Woodstock Iron v. Richmond & D. Extension Company/Opinion of the Court

by Samuel Freeman Miller

United States Supreme Court

129 U.S. 643

Woodstock Iron  v.  Richmond & D. Extension Company

As appears from the pleadings, which are set forth in the above statement, some time previous to November, 1881, the plaintiff below, the Richmond & Danville Extension Company, a corporation created under the laws of New Jersey, entered into a contract with the Georgia Pacific Railway Company, a corporation created under the laws of Georgia, to locate and construct for the latter company, by the nearest, cheapest, and most suitable route, a railroad from Atlanta, in Georgia, through Alabama, to Columbus, in Mississippi, at the rate of $20,000 a mile, to be paid in whole or part in the bonds of the railroad company; and in November, 1881, it was engaged in locating and constructing the road under the contract. At that time the defendant below, the Woodstock Iron Company, a corporation created under the laws of Alabama for the manufacture and sale of products of iron ore, was doing business at the town of Anniston, in that state; and it then made a formal proposition in writing to the extension company that if it would locate and construct, or cause to be located and constructed, the railroad by way of the town of Anniston, then the iron company would donate and convey, or cause to be donated and conveyed, to the extension company sundry parcels of land, both within and without the corporate limits of the town, for the location of the road, and which might be necessary for sidings or spare tracks; and would also donate and pay to the extension company $30,000,-one-half when the road made a connection with the line of the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company at Birmingham, Ala., and the other half when the road made a connection with the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company at that place; the payments to be made provided the road should be so far completed as to make the connections designated within three years. The proposition was formally accepted in writing by the extension company, through its vice-president, John W. Johnston. Pursuant to this contract, the extension company located and constructed the railroad by way of the town of Anniston by the 1st of January, 1883, and made the connections specified, within the period designated, and complied in every respect with its terms. The Woodstock Iron Company complied with the contract only in part. At the request of the extension company, it conveyed to the railroad company the several parcels of land mentioned, and also upon like request furnished it with cars to the value of $6,325. For the balance, amounting to $23,675, the present suit was brought, and the principal question presented to the court below, and to this court, is whether the contract is obligatory upon the defendant, or whether it is void as being against public policy.

In determining this question, it must be borne in mind that the contract of the extension company with the Georgia Pacific Railway Company was to locate and construct the road 'by the nearest, cheapest, and most suitable route from Atlanta, Ga., through Alabama, to Columbus, in Mississippi,' for the consideration of $20,000 a mile, and that it is averred in the pleadings and admitted by the demurrer, that, in causing the road to be located by way of Anniston, it was necessary to deflect the same from the nearest and cheapest and most natural route between the designated termini, a distance of five miles, at an additional cost of $100,000. In the light of these facts, there can be but one answer given to the question presented respecting the contract between the iron company and the extension company, namely, that it was a void contract, immoral in its conception, and corrupting in its tendency. It was a contract by an employe of a railroad company with a third party, for a consideration to be received from that third party, to violate its engagement with its employer in the important business of locating and constructing a railroad, and instead of selecting the shortest, cheapest, and most suitable route, to locate the road by a longer route, and thus impose an unnecessary and heavy burden upon its employer. The proposition of the iron company, which was accepted, was to pay the extension company for a breach of its duty. In plain language, it was nothing less than the offer of a bribe to the latter company to be faithless to its engagements, and to do with reference to the business in which it was engaged what would amount to little less than robbery of its employer. The transaction on the part of the iron company was none the less offensive because of the threats of the extension company, made by its vice-president, who was also a director and stockholder of the railroad company, that, if the land and money mentioned were not donated, it would cause the road to be located away from Anniston by the rival town of Oxford. The threats did not excuse, much less justify, the offer.

We have thus far considered the case as one only between private parties, where an employe has agreed, for a money consideration, to violate his obligation to his employer; but there are other circumstances which add to the offensiveness of the transaction. The business of the extension company was one in which the public was interested. Railroads are for many purposes public high ways. They are constructed for the convenience of the public in the transportation of persons and property. In their construction without unnecessary length between designated points, in their having proper accommodations, and in their charges for transportation, the public is directly interested. Corporations, it is true, formed for their construction, are private corporations, but, while their directors are required to look to the interests of their stockholders, they must do so in subordination to and in connection with the public interests, which they are equally bound to respect and subserve. All arrangements, therefore, by which directors or stockholders or other persons may acquire gain, by inducing those corporations to disregard their duties to the public, are illegal, and lead to unfair dealing, and, thus being against public policy, will not be enforced by the courts. In this case the extension company, to which the duty of locating and constructing the railroad between its termini was intrusted, in agreeing, for a consideration offered by a third party, to disregard that duty, and locate and construct the road by a longer route than was required, not only committed a wrong upon the railroad company by thus imposing unnecessary burdens upon it, to meet which larger charges for transportation might be called for, but also a wrong upon the public.

