1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Rome/History

Ancient History

I. The Beginnings of Rome and the Monarchy.

Both the city and the state of Rome are represented in tradition as having been gradually formed by the fusion of separate communities. The original settlement of Romulus is said to have been limited to the Palatine Mount. With this were united before the end of his reign the Capitoline and the Quirinal; Tullus Hostilius added the Caelian, Ancus Martius the Aventine; and finally Servius Tullius included the Esquiline and Viminal, and enclosed the whole seven hills with a stone wall. The growth of the state closely followed that of the city. To the original Romans on the Palatine were added successively the Sabine followers of King Tatius, Albans transplanted by Tullus, Latins by Ancus, and lastly the Etruscan comrades of Caeles Vibenna. This tradition is supported by other and more positive evidence. The race of the Luperci on February 15 was in fact a purification of the boundaries of the “ancient Palatine town,”^[1] the “square Rome” of Ennius;^[2] and the course taken is that described by Tacitus as the “pomoerium” of the city founded by Romulus.^[3] On the Esquiline, Varro mentions an “ancient city” and an “earthen rampart,”^[4] and the festival of the Septimontium is evidence of a union between this settlement and that on the Palatine.^[5] The fusion of these “Mounts” with a settlement on the Quirinal “Hill” is also attested by trustworthy evidence;^[6] and in particular the line taken by the procession of the Argei represents the enlarged boundaries of these united communities.^[7] Lastly, the Servian agger still remains as a witness to the final enclosure of the various settlements within a single ring-wall. The united community thus formed was largely of Latin descent. Indications of this are not, wanting even in the traditions themselves: King Faunus, who rules the Aborigines on the Palatine, is Latin; “Latini” is the name ascribed to the united Aborigines and Trojans; the immediate progenitors of Rome are the Latin Lavinium and the Latin Alba. Much evidence in the language, the religion, the institutions and, the civilization of early Rome points to the same conclusion. The speech of the Romans is from the first Latin,^[8] though showing many traces of contact with the neighbouring dialects of the Sabines and Volscians and also of Etruscans; the oldest gods of Rome—Saturn, Jupiter, Juno, Diana—are all Latin; “rex,” “praetor,”, “dictator,” “curia,” are Latin titles and institutions.^[9] The primitive settlements, with their earthen ramparts and wooden palisades planted upon them out of reach both of human foes and of the malaria of the swampy low grounds, are only typical of the mode of settlement which the conditions of life dictated throughout the Latian plain.^[10] But tradition insists on the admixture of at least two non-Latin elements, a Sabine and an Etruscan. The question as regards the latter will be more fully discussed hereafter; it is enough to say here that while the evidence of nomenclature (Schulze, Geschichte der Lat. Eigennamen, Leipzig, 1904, p. 579, with the modifications suggested in the Classical Review, December 1907) shows that many Etruscan gentes were settled within the bounds of the early city, there is no satisfactory evidence that there was any large Etruscan strain The Sabines
in Rome. in the Roman blood.^[11] With the Sabines it is otherwise. That union of the Palatine and Quirinal settlements which constituted so decisive a stage in the growth of Rome is represented as having been in reality a union of the original Latins with a band of Sabine invaders who had seized and held not only the Quirinal Hill, but the northern and nearest peak of the Capitoline Mount. The tradition was evidently deeply rooted. The name of the god Quirinus, from which that of the Quirinal Hill itself presumably sprang, was popularly connected with the Sabine town of Cures.^[12] The ancient worships connected with it were said to be Sabine.^[13] One of the three old tribes, the Tities, was believed to represent the Sabine element;^[14] the second and the fourth kings are both of Sabine descent. By the great majority of modern writers the substance of the tradition, the fusion of a body of Sabine invaders with the original Latins, is accepted as historical; and even Mommsen allowed its possibility, though he threw back the time of its occurrence to an earlier period than that of the union of the two settlements.^[15] We cannot here enter into the question at length, but some fairly certain points may be mentioned. The probability of Sabine raids and a Sabine settlement, possibly on the Quirinal Hill, in very early times may be admitted. The incursions of the highland Apennine tribes into the lowlands fill a large place in early Italian history. The Latins were said to have originally descended from the mountain glens near Reate.^[16] The invasions of Campania and of Magna Graecia by Sabine (more correctly Safine) tribes are matter of history (see Samnites), and the Sabines themselves are represented as a restless highland people, ever seeking, new homes in richer lands.^[17] In very early days they appear on the borders of Latium, in close proximity to Rome, and Sabine forays are familiar and frequent occurrences in the old legends. But beyond these general considerations recent inquiry enables us to advance to some few definite conclusions. (1) It may now be regarded as established beyond question that the patrician class at Rome sprang from a race other than that of the plebeians. This was long ago recognized by Schwegler (see his Römische Geschichte, passim) on the sufficient ground of the great religious cleavage between the two orders. Such jealousy of mutual contact in religious matters as is apparent all through the history of the city very rarely, if ever, springs from any other source than a real difference of race. This point was developed by Professor W. Ridgeway in his Who were the Romans? (London, 1908), where he points out (a) that the deities tended by the three greater or patrician flamens, namely, Dialis, Martialis, Quirinalis, were all closely connected with the Sabines; (b) further, that the patrician form of marriage, the highly religious ceremony called Confarreatio, differed entirely from the other forms, Usus and Coemptio, which there is reason to attribute to a plebeian origin; (c) that the arms, especially the round shield, carried by the first class in the originally military constitution of Servius Tullius (see below), are characteristic of the warriors of Central Europe in the Early Iron and Bronze Age, whereas those of the remaining classes can be shown to have been in general use during the immediately preceding period in the Mediterranean lands.

For other archaeological evidence separating the patricians from the plebeians, and connecting the patricians closely with the Sabines the reader must be referred to Ridgeway's essay. It is, however, well to make special mention here of the tradition, which is given by Livy (ii. 16. 4), and is undated but not the less probable for being a non-annalistic tradition, preserved in the gens itself, of the prompt welcome given to the Sabine Appius Claudius, the founder of the haughtiest of all the Roman noble families, by the patricians of Rome and his immediate admission to all their political privileges. Ridgeway points out that this implies, at that early time, a substantial identity of race.

On the linguistic side of the question it is well to mention for clearness' sake that this Safine or patrician class marked its ascendancy all over Central and Southern Italy, from the 6th century B.C. onwards, by its preference for forming ethnic names with the suffix -no- which it frequently imposed also upon the communities whom it brought under its influence. Sabini (earlier Safini), Romani, Latini, Sidicini, Aricini, Marrucini, and the like are all names formed in this way (see further Sabini).

2. It may also now be regarded as certain that what we may call the Lower or Earlier Stratum (or Strata) of population in Rome, themselves spoke a language which was as truly Indo-European as the language of their Safine conquerors. In the article Volsci will be found evidence for the conclusion that the language of what has been there entitled the Co-Folk was not less certainly Indo-European, and in some respects probably a less modified form of Indo-European, than that of the Safines. A number of the names formed with the -co- suffix and with the -ati- suffix (which is frequent in the same districts) contain unmistakably Indo-European words such as Graviscae, Marica, dea Marica, Volsci, Casinates, Soracte, Interamnites, Auxumates. The fusion of this earlier population with the patricians is far easier to imagine when it is recognized that the two parties spoke kindred though by no means identical languages. It is the essentially Indo-European character of the early inhabitants of the Latin plain which has led many scholars to doubt that there was any racial distinction at all between patricians and plebeians, but the increase of knowledge of the dialects spoken in the different regions of Italy has now enabled us to judge this question with very much fuller evidence.

3. There arises, however, the important question or questions as to the origin, or at least the ethnic connexions of this earlier stratum. The task of the historic inquirer will not be completely performed until at least some further progress has been made in connecting this earlier population of the western coast of Italy, on the one hand, with one or more of the early races (see Siculi, Veneti, Liguria, Pelasgians) whom tradition declares to have once inhabited the soil of Latium; and on the other, with the people or peoples whom archaeological research reveals to us as having left behind them different strata of remains, all earlier than the Iron or Roman Age, both in Latium and in other parts of Italy. Professor Ridgeway has taken a short way with these problems which may prove to be the true one; he classes together as Ligurian all pre-Safine inhabitants of Italy save such elements as, like the Etruscans, can be shown to have invaded it over sea (see Etruria, § Language). This is one of the most promising fields of investigation now open to scholars, but in view of the confused and mutilated shape in which the traditions current in ancient times have come down to us, it demands an exceedingly careful scrutiny of the archaeological and the linguistic evidence, and exceedingly cautious judgment in combining them. The point of outstanding importance is to determine whether the earlier Indo-European population is to be regarded as having been in Italy from the beginning of human habitation. Archaeologists generally like W. Helbig (Die Italiker der Poebene) and more recently B. Modestov (Introduction à l'histoire romaine, Paris, 1907) have been inclined to regard the Ligurians as the most primitive population of Italy, but to distinguish them sharply from the people who built the Lake Settlement and Pile Dwellings, which appear (with important variations of type):—(1) in the western half of the valley of the Po; (2) in the eastern half of the same; (3) in Picenum; (4) in Latium; and (5) as far south as Tarentum. One of the most important points in the identification is the question of the method of burial employed at different epochs by the different communities. (See the works already cited, with that of O. Montelius, La Civilisation primitive en Italie.)

The populus Romanus was, we are told, divided into three tribes, Ramnes, Tities and Luceres,^[18] and into thirty curiae. The three names, as Schulze has shown (Lat. Eigennamen, p. 580), are neither more nor less than the names of three Etruscan gentes (whether The people. or not derived from Safine or Latin originals), and the tradition is a striking result of the Etruscan domination in the 6th century B.C.,^[19] which we shall shortly consider.

Of far greater importance is the division into curiae. In Cicero's time there were still curies, curial festivals and curiate assemblies, and modern authors are unquestionably right in regarding the curia as the keystone of the primitive political system. It was a primitive association held together by participation in common sacra, and possessing common festivals, common priests and a common chapel, hall and hearth. As separate associations the curiae were probably older than the Roman state, but,^[20] however this may be, it is certain that of this state when formed they constituted the only effective political subdivisions. The members of the thirty curiae form the populus Romanus, and the earliest known condition of Roman citizenship is the communio sacrorum, partnership in the curial sacra. Below the curia there was no further political division, for there is no reason to believe that the curia was ever formally subdivided into a fixed number of gentes and families.^[21]

At their head was the rex, the ruler of the united people. The Roman “king” is not simply either the hereditary and patriarchal chief of a clan, the priestly head of a community bound together by common sacra, but the elected magistrate of a state, but a mixture of all The king.three.^[22] In later times, when no “patrician magistrates” were forthcoming to hold the elections for their successors, a procedure was adopted which was believed to represent the manner in which the early kings had been appointed.^[23] In this procedure the ancient privileges of the old gentes and their elders, the importance of maintaining unbroken the continuity of the sacra, on the transmission and observance of which the welfare of the community depended, and thirdly the rights of the freemen, are all recognized. On the death of a king, the auspicia, and with them the supreme authority, revert to the council of elders, the patres, as representing the gentes. By the patres an interrex is appointed, who in turn nominates a second; by him, or even by a third or fourth interrex, a new king is selected in consultation with the patres. The king-designate is then proposed to the freemen assembled by their curiae for their acceptance, and finally their formal acceptance is ratified by the patres, as a security that the sacra of which they are the guardians have been respected.^[24] Thus the king is in the first instance selected by the representatives of the old gentes, and they ratify his appointment. In form he is nominated directly by a predecessor from whose hands he receives the auspicia. But it is necessary also that the choice of the patres and the nomination of the interrex should be confirmed by a solemn vote of the community.

It is useless to attempt a precise definition of the prerogatives of the king when once installed in office. Tradition ascribes to him a position and powers closely resembling those of the heroic kings of Greece. He rules for life, and he is the sole ruler, unfettered by written statutes. He is the supreme judge, settling all disputes and punishing wrongdoers even with death. All other officials are appointed by him. He imposes taxes, distributes lands and erects buildings. Senate and assembly meet only when he convenes them, and meet for little else than to receive communications from him. In war he is absolute leader,^[25] and finally he is also the religious head of the community. It is his business to consult the gods on its behalf, to offer the solemn sacrifices and to announce the days of the public festivals. Hard by his house was the common hearth of the state, where the vestal virgins cherished the sacred fire.

By the side of the king stood the senate, or council of elders. In the descriptions left us of the primitive senate, as in those The senate. of the rex, we can discover traces of a transition from an earlier state of things when Rome was only an assemblage of clans or village communities, allied indeed, but each still ruled by its own chiefs and headmen, to one in which these groups have been fused into a single state under a common ruler. On the one hand the senate appears as a representative council of chiefs, with inalienable prerogatives of its own, and claiming to be the ultimate depositary of the supreme authority and of the sacra connected with it. The senators are the patres; they are taken from the leading gentes; they hold their seats for life; to them the auspicia revert on the death of a king; they appoint the interrex from their own body, are consulted in the choice of the new king,^[26] and their sanction is necessary to ratify the vote of the assembled freemen. On the other hand, they are no longer supreme. They cannot appoint a king but with the consent of the community, and their relation to the king when appointed is one of subordination. Vacancies in their ranks are filled up by him, and they can but give him advice and counsel when he chooses to consult them.

The popular assembly of united Rome in its earliest days was that in which the freemen met and voted by their curiae The assembly. (comitia curiata^[27]). The place of assembly was in the Comitium at the north-east end of the Forum,^[28] at the summons and under the presidency of the king or, failing him, of the interrex. By the rex or the interrex the question was put, and the voting took place curiatim, the curiae being called up in turn. The vote of each curia was decided by the majority of individual votes, and a majority of the votes of the curiae determined the final result. But the occasions on which the assembly could exercise its power must have been few. Their right to elect magistrates was apparently limited to the acceptance or rejection of the king proposed by the interrex. Of the passing of laws, in the later sense of the term, there is no trace in the kingly period. Dionysius's statement^[29] that they voted on questions of war and peace is improbable in itself and unsupported by tradition. They are indeed represented, in one instance, as deciding a capital case, but it is by the express permission of the king and not of right.^[30] Assemblies of the people were also, and probably more frequently, convened for other purposes. Not only did they meet to hear from the king the announcement of the high days and holidays for each month, and to witness such solemn religious rites as the inauguration of a priest, but their presence (and sometimes their vote) was further required to authorize and attest certain acts, which in a later age assumed a more private character. The disposal of property by will^[31] and the solemn renunciation of family or gentile sacra^[32] could only take place in the presence of the assembled freemen, while for adoption^[33] (adrogatio) not only their presence but their formal consent was necessary.

A history of this early Roman state is out of the question. The names, dates and achievements of the first four kings are Rome under the kings. all too unsubstantial to form the basis of a sober narrative;^[34] a few points only can be considered as fairly well established. If we except the long eventless reign ascribed to King Numa, tradition represents the first kings as incessantly at war with their immediate neighbours. The details of these wars are no doubt mythical; but the implied condition of continual struggle, and the narrow range within which the struggle is confined, may be accepted as true. The picture drawn is that of a small community, with a few square miles of territory, at deadly feud with its nearest neighbours, within a radius of some 12 m. round Rome. Nor, in spite of the repeated victories with which tradition credits Romulus, Ancus and Tullus, does there seem to have been any real extension of Roman territory except towards the sea. Fidenae remains Etruscan; the Sabines continue masters up to the Anio; Praeneste, Gabii and Tusculum are still untouched; and on this side it is doubtful if Roman territory, in spite of the possible destruction of Alba, extended to a greater distance than the sixth milestone from Rome.^[35] But along the course of the Tiber below the city there was a decided advance. The fortification of the Janiculum; the building of the pons sublicius, the foundation of Ostia and the acquisition of the salt-works near the sea may all be safely ascribed to this early period. Closely connected, too, with the control of the Tiber from Rome to the sea was the subjugation of the petty Latin communities lying south of the river; and the tradition of the conquest and destruction of Politorium, Tellenae and Ficana is confirmed by the absence in historical times of any Latin communities in this district.

With the reign of the fifth king Tarquinius Priscus a marked change takes place. The traditional accounts of the last three The Tarquins. kings not only wear a more historical air than those of the first four, but they describe something like a transformation of the Roman city and state. Under the rule of these latter kings the separate settlements are for the first time enclosed with a rampart of colossal size and extent.^[36] The low grounds are drained, and a forum and circus elaborately laid out; on the Capitoline Mount a temple, is erected, the massive foundations of which were an object of wonder even to Pliny.^[37] To the same period are assigned the redivision of the city area into four new districts and the introduction of a new military system. The kings increase in, power and surround themselves with new splendour. Abroad, too, Rome suddenly appears as at powerful state ruling far and wide over southern Etruria and Latium. These startling changes are, moreover, ascribed to kings of alien descent, who one and all ascend the throne in the teeth of established constitutional forms. Finally, with the expulsion of the last of them—the younger Tarquin—comes a sudden shrinkage of power. At the commencement of the Republic Rome is once more a comparatively small state, with hostile and independent neighbours at her very doors. It is impossible to doubt the conviction that the true explanation of this phenomenon is to be found in the supposition that Rome during this period passed under the rule of powerful Etruscan lords.^[38] In the 7th and 6th centuries B.C., and probably earlier still, the Etruscans appear as ruling widely outside the limits of Etruria proper. They were supreme in the valley of the Po until their power there was broken by the irruption of Celtic tribes from beyond the Alps, and while still masters of the plains of Lombardy they established themselves in the rich lowlands of Campania, where they held their ground until the capture of Capua by the Samnite highlanders in 423 B.C. It is on the face of it improbable that a power which had extended its sway from the Alps to the Tiber, and from the Liris to Surrentum, should have left untouched the intervening stretch of country between the Tiber and the Liris. And there is abundant evidence of Etruscan rule in Latium.^[39] According to Dionysius there was a time when the Latins were known to the Greeks as Tyrrhenians, and Rome as a Tyrrhenian city.^[40] When Aeneas landed in Italy the Latins were at feud with Turnus (Turrhenos? Dionys. i. 64) of Ardea, whose close ally was the ruthless Mezentius, prince of Caere, to whom the Latins had been forced to pay a tribute of wine.^[41] Cato declared the Volsci to have been once subject to Etruscan rule,^[42] and Etruscan remains found at Velitrae,^[43] as well, as; the second name of the Volscian Anxur, Tarracina (the city of Tarchon), confirm his statement. Nearer still to Rome is Tusculum, with its significant name, at Praeneste we have a great number of Etruscan inscriptions and bronzes, and at Alba we hear of a prince Ταρχέτιος,^[44] lawless and cruel like Mezentius, who consults the “oracle of Tethys in Tyrrhenia.” Thus we find the Etruscan power encircling Rome on all sides, and in Rome itself a tradition of the rule of princes of Etruscan origin. The Tarquinii come, from south Etruria; their name can hardly be anything else than the Latin equivalent of the Etruscan Tarchon, and is therefore possibly a title (= “lord” or “prince”) rather than a proper name.^[45] Even Servius Tullius was identified by Tuscan chroniclers with an Etruscan “Mastarna.”^[46] Again, what we are told of Etruscan conquests does not represent them as moving, like the Sabellian tribes, in large bodies and settling down en masse in the conquered districts. We hear rather of military raids led by ambitious chiefs who carve out principalities for themselves with their own good swords, and with their followers rule oppressively over alien and subject peoples.^[47] And so at Rome the story of the Tarquins implies not, a wave of Etruscan immigration so much as a rule of Etruscan princes over conquered Latins.

