Wright v. Council of City of Emporia/Dissent Burger
[p471] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, join, dissenting.
If it appeared that the city of Emporia's operation of a separate school system would either perpetuate racial segregation in the schools of the Greensville County area or otherwise frustrate the dismantling of the dual system in that area, I would unhesitatingly join in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the judgment of the District Court. However, I do not believe the record supports such findings and can only conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in preventing Emporia from exercising its lawful right to provide for the education of its own children.
By accepting the District Court's conclusion that Emporia's operation of its own schools would "impede the dismantling of the dual system," the Court necessarily implies that the result of the severance would be something less than unitary schools, and that segregated education would persist in some measure in the classrooms of the Greenville County area. The Court does not articulate the standard by which it reaches this conclusion, and its result far exceeds the contemplation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and all succeeding cases, including Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
If the severance of the two systems were permitted to proceed, the assignment of children to schools would depend solely on their residence. County residents would attend county schools, and city residents would attend city schools. Assignment to schools would in no sense [p472] depend on race. Such a geographic assignment pattern is prima facie consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. See Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (N.J. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
However, where a school system has been operated on a segregated basis in the past, and where ostensibly neutral attendance zones or district lines are drawn where none have existed before, we do not close our eyes to the facts in favor of theory. In Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court ruled that dual school systems must cease to exist in an objective sense as well as under the law. It was apparent that under the freedom-of-choice plan before the Court in Green, the mere elimination of mandatory segregation had provided no meaningful remedy. Green imposed on school boards the responsibility to "fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." 391 U.S., at 442. That, I believe, is precisely what would result if Emporia were permitted to operate its own school system—schools neither Negro nor white, "but just schools." As separate systems, both Emporia and Greensville County would have a majority of Negro students, the former slightly more than half, the latter slightly more than two-thirds. In the words of the Court of Appeals, "[t]he Emporia city unit would not be a white island in an otherwise black county." 442 F. 2d, at 573. Moreover, the Negro majority in the remaining county system would only slightly exceed that of the entire county area including Emporia. It is undisputed that education would be conducted on a completely desegregated basis within the separate systems. Thus, the situation would in no sense be comparable to that where the creation of attendance zones within a single formerly segregated school system leaves an inordinate number [p473] of one-race schools, such as were found in Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971). Rather than perpetuating a dual system, I believe the proposed arrangement would completely eliminate all traces of state-imposed segregation.
It is quite true that the racial ratios of the two school systems would differ, but the elimination of such disparities is not the mission of desegregation. We stated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S., at 24:
"If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole."
It can no more be said that racial balance is the norm to be sought, than it can be said that mere racial imbalance was the condition requiring a judicial remedy. The pointlessness of such a "racial balancing" approach is well illustrated by the facts of this case. The District Court and the petitioners have placed great emphasis on the estimated six-percent increase in the proportion of Negro students in the county schools that would result from Emporia's withdrawal. I do not see how a difference of one or two children per class[1] would even be noticed, let alone how it would render [p474] a school part of a dual system. We have seen that the normal movement of populations could bring about such shifts in a relatively short period of time. Obsession with such minor statistical differences reflects the gravely mistaken view that a plan providing more consistent racial ratios is somehow more unitary than one which tolerates a lack of racial balance. Since the goal is to dismantle dual school systems rather than to reproduce in each classroom a microcosmic reflection of the racial proportions of a given geographical area, there is no basis for saying that a plan providing a uniform racial balance is more effective or constitutionally preferred. School authorities may wish to pursue that goal as a matter of policy, but we have made it plain that it is not constitutionally mandated. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S., at 16.
The Court disavows a "racial balancing" approach, and seeks to justify the District Court's ruling by relying on several additional factors thought to aggravate the effect of the racial disparity. The real significance of these additional factors is so negligible as to suggest that the racial imbalance itself may be what the Court finds most unacceptable.
First, the Court raises the specter of resegregation resulting from the operation of separate school systems in the county area, but on the record in this case this is, at best, highly speculative. The Court suggests two reasons why such an additional racial shift could be anticipated with the existence of a separate school system for Emporia: white students residing in the county might abandon the public schools in favor of private academies, and white students residing in the city might leave private schools and enroll in the city school.
