA representatives expressed interest in this material and particularly were interested in more details concerning messages which reflected that in 1944 and 1945 OSS was penetrated by the MGB. You may recall that this is the material which corroborates the information previously furnished to us by Elizabeth Bentley regarding the Soviet Intelligence penetration OSS, including agents such as Duncan Lee, an assistant to General Donevan. The CIA representatives were interested in the information dealing with Donald MacLean, a British diplomat who disappeared, and the Fuchs case.

Mr. Kirby stated that the conference with CIA lasted approximately 3½ hours, much of the time being taken up with explaining to CIA the limitations on the materials. CIA was informed that the principal traffic emanated from New York to Moscow, that there was also considerable traffic between Canberra, Australia, and Moscow, and a smaller amount of traffic between London and Moscow, as well as a little other traffic.

Mr. Kirby said he informed CIA that AFSA was not in the identification business and that identifications made on the basis of the material were known to the Bureau and were the result of the Bureau's work. He explained further that the Bureau has been dealing with AFSA on this problem for a period of four years. He therefore informed the CIA representatives that in so for as identifications were concerned from the traffic, AFSA could not give this information to CIA. He tactfully suggested that such details would be available only through the Bureau.

Mr. Kirby said he did not find it necessary to explain to CIA the extent to which the material has been published and made available to the Bureau and he was not asked any such question. He said further he was not asked and did not tell the CIA representatives of the fact that the Bureau has furnished to AFSA in considerable detail the results of our investigations. He stated that the CIA representatives indicated they intended to approach the Bureau regarding certain aspects of this problem.

Mr. Kirby purposely had not called in to the conference Mr. Meredith Gardner, the cryptoanalyst who works on the problem, as he did not want Gardner placed in the position of having to answer questions regarding the extent of the material and the identifications made from the material. He said that this enabled Dennis and himself to take the position that they were not fully aware of all the work which has been done in connection with this matter. He said that he expected that CIA would probably contact the Bureau and would thereafter again contact his agency in order to obtain further information regarding matters which CIA feels will be of interest to their agency.

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information and it is felt that we can anticipate that Mr. Harvey or Mr. Paige will be contacting the Bureau regarding this matter. It is felt that we should continue to maintain the position that AFSA is the only agency which can disseminate the actual   information. It is felt we should limit any discussion with CIA to cases where they have a definite responsibility, such as MGB agents now abroad, former OSS personnel, and the like.

 

I concur. In view of loose methods in CIA + some of its questionable personnel we must be most circumspect.

D