The achievements ascribed to the Tarquins are not less characteristic. Their despotic rule and splendour contrast with the primitive simplicity of the native kings. Only Etruscan builders, under the direction of wealthy and powerful Etruscan lords, could have built the great cloaca, the Servian wall, or the Capitoline temple,—monuments which challenged comparison with those of the emperors themselves. Nor do the traces of Greek influence upon Rome during this period^[48] conflict with the theory of an Etruscan supremacy; on the contrary, it is at least possible that it was thanks to the extended rule and wide connexions of her Etruscan rulers that Rome was first brought into direct contact with the Greeks, who had long traded with the Etruscan ports and influenced Etruscan culture.^[49]

The Etruscan princes are represented, not only as having raised Rome for the time to a commanding position in Latium and lavished The Servian reforms. upon the city itself the resources of Etruscan civilization, but also as the authors of important internal changes. They are represented as favouring new men at the expense of the old patrician families, and as reorganizing the Roman army on a new footing, a policy natural enough in military princes of alien birth, and rendered possible by the additions which conquest had made to the original community. From among the leading families of the conquered Latin states a hundred new members were admitted to the senate, and these gentes thenceforth ranked as patrician, and became known as gentes minores.^[50] The changes in the army begun, it is said, by the elder Tarquin and completed by Servius Tullius were more important. The basis of the primitive military system had been three tribes, each of which furnished 1000 men to the legion and 100 to the cavalry.^[51] Tarquinius Priscus, we are told, contemplated the creation of three fresh tribes and three additional centuries of horsemen with new names,^[52] though in face of the opposition offered by the old families he contented himself with simply doubling the strength without altering the names of the old divisions.^[53] But the change attributed to Servius Tullius went far beyond this. His famous distribution of all freeholders (assidui) into tribes, classes and centuries,^[54] though subsequently adopted with modifications as the basis of the political system, was at first exclusively military in its nature and objects.^[55] It amounted, in fact, to the formation of a new and enlarged army on a new footing. In this force, excepting in the case of the centuries of the horsemen, no regard was paid either to the old clan divisions or to the semi-religious, semi political curiae. In its ranks were included all freeholders within the Roman territory, whether members or not of any of the old divisions, and the organization of this new army of assidui was not less independent of the old system with its clannish and religious traditions and forms. The unit was the centuria or company of 100 men; the centuriae were grouped in “classes” and drawn up in the order of the phalanx.^[56] The centuries in front were composed of the wealthier citizens, whose means enabled them to bear the cost of the complete equipments necessary for those who were to bear the brunt of the onset. These centuries formed the first class. Behind them stood the centuries of the second and third classes, less completely armed, but making up together with those of the first class the heavy armed infantry.^[57] In the rear were the centuries of the fourth and fifth classes, recruited from the poorer freeholders, and serving only as lights armed troops. The entire available body of freeholders was divided into two equal portions, a reserve corps of seniores and a corps of juniores for active service. Each of these corps consisted of 85 centuries for 8500 men, i.e. of two legions of about 4200 men each, the normal strength of a consular legion under the early Republic.^[58] It is noticeable also that the heavily-armed centuries of the three first classes in each of these legions represented a total of 3000 men, a number which agrees exactly with the number of heavy-armed troops in the legion as described by Polybius. Attached to the legions, but not included in them, were the companies of sappers and trumpeters. Lastly, to the six centuries of horsemen, which still retained the old tribal names, twelve more were added as a distinct body, and recruited from the wealthiest class of citizens.^[59] The four “tribes” also instituted by Servius were probably intended to serve as the bases for the levy of freeholders for the new army.^[60] As their names show, they corresponded with the natural local divisions of the city territory.^[61]

The last of these Etruscan lords to rule in Rome was Tarquin the Proud. He is described as a splendid and despotic monarch. His sway extended over Latium as far south as Circeii. Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumae, was his ally, and kinsmen of his own were princes at Collatia, at Gabii, Fall of the monarchy. and at Tusculum. The Volscian highlanders were chastised, and Signia with its massive walls was built to hold them in check. In Rome itself the Capitoline temple and the great cloaca bore witness to his power. But his rule pressed heavily upon the Romans, and at the last, on the news of the foul wrong done by his son Sextus to a noble Roman matron, Lucretia, the indignant people rose in revolt. Tarquin, who was away besieging Ardea, was deposed; sentence of exile was passed upon him and upon all his race; and the people swore that never again should a king rule in Rome. Freed from the tyrant, they chose for themselves two yearly magistrates who should exercise the supreme authority, and thus the Republic of Rome was founded. Three times the banished Tarquin strove desperately to recover the throne he had lost. First of all the men of Veii and Tarquinii marched to his aid, but were defeated in a pitched battle on the Roman frontier. A year later Lars Porsena, prince of Clusium, at the head of all the powers of Etruria, appeared before the gates of Rome, and closely besieged the city, until, moved by the valour of his foe, he granted honourable terms of peace and withdrew.^[62] Once again, by Lake Regillus, the Romans fought victoriously for their liberty against Tarquin’s son-in-law Mamilius, prince of Tusculum, and chief of the Latin name. Mamilius was slain; Tarquin in despair found a refuge at Cumae, and there soon afterwards died.

So, in brief, ran the story of the flight of the kings, as it was told by the chroniclers whose story Livy reports, though with explicit and repeated notes of reserve. Its details are most of them fabulous; it is crowded with inconsistencies and improbabilities; there are no trustworthy dates; the names even of the chief factors are probably fictitious, and the hand of the improver, Greek or Roman, is traceable throughout.^[63] But there is no room for doubting the main facts of the emancipation of Rome from the rule of alien princes and the final abolition of the kingly office.  (H. F. P.; R. S. C.) 

II. The Republic.

Period A: 509–265 B.C.^[64](a) The Struggle between the Orders.—It is characteristic of Rome that the change from monarchy to republic^[65] should have been made with the least possible disturbance of existing forms. The title of king was retained, though only as that of a priestly officer 245–489 A.U.C. (rex sacrorum) to whom some of the religious functions of the former kings were transferred. The two annually elected consuls, or praetores,^[66] were regarded as joint heirs of the full kingly authority, and as holding the imperium, and the correlative right of taking the auspices, by direct transmission from the founder of the city. They were, it is true, elected or designated by a new assembly, by the army of landholders voting by their classes and centuries (comitia centuriata), and to this body was given also the right of passing laws; nevertheless it was still by a vote of the thirty curiae (lex curiata) that the supreme authority was formally conferred on the magistrates chosen by the centuries of landholders, and both the choice of magistrates and the passing of laws still required the sanction of the patrician senators (patrum auctoritas).^[67] Nor, lastly, were the legal prerogatives of the senate altered, although it is probable that before long plebeians were admitted to seats, if not to votes, and though its importance was gradually increased by the substitution of an annual magistracy for the lifelong rule of a single king. But the abolition of the monarchy brought with it a change of the utmost importance in the actual working of the constitution. Though the distinction between patricians and plebeians was at least as old as the state itself, it is not until the establishment of the Republic that it plays any part in the history of Rome. No sooner, however, was the overshadowing authority of the king removed than a struggle commenced between the two orders which lasted for more than two centuries. It was in no sense a struggle between a conquering and a conquered class, or between an exclusive citizen body and an unenfranchised mass outside its pale. Patricians and plebeians were equally citizens of Rome, sprung off the same race and speaking the same tongue (but see above).^[68] The former were the members of those ancient gentes which had possibly been once the “chiefly” families in the small communities which preceded the united state, and which claimed by hereditary right a privileged position in the community. Only patricians could sit in the council of patres, and hence probably the name given to their order.^[69] To their representatives the supreme authority reverted on the death of the king; the due transmission of the auspicia and the public worship of the state gods were their special care; and to them alone were known the traditional usages and forms which regulated the life of the people from day to day. To the plebs (the multitude, πλῆθος) belonged all who were not members of some patrician gens, whether independent freemen or attached as “clients”^[70] to one of the great houses. The plebeian was a citizen, with civil rights and a vote in the assembly of the curies, but he was excluded by ancient custom from all share in the higher honours of the state, and intermarriage with a patrician was not recognized as a properly legal union^[71] (see Patricians).

The revolution which expelled the Tarquins gave the patricians, who had mainly assisted in bringing it about, an overwhelming ascendancy in the state. The plebs had indeed gained something. Not only is it probable that the strictness of the old tie of clientship had somewhat relaxed, and that the number of the clientes was smaller and their dependence on patrician patrons less complete, but the ranks of the plebs had, under the later kings, been swelled by the admission of conquered Latins, and the freeholders among these had with others been enrolled in the Servian tribes, classes and centuries. The establishment of the Republic invested this military levy of landholders with political rights as an assembly, for by their votes the consuls were chosen and laws passed, and it was the plebeian landholders who formed the main strength of the plebs in the struggle that followed. But these gains were greater in appearance than in reality. The plebeian landholders commanded only a minority of votes in the comitia centuriata. In their choice of magistrates they were limited to the patrician candidates nominated by patrician presiding magistrates, and their choice required confirmation not only by the older and smaller assembly of the curiae, in which the patricians and their clients predominated, but also by the patrician patres. They could only vote on laws proposed by patrician consuls, and here again the subsequent sanction of the patres was necessary. The whole procedure of the comitia was in short absolutely in the hands of their patrician presidents, and liable to every sort of interruption and suspension from patrician pontiffs and augurs (for details see further Comitia and Senate).

But these political disabilities did not constitute the main grievance of the plebs in the early years of the Republic. What they fought for was protection for their lives and liberties, and the object of attack was the despotic authority of the patrician magistrates. The consuls wielded the full imperium of the kings, and against this “consular authority” the plebeian, though a citizen, had no protection and no appeal, nor were matters improved when for the two consuls was substituted in some emergency a single, all-powerful, irresponsible dictator.

The history of this struggle between the orders opens with a concession made to the plebs by one of the consuls themselves, Lex Valeria de provocatione. a concession possibly due to a desire to secure the allegiance of the plebeian landholders, who formed the backbone of the army. In the first year of the Republic, according to the received chronology, P. Valerius Publicola or Poplicola carried in the comitia centuriata his famous law of appeal.^[72] It enacted that no magistrate, saving only a dictator, should execute a capital sentence upon any Roman citizen unless the sentence had been confirmed on appeal by the assembly of the centuries. But, though the “right of appeal” granted by this law was justly regarded in later times as the greatest safeguard of a Roman's liberties, it was by no means at first so effective a protection as it afterwards became. For not only was the operation of the law limited to the bounds of the city, so that the consul in the field or on the march was left as absolute as before, but no security was provided for its observance even within the city by consuls resolved to disregard it.^[73]

It was by their own efforts that the plebeians first obtained any real protection against magisterial despotism. The The first secession and the tribunate. traditional accounts of the first secession are confused and contradictory,^[74] but its causes and results are tolerably clear. The seceders were the plebeian legionaries recently returned from a victorious campaign. Indignant at the delay of the promised reforms, they ignored the order given them to march afresh against Volsci and Aequi, and instead entrenched themselves on a hill across the Anio, some 3 m. from Rome, and known afterwards as the Mons Sacer. The frightened patricians came to terms, and a solemn agreement (lex sacrata)^[75] was concluded between the orders, by which it was provided that henceforth the plebeians should have annual magistrates of their own called tribunes (tribuni plebis), members of their own order, who should be authorized to protect them against the consuls,^[76] and a curse was invoked upon the man who should injure or impede the tribune in the performance of his duties.^[77] The number of tribunes was possibly at first two, then five; before 449 B.C. it had been raised to ten.

The tribunate is an institution which has no parallel in history. The tribune was not, and, strictly speaking, never became, a magistrate of the Roman people. His one proper prerogative was that of granting protection to the oppressed plebeian against a patrician officer. This prerogative (jus auxilii) was secured to him, not by the ordinary constitution, but by a special compact between the orders, and was protected by the ancient oath (vetus jusjurandum),^[78] which invoked a curse upon the violator of a tribune. This exceptional and anomalous right the tribunes could only exercise in person, within the limits of the “pomoerium,” and against individual acts of magisterial oppression.^[79] It was only gradually that it expanded into a wide power of interference with the whole machinery of government, and was supplemented by the legislative powers which rendered the tribunate of the last century B.C. so formidable (see Tribune).

But from the first the tribunes were for the plebs not only protectors but leaders, under whom they organized themselves Lex Publilia. in opposition to the patricians. The tribunes convened assemblies of the plebs (concilia plebis), and carried resolutions on questions of interest to the order. This incipient plebeian organization was materially advanced by the Publilian 283. law of 471 B.C.,^[80] which appears to have formally recognized as lawful the plebeian concilia, and established also the tribune's right cum plebe agere, i.e. to propose and carry resolutions in them. These assemblies were tributa, or, in other words, the voting in them took place not by curies or centuries but by tribes. In them, lastly, after the Publilian law, if not before, the tribunes were annually elected.^[81] By this law the foundations were laid both of the powerful concilia plebis of later days and also of the legislative and judicial prerogatives of the tribunes. The patricians maintained indeed that resolutions (plebiscita) carried by tribunes in the concilia plebis were not binding on their order, but the moral weight of such resolutions, whether they affirmed a general principle or pronounced sentence of condemnation on some single patrician, was no doubt considerable.

The next stage in the struggle is marked by the attempt to substitute a public written law for unwritten usage.

The proposal of C. Terentilius Arsa (462 B.C.) to appoint a plebeian commission to draw up laws restricting the powers of the consuls^[82] was resolutely opposed by the patricians. but after ten years of bitter party strife a compromise was effected. A commission of ten patricians was appointed, who should frame and publish a code of law binding equally 292.

The Decemvirate. on both the orders. These decemviri were to be the sole and supreme magistrates for the year, and the law of appeal was suspended in their favour.^[83] The code which they promulgated, the famous XII. Tables, owed little of its importance to any novelties or improvements contained in its provisions. For the most part it seems merely to have reaffirmed existing usages and laws (see Roman Law). But it imposed, as it was intended to do, a check on the arbitrary administration of justice by the magistrates. With the publication of the code the proper work of the decemvirs was finished; nevertheless, for the next year a fresh decemvirate was elected, and it is conceivable that the intention was permanently to substitute government by an irresponsible patrician “council of ten” for the old constitution.^[84] However this may have been, the tyranny of the decemvirs themselves was fatal to the continuance of their power. We are told of a second secession of the plebs, this time to the Janiculum, and of negotiations with the senate, the result of which was the enforced abdication of the decemvirs. The plebs joyfully chose for themselves tribunes, and in the comitia centuriata two consuls were created. But this restoration of the old régime was accompanied by legislation which Valerio-Horatian laws. made it an important crisis in the history of the struggle between the orders. With the fall of the decemvirate this struggle enters upon a new phase. The tribunes appear as at once more powerful and more strictly constitutional magistrates; the plebeian concilia take their place by the side of the older assemblies; and finally this improved machinery is used not simply in self-defence against patrician oppression but to obtain complete political equality. This change was no doubt due in part to circumstances outside legislation, above all to the expansion of the Roman state, which swelled the numbers and added to the social importance of the plebs as compared with the dwindling forces of the close corporation of patrician gentes. Still the legislation of 449 clearly involved more than a restoration of the old form of government. The Valerio-Horatian laws, besides reaffirming the right of appeal and the inviolability of the tribunes, improved the position of the plebeian assemblies by enacting that plebiscita passed in them, and, as seems probable, approved by the patres, should be binding on patricians as well as plebeians.^[85] By this law the tribunes obtained a recognized initiative in legislation. Henceforth the desired reforms were introduced and carried by tribunes in what were now styled comitia tributa, and, if sanctioned by the patres, became laws of the state. From this period, too, must be dated the legalization at any rate of the tribune's right to impeach any citizen before the assembly of the tribes.^[86] Henceforward there is no question of the tribune's right to propose to the plebs to impose a fine, or of the validity of the sentence when passed. The efficiency of these new weapons of attack was amply proved by the subsequent course of the struggle. Only a few years after the Valerio-Horatian legislation came the lex Canuleia, itself a plebiscitum Lex Canuleia. 309. (445 B.C.), by which mixed marriages between patricians and plebeians were declared lawful, and the social Canuleia. exclusiveness of the patriciate broken down. In the same year with this measure, and like it in the interests primarily of the wealthier plebeians, a vigorous attack commenced on the Leges Liciniae Sextiae. 387. patrician monopoly of the consulate, and round this stronghold of patrician ascendancy the conflict raged until the passing of the Licinian laws in 367. The original proposal of the tribune Gaius Canuleius, in 445, that the people should be allowed to elect a plebeian consul was evaded by a compromise. The senate resolved that for the next year, in the stead of consuls, six military tribunes with consular-powers should be elected,^[87] and that the new office should be open to patricians and plebeians alike. The consulship was thus for the time saved from pollution, as the patricians phrased it, but the growing strength of the plebs is shown by the fact that in fifty years out of the seventy-eight 310–88. between 444 and 366 they succeeded in obtaining the election of consular tribunes rather than of consuls. Despite, however, these discouragernents, the patricians fought on. Each year they strove to secure the creation of consuls rather than consular tribunes, and failing this strained every nerve to secure for their own order at least a majority among the latter. 319. Even the institution of the censorship (435), though rendered desirable by the increasing importance and complexity of the census, was, it is probable, due in part to their desire to discount beforehand the threatened loss of the consulship by diminishing its powers.^[88] Other causes, too, helped to protract the struggle. Between the wealthier plebeians, who were ambitious of high office, and the poorer, whose minds were set rather on allotments of land, there was a division of interest of which the patricians were not slow to take advantage, and to this must be added the pressure of war. The death struggle with Veii and the sack of Rome by the Gauls absorbed for the 377. time all the energies of the community. In 377, however, two of the tribunes, C. Licinius Stolo (see Licinius Stolo, Gaius) and L. Sextius, came forward with proposals which united all sections of the plebs in their support. Their proposals were as follows:^[89] (1) that consuls and not consular tribunes be elected; (2) that one consul at least should be a plebeian; (3) that the priestly college, which had the charge of the Sibylline books, should consist of ten members instead of two, and that of these half should be plebeians; (4) that no single citizen should hold in occupation more than 500 acres of the common lands, or pasture upon them more than 100 head of cattle and 500 sheep; (5) that all landowners should employ a certain amount of free as well as slave labour on their estates; (6) that interest already paid on debts should be deducted from the principal, and the remainder paid off in three years. The three last proposals were obviously intended to meet the demands of the poorer plebeians, and to secure their support for the first half of the scheme. Ten years of bitter conflict 387. followed, but at last, in 367 B.C., the Licinian rotations became law, and one of their authors, L. Sextius, was created the first plebeian consul. For the moment it was some consolation to the patricians that they not only succeeded in detaching from the consulship the administration of civil law, which was entrusted to a separate officer, praetor urbanus, to be elected by the comitia of the centuries, with an understanding apparently that he should be a patrician, but also obtained the institution of two additional aediles (aediles curules), who were in like manner to be members of their own order.^[90] With the opening of the consulship, however, the issue of the long contest was virtually decided, and the next eighty years witnessed a rapid succession of plebeian victories. Now that a plebeian Opening of the magistracies.

398.  404.

417.  454.

415. Publilian laws. consul might preside at the elections, the main difficulty in the way of the nomination and election of plebeian candidates was removed. The proposed patrician monopoly of the new curule aedileship was almost instantly abandoned. In 356 the first plebeian was made dictator; in 350 the censorship, and in 337 the praetorship were filled for the first time by plebeians; and lastly, in 300, by the lex Ogulnia, even the sacred colleges of the pontiffs and augurs, the old strongholds of patrician supremacy, were thrown open to the plebs.^[91] The patricians lost also the control they had exercised so long over the action of the people in assembly. The patrum auctoritas, the sanction given or refused by the patrician senators to laws and to elections, had hitherto been a powerful weapon in their hands. But in 339 a law of Q. Publilius Philo, a plebeian dictator, enacted that this sanction should be given beforehand to laws enacted in the comitia centuriata,^[92] and a lex Maenia of uncertain date extended the rule to elections in the same assembly. Livy ascribes to the same Publilius a law emancipating the concilium plebis Lex Hortensia, 467. from the control of the patres; but this seems in reality to have been effected by the famous lex Hortensia, carried by another plebeian dictator.^[93] Henceforward the patrum auctoritas sank into a meaningless form, though as such it still survived in the time of Livy. From 287 onwards it is certain that measures passed by the plebs, voting by their tribes, had the full force of laws without any further conditions whatsoever. The legislative independence of the plebeian assembly was secured, and with this crowning victory ended the long struggle between the orders.

(b) Conquest of Italy.—Twelve years after the passing of the lex Hortensia, King Pyrrhus, beaten at Beneventum, withdrew from Italy, and Rome was left mistress of the peninsula. The steps by which this supremacy had been won have now to be traced.^[94]

The expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome, followed as it seems to have been by the emancipation from Etruscan supremacy of all the country between the Tiber and the Liris, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. North of the Tiber the powerful Etruscan city, of Veii, after aivain attempt to restore, the Tarquins, relapsed into an attitude of sullen hostility towards Rome, 347. which, down to the outbreak of the final struggle in 407, found vent in constant and harassing border forays. The Sabines recommenced their raids across the Anio; from their hills to the south-east the Aequi pressed forward as far as the eastern spurs of the Alban range, and ravaged the low country between that range and the Sabine mountains; the Volsci overran the coast-lands as far as Antium, established themselves at Velitrae and even wasted the fields within a few miles of Rome. But the good fortune of Rome did not leave her to face these foes single-handed, and it is a significant League with the Latins and Etruscans. 261. fact that the history of the Roman advance begins, not with a brilliant victory, but with a timely alliance. According to Livy, it was in 493, only a few years after the defeat of the prince of Tusculum at Lake Regillus, that a treaty was concluded between Rome and the Latin communities of the Campagna.^[95] The alliance was in every respect natural. The Latins were the near neighbours and kinsmen of the Romans, and both Romans and Latins were just freed from Etruscan rule to find themselves as lowlanders and dwellers in towns face to face with a common foe in the ruder hill tribes on their borders. The exact terms of the treaty cannot, any more than the precise circumstances under which it was concluded, be stated with certainty (see Latium), but two points seem clear. There was at first a genuine equality in the relations between the allies; Romans and Latins, though combining for defence and offence, did so without sacrificing their separate freedom of action, even in the matter of waging wars independently of each other.^[96] But, secondly, Rome enjoyed from the first one inestimable advantage. The Latins lay between her and the most active of her foes, the Aequi and Volsci, and served to protect her territories at the expense of their own. Behind this barrier Rome grew strong, and the close of the Aequian and Volscian wars left the Latins her dependents rather than her allies. Beyond the limits of the Campagna. Rome found a second ally, hardly less useful than the Latins, in the tribe of the Hernici (“the men of the rocks”), in the valley of the Trerus, who had equal reason with the Romans and Latins to dread the Volsci and Aequi, while their position midway between the two latter peoples made them valuable auxiliaries to the lowlanders of the Campagna.

The treaty with the Hernici is said to have been concluded in 486,^[97] and the confederacy of the three peoples—Romans, Latins and Hernicans—lasted down to the great Latin war in 340. Confused and untrustworthy as are the chronicles of the early wars of Rome, it is clear that, notwithstanding the acquisition of these allies, Rome 268.  414.

280.  305. made but little way against her foes during the first fifty years of the existence of the Republic. In 474, it is true, an end was put for a time to the harassing border feud with Veii by a forty years’ peace, an advantage due not so much to Roman valour as to the increasing dangers from other quarters which were threatening the Etruscan states.^[98] But this partial success stands alone, and down to 449 the raids of Sabines, Aequi and Volsci continue without intermission, and are occasionally carried up to the very walls of Rome.