In assessing these projections it is necessary to compare the nature of the proposed separate systems with [p475] that of the court-ordered "pairing" system. Thus the first possibility, that white students from the county might enter private schools, assumes that white families would be more likely to withdraw their children from public schools that are 72% Negro than from those that are 66% Negro. At most, any such difference would be marginal, and in fact it seems highly improbable that there would be any difference at all. The second possibility postulated by the Court seems equally unlikely; it assumes that families from the city who had previously withdrawn their children form the public schools due to impending desegregation, would return their children to public schools having more Negro than white pupils.
The Court does not mention the possibility of some form of mass migration of white families into the city from the outlying county. Of course, when there are adjoining school districts differing in their racial compositions, it is always conceivable that the differences will be accentuated by the so-called "white flight" phenomenon. But that danger seems remote in a situation such as this where there is a predominantly Negro population throughout the entire area of concern.
Second, the Court attaches significance to the fact that the school buildings located in the county were formerly used as all-Negro schools and intimates that these facilities are of generally poorer quality than those in the city. But the District Court made no such finding of fact, and the record does not support the Court's suggestion on this point. Admittedly, some dissatisfaction was expressed with the sites of the elementary schools in the county, and only the city elementary school has an auditorium. However, all three elementary schools located in the county are more modern than any school building located in the city, and the county and city high school buildings are identical in every respect. [p476] On a fair reading of the entire record, it can only be said that any differences between the educational facilities located in the city and those in the county are de minimis.
Finally, the Court states that the process of desegregation would be impeded by the "adverse psychological effect" that a separate city system would have on Negro students in the county. Here, again, the Court seeks to justify the District Court's discretionary action by reliance on a factor never considered by that court. More important, it surpasses the bounds of reason to equate the psychological impact of creating adjoining unitary school systems, both having Negro majorities, with the feelings of inferiority referred to in Brown I as engendered by a segregated school system. In Brown I the Court emphasized that the legal policy of separating children in schools solely according to their race inevitably generates a sense of inferiority. These observations were supported by common human experience and reinforced by psychological authority. Here the Court seeks to make a similar judgment in a setting where no child is accorded differing treatment on the basis of race. This wholly speculative observation by the Court is supported neither by common experience nor by scientific authority.
Even giving maximum rational weight to all of the factors mentioned by the Court, I cannot conclude that separate systems for Emporia and Greensville County would be anything less than fully unitary and nonracial. The foundation and superstructure of the dual system would be dissolved, and the result would not factually preserve the separation of races that existed in the past. We noted in Swann "that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation by law." 402 [p477] U.S., at 26. This reflects our consistent emphasis on the elimination of the discriminatory systems, rather than on mere numbers in particular schools. The proposed systems here would retain no "one-race, or virtually one-race schools," but more important, all vestiges of the discriminatory system would be removed. That is all the Constitution commands.
It is argued that even if Emporia's operation of its own unitary school system would have been constitutionally permissible, it was nevertheless within the equitable discretion of the District Court to insist on a "more effective" plan of desegregation in the form of a county-wide school system. In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Court first conferred on the district courts the responsibility to enforce the desegregation of the schools, if school authorities failed to do so, according to equitable remedial principles. While we have emphasized the flexibility of the power of the district courts in this process, the invocation of remedial jurisdiction is not equivalent to having a school district placed in receivership. It has been implicit in all of our decisions from Brown II to Swann, that if local authorities devise a plan that will effectively eliminate segregation in the schools, a district court must accept such a plan unless there are strong reasons why a different plan is to be preferred. A local school board plan that will eliminate dual schools, stop discrimination, and improve the quality of education ought not be cause aside because a judge can evolve some other plan that accomplishes the same results, or what he considers a preferable result, with a two percent, four percent, or six percent difference in racial composition. Such an approach gives controlling weight to sociological theories, not constitutional doctrine.