The case of Fuller v. Dame is instructive on this head. 18 Pick. 472. It there appeared that Dame, the defendant, was the owner of a large tract of land and flats situated on Sea street, and between it and Front street, on the south side of Boston, which would be greatly enhanced in value if the Boston & Worcester Railroad Company would locate one of its depots between those streets and easterly of Front street. To induce the company to make such location, it was supposed to be necessary to form an association, which would pay to it a large sum of money, and furnish a large tract of land for the depot, besides making other donations; and, to provide the money and land, also to form a company to purchase the flats and land between the streets named, to be held as joint stock, and laid out in due form and shape for sale. Fuller agreed to aid Dame in getting up such company, and in inducing the railroad company to fix its termination and principal depot between those streets, Fuller being himself of opinion that the railroad ought, from a view of the public good and the good of its stockholders, to enter the city on the southerly side, and have its principal depot there. In consideration of such agreement Dame gave his note for $9,600, payable to Fuller in three years, the note being deposited with third parties, to be delivered to him when the principal depot of the railroad company for merchandise was constructed between the streets mentioned. Fuller was at the time of the agreement a stockholder in the railroad company. The road having been completed, and the principal depot located between the streets mentioned, and the note not being paid, suit was brought upon it. It was adjudged that the contract was contrary to public policy, and that the note given in consideration of it was therefore void. In coming to this conclusion the court considered somewhat at large the ground upon which contracts of this character were avoided, and held that it was because they tended to place one under wrong influences, by offering him a temptation to do that which might injuriously affect the rights and interests of third persons, and that the case before it was within the operation of this principle, the contract tending injuriously to affect the public interest in establishing the fittest and most suitable location for the termination of the Boston & Worcester Railroad for the accommodation of the public travel. It is true the road was constructed and located by the corporation at the expense of private parties under the sanction of the legislature, incorporated for that purpose, who were to be remunerated by a toll levied and regulated by law; and it was left to its directors to fix the termination and place of deposit. But the court added: 'In doing this a confidence was reposed in them, acting as agents for the public,-a confidence which, it seems, could be safely so reposed, when it is considered that the interests of the corporation as a company of passenger and freight carriers for profit was identical with the interests of those who were to be carried, and had goods to be carried; that is, with the public interest. This confidence, however, could only be safely so reposed under the belief that all the directors and members of the company should exercise their best and their unbiased judgment upon the question of such fitness, without being influenced by distinct and extraneous interests, having no connection with the accommodation of the public or the interests of the company. Any attempt, therefore, to create and bring into efficient operation such undue influence, has all the injurious effects of a fraud upon the public, by causing a question which ought to be decided with a sole and single regard to public interests to be affected and controlled by considerations having no regard to such interests. It is no answer to say that, by the act of incorporation, the executive authority was vested in a board of directors, and Mr. Fuller was not a director. He was a member of the company, and might be chosen a director. He was an elector of the directors, and they were directly responsible to the stockholders. The immediate act of location was with the directors, but the efficient authority was with the members and stockholders of the corporation, who elect the directors. The election may depend upon the known views and opinions of candidates upon this very question of location. They had a right to his disinterested judgment and advice upon the question of location, and this could not be exercised while he held and relied on a promise for a large sum of money, the payment of which depended upon the decision of this question by the directors.'