Very different is the impression left by the annals of the next sixty years (449–390). During this period there is an unmistakable development of Roman power on all sides. In southern Etruria the capture of Veii (396) virtually gave Rome the mastery as far as the Ciminian forest. Sutrium and Nepete, “the gates of Etruria,” 305–64.

Capture of Veii.

358.  308.

336.  361. became her allies and guarded her interests against any attack from the Etruscan communities to the north, while along the Tiber valley her suzerainty was acknowledged as far as Capena and Falerii. On the Anio frontier we hear of no disturbances from 449 until some ten years after the sack of Rome by the Gauls. In 446 the Aequi appear for the last time before the gates of Rome. After 418 they disappear from Mount Algidus, and in the same year the communications of Rome and Latium with the Hernici in the Trerus valley were secured by the capture and colonization of Labicum. Successive invasions, too, broke the strength of the Volsci, and in 393 a Latin colony was founded as far south as Circeii. In part, no doubt, these Roman successes were due to the improved condition of affairs in Rome itself, consequent upon the great reforms carried 304-312.

Decline of Etruscan power. between 450 and 442; but it is equally, certain that now, as often afterwards, fortune befriended Rome by weakening, or by diverting the attention of, her opponents. In particular, her rapid advance in southern Etruria was facilitated by the heavy blows indicted upon the Etruscans during the 5th century B.C. by Celts, Greeks and Samnites. By the close of this century the Celts had expelled them from the rich plains of what was afterwards known as Cisalpine Gaul, and were even threatening to advance across the Apennines into Etruria proper. The Sicilian Greeks, headed by the tyrants of Syracuse, wrested from them their mastery of the seas, and finally, on the capture of Capua by the 331. Samnites in 423, they lost their possessions in the fertile Campanian plain. These conquests of the Samnites were part of a great southward movement of the highland Sabellian peoples, the immediate effects of which upon the fortunes of Rome were not confined to the weakening of the Etruscan power. It is probable that the cessation of the Sabine raids across the Anio was partly due to the new outlets which were opened southwards for the restless and populous hill tribes which had so long disturbed the peace of the Latin lowlands. We may conjecture, also, that the growing feebleness exhibited by Volsci and Aequi was in some measure caused by the pressure upon their rear of the Sabellian clans which at this time established themselves near the Fucine lake and along the course of the Liris.

But in 390, only six years after the great victory over her ancient rival Veii, the Roman advance was for a moment Sack of Rome by the Gauls. 363. checked by a disaster which threatened to alter the course of history in Italy, and which left a lasting impress on the Roman mind. In 391 a Celtic horde left their newly won lands on the Adriatic, and, crossing the Apennines into Etruria, laid siege to the Etruscan city of Clusium (Chiusi). Thence, provoked, it is said, by the conduct of the Roman ambassadors, who, forgetting their sacred character, had fought in the ranks of Clusium and slain a Celtic chief, the barbarians marched upon Rome. On July the 364. 18th of 390 B.C., only a few miles from Rome, was fought the disastrous battle of the Allia. The defeat of the Romans was complete, and Rome lay at the mercy of her foe. But in characteristic fashion the Celts halted three days to enjoy the fruits of victory, and time was thus given to put the Capitol at least in a state of defence. The arrival of the barbarians was followed by the sack of the city, but the Capitol remained impregnable. For seven months they besieged it, and then in as sudden a fashion as they had come they disappeared. The Roman chroniclers explain their retreat in their own way, by the fortunate appearance of M. Furius Camillus with the troops which he had collected, at the very moment when famine had forced the garrison on the Capitol to accept terms. More probably the news that their lands across the Apennines were threatened by the Veneti, coupled with the unaccustomed tedium of a long siege and the difficulty of obtaining supplies, inclined the Celts to accept readily a heavy ransom as the price of their withdrawal. But, whatever the reason, it is certain that they retreated, and, though during the next fifty years marauding bands appeared at intervals in the neighbourhood of Rome, and even once penetrated as far south as 393-94. Campania (361-60), the Celts never obtained any footing in Italy outside the plains in the north which they had made their own.

Nor, in spite of the defeat on the Allia and the sack of the city, was Rome weakened except for the moment by the Celtic Annexation of southern Etruria. attack. The storm passed away as rapidly as it had come on. The city was hastily rebuilt, and Rome dismayed the enemies who hastened to take advantage of her misfortunes by her undiminished vigour. Her conquests in southern Etruria were successfully defended against repeated attacks from the Etruscans to the north. The 367. creation in 387 of four new tribes (Stellatina, Sabatina, Tromentina, Arnensis) marked the final annexation of the territory of Veii and of the lands lying along the Tiber valley. A few years later Latin colonies were established at Sutrium and Nepete for the more effectual defence of the frontier, and 401. finally, in 353, the subjugation of South Etruria was completed, by the submission of Caere (q.v.) and its partial incorporation with the Roman state as a “municipium sine suffragio”—the first, it is said, of its kind.^[99]

Next to the settlement of southern Etruria, the most important of the successes gained by Rome between 390 and Successes against Aequi and Volsci. 364-411. 365. 450. 343 B.C. were those won against her old foes the Aequi and Volsci, and her old allies the Latins and Hernicans. The Aequi indeed, already weakened by their long feud with Rome, and hard pressed by the Sabellian tribes in their rear, were easily dealt with, and after the campaign of 389 we have no further mention of an Aequian war until the last Aequian rising in 304. The Volsci, who in 389 had advanced to Lanuvium, were met and utterly defeated by Camillus, the conqueror of Veii, and this victory was followed up by the gradual subjugation to Rome of all the lowland country lying between the hills and the sea as far south as Tarracina. Latin colonies 369, 375. 406, 396. were established at Satricum (385), at Setia (379), and at Antium and Tarracina some time before 348. In 358 two fresh Roman tribes (Pomptina and Publilia) were formed in the same district.^[100]

Rome had now nothing more to fear from the foes who a century ago had threatened her very existence. The lowland Reorganization of the Latin league. country, of which she was the natural centre, from the Cimmian forest to Tarracina, was quiet, and within its limits Rome was by far the strongest power. But she had now to reckon with the old and faithful allies to whose loyal aid her present position was largely due. The Latini and Hernici had suffered severely in the Aequian and Volscian wars; it is probable that not a few of the smaller communities included in the league had either been destroyed or been absorbed by larger states, and the independence of all alike was threatened by the growing power of Rome. The sack of Rome by the Celts gave them an opportunity of reasserting their independence, and we are consequently told that this disaster was immediately followed by the temporary dissolution of the confederacy, and this again a few years later by a series of actual conflicts between Rome 371-96.

372. 396. and her former allies. Between 383 and 358 we hear of wars with Tibur, Praeneste, Tusculum, Lanuvium, Circeii and the Hernici. But in all Rome was successful. In 382 Tusculum was fully incorporated with the Roman state by the bestowal of the full franchise;^[101] in 358, according to both Livy and Polybius, the old alliance was formally renewed with Latini and Hernici. We cannot, however, be wrong in assuming that the position of the allies under the new league was far inferior to that accorded them by the treaty of Spurius Cassius.^[102] Henceforth they were the subjects rather than the equals of Rome, a position which it is evident that they accepted much against their will, and from which they were yet to make one last effort to escape.

We have now reached the close of the first stage in Rome's advance towards supremacy in Italy. By 343 B.C. she was 411. already mistress both of the low country stretching from the Ciminian forest to Tarracina and Circeii and of the bordering highlands. Her own territory had largely increased. Across the Tiber the lands of Veii, Capena and Caere were nearly all Roman, while in Latium she had carried her frontiers to Tusculum on the Alban range and to the southernmost limits of the Pomptine district. And this territory was protected by a circle of dependent allies and colonies reaching northward to Sutrium and Nepete, and southward to Sora on the upper Liris, and to Circeii on the coast. Already, too, she was, beginning to be recognized as a power outside the limits of the Latin lowlands. The fame of the capture of Rome by the Celts had reached Athens, and her subsequent victories over marauding Celtic bands had given her prestige in South 400. 404. Italy as a bulwark against northern barbarians. In 354 she had formed her first connexions beyond the Liris by a treaty with the Samnites, and in 348 followed a far more important treaty with the great maritime state of Carthage.^[103]

Rome had won her supremacy from the Ciminian forest to the Liris as the champion of the comparatively civilized Advance beyond the Liris, and the Samnite Wars. communities of the lowlands against the rude highland tribes which threatened to overrun them, and so, when her legions first crossed the Liris, it was in answer to an appeal from a lowland city against invaders from the hills. While she was engaged in clearing Latium of Volsci and Aequi, the Sabellian tribes of the central Apennines had rapidly spread over the southern half of the peninsula. Foremost among these tribes were the Samnites, a portion of whom had captured the Etruscan city of Capua in 331, 334. 423, the Greek Cumae in 420, and had since then ruled as masters over the fertile Campanian territory. But in their new homes the conquerors soon lost all sense of relationship and sympathy with their highland brethren. They dwelt in cities, amassed wealth, and inherited the civilization of the Greeks and Etruscans whom they had dispossessed;^[104] above all, they had before long to defend themselves in their turn against the attacks of their ruder kinsmen from the hills, and it was for aid against these that the Samnites of Campania appealed to the rising state which had already made herself known as the bulwark of the lowlands north of the Liris, and which with her Latin and Hernican allies had scarcely less interest than the Campanian cities themselves in checking the raids of the highland Samnite tribes.

The Campanian appeal was listened to. Rome with her confederates entered into alliance with Capua and the First Samnite War. 411. neighbouring Campanian towns, and war was formally declared (343) against the Samnites.^[105] While to the Latins and Hernicans was entrusted apparently the defence of Latium and the Hernican valley against the northerly members of the Samnite confederacy, the Romans themselves undertook the task of driving the invaders out of Campania. After two campaigns the war was ended in 413. 341 by a treaty, and the Samnites withdrew from the lowlands, leaving Rome the recognized suzerain of the Campanian cities which had sought her aid.^[106]

There is no doubt that the check thus given by Rome to the advance of the hitherto invincible Sabellian highlanders not only made her the natural head and champion of the low countries, south as well as north of the Liris, but also considerably added to her prestige. Carthage sent her congratulations; and the Etruscan city of Falerii voluntarily enrolled herself among the allies of Rome. Of even greater service, however, was the fact that for fifteen years the Samnites remained quiet, for this inactivity, whatever its cause, enabled Rome triumphantly to surmount a danger which threatened for the moment to wreck her whole position. This danger was nothing less than a desperate effort on the part of nearly all her allies and dependants south of the Tiber to throw off the yoke of her supremacy. The Latin War. The way was led by her ancient confederates the Latini, whose smouldering discontent broke into open flame directly the fear of a Samnite attack was removed. From the Latin Campagna and the Sabine hills the revolt spread westward and southward to Antium and Tarracina, and even to the towns of the Campanian plain, where the mass of the inhabitants at once repudiated the alliance formed with Rome by the ruling class. The struggle was sharp but short. In two pitched battles^[107] the strength of the insurrection was broken, and two more campaigns sufficed for the complete reduction of such of the insurgent communities as still held out. The revolt crushed, Rome set herself deliberately to the task of re-establishing on a new and firmer Settlement of Latium; basis her supremacy over the lowlands, and in doing so laid the foundations of that marvellous organization which was destined to spread rapidly over Italy, and to withstand the attacks even of Hannibal. The old historic Latin league ceased to exist, though its memory was still preserved by the yearly Latin festival on the Alban Mount; Most if not all of the common land of the league became Roman territory,^[108] five at least of the old Latin cities were compelled to accept the Roman franchise^[109] and enter the pale of the Roman state. The rest, with the Latin colonies, were ranked as Latin allies of Rome, but on terms which secured their complete dependence upon the sovereign city. The policy of isolation, which became so cardinal a principle of Roman rule, was now first systematically applied. No rights of conubium or commercium were any longer to exist between these communities. Their federal councils were prohibited, and all federal action independent of Rome forbidden.^[110]

In Campania and the coast-lands connecting Campania with Rome, a policy of annexation was considered safer than that and of Campania. of alliance. Of the two frontier posts of the Volsci, Antium and Velitrae, the former was constituted a Roman colony, its long galleys burnt and their prows set up in the Forum at Rome, while the walls of Velitrae were razed to the ground, its leading men banished beyond the Tiber, and their lands given to Roman settlers. Farther south on the route to Campania, Fundi and Formiae were, after the precedent set in the case of Caere, declared Roman and granted the civil rights of Roman citizenship, while lastly in Campania itself the same status was given to Capua, Cumae, and the smaller communities dependent upon them.^[111] 416-26. 424. During the ten years from 338 to 328 the work of settlement was steadily continued. Tarracina, like Antium, was made a Roman colony. Privernum, the last Volscian town to offer resistance to Rome, was subdued in 330, part of its territory allotted to Roman citizens, and the state itself forced to accept the Roman franchise. Lastly, to strengthen the lines of defence against the Sabellian tribes, two colonies with the rights of Latin allies were established 420, 426. at Cales (334) and at Fregellae (328). The settlement of the lowlands was accomplished. As a single powerful and compact state with an outer circle of closely dependent allies, Rome now stood in sharp contrast with the disunited and degenerate cities of northern Etruria, the loosely organized tribes of the Apennines, and the decaying and disorderly Greek towns of the south.

The strength of this system was now to be tried by struggle with the one Italian people who were still ready and able to Second Samnite War, 327-04 = 427-50. 412-27. 422. 427. contest with Rome the supremacy of the peninsula. The passive attitude of the Samnites between 342 and 327 was no doubt largely due to the dangers which had suddenly threatened them in South Italy; But the death of Alexander of Epirus, in 332,^[112] removed their only formidable opponent there, and left them free to turn their attention to the necessity of checking the steady advance of Rome. In 327, the year after the ominous foundation of a Roman colony at Fregellae, a pretext for renewing the struggle was offered them. The Cumaean colony of Palaepolis^[113] had incurred the wrath of Rome by its raids into her territory in Campania. The Samnites sent a force to defend it, and Rome replied by a declaration of war. The two opponents were not at first sight unequally matched, and had the Sabellian tribes held firmly together the issue of the struggle might have been different. As it was, however, the Lucanians to the south actually joined Rome from the first, while the northern clans, Marsi, Vestini, Paeligni, Frentani, after a feeble and lukewarm resistance, subsided into 450. a neutrality which was exchanged in 304 for a formal alliance with Rome. An even greater advantage to Rome from the outset was the enmity existing between the Samnites and the Apulians, the latter of whom from the first joined Rome and thus gave her a position in the rear of her enemy and in a country eminently well fitted for maintaining a large military force. These weaknesses on the Samnite side were amply illustrated by the events of the war.

The first seven or eight years were marked by one serious disaster to the Roman arms, the defeat at the Caudine Forks 433, 436. (321), but, when in 318 the Samnites asked for and obtained a two years' truce, Rome had succeeded not only in inflicting several severe blows upon her enemies but in isolating them from outside help. The Lucanians to the south were her allies. To the east, in the rear of Samnium, Apulia acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, and 434. 438. Luceria, captured in 320, had been established as a base of Roman operations. Finally to the north the Romans had easily overcome the feeble resistance of the Vestini and Frentani, and secured through their territories a safe passage for their legions to Apulia. On the renewal of hostilities in 316, the Samnites, bent on escaping from the net which was being slowly drawn round them, made a series of desperate efforts to break through the lines of defence which protected Latium and Campania. Sora and Fregellae on the upper Liris were captured by a sudden attack; the Ausones in the low country near the mouth of the same river were encouraged to revolt by the appearance of the Samnite army; and in Campania another army, attracted by rumours of disturbance, all but defeated the Roman consuls under the very walls of Capua. But these efforts were unavailing. Sora and Fregellae were recovered as quickly as they had been lost, and the frontier there was strengthened by the establishment of a colony at Interamna. The Ausones were punished by the confiscation of their territory, and Roman supremacy further secured by the two colonies of Suessa and Pontia (312). The construction of the famous Via Appia,^[114] the work of the censor Appius Claudius Caecus, opened a safe and direct route to Campania, while the capture of Nola deprived the Samnites of their last important stronghold in the Campanian lowlands. The failure of these attempts broke the courage even of the Samnites. Their hopes were indeed raised for a moment by the news that Etruria had risen against Rome (310), but their daring scheme of effecting a union with the Etruscans was frustrated 449. 450. by the energy of the Roman generals. Five years later (305) the Romans revenged a Samnite raid into Campania by an invasion of Samnium itself. Arpinum on the frontier was taken, and at last, after a twenty-two years' struggle, the Second Samnite War was closed by a renewal of the ancient treaty with Rome (304).^[115]

The six years' of peace which followed (304-298) were employed by Rome in still further strengthening her position. 450-56. Already, two years before the peace, a rash revolt of the Hernici^[116] had given Rome a pretext for finally annexing the territory of her ancient allies. The tribal confederacy was broken up, and all the Hernican communities, with the exception of three which had not joined the revolt, were incorporated with the Roman state as municipia, with the civil rights of the Roman franchise. Between the Hernican valley and the frontiers of the nearest Sabellian tribes lay what remained of the once formidable people of the Aequi. In 450.

453. their case, too, a revolt (304) was followed by the annexation of their territory, which was marked in this case by the formation there (301) of two Roman tribes (Aniensis and Teretina).^[117] Not content with thus carrying the borders of their own territory up to the very frontiers of the Sabellian country, Rome succeeded (304) in finally detaching from the Sabellian Confederacy all the tribes lying^[118] between the north-east frontier of Latium and the Adriatic Sea. Henceforward the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini and Frentani were enrolled among the allies of Rome, and not only swelled her forces in the field but interposed a useful barrier between her enemies to the north in Etruria and Umbria and those to the south in Samnium, while they connected her directly with the friendly Apulians. Lastly, as a security for the fidelity at least of the nearest of these allies, colonies were planted in the Marsian territories at Alba Fucentia 451, 456. 452. (303) and at Carsioli (298). A significant indication of the widening range of Rome's influence in Italy, and of the new responsibilities rapidly pressing upon her, is the fact that when in 302 the Spartan Cleonymus landed in the territory of the Sallentini, far away in the south-east, he was met and repulsed by a Roman force.^[119]

Six years after the conclusion of the treaty which ended the Second Samnite War, news arrived that the Samnites were harassing the Lucanians. Rome at once interfered to Third Samnite War, 298-90 = 456-64. protect her allies. Samnium was invaded in force, the country ravaged and one stronghold after another captured. Unable any longer to hold their own in a position where they were hedged round by enemies, the Samnite leaders turned as a last hope to the communities of northern Etruria, to the free tribes of Umbria and to the once dreaded Celts. With a splendid daring they formed the scheme of uniting all these peoples with themselves in a last desperate effort to break the power of Rome.

For some forty years after the final annexation of southern Etruria (351 B.C.) matters had remained unchanged Romans in N. Ertruria. 403. 443. in that quarter. Sutrium and Nepete still guarded Romans the Roman frontier; the natural boundary of the Ciminian forest was still intact; and up the valley of the Tiber Rome had not advanced beyond Falerii, a few miles short of the most southerly Umbrian town Ocriculum. But in 311, on the expiry, apparently of the long truce with Rome, concluded in 351, the northern Etruscans, alarmed no doubt by the rapid advances which Rome was making farther south, rose in arms and attacked Sutrium. The attack, however, recoiled disastrously upon the heads of the assailants. A Roman force promptly relieved Sutrium, and its leader, Q. Fabius Rullianus, without awaiting orders from home, boldly plunged into the wilds of the Ciminian forest, and crossing them safely swept with fire and sword over the rich lands to the north. Then turning southward he met and utterly defeated the forces which the Etruscans had hastily raised in the hopes of intercepting him at the Vadimonian Lake.^[120] This decisive victory ended the war. The Etruscan cities, disunited among themselves, and enervated by long years of peace, abandoned the struggle for the time, paid a heavy indemnity 445-46. and concluded a truce with Rome (309-8). In the same year the promptitude of Fabius easily averted a threatened attack by the Umbrians, but Rome proceeded nevertheless to fortify herself in her invariable fashion against future dangers on this side, by an alliance with Ocriculum, which was followed ten years later (299) by a colony at Nequinum,^[121] and an alliance with the Picentes, whose position in the rear of Umbria rendered them as valuable to Rome as the Apulians had proved farther south.