This limitation on the discretion of the district courts involves more than polite deference to the role of local [p478] governments. Local control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well. The success of any school system depends on a vast range of factors that lie beyond the competence and power of the courts. Curricular decisions, the structuring of grade levels, the planning of extracurricular activities, to mention a few, are matters lying solely within the province of school officials, who maintain a day-to-day supervision that a judge cannot. A plan devised by school officials is apt to be attuned to these highly relevant educational goals; a plan deemed preferable in the abstract by a judge might well overlook and thus undermine these primary concerns.
The discretion of a district court is further limited where, as here, it deals with totally separate political entities. This is a very different case from one where a school board proposes attendance zones within a single school district or even one where a school distance is newly formed within a county unit. Under Virginia law, Emporia is as independent from Greensville County as one State is from another. See City of Richmond v. County Board, 199 Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E. 2d 641, 644 (1958); Murray v. City of Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 324, 64 S.E. 2d 804, 807 (1951). This may be an anomaly in municipal jurisprudence, but it is Virginia's anomaly; it is of ancient origin, and it is not forbidden by the Constitution. To bar the city of Emporia from operating its own school system is to strip it of its most important governmental responsibility, and thus largely to deny its existence as an independent governmental entity. It is a serious step and, absent the factors that persuade me to the contrary in Scotland Neck,[2] decided today, I am unwilling to go that far.
[p479] Although the rights and powers of a bona fide political entity may not be used as a cloak for evasive action, neither can those powers be nullified by judicial intervention to achieve a unitary system in a particular way. When a plan devised by local authorities crosses the threshold of achieving actual desegregation, it is not for the district courts to overstep local prerogatives and insist on some other alternative. Judicial power ends when a dual school system has ceased to exist.
Since Emporia's operation of a separate school system would not compromise the goal of eliminating dual schools, there is no basis for requiring Emporia to demonstrate the necessity of its decision. The "heavy burden" test referred to in Green applies only where there is serious reason to doubt the efficacy of a school board's plan as a means of achieving desegregation, and there is no basis for such doubt here. Nonetheless, the Court's treatment of Emporia's reasons for establishing a separate system merits comment.
The Court makes light of Emporia's desire to create a high-quality, unitary school system for the children of its citizens. In so doing, the Court disregards the following explicit finding of the District Court:
"The city clearly contemplates a superior quality educational program. It is anticipated that the cost will be such as to require higher tax payments by city residents. A kindergarten program, ungraded primary levels, health services, adult education, and a low pupil-teacher ratio are included in the plan...." 309 F. Supp., at 674.
Furthermore, the Court suggests that if Emporia were in fact to provide the top-flight educational program the District Judge anticipated, it could only worsen the quality of education in the remaining county schools. To be sure, there was cause for concern over the relative quality of education offered in the county schools; [p480] as the District Court observed, county officials did "not embrace the court-ordered unitary plan with enthusiasm." 309 F. Supp., at 680. The record shows that prior to the 1969-1970 school year, per-pupil expenditures in Greensville County lagged behind the state median, and that the increase in the county school budget for the 1969-1970 school year was insufficient to keep abreast of inflation, not to mention increased transportation costs. But the city of Emporia was in no position to alleviate this problem for the county. The county had previously refused to allow the city to participate in joint administration of the schools, and the city had absolutely no power to affect the level of funding for the county schools. Under the contract, Emporia was the purchaser of whatever educational services the county had to offer. Out of understandable concern for the quality of these services, it sought to alter the contractual arrangement in order to provide better unitary schools.
There is no basis on this record for assuming that the quality of education in the county schools was likely to suffer further due to Emporia's withdrawal. The Court relies on the District Court's finding that "the desire of the city leaders, coupled with their obvious leadership ability, is and will be an important facet in the successful operation of any court-ordered plan." 309 F. Supp., at 679. The District Court made this finding despite the fact that the county had refused to administer the schools jointly with the city, and despite uncontradicted evidence that there was no line of communications between the city and county governments, that the city government had been unable to get any cooperation from the county government, and that there was an atmosphere of active antagonism between the two governments. With all deference to the trier of fact, I cannot accept this finding as supported by evidence in the record of this case. It appears that the District Court wanted [p481] that "obvious leadership ability" of Emporia's citizens to exert its influence on the more reluctant leadership in the county. This is a laudable goal in the abstract, but the courts must adjust their remedies to the facts of each case as they bear on the central problem of eliminating a dual system.
