Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas/Dissent Brennan

by William Joseph Brennan

Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting.

The constitutional challenge to the village ordinance is premised solely on alleged infringement of associational and other constitutional rights of tenants. But the named tenant appellees have quit the house, thus raising a serious question whether there now exists a cognizable "case or controversy" that satisfies that indispensable requisite of Art. III of the Constitution. Existence of a case or controversy must, of course, appear at every stage of review, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10 (1974). In my view it does not appear at this stage of this case.

Plainly there is no case or controversy as to the named tenant appellees since, having moved out, they no longer have an interest, associational, economic or otherwise, to be vindicated by invalidation of the ordinance. Whether there is a cognizable case or controversy must therefore turn on whether the lessor appellees may attack the ordinance on the basis of the constitutional rights of their tenants.

The general "weighty" rule of practice is "that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities," United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960). A pertinent exception, however, ordinarily limits a litigant to the assertion of the alleged denial of another's constitutional rights to situations in which there is: (1) evidence that as a direct consequence of the denial of constitutional rights of the others, the litigant faces substantial economic injury, [p11] Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–536 (1925); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255–256 (1953), or criminal prosecution, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and (2) a showing that the litigant's and the others' interests intertwine and unless the litigant may assert the constitutional rights of the others, those rights cannot effectively be vindicated. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

In my view, lessor appellees do not, on the present record, satisfy either requirement of the exception. Their own brief negates any claim that they face economic loss. The brief states that "there is nothing in the record to support the contention that in a middle class, suburban residential community like Belle Terre, traditional families are willing to pay more or less than students with limited means like the Appellees." Brief for Appellees 54–55. And whether they face criminal prosecution for violations of the ordinance is at least unclear. The criminal summons served on them on July 19, 1972, was withdrawn because not preceded, as required by the village's procedure, by an order requiring discontinuance of violations within 48 hours. An order to discontinue violation was served thereafter on July 31, but was not followed by service of a criminal summons when the violation was not discontinued within 48 hours.^*

The Court argues that, because a zoning ordinance "has an impact on the value of the property which it regulates," there is a cognizable case or controversy. But [p12] even if lessor appellees for that reason have a personal stake, and we were to concede that landlord and tenant interests intertwine in respect of the ordinance, I cannot see, on the present record, how it can be concluded that "it would be difficult if not impossible," Barrows v. Jackson, supra, at 257, for present or prospective unrelated tenant groups of more than two to assert their own rights before the courts, since the departed tenant appellees had no difficulty in doing so. Thus, the second requirement of the exception would not presently appear to be satisfied. Accordingly it is irrelevant that the house was let, as we are now informed, to other unrelated tenants on a month-to-month basis after the tenant appellees moved out. None of the new tenants has sought to intervene in this suit. Indeed, for all that appears, they too may have moved out and the house may be vacant.

I dissent and would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. If the District Court determines that a cognizable case or controversy no longer exists, the complaint should be dismissed. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).

Notes

* ↑  In these circumstances, I agree with the Court that no criminal action was "pending" when this suit was brought and that therefore the District Court correctly declined to apply the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).