Fourteen years had passed since the battle on the Vadimonian Lake, when the Samnites appeared on the borders of Etruria and called on the peoples of northern Italy to rise against the common enemy. Their appeal, backed by the presence of their troops, was successful. The Etruscans Battle of Sentinum, 295 = 459. found courage to face the Roman legions once more; a few of the Umbrians joined them; but the most valuable allies to the Samnites were the Celts, who had for some time threatened a raid across the Apennines, and who now marched eagerly into Umbria and joined the coalition. The news that the Celts were in motion produced a startling effect at Rome, and every nerve was strained to meet this new danger. While two armies were left in southern Etruria as reserves, the two consuls, Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus the younger, both tried soldiers, marched northwards up the valley of the Tiber and into Umbria at the head of four Roman legions and a still larger force of Italian allies. At Sentinum, on the further side of the Apennines, they encountered the united forces of the Celts and Samnites, the Etruscans and Umbrians having, it is said, been withdrawn for the defence of their own homes. The battle that followed was desperate, and the Romans lost one of their consuls, Decius, and more than 8000 men.^[122] But the Roman victory was decisive. The Celts were annihilated, and the fear of a second Celtic attack on Rome removed. All danger from the coalition was over. The Etruscan communities gladly purchased peace by the payment of indemnities. The rising in Umbria, never formidable, died away, and the Samnites were left single-handed to bear the whole weight of the wrath of Rome. During four years more, however, they desperately defended their highland 461, 462.
464. homes, and twice at least, in 293 and 292, they managed to place in the field a force sufficient to meet the Roman legions on equal terms. At last, in 290, the consul M’.Curius Dentatus finally exhausted their power of resistance. Peace was concluded, and it is significant of the respect inspired at Rome by their indomitable courage that they were allowed to become the allies of Rome, on equal terms and without any sacrifice of independence.^[123]

Between the close of the Third Samnite War and the landing of Pyrrhus in 281 B.C. we find Rome engaged, as her wont was, in quietly extending and consolidating her power. In southern Italy she strengthened her hold on Apulia by planting on the borders of Apulia and Lucania the 473.
464.
469–71. strong colony of Venusia.^[124] In central Italy the annexation of the Sabine country (290) carried her frontiers eastward to the borders of her Picentine allies on the Adriatic.^[125] Farther east, in the territory of the Picentes themselves, she established colonies on the Adriatic coast at Hadria and Castrum (285–83).^[126] North of the Picentes lay the territories of the Celtic Senones stretching inland to the north-east borders of Etruria, and these too now fell into her hands. Ten years after their defeat at Sentinum (285–84) a Celtic force descended into Etruria, besieged Arretium and defeated the relieving force dispatched by Rome. In 283 the consul L. Cornelius Dolabella was sent to avenge the insult. He completely routed the Senones. Their lands were annexed by Rome, and a colony established at Sena on the coast. This success, followed as it was by the decisive defeat of the neighbouring tribe of the Boii, who had invaded Etruria and penetrated as far south as the Vadimonian Lake, awed the Celts into quiet, and for more than forty years there was comparative tranquillity in northern Italy.^[127]

In the south, however, the claims of Rome to supremacy were now to be disputed by a new and formidable foe. At the close of the Third Samnite War the Greek cities on the southern coast of Italy found themselves once more harassed by the Sabellian tribes on their borders, War with Pyrrhus, 281–75 = 473–79. whose energies, no longer absorbed by the long struggles in central Italy, now found an attractive opening southward. Naturally enough the Greeks, like the Capuans sixty years before, appealed for aid to Rome (283—82), and like the Capuans they offered in return to recognize the suzerainty of the great Latin Republic. In reply a Roman force under C. Fabricius Luscinus marched into south Italy, easily routed the marauding bands of Lucanians, Bruttians and 471–72. Samnites, and established Roman garrisons in Locri, Croton, Rhegium and Thurii. At Tarentum, the most powerful and flourishing of the Greek seaports, this sudden and rapid advance of Rome excited the greatest anxiety. Tarentum was already allied by treaty (301) with Rome, and she had now to decide whether this treaty should be exchanged for one which would place her, like the other Greek communities, under the protectorate of Rome, or whether she should find 453. some ally able and willing to assist in making a last stand for independence. The former course, in Tarentum, as before at Capua, was the one favoured by the aristocratic party; the latter was eagerly supported by the mass of the people and their leaders. While matters were still in suspense, the appearance, contrary to the treaty, of a Roman squadron off the harbour decided the controversy. The Tarentines, indignant at the insult, attacked the hostile fleet, killed the admiral and sunk most of the ships. Still Rome, relying probably on her partisans in the city, tried negotiation, and an alliance appeared likely after all, when suddenly the help for which the Tarentine democrats 473–74. had been looking appeared, and war with Rome was resolved upon (281–80).^[128]

King Pyrrhus,^[129] whose timely appearance seemed for the moment to have saved the independence of Tarentum, was the most brilliant of the military adventurers whom the disturbed times following the death of Alexander the Great had brought into prominence. High-spirited, generous and ambitious, he had formed the scheme of rivalling Alexander’s achievements in the East, by winning for himself an empire in the West. He aspired not only to unite under his rule the Greek communities of Italy and Sicily, but to overthrow the great Phoenician state of Carthage—the natural enemy of Greeks in the West, as Persia had been in the East. Of Rome it is clear that he knew little or nothing; the task of ridding the Greek seaports of their barbarian foes he no doubt regarded as an easy one; and the splendid force he brought with him was intended rather for the conquest of the West than for the preliminary work of chastising a few Italian tribes, or securing the submission of the unwarlike Italian Greeks. He defeated the Roman consul, M. Valerius Laevinus, on the banks of the 474. Liris (280), and gained the support of the Greek cities as well as that of numerous bands of Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians. But, to the disappointment of his new allies, Pyrrhus showed no anxiety to follow up his advantage. His heart was set on Sicily and Africa, and his immediate object was to come to terms with Rome. But though he advanced as near Rome as Anagnia (279), nothing could shake the resolution of the senate, and in the next year 475. (278) he again routed the legions at Asculum (Ascoli), but only to find that the indomitable resolution of the enemy was strengthened by defeat. He now crossed into Sicily, where, though at first successful, he was unable to achieve any lasting result. Soured and disappointed, Pyrrhus returned to Italy (276) to find the Roman legions steadily moving 476 southwards, and his Italian allies disgusted by his desertion of their cause. In 275 the decisive battle of the war 478. 479. was fought at Beneventum. The consul, M'. Curius Dentatus, the conqueror of Samnium, gained a complete victory, and Pyrrhus, unable any longer to face his opponents in the field, and disappointed of all assistance from his allies, retreated toin disgust to Tarentum and thence crossed into Greece.^[130]

A few years later (272) Tarentum was surrendered to Rome by its Epirot garrison; it was granted a treaty of alliance, but its walls were razed and its fleet handed over to Rome. In 270 Rhegium also entered the ranks of Roman allies, and finally in 269 a single 482. 484. 485. 481, 491. 481, 486, 491. 486. 486. 490. campaign crushed the last efforts at resistance in Samnium. Rome was now at leisure to consolidate the position she had won. Between 273 and 263 three new colonies were founded in Samnium and Lucania—Paestum in 273, Beneventum in 268, Aesernia in 263. In central Italy the area of Roman territory was increased by the full enfranchisement (268) of the Sabines,^[131] and of their neighbours to the east, the people of Picenum. To guard the Adriatic coast colonies were established at Ariminum (268), at Firmum and at Castrum Novum (264), while to the already numerous maritime colonies was added that of Cosa in Etruria.^[132]

Rome was now the undisputed mistress of Italy. The limits of her supremacy to the north were represented roughly by a line drawn across the peninsula from the mouth of Rome the mistress of Italy. the Arno on the west to that of the Aesis on the east.^[133] Beyond this line lay the Ligurians and the Celts; all south of it was now united as “Italy” under the rule of Rome.

But the rule of Rome over Italy, like her wider rule over the Mediterranean coasts, was not an absolute dominion over conquered subjects. It was in form at least a confederacy under Roman protection and guidance; and the Italians, like the provincials, were not the subjects, but the “allies and friends” of the Roman people.^[134] In the treatment of these allies Rome consistently followed the maxim, divide et impera. In every possible way she strove to isolate them from each other, while binding them closely to herself. The old federal groups were in most cases broken up, and each of the members united with Rome by a special treaty of alliance. In Etruria, Latium, Campania and Magna Graecia the city state was taken as the unit; in central Italy where urban life was non-existent, the unit was the tribe. The northern Sabellian peoples, for instance—the Marsi, Paeligni, Yestini, Marrucini, Frentani—were now constituted as separate communities in alliance with Rome. In many cases, too, no freedom of trade or intermarriage was allowed between the allies themselves, a policy afterwards systematically pursued in the provinces. Nor were all these numerous allied communities placed on the same footing as regarded their relations with Rome herself. To begin with, a sharp distinction was drawn between The Latins. the “Latini” and the general mass of Italian allies. The “Latins” of this period had little more than the name in common with the old thirty Latin peoples of the days of Spurius Cassius. With a few exceptions, such as Tibur and Praeneste, the latter had either disappeared or had been incorporated with the Roman state, and the Latins of 268 B.C. were almost exclusively the “Latin colonies,” that is to say, communities founded by Rome, composed of men of Roman blood, and whose only claim to the title “Latin” lay in the fact that Rome granted to them some portion of the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by the old Latin cities under the Cassian treaty.^[135] Though nominally allies, they were in fact offshoots of Rome herself, bound to her by community of race, language and interest, and planted as Roman garrisons among alien and conquered peoples. The Roman citizen who joined a Latin colony lost his citizenship—to have allowed him to retain it would no doubt have been regarded as enlarging too rapidly the limits of the citizen body; but he received in exchange the status of a favoured ally. The member of a Latin 486. colony had the right of commercium and down to 268^[136] of conubium also with Roman citizens. Provided they left sons and property to represent them at home, they were free to migrate to Rome and acquire the Roman franchise. In war-time they not only shared in the booty, but claimed a portion of any land confiscated by Rome and declared “public.” These privileges, coupled with their close natural affinities with Rome, successfully secured the fidelity of the Latin colonies, which became not only the most efficient props of Roman supremacy, but powerful agents in the work of Romanizing The Italian allies. Italy. Below the privileged Latins stood the Italian allies; and here again we know generally that there were considerable differences of status, determined in each case by the terms of their respective treaties with Rome. We are told that the Greek cities of Neapolis and Heraclea were among the most favoured;^[137] the Bruttii, on the other hand, seem, even before the Hannibalic War, to have been less generously treated. But beyond this we have no detailed information.

Rome, however, did not rely only on this policy of isolation. Her allies were attached as closely to herself as they were clearly separated from each other, and from the first she took every security for the maintenance of her own paramount authority. Within its own borders, each ally was left to manage its own affairs as an independent state.^[138] The badges which marked subjection to Rome in the provinces—the resident magistrate and the tribute—were unknown in Italy. But in all points affecting the relations of one ally with another, in all questions of the general interests of Italy and of foreign policy, the decision rested solely with Rome. The place of a federal constitution, of a federal council, of federal officers, was filled by the Roman senate, assembly and magistrates. The maintenance of peace and order in Italy, the defence of the coasts and frontiers, the making of war or peace with foreign powers, were matters the settlement of which Rome kept entirely in her own hands. Each allied state, in time of war, was called upon for a certain contingent of men, but, though its contingent usually formed a distinct corps under officers of its own, its numerical strength was fixed by Rome, it was brigaded with the Roman legions, and was under the orders of the Roman consul.^[139]

This paramount authority of Rome throughout the peninsula was confirmed and justified by the fact that Rome herself was now infinitely more powerful than any one of her numerous allies. Her territory, as distinct from that of the allied states, covered something like one-third The Roman state. of the peninsula south of the Aesis. Along the west coast it stretched from Caere to the southern borders of Campania. Inland, it included the former territories of the Acqui and Hernici, the Sabine country, and even extended eastward into Picenum, While beyond these limits were outlying districts, such as the lands of the Senonian Celts, with the Roman colony of Sena, and others elsewhere in Italy, which had been confiscated by Rome and given over to Roman settlers. Since the 388. first important annexation of territory after the capture of Veii (396), twelve new tribes had been formed,^[140] and the number of male citizens registered at the census had risen from 152,000 to 290,000.^[141] Within this enlarged Roman state were now included numerous communities with local institutions and government. At their head stood the Roman colonies (coloniae civium Romanorum), Colonies and municipia. founded to guard especially the coasts of Latium and Campania.^[142] Next to these eldest children of Rome came those communities which had been invested with the full Roman franchise, such, for instance, as the old Latin towns of Aricia, Lanuvium, Tusculum, Nomentum and Pedum. Lowest in the scale were those which had not been considered ripe for the full franchise, but had, like Caere, received instead the civitas sine suffragio, the civil without the political rights.^[143] Their members, though Roman citizens, were not enrolled in the tribes, and in time of war served not in the ranks of the Roman legions but in separate contingents. In addition to these organized town communities, there were also the groups of Roman settlers on the public lands, and the dwellers in the village communities of the enfranchised highland districts in central Italy.

The administrative needs of this enlarged Rome were obviously such as could not be adequately satisfied by the system which had done well enough for a small city state with a few square miles of territory. The old centralization of all government in Rome itself had become an impossibility, and the Roman statesmen did their best to meet the altered requirements of the time. The urban communities within the Roman pale, colonies and municipia, were allowed a large measure of local self-government. In all we find local assemblies, senates and magistrates, to whose hands the ordinary routine of local administration was confided, and, in spite of differences in detail, e.g. in the titles and numbers of the magistrates, the same type of constitution prevailed throughout.^[144] But these local authorities were carefully subordinated to the higher powers in Rome. The local constitution could be modified or revoked by the Roman senate and assembly, and the local magistrates, no less than the ordinary members of the community, were subject to the paramount authority of the Roman consuls, praetors and censors. In particular, care was taken to keep the administration of justice well under central control. The Roman citizen in a colony or municipium enjoyed, of course, the right of appeal to the Roman people in a capital case. We may also assume that from the first some limit was placed to the jurisdiction of the local magistrate, and that cases falling outside it came before the central authorities. But an additional safeguard for the Prefects. equitable and uniform administration of Roman law, in communities to many of which the Roman code was new and unfamiliar, was provided by the institution of prefects (praefecti juri dicundo),^[145] who were sent out annually, as representatives of the Roman praetor, to administer justice in the colonies and municipia. To prefects was, moreover, assigned the charge of those districts within the Roman pale where no urban communities, and consequently no organized local government, existed. In these two institutions, that of municipal government and that of prefectures, we have already two of the cardinal points of the later imperial system of government.

Lastly, the changes which the altered position and increased responsibilities of Rome had effected in her military system^[146] tended to weaken the intimate connexion between the Roman army in the field and the Roman people at home, and thus prepared the way for that complete The military system. breach between the two which in the end proved fatal to the Republic. It is true that service in the legion was still the first duty and the highest privilege of the fully qualified citizen. But this service was gradually altering in character. Though new legions were still raised each year for the summer campaigns, this was by no means always accompanied, as formerly, by the disbandment of those already on foot, and this increase in the length of time during which the citizen was kept with the standards had, as early as the siege of Veii, necessitated a further deviation from the old theory of military service—the introduction of pay.^[147] Moreover, while in the early days of the Republic the same divisions served for the soldier in the legion and the citizen in the assembly, in the new manipular system,^[148] with its three lines, no regard was paid to civic distinctions, but only to length of service and military efficiency, while at the same time the more open order of fighting which it involved demanded of each soldier greater skill, and therefore a more thorough training in arms than the old phalanx. The Proconsulate. One other change resulted from the new military necessities of the time, which was as fruitful of results as the incipient separation between the citizen and the soldier. Under the early Republic, the chief command of the legions rested with the consuls of the year. But, as Rome’s military operations increased in area and in distance from Rome, a larger staff became necessary, and the inconvenience of summoning home a consul in the field from an unfinished campaign became intolerable. The remedy found, that of prolonging for a further period the imperium of the consul, was first applied in 327 B.C. in the case of Q. Publilius Philo,^[149] 427–90. and between 327 and 264 instances of this prorogatio imperii became increasingly common. This proconsular authority, originally an occasional and subordinate one, was destined to become first of all the strongest force in the Republic, and ultimately the chief prop of the power of the Caesars.

Period B: Rome and the Mediterranean States, 265–146 B.C.—(a) Conquest of the West.—Though marked out by her geographical position as the natural centre of the Mediterranean, Italy had hitherto played no active part in Mediterranean politics, but, now that she was for the first 489–608. time united, it was felt throughout the Mediterranean world that a new power had arisen, and Rome, as the head and representative of Italy, found herself irresistibly drawn into the vortex of Mediterranean affairs. Egypt sought her alliance, and Greek scholars began to interest themselves keenly in the history, constitution, and character of the Latin Republic which had so suddenly become famous. But Rome looked naturally westward rather than eastward. The western coasts of the peninsula were the most fertile and populous and wealthy; and it was in this direction that the natural openings for Italian commerce were to be found. It was, however, precisely on this side that Rome had serious ground for anxiety. Carthage was now at the height of her power. Her outposts were threateningly near to Italy in Sardinia and in Sicily, while her fleets swept the seas and jealously guarded for the benefit of Carthage alone the hidden treasures of the West. In the east of Sicily, Syracuse still upheld the cause of Greek independence against the hereditary foe of the Greek race; but Syracuse stood alone, and her resources were comparatively small. What Rome had to fear was the establishment, and that at no distant date, of an absolute Carthaginian domination over the Western seas—a domination which would not only be fatal to Italian commerce, but would be a standing menace to the safety of the Italian coasts.

It was above all things essential for Rome that the Carthaginians should advance no farther eastward. But already in 272 Tarentum had almost fallen into their grasp, and seven years later Rome was threatened with the establishment of Carthaginian rule at Messana, within First Punic War,
265–41 – 489–513. sight of the Italian coast. The intervention of both powers in a quarrel between the Mamertines, a body of Campanian mercenaries who had occupied Messana, and Hiero II. of Syracuse, led to the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage in 264 B.C. The military history of the struggle which followed is treated in the article Punic Wars; it will suffice to note here that the war lasted until 241 B.C., when the Carthaginians were compelled to cede 490.Sicily and the Lipari islands to Rome, and to pay an indemnity of 3200 talents (about £800,000).

The struggle was one in which both Rome and Carthage were serving an apprenticeship in a warfare the conditions of which were unfamiliar to both. The Roman legions were foes very unlike any against which the Carthaginian leaders had ever led their motley array of mercenaries, while Rome was called upon for the first time to fight a war across the sea, and to fight with ships against the greatest naval power of the age. The novelty of these conditions accounts for much of the vacillating and uncertain action observable on both sides. It is possible that Hamilcar had already made up his mind that Rome must be attacked and crushed in Italy, but his government attempted nothing more than raids upon the coast. There are indications also that some in the Roman senate saw no end to the struggle but in the destruction of Carthage; yet an invasion of Africa was only once seriously attempted, and then only a half-hearted support was given to the expedition. But these peculiarities in the war served to bring out in the clearest relief the strength and the weakness of the two contending states. The chief dangers for Carthage lay obviously in the jealousy exhibited at home of her officers abroad, in the difficulty of controlling her mercenary troops, and in the ever-present possibility of disaffection among her subjects in Libya—dangers which even the genius of Hannibal failed finally to surmount. Rome, on the other hand, was strong in the public spirit of her citizens, the fidelity of her allies, the valour and discipline of her legions. What she needed was a system which should make a better use of her splendid materials than one under which her plans were shaped from day to day by a divided senate, and executed by officers who were changed every year, and by soldiers most of whom returned home at the close of each summer’s campaign.

The interval between the First and Second Punic Wars was employed by both Rome and Carthage in strengthening their respective positions. The eastern end of Sicily was still left under the rule of Hiero as the ally of Rome, but the larger western portion of the island became directly subject to Rome, and a temporary arrangement seems to have been made for its government, either by one of the two praetors, or possibly by a quaestor.^[150] Sardinia and Corsica had not been surrendered to 513, 515. Rome by the treaty of 241, but three years later (239), on the invitation of the Carthaginian mercenaries stationed in the islands, a Roman force occupied them; Carthage protested, but, on the Romans threatening war, she gave way, and Sardinia and Corsica were formally ceded to Rome, though it was some seven or eight years before all resistance on the part of the natives themselves was crushed. In 227, however, the senate considered matters ripe 527. for the establishment of a separate administration in her oversea possessions. In that year two additional praetors were elected; to one was assigned the charge of western Sicily, to the other that of Sardinia and Corsica,^[151] and thus the first stones of the Roman provincial system were laid. Of at least equal importance for the security of the peninsula was the subjugation of the Celtic tribes in the valley of the Po. These, headed by the Boii and Insubres and assisted by levies from 529. the Celts to the westward, had in 225 alarmed the whole of Italy by invading Etruria and penetrating to Clusium, only three days' journey from Rome. Here, however, their courage seems to have failed them. They retreated northward along the Etruscan coast, until at Telamon their way was barred by the Roman legions, returning from Sardinia to the defence of Rome, while a second consular army hung upon their rear. Thus hemmed in, the Celts fought desperately, but were completely defeated and the flower of their tribesmen slain. The Romans followed up their success by invading the Celtic territory. The Boii were easily reduced to submission. The Insubres, north of the Po, resisted more obstinately, but by 532. 222 the war was over, and all the tribes in the rich Po valley acknowledged the supremacy of Rome. The conquered Celts were not enrolled among the Italian allies of Rome, but were treated as subjects beyond the frontier. Three colonies were founded to hold them in check—Placentia (218) and Cremona in the territory of the Insubres, Mutina (183) in that of the Boii; and the great northern road (Via Flaminia) was completed as far as the Celtic border at Ariminum.

On the Adriatic coast the immediate interests of Rome were limited to rendering the sea safe for Italian trade. It was with this object that, in 229, the first Roman expedition crossed the Adriatic, and inflicted severe chastisement on the Illyrian pirates of the opposite 525. coast.^[152] This expedition was the means of establishing for the first time direct political relations between Rome and the states of Greece proper, to many of which the suppression of piracy in the Adriatic was of as much importance as to Rome herself. Alliances were concluded with Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia; and embassies explaining the reasons which had brought Roman troops into Greece were sent to the Aetolians, the Achaeans, and even to Athens and Corinth. Everywhere they were well received, and the admission of the Romans to the Isthmian 526. games^[153] (228) formally acknowledged them as the natural allies of the free Greek states against both barbarian tribes and foreign despots. Meanwhile Carthage had acquired a possession which promised to compensate her for the loss of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. The genius of her greatest citizen and soldier, Hamilcar Barca, had appreciated the enormous value of the Spanish peninsula, and conceived the scheme of founding there a Carthaginian dominion which should not only add to the wealth of Carthage, but supply her with a base of operations for a war of revenge with Rome. 518–26. 526–33. 535. The conquest of southern and eastern Spain, begun by Hamilcar (236–28) and carried on by his kinsman Hasdrubal (228–21), was completed by his son Hannibal, who, with all his father’s genius, inherited also his father's hatred of Rome, and by 219 the authority of Carthage had been extended as far as the Ebro (see Spain, History). Rome had not watched this rapid advance without anxiety, but, probably owing to her troubles 528. with the Celts, she had contented herself with stipulating (226) that Carthage should not carry her arms beyond the Ebro, so as to threaten Rome’s ancient ally, the Greek Massilia (mod. Marseilles), and with securing the independence of the two nominally Greek communities, Emporiae and Saguntum,^[154] on the east coast.