Although acknowledging Emporia's need to have some "[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of [its] children," the Court states that since Emporia found the contractual arrangement tolerable prior to 1969, it should not now be heard to complain. However, the city did not enter that contract of its own free choice. From the time Emporia became a city, consideration was given to the formation of a separate school system, and it was at least thought necessary that the city participate in administration of the county school system. After the county rejected the city's proposal for joint administration, the county threatened to terminate educational services for city children unless the city entered an agreement by April 30, 1968. Only then—under virtual duress—did the city submit to the contractual arrangement. It was not until June 1969 that the city was advised by its counsel that the agreement might be illegal. Steps were then taken to terminate the strained relationship.
Recognizing the tensions inherent in a contractual arrangement put together under these conditions, the Court indicates that Emporia might be permitted to operate a separate school system at some future time. The Court does not explain how the passage of time will substantially alter the situation that existed at the time the District Court entered its injunction. If, as the Court states, desegregation in the county was destined to fail if Emporia established its own school system in 1969, it is difficult to understand why it would not be an undue risk to allow separation in the future. [p482] The more realistic view is that there was never such a danger, and that the District Court had no cause to disregard Emporia's desire to free itself from its ties to Greensville County. However, even on the Court's terms, I assume that Emporia could go back to the District Court tomorrow and renew its request to operate a separate system. The county-wide plan has been in effect for the past three years, and the city should not be relieved of the court-imposed duty to purchase whatever quality of education the county sees fit to provide.
Finally, some discussion is warranted of the relevance of discriminatory purpose in cases such as these. It is, of course, correct that "[t]he measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness," Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S., at 37, and that a plan that stops short of dismantling a dual school system cannot be redeemed by benevolent motives. But it is also true that even where a dual system has in fact been dismantled, as it plainly has been in Emporia, we must still be alert to make sure that ostensibly nondiscriminatory actions are not designed to exclude children from schools because of their race. We are well aware that the progress of school desegregation since 1954 has been hampered by persistent resistance and evasion in many places. Thus, the normal judicial reluctance to probe the motives or purposes underlying official acts must yield to the realities in this very sensitive area of constitutional adjudication. Compare Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), with Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
There is no basis for concluding, on this record, that Emporia's decision to operate a separate school system was the manifestation of a discriminatory purpose. The strongest finding made by the District Court was that race was "in a sense" a factor in the city's decision; read in context, this ambiguous finding does not relate to any [p483] invidious consideration of race. The District Court relied solely on the following testimony of the chairman of the city school board:
"Race, of course, affected the operation of the schools by the county, and I again say, I do not think, or we felt that the county was not capable of putting the monies in and the effort and the leadership into a system that would effectively make a unitary system work...," 309 F. Supp., at 680.
I cannot view this kind of consideration of race as discriminatory or even objectionable. The same doubts about the county's commitment to the operation of a high-quality unitary system would have come into play even if the racial composition of Emporia were precisely the same as that of the entire county area, including Emporia.
Nor is this a case where we can presume a discriminatory purpose from an obviously discriminatory effect. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). We are not confronted with an awkward gerrymander or striking shift in racial proportions. The modest difference between the racial composition of Emporia's proposed separate school system and that of the county as a whole affords no basis for an inference of racial motivation. And while it seems that the more cumbersome features of the District Court's plan hastened the city's inevitable decision to operate a separate unitary school system, this was not because of any desire to manipulate the racial balance of its schools.
Read as a whole, this record suggests that the District Court, acting before our decision in Swann, was reaching for some hypothetical perfection in racial balance, rather than the elimination of a dual school system. To put it in the simplest terms, the Court, in adopting the District Court's approach, goes too far.
Notes
[edit]- ↑ The record shows that the pupil-teacher ratio in the county schools is less than 25 to 1. Assuming some rough correspondence between this ratio and the size of classes, a 6% racial shift would represent a change in the racial identity of 1.5 students per class on the average.
- ↑ United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education and Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, post, p. 484.