The case before us is much stronger than the one thus decided by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. There the contract was held invalid because made with a stockholder of the company, by which he promised, for a pecuniary consideration, to endeavor to procure the company to locate one of its depots at a particular place in the city. Here the contract was with an employe of the company to induce it to disregard its obligations, and the principal person making that contract on the part of the employe was a director and stockholder of the company which was to be thus seriously affected. The principle, which is so clearly and forcibly stated in Fuller v. Dame, has been applied in numberous instances by the highest courts of different states, to avoid contracts made to influence railroad companies in selecting their routes and locating their depots and stations, by donations of land and money to some of its directors or stockholders or agents. Thus in Bestor v. Wathen, 60 Ill. 138, it appeared that in 1849 the legislature of Illinois incorporated a company to build a railroad from a point on the Mississippi river to Peoria, and that in 1852 the charter was amended so as to authorize the extension of the road from Peoria eastward to the state line. In 1855 the company made a contract with the firm of Cruger, Secor & Co., by which the latter undertook the construction and equipment of the road. In 1856, while engaged upon this work, the members of the firm, together with Bestor, the president of the railroad company, Sweat, one of its directors, and Smith, its construction agent, entered into a contract with Wathen and Gibson, the defendants, by which the latter, being the owners of 160 acres of land, agreed, in consideration that the road then in process of construction should cross the Illinois Central Railroad where their land was situated, the land would be laid out into town lots and sold, and after proceeds amounting to $4,800 had been received, which were to be retained by Wathen and Gibson, a conveyance of an undivided half of the residue should be made to the other parties. The only consideration for this agreement, aside from the location of the road, was that the other parties should assist and contribute to the building up of the town on the land. The road was constructed across the Illinois Central, and Wathen and Gibson laid out the land into lots, and proceeded to sell the same, and the town of El Paso was built on the land and an adjoining tract. In 1863 the plaintiffs filed their bill against Wathen and Gibson for an account of the sales and a conveyance of the undivided half of the lots unsold. The court held the contract void as against public policy, and dismissed the suit, and the decree in this respect was affirmed by the supreme court of the state; that court observing that when the people through their legislature grants to a company the right of eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a railroad it is upon the supposition that the road will bring certain benefits to the public, and that, when subscriptions are made to its stock, the money is subscribed upon the understanding that the officers intrusted with the construction of the road will so locate its line and establish its depots as to bring the highest pecuniary profit to the stockholders compatible with a proper regard for the public convenience; that these alone are the considerations which should control officers of the road, and, so far as they permit their official action to be swayed by their private interests, they are guilty of a breach of turst towards the stockholders, and a breach of duty to the public at large; and it added: 'A court of equity will not enforce a contract resting upon such official delinquency, or even tending to produce it. Such is the character of the contract before us. If we enforce it we lend the sanction of the court to a class of contracts, the inevitable tendency of which is to make the officers of these powerful corporations pervert their trust to their private gain, at the price of injury at once to the stockholders and to the public. Rendered into plain English, the contract in this case was a bribe on the part of Wathen and Gibson to the president and other officers of the railway company, and to the contractors who were building the road, of an undivided half of one hundred and sixty acres of land, in consideration of which the road was to be constructed on a certain line and a depot built at a certain point. Now, if this was the best line for crossing the Illinois Central, considered with reference to the interest of the stockholders and of the public, then it was the duty of the officers of the company to establish it there; and if they intended so to do because it was the proper line, but professed to be hesitating between this and another line in order to secure for themselves the contract under consideration, as is somewhat indicated by the evidence, then they were practicing a species of fraud upon the defendants, and using a false pretext in order to acquire defendant's property without consideration. If, on the other hand, this line was not the best, but was adopted because of this contract, the case is still stronger against the complainants. If such was the fact, they are asking the court to enforce the payment of a bribe, the promise of which induced them to sacrifice their official duty to their private gain. If, as a third contingency, the choice lay between this line and another equally good, but not better, and they were influenced by this contract to adopt this line, then, although neither the company nor the public has been injured, yet the defendants have made their official power an instrument of private emolument in a manner which no court of equity can sanction. In this particular case no wrong may have been done, and yet public policy plainly forbids the sanction of such contracts, because of the great temptation they would offer to official faithlessness and corruption.' The doctrine of this case was approved by the supreme court of Illinois in Linder v. Carpenter, 62 Ill. 309, and in Railroad Co. v. Mathers, 71 Ill. 592. Holladay v. Patterson, decided by the supreme court of Oregon, (5 Or. 177,) is also in harmony with Fuller v. Dame and Bestor v. Wathen, the court following a similar course of readsoning to that adopted in those cases. That doctrine and reasoning are also often applied where the reward or money consideration for taking a particular route or establishing a station or depot at a particular place is offered directly to the railroad company instead of to its directors, stockholders, or agents. But we do not refer to them, because there are exceptions or qualifications in the application of the doctrine in such cases requiring explanation, as where a subscription is conditioned upon the adoption of a particular route, or the construction of a station or depot at a particular place. Railroad Co. v. Seely, 45 Mo. 212; Bank v. Ayres, 12 Wis. 570; Plank-Road Co. v. Payne, 15 N. Y. 583. There is no exception in any decision called to our attention as to the character of a contract, when, for a pecuniary consideration, directors, stockholders, or agents of a company undertake to influence its conduct in these matters. Indeed, the law is general that agreements upon pecuniary considerations, or the promise of them, to influence the conduct of officers charged with duties affecting the publice interest, or with duties of a fiduciary character to private parties, are against the true policy of the state, which is to secure fidelity in the discharge of all such duties. Agreements of that character introduce mercenary considerations to control the conduct of parties, instead of considerations arising from the nature of their duties, and the most efficient way of discharging them. They are therefore necessarily corrupt in their tendencies. As we said in Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 48, 56, 'that all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution,' so we say of agreements like the one in this case. They are against public policy, because of their corrupt tendency, whether lawful or unlawful means are contemplated or used in carrying them into execution. 'The law,' as said in that case, 'looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country.' Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 274. From the views expressed it follows that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrers to the special pleas above mentioned, and it is not necessary, therefore, to consider the other pleas. The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrers to the above pleas, and take further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and it is so ordered.

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