But these precautions were of no avail against the resolute determination of Hannibal, with whom the conquest of Spain was only preliminary to an attack upon Italy, and who could not afford to leave behind him in Spain a state allied to Rome. In 219, therefore, disregarding the protests of a Roman embassy, he attacked and took Saguntum, an act which, as he had foreseen, rendered a rupture with Rome inevitable, while it set his own hands free for a further advance.

For the details of the war which followed, the reader may be referred to the articles Punic Wars, Hannibal, and Scipio. Second Punic War, 218–1 = 536–53.
538. 539. 540. From the outbreak of hostilities until the crowning victory of Cannae in 216 Hannibal’s career of success was unchecked; and the annihilation of the Roman army in that battle was followed by the defection of almost the whole of southern Italy, with the exception of the Latin colonies and the Greek coast towns. In 215, moreover, Philip V. of Macedon formed an alliance with Hannibal and threatened to invade Italy; in 214 Syracuse revolted, and in 212 the Greek cities in S. Italy went over to Hannibal. But the indomitable spirit of the Romans asserted itself in the face of these crushing 542, 543. misfortunes. In 212 Syracuse was recovered; in 211 Capua fell after a long siege which Hannibal failed to raise, even by his famous march up to the gates of Rome, and in the same year a coalition was formed in Greece against Philip V. of Macedon, which effectually paralysed his offensive action. Hannibal was now confined to Lucania and Bruttium and his brother Hasdrubal, marching from Spain to join him, 547. 548. 543-48. was defeated and slain on the river Metaurus (207). The war in Italy was now virtually ended, for, though during four years more Hannibal stood at bay in a corner of Bruttium, he was powerless to prevent the restoration of Roman authority throughout the peninsula. Sicily was once more secure; and finally in 206, the year after the victory on the Metaurus, the successes of the young P. Scipio in Spain (211-6) were crowned by the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians from the peninsula. On his return from Spain Scipio eagerly urged an immediate invasion 549. 550. 551. of Africa. The senate hesitated; but Scipio gained the day. He was elected consul for 205, and given the province of Sicily, with permission to cross into Africa if he thought fit. Voluntary contributions of men, money, and supplies poured in to the support of the popular hero; and by the end of 205 Scipio had collected in Sicily a sufficient force for his purpose. In 204 he crossed to Africa, where he was welcomed by the Numidian prince Massinissa, whose friendship he had made in Spain. In 203 he twice defeated the Carthaginian forces, and a large party at Carthage were anxious to accept his offer of negotiations. But the advocates of resistance triumphed.

Hannibal was recalled from Italy, and returned to fight his last battle against Rome at Zama, where Scipio, who had 552. been continued in command as proconsul for 202 by a special vote of the people, won a complete victory. The war was over. The Roman assembly voted that the Carthaginian request for peace should be granted, and entrusted the settlement of the terms to Scipio and a commission often senators. Carthage was allowed to retain her territory in Africa; but she undertook to wage no wars outside Africa, and none inside without the consent of Rome. She surrendered all her ships but ten triremes, her elephants, and all prisoners of war, and agreed to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents in fifty years. The Numidian Massinissa (q.v.) was rewarded by an increase of territory, and was enrolled among the “allies and friends” of the Roman people.

The battle of Zama decided the fate of the West. The power of Carthage was broken and her supremacy passed to Rome. The West under Roman rule. 631. Henceforth Rome had no rival to fear westward of Italy, and it rested with herself to settle within what limits her supremacy should be confined and what form it should take. For the next fifty years, however, Rome was too deeply involved in the affairs of the East to think of extending her rule far beyond the limits of the rich inheritance which had fallen to her by the defeat of Carthage; but within this area considerable advance was made in the organization and consolidation of her rule. In Sicily and Spain, the immediate establishment of a Roman Sicily and Spain. 553. 548-57. government was imperatively necessary, if these possessions were not either to fall a prey to internal anarchy, or be recovered for Carthage by some second Hamilcar. Accordingly, we find that in Sicily the former dominions of Hiero were at once united with the western half of the island as a single province,^[155] and that in Spain, after nine years of a provisional government (206-197), two provinces were in 197^[156] definitely established, and each, like Sicily, assigned to one of the praetors for the year, two additional praetors being elected for the purpose. But here the resemblance between the two cases 553. 618. ends. From 201 down to the outbreak of the Slave War in 136 there was unbroken peace in Sicily, and its part in the history is limited to its important functions in supplying Rome with corn and in provisioning and clothing the Roman legions.^[157] It became every year a more integral part of Italy; and a large proportion even of the land itself passed gradually into the hands of enterprising Roman speculators. The governors of the two Spains had very different work to do from that which fell to the lot of the Sicilian praetors. The condition of Spain required that year after year the praetors should be armed with the consular authority, and backed by a standing force of four legions, while more than once the presence of the consuls themselves was found necessary. Still, in spite of all difficulties, the work of pacification proceeded. To M. Porcius Cato, the censor, and 559. 574-75. 605. 621. to Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (praetor and propraetor, 180-79), father of the two tribunes, is mainly due the credit of quieting the Celtiberian tribes of central Spain, and the government of Gracchus was followed by thirty years of comparative tranquillity. The insurrection headed by Viriathus in 149 was largely caused by exactions of the Roman magistrates themselves, while its obstinate continuance down to the capture of Numantia, in 133, was almost as much the result of the incapacity of the Roman commanders.^[158] But the re-settlement of the country by Scipio Africanus the younger in that year left all Spain, with the exception of the highland Astures and Cantabri in the north-west, finally and tranquilly subject to Rome. Roman traders and speculators flocked to the seaport towns and spread inland. The mines became centres of Roman industry; the Roman legionaries quartered in Spain year after year married Spanish wives, and when their service was over gladly settled down in Spain in preference to returning to Italy. The first Roman communities established outside Italy were both planted in Spain, and both owed their existence to the Roman legions.^[159]

In Africa there was no question at first of the introduction of Roman government by the formation of a province (see Africa—Third Punic War, 153-46 = 605-8. 559, 571. Africa, Roman). Carthage, bound hand and foot by the treaty of 201, was placed under the jealous watch of the loyal prince of Numidia, who himself willingly acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome. But it was impossible for this arrangement to be permanent. Every symptom of reviving prosperity at Carthage was regarded at Rome with feverish anxiety, and neither the expulsion of Hannibal in 195 nor his death in 183 did much to check the growing conviction that Rome would never be secure while her rival existed. It was therefore with grim satisfaction that many in the Roman senate watched the increasing irritation of the Carthaginians under the harassing raids and encroachments of their favoured neighbour Massinissa, and waited for the moment when Carthage should, by some breach of the conditions imposed upon her, supply 603. 607. Rome with a pretext for interference. At last in 151 came the news that Carthage, in defiance of treaty obligations, was actually at war with Massinissa. The anti-Carthaginan party in the senate, headed by M. Porcius Cato, eagerly seized the opportunity, and war was declared, and nothing short of the destruction of their city itself was demanded from the despairing Carthaginians. The demand was refused, and in 149 the siege of Carthage begun. During the next two years little progress was made, but in 147 P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, grandson by adoption of the conqueror of Hannibal, was, at the age of thirty-seven, and though only a candidate for the aedileship, elected consul, and given the 608. command in Africa. In the next year (146) Carthage was taken and razed to the ground. Its territory became the Roman province of Africa, while Numidia, now ruled by the three sons of Massinissa, remained as an allied state under Roman suzerainty, and served to protect the new province against the raids of the desert tribes (see Carthage).

In Italy itself the Hannibalic war had been followed by important changes. In the north the Celtic tribes paid for their Italy. sympathy with Hannibal by the final loss of all separate political existence. Cispadane Gaul, studded with colonies and flooded with Roman settlers, was rapidly Romanized. Beyond the Padus (Po) in Polybius's time Roman civilization was already widely spread. In the extreme north-east the Latin colony of Aquileia, the last of its kind, was 573. 574. 581. founded in 181, to control the Alpine tribes, while in the north-west the Ligurians were held in check by the colony of Luna (180), and by the extensive settlements of Roman citizens and Latins made on Ligurian territory in 173.^[160] In southern Italy the depression of the Greek cities on the coast, begun by the raids of the Sabellian tribes, was completed by the repeated blows inflicted upon them during the Hannibalic struggle. Some of them lost territory;^[161] all suffered from a decline of population and loss of trade; and their place was taken by such new Roman settlements as Brundusium (Brindisi) and Puteoli (Pozzuoli).^[162] In the interior the southern Sabellian tribes suffered scarcely less severely. The Bruttii were struck off the list of Roman allies, and nearly all their territory was confiscated.^[163] To the Apulians and Lucanians no such hard measure was meted out; but their strength had been broken by the war, and their numbers dwindled; large tracts of land in their territories were seized by Rome, and allotted to Roman settlers, or occupied by Roman speculators. That Etruria also suffered from declining energy, a dwindling population, and the 621. spread of large estates is clear from the state of things existing there in 133. It was indeed in central Italy, the home of the Latins and their nearest kinsmen, and in the new Latin and Roman settlements throughout the peninsula that progress and activity were henceforth concentrated.

(b) Rome in the East, 200-133.—Ever since the repulse of Pyrrhus from Italy, Rome had been slowly drifting 553-608. 554-621. 526. 540. into closer contact with the Eastern states. With one of the three great powers which had divided between them the empire of Alexander, with Egypt, she had formed an alliance in 273, and the alliance had been cemented by the growth of commercial intercourse between the two countries.^[164] In 228 her chastisement of the Illyrian pirates had led naturally enough to the establishment of friendly relations with some of the states of Greece proper. In 214 the alliance between Philip V. and Hannibal, and the former's threatened attack on Italy, forced her into war with Macedon, at the head of a coalition of the Greek states against him, which effectually frustrated his designs against herself; at the first 549. opportunity, however (205), she ended the war by a peace which left the position unchanged. The results of the war were not only to draw closer the ties which bound Rome to the Greek states, but to inspire the senate with a genuine dread of Philip's restless ambition, and with a bitter resentment against him for his union with Hannibal. The events of the next four years served to deepen both these feelings. In 205 Philip entered into a compact with Antiochus III. of Syria for the partition between them of the dominions of Egypt,^[165] now left by the death of Ptolemy Philopator to the rule of a boy-king. Antiochus was to take Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, while Philip claimed for his share the districts subject to Egypt on the coasts of the Aegean and the Greek islands. Philip no doubt hoped to be able to secure these unlawful acquisitions before the close of the Second Punic War should set Rome free to interfere with his plans. But the obstinate resistance offered by Attalus of Pergamum and the 553. Rhodians upset his calculations. In 201 Rome made peace with Carthage, and the senate had leisure to listen to the urgent appeal for assistance which reached her from her Eastern allies. With Antiochus indeed the senate was not yet prepared to quarrel; but with Philip the senate had no thoughts of a peaceful settlement. Their animosity against him has been deepened by the assistance he had recently rendered to Carthage. Always an unsafe and turbulent neighbour, he would, if allowed to become supreme in the Aegean, prove as dangerous to her interests in the East as Carthage had been in the West. To cripple or at least to stay the growth of Philip's power was in the eyes of the senate a necessity; but it was only by representing a Macedonian invasion of Italy as imminent 554. that they persuaded the assembly, which was longing for peace, to pass a declaration of war^[166] (200). The war began in the summer of 200 B.C., and, though the landing of the Roman legions in Epirus was not followed, as had been hoped, by any general rising against Philip, yet the latter had soon to discover that, if they were Second Macedonian War. 200-197 = 554-57. not enthusiastic for Rome, they were still less inclined actively to assist himself. Neither by force nor by diplomacy could he make any progress south of Boeotia. The fleets of Pergamum and Rhodes, now the zealous allies of Rome, protected Attica and watched the eastern coasts. The Achaeans and Nabis of Sparta were obstinately neutral, while nearer home in the north the Epirots and Aetolians threatened Thessaly and Macedonia. His own resources both in men and in money had been severely strained by his constant wars,^[167] and the only ally who could have given him effective assistance, Antiochus, was fully occupied with the conquest of Coele-Syria. It is no wonder then that, in spite of his dashing generalship and high courage, he made 556. but a brief stand. T. Quinctius Flamininus (consul 198), in his first year of command, defeated him on the Aous, drove him back to the pass of Tempe, and in the next year utterly routed him at Cynoscephalae. Almost at the same moment the Achaeans, who had now joined Rome, took Corinth, and the Rhodians defeated his troops in Caria.^[168] Further resistance was impossible; Philip submitted, and early the next year a Roman commission reached Greece with instructions to arrange terms of peace. These were such as effectually secured Rome's main object in the war, the removal of all danger to herself and her allies from Macedonian aggression.^[169] 553. Philip was left in possession of his kingdom, but was degraded to the rank of a second-rate power, deprived of all possessions in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, and forbidden, as Carthage had been in 201, to wage war without the consent of Rome, whose ally and friend he now became.

The second point in the settlement now effected by Rome was the liberation of the Greeks. The “freedom of Greece” The liberation of the Greece. 560. was proclaimed at the Isthmian games amid a scene of wild enthusiasm,^[170] which reached its height when two years later (194) Flamininus withdrew his troops even from the “three fetters of Greece”—Chalcis, Demetrias and Corinth.^[171] There is no reason to doubt that, in acting thus, not only Flamininus himself, but the senate and people at home were influenced, partly at any rate, by feelings of genuine sympathy with the Greeks and reverence for their past. It is equally clear that no other course was open to them. For Rome to have annexed Greece, as she had annexed Sicily and Spain, would have been a flagrant violation of the pledges she had repeatedly given both before and during the war; the attempt would have excited the fiercest opposition, and would probably have thrown the Asiatic as well as the European Greeks into the arms of Antiochus. But a friendly and independent Greece would be at once a check on Macedon, a barrier against aggression from the East, and a promising field for Roman commerce. Nor while liberating the Greeks did Rome abstain from such arrangements as seemed necessary to secure the predominance of her own influence. In the Peloponnese, for instance, the Achaeans were rewarded by considerable accessions of territory; and it is possible that the Greek states, as allies of Rome, were expected to refrain from war upon each other without her consent.^[172]

Antiochus III. of Syria, Philip's accomplice in the proposed partition of the dominions of their common rival, Egypt, with returned from the conquest of Coele-Syria (198) to learn first of all that Philip was hard pressed by the Romans, and shortly afterwards that he hadWar with Antiochus, 192–89 = 562–65. been decisively beaten at Cynoscephalae. It was already too late to assist his former ally, but Antiochus resolved at any rate to lose no time in securing for himself the possessions of the Ptolemies in Asia Minor and in eastern Thrace, which Philip had claimed, and which Rome now pronounced free and independent. In 197–96 he overran Asia Minor and crossed into Thrace.^[173] But Antiochus was pleasure-loving, irresolute, and no general, and it was not until 192 that the urgent entreaties of the Aetolians, and the withdrawal of the Roman troops from Greece, nerved him to the decisive step of crossing the Aegean; even then the force he took with557–58.
562. him was so small as to show that he completely failed to appreciate the nature of the task before him.^[174] At Rome the prospect of a conflict with Antiochus excited great anxiety, and it was not until every resource of diplomacy had been exhausted that war was declared,^[175] and the real weakness which lay behind the once magnificent pretensions of the “king of kings” was revealed.

Had Antiochus acted with energy when in 192 he landed in Greece, he might have won the day before the Roman legions appeared. As it was, in spite of the warnings of Hannibal,^[176] who was now in his camp, and of the Aetolians, he frittered away valuable time between562.

563.

564. his pleasures at Chalcis and useless attacks on petty Thessalian towns. In 191 Glabrio landed at the head of an imposing force; and a single battle at Thermopylae broke the courage of Antiochus, who hastily recrossed the sea to Ephesus, leaving his Aetolian allies to their fate. But Rome could not pause here. The safety of her faithful allies, the Pergamenes and Rhodians, and of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, as well as the necessity of chastising Antiochus, demanded an invasion of Asia. A Roman fleet had already (191) crossed the Aegean, and in concert with the fleets of Pergamum and Rhodes worsted the navy of Antiochus. In 190 the new consul L. Scipio, accompanied by his famous brother, the conqueror of Africa, led the Roman legion for the first time into Asia. At Magnesia ad Sipylum, in Lydia, he met and defeated the motley and ill-disciplined hosts of the great king.^[177] For the first time the West, under Roman leadership, successfully encountered the forces of the East, and the struggle began which lasted far on into the days of the Settlement of western Asia. emperors. The terms of the peace which followed the victory at Magnesia tell their own story clearly enough. There is no question, any more than in Greece, of annexation; the main object in view is that of securing the predominance of Roman interests and influence throughout the peninsula of Asia Minor, and removing to a safe distance the only eastern power which could be considered dangerous.^[178] The line of the Halys and the Taurus range, the natural boundary of the peninsula eastward, was established as the boundary between Antiochus and the kingdoms, cities and peoples now enrolled as the allies and friends of Rome. This line Antiochus was forbidden to cross; nor was he to send ships of war farther west than Cape Sarpedon in Cilicia. Immediately to the west of this frontier lay Bithynia, Paphlagonia and the immigrant Celtic Galatae, and these frontier states, now the allies of Rome, served as a second line of defence against attacks from the east. The area lying between these “buffer states” and the Aegean was organized by Rome in such a way as should at once reward the fidelity of her allies and secure both her own paramount authority and safety from foreign attack. Pergamum and Rhodes were so strengthened—the former by the gift of the Chersonese, Lycaonia, Phrygia, Mysia and Lydia, the latter by that of Lycia and Caria—as not only amply to reward their loyalty, but to constitute them effective props of Roman interests and effective barriers alike against Thracian and Celtic raids in the north and Syrian aggression in the south. Lastly, the Greek cities on the coast, except those already tributary to Pergamum, were declared free, and established as independent allies of Rome.

In a space of little, over eleven years (200–189) 554–65. Third Macedonian War, 171–68 = 583–86. 557. Rome had broken the power of Alexander's successors and established throughout the eastern Mediterranean a Roman protectorate.

It was in the western half of this protectorate that the first steps in the direction of annexation were taken. The enthusiasm provoked by the liberation of the Greeks had died away, and its place had been taken by feelings of dissatisfied ambition or sullen resentment. Internecine feuds and economic distress had brought many parts of Greece to the verge of anarchy, and, above all, the very foundations of the settlement effected in 197 were threatened by the reviving power and aspirations of Macedon. Loyally as Philip had aided Rome in the war with Antiochus, the peace of Magnesia brought him nothing but fresh humiliation. He was forced to abandon all hopes of recovering Thessaly, and he had the mortification to see the hated king of Pergamum installed almost on his borders as master of the Thracian Chersonese. Resistance at the time 565–75. was unavailing, but from 189 until his death (179) he laboured patiently and quietly to increase the internal resources of his own kingdom,^[179] and to foment, by dexterous intrigue, feelings of hostility to Rome among his Greek and barbarian neighbours. His successor, Perseus, his son by a left-handed alliance, continued his father's work. He made friends among the Illyrian and Thracian princes, connected himself by marriage with Antiochus IV. of Syria and with Prusias of Bithynia, and, among the Greek peoples, strove, not without success, to revive the memories of the past glories of Greece under the Macedonian leadership of the great Alexander.^[180] The senate could no longer hesitate. They were well aware of the restlessness and discontent in Greece; and after hearing from Eumenes of Pergamum, and from their own officers, all details of Perseus's intrigues and preparations, they declared war.^[181] The struggle, in spite of Perseus's courage and the incapacity at the outset of the Roman commanders, was short and decisive. The sympathy of the Greeks with Perseus, which had been encouraged by the hitherto passive attitude assumed by Rome, instantly evaporated on the news that the Roman legions were on their way to Greece. No assistance came from Prusias or Antiochus, and Perseus's only allies were the Thracian king Cotys and the Illyrian Genthius. The victory gained by L. Aemilius 586. Paulus at Pydna (168) ended the war.^[182] Perseus became the prisoner of Rome, and as such died in Italy a few years later.^[183] Rome had begun the war with the fixed resolution no longer of crippling but of destroying the Macedonian state. Perseus's repeated proposals for peace during the war had been rejected; and his defeat was followed by the final extinction of the kingdom of Philip and Alexander.^[184] Macedonia, though it ceased to exist as a single state, was not, however, definitely constituted a Roman province.^[185] On the contrary, the mistake was made of introducing some of the main principles of the provincial system—taxation, disarmament and the isolation of the separate communities—without the addition of the element most essential for the maintenance of order—that of a resident Roman governor. The four petty republics now created were each autonomous, and each separated from the rest by the prohibition of commercium and conubium, but no central controlling authority was substituted for that of the Macedonian king. The inevitable result was confusion 605–8. Macedonia a Roman province. and disorder, resulting finally (149–48) in the attempt of a pretender, Andriscus, who claimed to be a son of Perseus, to resuscitate the ancient monarchy.^[186] On his defeat in 148 the senate declared Macedonia province. a Roman province, and placed a Roman magistrate at its head.^[187]

From 189 to the defeat of Perseus in 168 no formal change of importance in the status of the Greek states had been made by Affairs in Greece, 565–87. Rome. The senate, though forced year after year to listen to the mutual recriminations and complaints of rival communities and factions, contented itself as a rule with intervening just enough to remind the Greeks that their freedom was limited by its own paramount authority, and to prevent any single state or confederacy from raising itself too far above the level of general weakness which it was the interest of Rome to maintain. After the victory at Pydna, however, the sympathy shown for Perseus, exaggerated as it seems to have been by the interested representations of the womanizing factions in the various states, was made the pretext for a more emphatic assertion of Roman ascendancy. All those suspected of Macedonian leanings were removed to Italy, as hostages for the loyalty of their several communities,^[188] and the real motive for the step was made clear by the exceptionally severe treatment of the Achaeans, whose loyalty was not really doubtful, but whose growing power in the Peloponnese and independence of language had awakened alarm at Rome. A thousand of their leading men, among them the historian Polybius, were carried off to Italy (see Polybius). In Aetolia the Romans connived at the massacre by their so-called friends of five hundred of the opposite party. Acarnania was weakened by the loss of Leucas, while Athens was rewarded for her unambitious loyalty by the gift of Delos and Samos.

But this somewhat violent experiment only answered for a time. In 148 the Achaeans rashly persisted, in spite of warnings, Settlement of Greece, 146 = 608. in attempting to compel Sparta by force of arms to submit to the league. When threatened by Rome with the loss of all that they had gained since Cynoscephalae, they madly rushed into war.^[189] They were easily defeated, and a “commission of ten,” under the presidency of L. Mummius, was appointed by the senate thoroughly to resettle the affairs of Greece.^[190] Corinth, by orders of the senate, was burnt to the ground and its territory confiscated. Thebes and Chalcis were destroyed, and the walls of all towns which had shared in the last desperate outbreak were razed to the ground. All the existing confederacies were dissolved; no commercium was allowed between one community and another. Everywhere an aristocratic type of constitution, according to the invariable Roman practice, was established, and the payment of a tribute imposed. Into Greece, as into Macedonia 587. in 167, the now familiar features of the provincial system were introduced—disarmament, isolation and taxation. The Greeks were still nominally free, and no separate province with a governor of its own^[191] was established, but the needed central control was provided by assigning to the neighbouring governor of Macedonia a general supervision over the affairs of Greece. From the Adriatic to the Aegean, and as far north as the river Drilo and Mount Scardus, the whole peninsula was now under direct Roman rule.^[192]

Beyond the Aegean the Roman protectorate worked no better than in Macedonia and Greece, and the quarrels and disorders The Roman protectorate in Asia, 189–46 = 565–608. which flourished under its shadow were aggravated by its longer duration and by the still more selfish view taken by Rome of her responsibilities.^[193] At one period indeed, after the battle of Pydna, it seemed as if the more vigorous, if harsh, system then initiated in Macedon and Greece was to be adopted farther east also. The levelling policy pursued towards Macedon and the Achaeans was applied with less justice to Rome's two faithful and favoured allies, Rhodes and Pergamum. The former had rendered themselves obnoxious to Rome by their independent tone and still more by their power and commercial prosperity. On a charge of complicity with Perseus they were threatened with war, and though this danger was averted^[194] they were forced to exchange their equal alliance with Rome for one which placed them in close dependence upon her, and to resign the lucrative possessions in Lycia and Caria 565. given them in 189. Finally, their commercial prosperity was ruined by the establishment of a free port at Delos,^[195] and by the short-sighted acquiescence of Rome in the raids of the Cretan pirates. With Eumenes of Pergamum no other fault could be found than that he was strong and successful; but this was enough. His brother Attalus was invited, but in vain, to become his rival. His turbulent neighbours, the Galatae, were encouraged to harass him by raids. Pamphylia was declared independent, and favours were heaped upon Prusias of Bithynia. These and other annoyances and humiliations had the desired effect. Eumenes and his two successors—his brother and son, Attalus II. and Attalus III.—contrived indeed by studious humility and dexterous flattery to retain their thrones, but Pergamum (q.v.) ceased to be a powerful state, and its weakness, added to that of Rhodes, increased the prevalent disorder in Asia Minor. During the same period we have other indications of a temporary activity on the part of Rome. The frontier of the protectorate was pushed forward to the confines of Armenia by alliances with the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia beyond the Halys. In Syria, on the death of 590. 586. 591. Antiochus Epiphanes (164), Rome intervened to place a minor, Antiochus Eupator, on the throne, under Roman guardianship.^[196] In 168 Egypt formally acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome,^[197] and in 163 the senate, in the exercise of this new authority, restored Ptolemy Philometor to his throne, but at the same time weakened his position by handing over Cyrene and Cyprus to his brother Euegertes.^[198]

But this display of energy was short lived. From the death of Eumenes in 159 down to 133 Rome, secure in the absence of any formidable power in the East, and busy with affairs in Macedonia, Africa and Spain, relapsed into an595–621. inactivity the disastrous results of which revealed themselves in the next period, in the rise of Mithradates of Pontus, the spread of Cretan and Cilician piracy, and the advance of Parthia.

Both the western and eastern Mediterranean now acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, but her relations with the two were from the first different. The West fell to her as the prize of victory over Carthage, and, the Carthaginian power broken, there was no hindrance to the immediate establishment in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and finally in Africa, of direct Roman rule. To the majority, moreover, of her western subjects she brought a civilization as well as a government of a higher type than any before known to them. And so in the West she not only formed provinces but created a new and wider Roman world. To the East, on the contrary, she came as the liberator of the Greeks; and it was only slowly that in this part of the Empire her provincial system made way. In the East, moreover, the older civilization she found there obstinately held its ground. Her proconsuls governed and her legions protected the Greek communities, but to the last the East remained in language, manners and thought Greek and not Roman.

Period C: The Period of the Revolution (146–49 B.C.).—In the course of little more than a century, Rome had become the supreme power in the civilized world. By all men, says Polybius, it was taken for granted that nothing remained but to obey the commands of the Romans.^[199] For the future the interest of Roman history centres 608–705.in her attempts to perform the two Herculean tasks which this unique position laid upon her,—the efficient government of the subject peoples, and their defence against the barbarian races which swarmed around them on all sides. They were tasks under which the old republican constitution broke down, and which finally overtaxed the strength even of the marvellous organization framed and elaborated by Augustus and his successors.

Although in its outward form the old constitution had undergone little change during the age of war and conquest from 265 to 146,^[200] the causes, both internal and external, which brought about its fall had been silently at work throughout. Its form was in strictness that of a moderate democracy. The patriciate had ceased to Constitutional changes,
265–146＝489–608.exist as a privileged caste,^[201] and there was no longer any order of nobility recognized by the constitution. The senate and the offices of state were in law open to all,^[202] and the will of the people in assembly had been in the most explicit and unqualified manner declared to be supreme alike in the election of magistrates, in the passing of laws, and in all matters touching the caput of a Roman citizen. But in practice the constitution had become an oligarchy. The senate, not the assembly, ruled Rome, and both the senate and the magistracies were in the hands of a class which, in defiance of the law, arrogated to itself the title and the privileges of a nobility.^[203] The ascendancy of the senate is too obvious and familiar a fact to need much illustration here. It was but rarely that the assembly was called upon to decide questions of policy, and then the proposal was usually made by the magistrate in obedience to the express directions of the senate.^[204] In the enormous majority of cases the matter Ascendancy of
the senate.was settled by a senatus consultum, without any reference to the people at all. The assembly decides for war or peace,^[205] but the conduct of the war and the conditions of peace are matters left to the senate (q.v.). Now and then the assembly confers a command upon the man of its choice, or prolongs the imperium of a magistrate,^[206] but, as a rule, these and all questions connected with foreign affairs are settled within the walls of the senate-house.^[207] It is the senate which year after year assigns the commands and fixes the number and disposition of the military forces,^[208] directs the organization of a new province,^[209] conducts negotiations, and forms alliances. Within Italy, though its control of affairs was less exclusive, we find that, besides supervising the ordinary current business of administration, the senate decides questions connected with the Italian allies, sends out colonies, allots lands, and directs the suppression of disorders. Lastly, both in Italy and abroad it managed the finances.^[210] Inseparably connected with this monopoly of affairs to the exclusion of the assembly was the control which in practice, if not in theory, the senate exercised over the magistrates. The latter had become what Cicero wrongly declares they were always meant to be, merely the subordinate ministers of the supreme council,^[211] which assigned them their departments, provided them with the necessary equipment, claimed to direct their conduct, prolonged their commands, and rewarded them with triumphs. It was now at once the duty and the interest of a magistrate to be in auctoritate senatus, “subject to the authority of the senate,” and even the once formidable tribuni plebis are found during this period actively and loyally supporting the senate, and acting as its spokesmen in the assembly.^[212]

The causes of this ascendancy of the senate are to be found firstly in the fact that the senate was the only body capable of conducting affairs in an age of incessant war. The voters in the assembly, a numerous, widely scattered body, could not readily be called together, and when assembled were very imperfectly qualified to Its causes.decide momentous questions of military strategy and foreign policy. The senate, on the contrary, could be summoned in a moment,^[213] and included in its ranks all the skilled statesmen and soldiers of the commonwealth. The subordination of the magistrates was equally the result of circumstances, for, as the numbers of the magistrates, and also the area of government, increased, some central controlling power became absolutely necessary to prevent collisions between rival authorities, and to secure a proper division of labour, as well as to enforce the necessary concert and co-operation.^[214] No such power could be found anywhere in the republican system but in the senate, standing as it necessarily did in the closest relations with the magistrate, and composed as it was increasingly of men who were or had been in office.

Once more, behind both senate and magistrates, lay the whole power and influence of the new nobility.^[215] These nobiles were essentially distinct from the older and more legitimate patrician aristocracy. Every patrician was of course noble, but the majority of the “noble families” in 146 were not patrician but plebeian.^[216] The The nobiles.

608.title had been gradually appropriated, since the opening of the magistracies, by those families whose members had held curule office, and had thereby acquired the ius imaginum. It was thus in theory within the reach of any citizen who could win election even to the curule aedileship, and, moreover, it carried with it no legal privileges whatsoever. Gradually, however, the ennobled plebeian families drew together, and combined with the older patrician gentes to form a distinct order. Office brought wealth and prestige, and both wealth and prestige were liberally employed in securing for this select circle a monopoly of political power, and excluding new men.^[217] Already by the close of the period it was rare for any one but a noble to find his way into high office or into the senate. The senate and magistrates are the mouthpieces of this order, and identified with it in policy and interest. Lastly, it must be allowed that both the senate and the nobility had to some extent justified their power by the use they made of it. It was their tenacity of purpose and devoted patriotism which had carried Rome through the dark days of the Hannibalic War. The heroes of the struggle with Carthage belonged to the leading families; the disasters at the Trasimene Lake and at Cannae were associated with the blunders of popular favourites.

From the first, however, there was an inherent weakness in this senatorial government. It had no sound constitutional Weakness of the senatorial government. basis, and with the removal of its accidental supports it fell to the ground. Legally the senate had no positive authority. It could merely advise the magistrate when asked to do so, and its decrees were strictly only suggestions to the magistrate, which he was at liberty to accept or reject as he chose.^[218] It had, it is true, become customary for the magistrate not only to ask the senate's advice on all important points, but to follow it when given. But it was obvious that if this custom were weakened, and the magistrates chose to act independently, the senate was powerless. It might indeed anathematize^[219] the refractory official, or hamper him if it could by setting in motion against him a colleague or the tribunes, but it could do no more, and these measures failed just where the senate's control was most needed and most difficult to maintain—in its relations with the generals and governors of provinces abroad. The virtual 608. independence of the proconsul was before 146 already exciting the jealousy of the senate and endangering its supremacy.^[220] Nor again had the senate any legal hold over the assembly. Except in certain specified cases, it rested with the magistrate to decide whether any question should be settled by a decree of the senate or a vote of the assembly.^[221] If he decided to make a proposal to the assembly, he was not bound except by custom to obtain the previous approval of the senate,^[222] and the constitution set no limits to the power of the assembly to decide any question whatsoever that was laid before it.

587. From 167, at least, onwards, there were increasing indications that both the acquiescence of the people in senatorial government and the loyalty of the magistrates to the senate were failing. The absorbing excitement of the great wars had died away; the economic and social disturbance and distress which they produced were creating a growing feeling of discontent; and at the same time the senate provoked inquiries into its title to govern by its failure any longer to govern well. In the East there was confusion; in the West a single native chieftain defied the power which had crushed Carthage. At home the senate was becoming more and more simply an organ of the nobility, and the nobility were becoming every year more exclusive, more selfish, and less capable and unanimous.^[223] But if the senate was not to govern, the difficulty arose of finding an efficient substitute, and it was this difficulty that mainly determined the issue of the struggles which convulsed Rome from 621-705. 133 to 49. As the event showed, neither the assembly nor the numerous and disorganized magistracy was equal to the work; the magistrates were gradually pushed aside in favour of a more centralized authority, and the former became only the means by which this new authority was first encouraged in opposition to the senate and finally established in a position of impregnable strength. The assembly which made Pompey and Caesar found out too late that it could not unmake them.

It is possible that these constitutional and administrative Effects of conquest on Roman society: the new wealth. difficulties would not have proved so rapidly fatal to the Republic had not its very foundations been sapped by the changes which followed more or less directly on the conquests of the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. For the opening of the world to Rome, and of Rome to the world, produced a radical change in the structure of Roman society. The subjugation of the Mediterranean countries, by placing at the disposal of Rome the vast natural resources of the West and the accumulated treasures of the East, caused a rapid rise in the standard of wealth and a marked change in its distribution. The Roman state was enabled to dispense with the direct taxation of its citizens,^[224] since it derived all the revenue which it needed from the subject countries. But the wealth drawn from the provinces by the state was trifling in amount compared with that which flowed into the pockets of individual citizens. Not only was the booty taken in war largely appropriated by the Roman commanders and their men, but a host of money-makers settled upon the conquered provinces and exploited them for their profit. The nobles engaged in the task of administration, the contractors (publicani) who farmed the revenues, and the “men of business” (negotiatores) who, as money-lenders, merchants or speculators, penetrated to every corner of the Empire, reaped a rich harvest at the expense of the provincials. Farming in Italy on the old lines became increasingly laborious and unprofitable owing to the importation of foreign corn and foreign slaves,^[225] and capitalists sought easier methods of acquiring wealth. If this had meant that capital was expended in developing the natural resources of the provinces, the result would have been to increase the prosperity of the countries subject to Rome; but it was not so. The Roman negotiatores, who were often merely the agents of the great families of Rome, drained the accumulated wealth of the provinces by lending money to the subject communities at exorbitant rates of interest. Cicero, for example, found when governor of Cilicia that M. Junius Brutus had lent a large sum to the people of Salamis in Cyprus at 48% compound interest; and we cannot suppose that this was an exceptional case. Such practices as these, together with the wasteful and oppressive system of tax-farming, and the deliberate extortions carried on by senatorial governors, reduced the flourishing cities of the Greek East, within the space of two generations, to utter economic exhaustion.

But the reaction of the same process on Rome herself had far more important consequences. The whole structure of Roman Accentuation of class distinctions. society was altered, and the equality and homogeneity which had once been its chief characteristics were destroyed. The Roman nobles had not merely ceased, as in old days, to till their own farms; they had found a means of enriching themselves beyond the dreams of avarice, and when they returned from the government of a province it was to build sumptuous villas, filled with the spoils of Greece and Asia, to surround themselves with troops of slaves and dependents, and to live rather as princes than as citizens of a republic. The publicani and negotiatores formed a second order in the state, which rivalled the first in wealth and coveted a share in its political supremacy; while the third estate, the plebs urbana, was constantly increasing in numbers and at the same time sinking into the condition of an idle proletariat. The accentuation of class distinctions is indeed inevitable in a capitalist society, such as that of Rome was now becoming. But the process was fraught with grave political danger owing to the peculiarities of the Roman constitution, which rested in theory on the ultimate sovereignty of the people, who were in practice represented by the city mob. To win the support of the plebs became a necessity for ambitious politicians, and the means employed for this end poisoned the political life of Rome. The wealth derived from the provinces was freely spent in bribery,^[226] and the populace of Rome was encouraged to claim as the price of its support a share in the spoils of empire.

It was not only the structure and composition of Roman society that underwent a transformation. The victory of The new learning and manners. Rome in her struggle for supremacy in the Mediterranean basin had been largely due to the powerful conservative forces by which her institutions were preserved from decay. Respect for the mos majorum, or ancestral custom, imposed an effective check on the desire for innovation. Though personal religion, in the deeper sense, was foreign to the Roman temperament, there was a genuine belief in the gods whose favour had made Rome great in the past and would uphold her in the future so long as she trod in the old paths of loyalty and devotion. Above all, the healthy moral traditions of early Rome were maintained by the discipline of the family, resting on the supreme authority of the father—the patria potestas—and the powerful influence of the mother, to whom the early training of the child was entrusted.^[227] Finally, the institution of the censorship, backed as it was by the mighty force of public opinion, provided a deterrent which prevented any flagrant deviation from the accepted standard of morals. All this was changed by the influence of Greek civilization, with which Rome was first brought face to face in the 3rd century B.C. owing to her relations with Magna Graecia. At first the results of contact with the older and more brilliant culture of Hellas were on the whole good. In the 2nd century B.C., when constant intercourse was established with the communities of Greece proper and of Asia Minor, “philhellenism” became a passion, which was strongest in the best minds of the day and resulted in a quickened intellectual activity, wider sympathies and a more humane life. But at the same time the “new learning” was a disturbing and unsettling force. The Roman citizen was confronted with new doctrines in politics and religion, and initiated into the speculations of critical philosophy.^[228] Under the influence of this powerful solvent the fabric of tradition embodied in the mos majorum fell to pieces; a revolt set in against Roman discipline and Roman traditions of self-effacement, and the craving for individual distinction asserted itself with irresistible vehemence. As it had been in the days of the “Sophistic” movement at Athens, so it was now with Rome; a higher education, which, owing to its expense, was necessarily confined to the wealthier classes, interposed between the upper and lower ranks of society a barrier even more effectual than that set up by differences of material condition, and by releasing the individual from the trammels of traditional morality, gave his ambition free course. The effect on private morals may be gauged by the vehemence with which the reactionary opposition, headed by M. Porcius Cato (consul, 195 B.C.; censor, 184 559, 570. B.C.), inveighed against the new fashions, and by the list of measures passed to check the growth of luxury and licence, and to exclude the foreign teachers of the new learning.^[229] It was all in vain. The art of rhetoric, which was studied through the medium of Greek treatises and Greek models, furnished the Roman noble with weapons of attack and defence of which he was not slow to avail himself in the forum and the senate-house. In the science of money-making, which had been elaborated under the Hellenistic monarchies, the Roman capitalists proved apt pupils of their Greek teachers. Among the lower classes, contact with foreign slaves and freedmen, with foreign worships and foreign vices, produced a love of novelty which no legislation could check. Even amongst women there were symptoms of revolt against the old order, which showed itself in a growing freedom of manners and impatience of control,^[230] the marriage tie was relaxed,^[231] and the respect for mother and wife, which had been so powerful a factor in the maintenance of the Roman standard of morals, was grievously diminished. Thus Rome was at length brought face to face with a moral and economic crisis which a modern historian has described in the words: “Italy was living through the fever of moral disintegration and incoherence which assails all civilized societies that are rich in the manifold resources of culture and enjoyment, but tolerate few or no restraints on the feverish struggle of contending appetites.” In this struggle the Roman Republic perished, and personal government took its place. The world had outgrown the city-state and its political machinery, and as the notions of federalism (on any large scale) and representative government had not yet come into being, no solution of the problem was possible save that of absolutism. But a far stronger resistance would have been opposed to political revolution by the republican system had not public morals been sapped by the influences above described. Political corruption was reduced to a science^[232] for the benefit of individuals who were often faced with the alternatives of ruin or revolution;^[233] there was no longer any body of sound public opinion to which, in the last resort, appeal could be made; and, long before the final catastrophe took place, Roman society itself had become, in structure and temper, thoroughly unrepublican.

The first systematic attack upon the senatorial government is connected with the names of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus The Gracchi, 133-21 = 621-33. (q.v.), and its immediate occasion was an attempt to deal with no less a danger than the threatened disappearance of the class to which of all others Rome owed most in the past.^[234] The small landholders throughout the greater part of Italy were sinking deeper into ruin under the pressure of accumulated difficulties. The Hannibalic war had laid waste their fields and thinned their numbers, nor when peace returned to Italy did it bring with it any revival of prosperity. The heavy burden of military service still pressed ruinously upon them,^[235] and in addition they were called upon to compete with the foreign corn imported from beyond the sea, and with the foreign slave-labour purchased by the capital of wealthier men.^[236] Farming became unprofitable, and the hard laborious life with its scanty returns was thrown into still darker relief when compared with the stirring life of the camps with its opportunities of booty, or with the cheap provisions, frequent largesses and gay spectacles to be had in the large towns. The small holders went off to follow the eagles or swell the proletariat of the cities, and their holdings were left to run waste or merged in the vineyards, olive yards and above all in the great cattle farms of the rich, and their own place was taken by slaves. The evil was worst in Etruria and in southern Italy; but everywhere it was serious enough to demand the earnest attention of Roman statesmen. Of its existence the government had received plenty of warning in the declining numbers of able-bodied males returned at the census,^[237] in the increasing difficulties of recruiting for the legions,^[238] in servile outbreaks in Etruria and Apulia,^[239] and 554–94. 574. 594. between 200 and 160 a good deal was attempted by way of remedy. In addition to the foundation of twenty colonies,^[240] there were frequent allotments of land to veteran soldiers, especially in Apulia and Samnium.^[241] In 180, 40,000 Ligurians were removed from their homes and settled on vacant lands once the property of a Samnite tribe,^[242] and in 160 the Pomptine marshes were drained for the purpose of cultivation.^[243] But these efforts were only partially successful. The colonies planted in Cisalpine Gaul and in Picenum flourished, but of the others the majority slowly dwindled away, and two required recolonizing only eight years after their foundation.^[244] The veterans who received land were unfitted to make good farmers; and large numbers, on the first opportunity, gladly returned 594. 597. 621. as volunteers to a soldier's life. Moreover, after 160 even these efforts ceased, and with the single exception of the colony of Auximum in Picenum (157) nothing was done to check the spread of the evil, until in 133 Tiberius Gracchus, on his election to the tribunate, set his hand to the work.

The remedy proposed by Gracchus^[245] amounted in effect to the resumption by the state of as much of the “common land” as was not held in occupation by authorized persons and conformably to the provisions of the Licinian law,^[246] and the distribution in allotments of the land Tiberius Gracchus. thus rescued for the community from the monopoly of a few. It was a scheme which could quote in its favour ancient precedent as well as urgent necessity. Of the causes which led to its ultimate failure something will be said later on; for the present we must turn to the constitutional conflict which it provoked. The senate from the first identified itself with the interests of the wealthy occupiers, and Tiberius found himself forced into a struggle with that body, which had been no part of his original plan. He fell back on the legislative sovereignty of the assembly; he resuscitated the half-forgotten powers of interference vested in the tribunate in order to paralyse the action of the senatorial magistrates, and finally lost his life in an attempt to make good one of the weak points in the tribune's position by securing his own re-election for a second year. But the conflict did not end with his death. It was renewed on a wider scale, and with a more deliberate aim by his Gaius Gracchus. 631. brother Gaius, who on his election to the tribunate (123) at once came forward as the avowed enemy of the senate.^[247] The latter suddenly found its control of the administration threatened at a variety of points. On the invitation of the popular tribune the assembly proceeded to restrict the senate's freedom of action in assigning the provinces.^[248] It regulated the taxation of the province of Asia^[249] and altered the conditions of military service.^[250] In home affairs it inflicted two serious blows on the senate's authority by declaring the summary punishment of Roman citizens by the consuls on the strength of a senatus consultum to be a violation of the law of appeal,^[251] and by taking out of the senate's hands the control of the newly established court for the trial of cases of magisterial misgovernment in the provinces.^[252] Tiberius had committed the mistake of relying too exclusively on the support of one section only of the community; his brother endeavoured to enlist on the popular side every available ally. The Latins and Italians had opposed an agrarian scheme which took from them land which they had come to regard as rightfully theirs, and gave them no share in the benefit of the allotments.^[253] Gaius not only removed this latter grievance,^[254] but ardently supported and himself brought forward the first proposals made in Rome for their enfranchisement.^[255] The indifference of the city populace, to whom the prospect of small holdings in a remote district of Italy was not a tempting one, was overcome by the establishment of regular monthly doles of corn at a low price.^[256] Finally, the men of business—the publicans, merchants and money-lenders—were conciliated by the privilege granted to them of collecting the tithes of the new province of Asia, and placed in direct rivalry with the senate by the substitution of men of their own class as judges in the “quaestio de repetundis,” in place of senators.^[257] The organizer of this concerted attack upon the position of the senate fell, like his brother, in a riot.

The agrarian reforms of the two Gracchi had little permanent effect.^[258] Even in the lifetime of Gaius the clause in his brother's law rendering the new holdings inalienable was repealed, and the process of absorption recommenced. In 118 a stop was put to further allotment of occupied Failure of the attempt at agrarian reform.
636. 643. lands, and finally, in 111, the whole position of the agrarian question was altered by a law which converted all land still held in occupation into private land.^[259] The old controversy as to the proper use of the lands of the community was closed by this act of alienation. The controversy in future turns, not on the right of the poor citizens to the state lands, but on the expediency of purchasing other lands for distribution at the cost of the treasury.^[260]

But, though the agrarian reform failed, the political conflict it had provoked continued, and the lines on which it was waged were in the main those laid down by Gaius Gracchus. The sovereignty of the assembly continued to be the watchword of the popular party, and a free use of the tribunician powers of interference and of legislation remained the most effective means of accomplishing their aims.

Ten years after the death of Gaius the populares once more summoned up courage to challenge the supremacy of the Marius, 118-100 = 636-54. 636. 642. 643. 645. senate; but it was on a question of foreign administration that the conflict was renewed. The course of affairs in the client state of Numidia since Micipsa's death in 118 had been such as to discredit a stronger government than that of the senate.^[261] In defiance of Roman authority, and relying on the influence of his own well-spent gold, Jugurtha had murdered both his legitimate rivals, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and made himself master of Numidia. The declaration of war wrung from the senate (112) by popular indignation had been followed by the corruption of a consul^[262] (111) and the crushing defeat of the proconsul Albinus.^[263] On the news of this crowning disgrace the storm burst, and on the proposal of the tribunes a commission of inquiry was appointed into the conduct of the war.^[264] But the popular leaders did not stop here. Q. Caecilius Metellus, who as consul (109) had succeeded to the command in Numidia, was an able soldier but a rigid aristocrat; and they now resolved to improve their success by entrusting the command instead to a genuine son of the people. Their choice fell on Gaius Marius (see Marius), an experienced officer and administrator, but a man of humble birth, wholly illiterate, and one who, though no politician, was by temperament and training a hater of the polished and effeminate nobles who filled the senate.^[265] He was triumphantly elected, and, in spite of a decree of the senate continuing Metellus as proconsul, he was entrusted by a vote of the assembly with the charge of the war against Jugurtha (q.v.).^[266]

Jugurtha was vanquished; and Marius, who had been a second time elected consul in his absence, arrived at Rome in 650. 652. 653. January 104, bringing the captive prince with him in chains.^[267] But further triumphs awaited the popular hero. The Cimbri and Teutones were at the gates of Italy; they had four times defeated the senatorial generals, and Marius was called upon to save Rome from a second invasion of the barbarians.^[268] After two years of suspense the victory at Aquae Sextiae (102), followed by that on the Raudine plain (101), put an end to the danger by the annihilation of the invading hordes; and Marius, now consul for the fifth time, returned to Rome in triumph. There the popular party welcomed him as a leader with all the prestige of a successful general. Once more, however, they were destined to a brief success followed by disastrous defeat. Marius became for the sixth time consul;^[269] of the two popular leaders Glaucia became Saturninus and the Appuleian laws. praetor and Saturninus tribune. But Marius and his allies were not statesmen of the stamp of the Gracchi; and the laws proposed by Saturninus had evidently no serious aim in view other than that of harassing the senate. His corn law merely reduced the price fixed in 123 for the monthly dole of corn, and the main point of his agrarian law lay in the clause appended to it requiring all senators to swear to observe its provisions.^[270] The laws were carried, but the triumph of the popular leaders was short-lived. Their recklessness and violence had alienated all classes in Rome; and their period of office was drawing to a close. At the elections fresh rioting took place, and Marius as consul was called upon by the senate to protect the state against his own partisans. Saturninus and Glaucia surrendered, but while the senate was discussing their fate they were surrounded and murdered by their opponents.

The popular party had been worsted once more in their struggle with the senate, but none the less their alliance with Marius, and the position in which their votes placed him, marked an epoch in the history of the revolution. The transference of the political leadership to a consul who was nothing if not a soldier was at once a confession of the insufficiency of the purely civil authority of the tribunate and a dangerous encouragement of military interference in political controversies. The consequences were already foreshadowed by the special provisions made by Saturninus for Marius's veterans, and in the active part taken by them in the passing of his laws. Indirectly, too, Marius, though no politician, played an Military reforms of Marius. important part in this new departure. His military reforms^[271] at once democratized the army and attached it more closely to its leader for the time being. He swept away the last traces of civil distinctions of rank or wealth within the legion, admitted to its ranks all classes, and substituted voluntary enlistment under a popular general for the old-fashioned compulsory levy. The efficiency of the legion was increased at the cost of a complete severance of the ties which bound it to the civil community and to the civil authorities.

The next important crisis was due partly to the rivalry which had been growing more bitter each year between the senate and the commercial class, and partly to the long-impending question of the enfranchisement of the Italian allies. The publicani, negotiatores and others, who constituted what was now becoming known as the equestrian order (see Equites), had made unscrupulous use of their control of the courts and especially of the quaestio de repetundis against their natural rivals, the official class in the provinces. The threat of prosecution before a hostile jury was held over the head of every governor, legate and quaestor who ventured to interfere with their operations in the provinces. The average official preferred to connive at their exactions; the bolder ones paid with fines and even exile 662. Discontent of the Italian allies. for their courage. In 92 the necessity for a reform was proved beyond a doubt by the scandalous condemnation of P. Rutilius Rufus,^[272] ostensibly on a charge of extortion, in reality as the reward of his efforts to check the extortions of the Roman equites in Asia. The difficulties of the Italian question were more serious. That the Italian allies were discontented was notorious. After nearly two centuries of close alliance, of common dangers and victories, they now eagerly coveted as a boon that complete amalgamation with Rome which they had at first resented as a dishonour. But, unfortunately, Rome had grown more exclusive in proportion as the value set upon Roman citizenship increased. During the last forty years feelings of hope and disappointment had rapidly succeeded each other; Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus, Saturninus, had all held out promises of relief—and nothing had yet been done. On each occasion they had crowded to Rome, full of eager expectation, only to be harshly ejected from the city by the consul's orders.^[273] The justice of their claims could hardly be denied, the danger of continuing to ignore them was obvious—yet the difficulties in the way of granting them were formidable in the extreme, and from a higher than a merely selfish point of view there was much to be said against the revolution involved in so sudden and enormous an enlargement of the citizen body.

Marcus Livius Drusus (q.v.), who as tribune gallantly took up the task of reform, is claimed by Cicero^[274] as a member of that Marcus Livius Drusus 91 = 663. party of the centre to which he belonged himself. Noble, wealthy and popular, he seems to have hoped to be able by the weight of his position and character to rescue the burning questions of the day from the grasp of extreme partisans and to settle them peacefully and equitably. But he, like Cicero after him, had to find to his cost that there was no room in the fierce strife of Roman politics for moderate counsels. His proposal to reform the law courts excited the equestrian order and their friends in the senate to fury. The agrarian and corn laws which he coupled with it^[275] alienated many more in the senate, and roused the old anti-popular party feeling; finally, his known negotiations with the Italians were eagerly misrepresented to the jealous and excited people as evidence of complicity with a widespread conspiracy against Rome. His laws were carried, but the senate pronounced The Social War, 90-89 = 664-65. them null and void.^[276] Drusus was denounced in the senate house as a traitor, and on his way home was struck down by the hand of an unknown assassin. His assassination was the signal for an outbreak which had been secretly prepared for some time before. Throughout the highlands of central and southern Italy the flower of the Italian peoples rose as one man.^[277] Etruria and Umbria held aloof; the isolated Latin colonies stood firm; but the Sabellian clans, north and south, the Latinized Marsi and Paeligni, as well as the Oscan-speaking Samnites and Lucanians, rushed to arms. No time was lost in proclaiming their plans for the future. A new Italian state was to be formed. The Paelignian town of Corfinium was selected as its capital and rechristened with the proud name of Italica. All Italians were to be citizens of this new metropolis, and here were to be the place of assembly and the senate house. A senate of 500 members and a magistracy resembling that of Rome completed a constitution which adhered closely to the very political traditions which its authors had most reason to abjure.

Now, as always in the face of serious danger, the action of Rome was prompt and resolute. Both consuls took the field;^[278] with each were five legates, among them the veteran Marius and his destined rival L. Cornelius Sulla, and even freedmen were pressed into service with the legions. But the first year's campaign opened disastrously. In central Italy the northern Sabellians, and in the south the Samnites, defeated the forces opposed to them. And though before the end of the year Marius and Sulla in the north, and the consul Caesar himself in Campania, succeeded in inflicting severe blows on the enemy, and on the Marsi especially, it is not surprising that, with an empty treasury, with the insurgents' strength still unbroken, and with rumours of disaffection in the loyal districts, opinion in Rome should have turned in the direction of the more liberal policy which had been so often scornfully rejected and in favour of some compromise which should check the spread of the revolt, and 664. Lex Julia and lex Plautia Papiria. 665. possibly sow discord among their enemies. Towards the close of the year 90 the consul L. Julius Caesar (killed by Fimbria in 87) carried the lex Julia,^[279] by which the Roman franchise was offered to all communities which had not as yet revolted; early in the next year (89) the Julian law was supplemented by the lex Plautia Papiria, introduced by two of the tribunes, M. Plautius Silvanus and C. Papirius Carbo Arvina, which enacted that any citizen of an allied community then domiciled in Italy might obtain the franchise by giving in his name to a praetor in Rome within sixty days. A third law (lex Calpurnia), apparently passed at the same time, empowered Roman magistrates in the field to bestow the franchise there and then upon all who were willing to receive it. This sudden opening of the closed gates of Roman citizenship was completely successful, and its effects were at once visible in the diminished vigour of 665. the insurgents. By the end of 89 the Samnites and Lucanians were left alone in their obstinate hostility to Rome, and neither, thanks to Sulla's brilliant campaign in Samnium, had for the moment any strength left for active aggression.

The termination of the Social War brought with it no peace in Rome. The old quarrels were renewed with increased bitterness, and the newly enfranchised Italians themselves complained as bitterly of the restriction^[280] which robbed them of their due share of political influence by allowing them to vote only in a specified number of tribes. The senate itself was distracted by violent personal rivalries—and all these feuds, animosities and grievances were aggravated by the widespread economic distress and ruin which affected all classes.^[281] Lastly, war with Mithradates VI. had been declared; it was notorious that the privilege of commanding the force to be sent against him would be keenly contested, and that the contest would lie between the veteran Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla.^[282]

It was in an atmosphere thus charged with the elements of disturbance that P. Sulpicius Rufus as tribune^[283] brought P. Sulpicius Rufus, 88 = 666. forward his laws. He proposed—(1) that the command of the Mithradatic war should be given to Marius, (2) that the new citizens should be distributed through all the tribes, (3) that the freedmen should no longer be confined to the four city tribes, (4) that any senator owing more than 2000 denarii should lose his seat, (5) that those exiled on suspicion of complicity with the Italian revolt should be recalled. These proposals inevitably provoked a storm, and both sides were ominously ready for violent measures. The consuls, in order to prevent legislation, proclaimed a public holiday. Sulpicius replied by arming his followers and driving the consuls from the forum. The proclamation was withdrawn and the laws carried, but Sulpicius's triumph was short-lived. From Nola in Campania, where lay the legions commanded by him in the Social War, Sulla advanced on Rome, and for the first time a Roman consul entered the city at the head of the legions of the Republic. Resistance was hopeless. Marius and Sulpicius fled,^[284] and Sulla, summoning the assembly of the centuries, proposed the measures he considered necessary for the public security, the most important being a provision that the sanction of the senate should be necessary before any proposal was introduced to the assembly.^[285] 667. Marius and Cinna. Then, after waiting in Rome long enough to hold the consular elections, he left for Asia early in 87.

Sulla had conquered, but his victory cost the Republic dear. He had first taught political partisans to look for final success, not to a majority of votes in the forum or campus, but to the swords of the soldiery. The lesson was well learnt. Shortly after his departure L. Cornelius Cinna as consul revived the proposals of Sulpicius;^[286] his colleague, Gnaeus Octavius, at the head of an armed force fell upon the new citizens who had collected in crowds to vote, and the forum was heaped high with the bodies of the slain.^[287] Cinna fled, but fled, like Sulla, to the legions. When the senate declared him deposed from his consulship, he replied by invoking the aid of the soldiers in Campania in behalf of the violated rights of the people and the injured dignity of the consulship, and, like Sulla, found them ready to follow where he led. The neighbouring Italian communities, who had lost many citizens in the recent massacre, sent their new champion men and money;^[288] while from Africa, whither he had escaped after Sulla's entry into Rome, came Marius with 1000 Numidian horsemen. The senate had prepared for a desperate defence, but fortune was adverse, and after a brief resistance they gave way. Cinna was acknowledged as consul, the sentence of outlawry passed on Marius was revoked and Cinna and Marius entered Rome with their troops. Marius's thirst for revenge was gratified by a frightful massacre, and he lived long enough to be nominated consul for the seventh time. But he held his 668. 669, 670. consulship only a few weeks. Early in 86 he died, and for the next three years Cinna ruled Rome. Constitutional government was virtually suspended. For 85 and 84 Cinna nominated himself and a trusted colleague as consuls.^[289] The state was, as Cicero^[290] says, without lawful authority.^[291] One important matter was carried through—the registration in all the tribes of the newly enfranchised Italians,^[292] but beyond this little was done. The attention of Cinna and his friends was in truth engrossed by the ever-present dread of Sulla's return 668. 669. The return of Sulla, 83 = 671. from Asia. The consul of 86, L. Valerius Flaccus (who had been consul with Marius in 100 B.C.), sent out to supersede him, was murdered by his own soldiers at Nicomedia.^[293] In 85 Sulla, though disowned by his government, concluded a peace with Mithradates.^[294] In 84, after settling affairs in Asia and crushing Flaccus's successor, C. Flavius Fimbria, he crossed into Greece, and in the spring of return of 83 landed at Brundusium with 40,000 soldiers and a large following of émigré nobles. Cinna was dead,^[295] murdered like Flaccus by his mutinous soldiers; his most trusted colleague, Cn. Papirius Carbo, was commanding as proconsul in Cisalpine Gaul; and the resistance offered to Sulla's advance was slight. At Capua, Sulla routed the forces of one consul, Gaius Norbanus; at Teanum the troops of the other went over in a body to the side of the outlawed proconsul. After a winter spent in Campania he pressed forward to Rome, 672. defeated the younger Marius (consul, 82) near Praeneste, and entered the city without further opposition. In north Italy the success of his lieutenants, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (son of Metellus Numidicus), Cn. Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, had been fully as decisive. Cisalpine Gaul, Umbria and Etruria had all been won for Sulla, and the two principal leaders on the other side, Carbo and Norbanus, had each fled, one to Rhodes, the other to Africa. Only one foe remained to be conquered. The Samnites and Lucanians whom Cinna had conciliated, and who saw in Sulla their bitterest foe, were for the last time in arms, and had already joined forces with the remains of the Marian army close to Rome. The decisive battle was fought under the walls of the city, and ended in the complete defeat of the Marians and Italians (battle of the Colline Gate).^[296]

For a period of nearly ten years Rome and Italy had been distracted by civil war. Sulla was now called upon to heal the divisions which rent the state asunder, to set in working Sulla's dictatorship, 81 = 673. again the machinery of civil government and above all so to modify it as to meet the altered conditions, and to fortify it against the dangers which visibly threatened it in the future. The real charge against Sulla^[297] is not that he failed to accomplish all this, for to do so was beyond the powers even of a man so able, resolute and self-confident as Sulla, armed though he was with absolute authority and backed by overwhelming military strength and the prestige of unbroken success. He stands convicted rather of deliberately aggravating some and culpably ignoring others of the evils he should have tried to cure, and of contenting himself with a party triumph when he should have aimed at the regeneration and confirmation of the whole state. His victory was instantly followed, not by any measures of conciliation, but by a series of massacres, prescriptions and confiscations, of which almost the least serious consequence was the immediate loss of life which they entailed.^[298] From this time forward the fear of proscription and confiscation Effects of the Sulla proscriptions. recurred as a possible consequence of every political crisis, and it was with difficulty that Caesar himself dissipated the belief that his victory would be followed by a Sullan reign of terror. The legacy of hatred and discontent which Sulla left behind him was a constant source of disquiet and danger. In the children of the proscribed, whom he excluded from holding office, and the dispossessed owners of the confiscated lands, every agitator found ready and willing allies.^[299] The moneyed men of the equestrian order were more than ever hostile to the senatorial government, which they now identified with the man who cherished towards them a peculiar hatred,^[300] and whose creatures had hunted them down like dogs. The attachment which the new Italian citizens might in time have learnt to feel for the old republican constitution was nipped in the bud by the massacres at Praeneste and Norba, by the harsh treatment of the ancient towns of Etruria, and by the ruthless desolation of Samnium and Lucania.^[301] Quite as fatal were the results to the economic prosperity of the peninsula. Sulla's confiscations, following on the civil and social wars, opened the doors wide for a long train of evils. The veterans whom he planted on the lands he had seized^[302] did nothing for agriculture, and swelled the growing numbers of the turbulent and discontented.^[303] The “Sullan men” became as great an object of fear and dislike as the “Sullan reign.”^[304] The latifundia increased with startling rapidity—whole territories passing into the hands of greedy partisans.^[305] Wide tracts of land, confiscated but never allotted, ran to waste.^[306] In all but a few districts of Italy the free population finally and completely disappeared from the open country; and life and property were rendered insecure by the brigandage which now developed unchecked, and in which the herdsmen slaves played a prominent part. The outbreaks of Spartacus in 681. Constitutional legislation of Sulla. 73, and of Catiline ten years later, were significant commentaries on this part of Sulla's work.^[307] His constitutional legislation, while it included many useful administrative reforms, is marked by as violent a spirit of partisanship, and as apparently wilful a blindness to the future. The re-establishment on a legal basis of the ascendancy which custom had so long accorded to the senate was his main object. With this purpose he had already, 666. when consul in 88, made the senatus auctoritas legally necessary for proposals to the assembly. He now as dictator^[308] followed this up by crippling the power of the magistracy, which had been the most effective weapon in the hands of the senate's opponents. The legislative freedom of the tribunes was already hampered by the necessity of obtaining the senate's sanction; in addition, Sulla restricted their wide powers of interference (intercessio) to their original purpose of protecting individual plebeians,^[309] and discredited the office by prohibiting a tribune from holding any subsequent office in the state.^[310] The control of the courts (quaestiones perpetuae) was taken from the equestrian order and restored to the senate.^[311] To prevent the people from suddenly installing and keeping in high office a second Marius, he re-enacted the old law against re-election,^[312] and made legally binding the custom which required a man to mount up gradually to the consulship through the lower offices.^[313] His increase of the number of praetors from six to eight,^[314] and of quaestors to twenty,^[315] though required by administrative necessities, tended, by enlarging the numbers and further dividing the authority of the magistrates, to render them still more dependent upon the central direction of the senate. Lastly, he replaced the pontifical and augural colleges in the hands of the senatorial nobles, by enacting that vacancies 650. in them should, as before the lex Domitia (104), be filled up by co-optation.^[316] It cannot be said that Sulla was successful in fortifying the republican system against the dangers which menaced it from without. He accepted as an accomplished fact the enfranchisement of the Italians,^[317] but he made no provision to guard against the consequent reduction of the comitia to an absurdity,^[318] and with them of the civic government which rested upon them, or to organize an effective administrative system for the Italian communities.^[319] Of all men, too, Sulla had the best reason to appreciate the dangers to be feared from the growing independence of governors and generals in the provinces, and from the transformation of the old civic militia into a group of professional armies, devoted only to a successful leader, and with the weakest possible sense of allegiance to the state. He had himself, as proconsul of Asia, contemptuously and successfully defied the home government, and he, more than any other Roman general, had taught his soldiers to look only to their leader, and to think only of booty.^[320] Yet, beyond a few inadequate regulations, there is no evidence that Sulla dealt with these burning questions, the settlement of which was among the greatest of the achievements of Augustus.^[321] One administrative reform of real importance must, lastly, be set down to his credit. The judicial procedure first established in 149 for the trial of cases of magisterial 605-673. extortion in the provinces, and applied between 149 and 81 to cases of treason and bribery, Sulla extended so as to bring under it the chief criminal offences, and thus laid the foundations of the Roman criminal law.^[322]

The Sullan system stood for nine years, and was then overthrown—as it had been established—by a successful soldier. Overthrow of the Sullan constitution, 70 = 684. It was the fortune of Cn. Pompeius, a favourite officer of Sulla, first of all to violate in his own person the fundamental principles of the constitution re-established by his old chief, and then to overturn it. In Spain the Marian governor Q. Sertorius (see Sertorius) had defeated one after another of the proconsuls sent out by the senate, and was already in 77 master of all Hither Spain. To meet the crisis, Pompey, who was not yet thirty, and had never held even the quaestorship, was sent out to Spain with proconsular authority.^[323] Still Sertorius held out, until in 73 he was 681. 683. 681. foully murdered by his own officers. The native tribes who had loyally stood by him submitted, and Pompey early in 71 returned with his troops to Italy, where, during his absence in Spain, an event had occurred which had shown Roman society with startling plainness how near it stood to revolution. In 73 Spartacus,^[324] a Thracian slave, escaped with seventy others from a gladiators' training school at Capua. In an incredibly short time he found himself at the head of 70,000 runaway slaves, outlaws, brigands and impoverished peasants, and for two years terrorized Italy, routed the legions sent against him, and even threatened Rome. He was at length defeated and slain by the praetor, M. Licinius Crassus, in Apulia. In Rome itself the various 676. classes and parties hostile to the Sullan system had, ever since Sulla's death in 78, been incessantly agitating for the repeal of his most obnoxious laws, and needed only a leader in order successfully to attack a government discredited by failure at home and abroad. With the return of Pompey Pompey as consul. 684. from Spain their opportunity came, Pompey, who understood politics as little as Marius, was anxious to obtain a triumph, the consulship for the next year (70), and as the natural consequence of this an important command in the East. The opposition wanted his name and support, and a bargain was soon struck. Pompey and with him Marcus Licinius Crassus, the real conqueror of Spartacus, were elected consuls, almost in the presence of their troops, which lay encamped outside the gates in readiness to assist at the triumph and ovation granted to their respective leaders. Pompey lost no time in performing his part of the agreement. The tribunes regained their prerogatives.^[325] The “perpetual courts” (quaestiones perpetuae) were taken out of the hands of the senatorial judices, who had outdone the equestrian order in scandalous corruption,^[326] and finally the censors, the first since 86 B.C., purged the senate of the more worthless and disreputable of Sulla's partisans.^[327] The victory was complete; but for the future its chief significance lay in the clearness with which it showed that the final decision in matters political lay with neither of the two great parties in Rome, but with the holder of the military authority. The tribunes ceased to be political leaders and became lieutenants of the military commanders, and the change was fatal to the dignity of politics in the city. Men became conscious of the unreality of the old constitutional controversies, indifferent to the questions which agitated the forum and the curia, and contemptuously ready to alter or disregard the constitution itself when it stood in the way of interests nearer to their hearts.

When his consulship ended, Pompey impatiently awaited at the hands of the politicians he had befriended the further Gabinian and Manilian laws. 684-87. 687, 688. gift of a foreign command. He declined an ordinary province, and from the end of 70 to 67 he remained at Rome in a somewhat affectedly dignified seclusion.^[328] But in 67 and 66 the laws of Gabinius and Manilius gave him all and more than all that he expected (see Pompey). By the former he obtained the sole command for three years against the Mediterranean pirates.^[329] He was to have supreme authority over all Roman magistrates in the provinces throughout the Mediterranean and over the coasts for 50 miles inland. Fifteen legati, all of praetorian rank, were assigned to him, with two hundred ships, and as many troops as he thought desirable. The Manilian law transferred from Lucullus and Glabrio to Pompey the conduct of the Mithradatic War in Asia, and with it the entire control of Roman policy and interests in the East.^[330] The unrepublican character of the position thus granted to Pompey, and the dangers of the precedent established, were clearly enough pointed out by such moderate men as Q. Lutatius Catulus, the “father of the senate,” and by the orator Hortensius—but in vain. Both laws were supported, not only by the tribunes and the populace, but by the whole influence of the publicani and negotiatores, whose interests in the East were at stake.

Pompey left Rome in 67. In a marvellously short space of time he freed the Mediterranean from the Cilician pirates and established Roman authority in Cilicia itself. He then crushed Mithradates, added Syria to the list of Roman provinces, and led the Roman legions to the Euphrates and the Caspian, leaving no power capable of disputing with Rome the sovereignty 687, 692. Caesar. 684. of western Asia.^[331] He did not return to Italy till towards the end of 62. The interval was marked in Rome by the rise to political importance of Caesar and Cicero, and by Catiline's attempt at revolution. As the nephew of Marius and the son-in-law of Cinna, Caesar possessed a strong hereditary claim to the leadership of the popular and Marian party.^[332] He had already taken part in the agitation for the restoration of the tribunate; he had supported the Manilian law; and, when Pompey's withdrawal left the field clear for other competitors, he stepped at once into the front rank on the popular side.^[333] He took upon himself, as their nearest representative, the task of clearing the memory and avenging the wrongs of the great popular leaders, Marius, Cinna and Saturninus. He publicly reminded the people of Marius's services, and set up again upon the Capitol the trophies of the Cimbric War. He endeavoured to bring to justice, not only the ringleaders in Sulla's bloody work of proscription, but even the murderers of Saturninus, and vehemently pleaded the cause of the children of the proscribed. While thus carrying on in genuine Roman fashion the feud of his family, he attracted the sympathies of the Italians by his efforts to procure the Roman franchise for the Latin communities beyond the Po, and won the affections of the populace in Rome and its immediate neighbourhood by the splendour of the 689. games which he gave as curule aedile (65), and by his lavish expenditure upon the improvement of the Appian Way. But these measures were with him only means to the further end of creating for himself a position such as that which Pompey had already won; and this ulterior aim he pursued with an audacious indifference to constitutional forms and usages. His coalition with Crassus, soon after Pompey's departure, secured him an ally whose colossal wealth and wide financial connexions were of inestimable value, and whose vanity and inferiority of intellect rendered him a willing tool. 689. 691. The story of his attempted coup d'état in January 65 is probably false,^[334] but it is evident that by the beginning of 63 he was bent on reaping the reward of his exertions by obtaining from the people an extraordinary command abroad, which should secure his position before Pompey's return; and the agrarian law proposed early that year by the tribune P. Servilius Rullus had for its object the creation, in favour of Caesar and Crassus, of a commission with powers so wide as to place its members almost on a level with Pompey himself.^[335] It was at this moment when all seemed going well, that Caesar's hopes were dashed to the ground by Catiline's desperate outbreak, which not only discredited every one connected with the popular party, but directed the suspicions of the well-to-do classes against Caesar himself, as a possible accomplice in Catiline's revolutionary schemes.^[336]

The same wave of indignation and suspicion which for the moment checked Caesar's rise carried Marcus Tullius Cicero to Cicero. the height of his fortunes. Cicero, as a politician, has been equally misjudged by friends and foes. That he was deficient in courage, that he was vain, and that he attempted the impossible, may be admitted at once. But he was neither a brilliant and unscrupulous adventurer nor an aimless trimmer, nor yet a devoted champion merely of senatorial ascendancy.^[337] He was a representative man, with a numerous following, and a policy which was naturally suggested to him by the circumstances of his birth, connexions and profession, and which, impracticable as it proved to be, was yet consistent, intelligible and high-minded. Born at Arpinum, he cherished like all Arpinates the memory of his great fellow-townsman Marius, the friend of the Italians, the saviour of Italy and the irreconcilable foe of Sulla and the nobles. A “municipal” himself, his chosen friends and his warmest supporters were found among the well-to-do classes in the Italian towns.^[338] Unpopular with the Roman aristocracy, who despised him as a peregrinus,^[339] and with the Roman populace, he was the trusted leader of the Italian middle class, “the true Roman people,” as he proudly styles them. It was they who carried his election 691, 696. 705. for the consulship^[340] (63), who in 58 insisted on his recall from exile,^[341] and it was his influence with them which made Caesar so anxious to win him over in 49. He represented their antipathy alike to socialistic schemes and to aristocratic exclusiveness, and their old-fashioned simplicity of life in contrast with the cosmopolitan luxury of the capital.^[342] By birth, too, he belonged to the equestrian order, the foremost representatives of which were indeed still the publicani and negotiatores, but which since the enfranchisement of Italy included also the substantial burgesses of the Italian towns and the smaller “squires” of the country districts. With them, too, Cicero was at one in their dread of democratic excesses and their social and political jealousy of the nobiles.^[343] Lastly, as a lawyer and a scholar, he was passionately attached to the ancient constitution. His political ideal was the natural outcome of these circumstances. He advocated the maintenance of the old constitution, but not as it was understood by the extreme politicians of the right and left. The senate was to be the supreme directing council,^[344] but the senate of Cicero's dreams was not an oligarchic assemblage of nobles, but a body freely open to all citizens, and representing the worth of the community.^[345] The magistrates, while deferring to the senate's authority, were to be at once vigorous and public-spirited; and the assembly itself which elected the magistrates and passed the laws was to consist, not of the “mob of the forum,” but of the true Roman people throughout Italy.^[346] For the realization of this ideal he looked, above all things, to the establishment of cordial relations between the senate and nobles in Rome and the great middle class of Italy represented by the equestrian order, between the capital and the country towns and districts. This was the concordia ordinum, the consensus Italiae, for which he laboured.^[347]

Cicero's election to the consulship for 63 over the heads of Caesar's nominees, Antonius and Catiline, was mainly The conspiracy of Catiline, 63 = 691. the work of the Italian middle class, already rendered uneasy both by the rumours which were rife of revolutionary schemes and of Caesar's boundless ambition, and by the numerous disquieting signs of disturbance noticeable in Italy. The new consul vigorously set himself to discharge the trust placed in him. He defeated the insidious proposals of Rullus for Caesar's aggrandizement and assisted in quashing the prosecution of Gaius Rabirius (q.v.). But with the consular elections in the autumn of 63 a fresh danger arose from a different quarter. The “conspiracy of Catiline” (see Catiline) was not the work of the popular party, and still less was it an unselfish attempt at reform; Catiline himself was a patrician, who had held high office, and possessed considerable ability and courage; but he was bankrupt in character and in purse, and two successive defeats in the consular elections had rendered him desperate. To retrieve his broken fortunes by violence was a course which was only too readily suggested by the history of the last forty years, and materials for a conflagration abounded on all sides. The danger to be feared from his intrigues lay in the state of Italy, which made a revolt against society and the established government only too likely if once a leader presented himself, and it was such a revolt that Catiline endeavoured to organize. Bankrupt nobles like himself, Sullan veterans and the starving peasants whom they had dispossessed of their holdings, outlaws of every description, the slave population of Rome, and the wilder herdsmen-slaves of the Apulian pastures, were all enlisted under his banner, and attempts were even made to excite disaffection among the newly conquered people of southern Gaul and the warlike tribes who still cherished the memory of Sertorius in Spain. In Etruria, the seat and centre of agrarian distress and discontent, a rising actually took place headed by a Sullan centurion, but the spread of the revolt was checked by Cicero's vigorous measures. Catiline fled from Rome, and died fighting with desperate courage at the head of his motley force of old soldiers, peasants and slaves. His accomplices in Rome were arrested, and, after an unavailing protest from Caesar, the senate authorized the consuls summarily to put them to death.

The Catilinarian outbreak had been a blow to Caesar, whose schemes it interrupted, but to Cicero it brought not only popularity and honour, but, as he believed, the realization of his political ideal. But Pompey was now on his way home,^[348] and Return of Pompey from Asia. again as in 70 the political future seemed to depend on the attitude which the successful general would assume; Pompey himself looked simply to the attainment by the help of one political party or another of his immediate aims, which at present were the ratification of his arrangements in Asia and a grant of land for his troops. It was the impracticable jealousy of his personal rivals in the senate, aided by the versatility of Caesar, who presented himself not as his rival but as his ally, which drove Pompey once Coalition of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus, 60 = 694. more, in spite of Cicero's efforts, into the camp of what was still nominally the popular party. In 60, on Caesar's return from his proprietorship in Spain, the coalition was formed which is known by the somewhat misleading title of the First Triumvirate.^[349] Pompey was ostensibly the head of this new alliance, and in return for the satisfaction of his own demands he undertook to support Caesar's candidature for the consulship. The wealth and influence of Crassus were enlisted in the same cause, and the publicani were secured by a promise of release from their bargain for collecting the taxes of Asia. Cicero was under no illusions as to the significance of this coalition. It scattered to the winds his dreams of a stable and conservative 695. republic. The year 59 saw the republic powerless in the hands of three citizens. Caesar as consul procured the ratification of Pompey's acts in Asia, granted to the publicani the relief refused by the senate, and carried an agrarian law of the new type, which provided for the purchase of lands for allotment at the cost of the treasury and for the assignment of the rich ager Campanus.^[350] But Caesar aimed at more than the carrying of laws in the teeth of the senate or any party Caesar's command in Gaul. victory in the forum. An important military command was essential to him. An obedient tribune, P. Vatinius, was found, and by the lex Vatinia he was given for five years the command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, to which was added by a decree of the senate Transalpine Gaul also.^[351] This command not only opened to him a great military career, but enabled him, as the master of the valley of the Po, to keep an effective watch on the course of affairs in Italy.

Early the next year the attack upon himself which Cicero had foreseen was made. P. Clodius (q.v.) as tribune brought forward a law enacting that any one who had put a Roman citizen to death without trial by the people should be interdicted from fire and water. Cicero, Banishment and recall of Cicero,
58–57 = 696–97. finding himself deserted even by Pompey, left Rome in a panic, and by a second Clodian law he was declared to be outlawed.^[352] With Caesar away in his province, and Cicero banished, Clodius was for the time master in Rome. But, absolute as he was in the streets, and recklessly as he parodied the policy of the Gracchi by violent attacks on the senate, his tribunate merely illustrated the anarchy which now inevitably followed the withdrawal of a strong controlling hand. A reaction speedily followed. Pompey, bewildered and alarmed by Clodius's violence, at last bestirred himself. Cicero's recall was decreed by the senate, and early in August 57 in the comitia centuriata, to which his Italian supporters flocked in crowds, a law was passed revoking the sentence of outlawry passed upon him.

Intoxicated by the acclamations which greeted him, and encouraged by Pompey's support, and by the salutary effects of Clodius's excesses, Cicero's hopes rose high.^[353] With indefatigable energy he strove to reconstruct a solid constitutional party, but only to fail once more. Renewal of the coalition, 65 = 698. Pompey was irritated by the hostility of a powerful section in the senate, who thwarted his desires for a fresh command and even encouraged Clodius in insulting the conqueror of the East. Caesar became alarmed at the reports which reached him that the repeal of his agrarian law was threatened and that the feeling against the coalition was growing in strength; above all, he was anxious for a renewal of his five years' command. He acted at once, and in the celebrated 698.
699. conference at Luca (56) the alliance of the three self-constituted rulers of Rome was renewed. Cicero succumbed to the inevitable and withdrew in despair from public life. Pompey and Crassus became consuls for 55. Caesar's command was renewed for another five years, and to each of his two allies important provinces were assigned for a similar period—Pompey receiving the two Spains and Africa, and Crassus Syria.^[354] The coalition now divided between them the control of the empire. For the future the question was, how long the coalition itself would last. Its duration proved to be Death of Crassus,
53 = 701.
700. short. In 53 Crassus was defeated and slain by the Parthians at Carrhae, and in Rome the course of events slowly forced Pompey into an attitude of hostility to Caesar. The year 54 brought with it a renewal of the riotous anarchy which had disgraced Rome in 58-57. Conscious of its own helplessness, the senate, with the eager assent of all respectable citizens, dissuaded Pompey from leaving Italy; and he accordingly left his provinces to be governed by his legates. But the anarchy and confusion only grew worse, and even strict constitutionalists like Cicero talked of the necessity of investing Pompey with some extraordinary powers for the preservation of order.^[355] At last in 52 he was elected sole consul, and not only 50, but Pompey sole consul, 52 = 702. his provincial command was prolonged for five years more, and fresh troops were assigned him.^[356] The rôle of “saviour of society” thus thrust upon Pompey was one which flattered his vanity, but it entailed consequences which it is probable he did not foresee, for it brought him into close alliance with the senate, and in the senate there was a powerful party who were resolved to force him into heading the attack they could not successfully make without him upon Caesar. It was known that the latter, whose command 705.
706.

Proposed recall of Caesar. 703-4. 705. expired in March 49, but who in the ordinary course of things would not have been replaced by his successor until January 48, was anxious to be allowed to stand for his second consulship in the autumn of 49 without coming in person to Rome.^[357] His opponents in the senate were equally bent on bringing his command to an end at the legal time, and so obliging him to disband his troops and stand for the consulship as a private person, or, if he kept his command, on preventing his standing for the consulship. Through 51 and 50 the discussions in the senate and the negotiations with Caesar continued, but with no result. On 1st January 49 Caesar made a last offer of compromise. The senate replied by requiring him on pain of outlawry to disband his legions. Two tribunes who supported him were ejected from the senate-house, and the magistrates with Pompey were authorized to take measures to protect the republic. Caesar hesitated no longer; Caesar crosses the Rubicon, 49 = 705.

709. he crossed the Rubicon and invaded Italy. The rapidity of his advance astounded and bewildered his foes. Pompey, followed by the consuls, by the majority of the senate and a long train of nobles, abandoned Italy as untenable, and crossed into Greece.^[358] At the end of March Caesar entered Rome as the master of Italy. Four years later, after the final victory of Munda (45), he became the undisputed master of the Roman world.^[359]

The task which Caesar had to perform was no easy one. It came upon him suddenly; for there is no sufficient reason to believe that Caesar had long premeditated revolution, or that he had previously aspired to anything more than such a position as that which Pompey had Dictatorship of Caesar, 48-44 =
706–10. already won, a position unrepublican indeed, but accepted by republicans as inevitable.^[360] War was forced upon him as the alternative to political suicide, but success in war brought the responsibilities of nearly absolute power, and Caesar's genius must be held to have shown itself in the masterly fashion in which he grasped the situation, rather than in the supposed sagacity with which he is said to have foreseen and prepared for it. In so far as he failed, his failure was mainly due to the fact that his tenure of power was too short for the work which he was required to perform. From the very first moment when Pompey's ignominious retreat left him master of Italy, he made it clear that he was neither a second Sulla nor even the reckless anarchist which many believed him to be.^[361] The Roman and Italian public were first startled by the masterly rapidity and energy of his movements, and then agreeably surprised by his lenity and moderation. No proscriptions or confiscations followed his victories, and all his acts evinced an unmistakable desire to effect a sober and reasonable settlement of the pressing questions of the hour; of this, and of his almost superhuman energy, the long list of measures he carried out or planned is sufficient proof. The “children of the proscribed” were at length restored to their rights,^[362] and with them many of the refugees^[363] who had found shelter in Caesar's camp during the two or three years immediately preceding the war; but the extreme men among his supporters soon realized that their hopes of novae tabulae and grants of land were illusory. In allotting lands to his veterans, Caesar carefully avoided any disturbance of existing owners and occupiers,^[364] and the mode in which he dealt with the economic crisis produced by the war seems to have satisfied all reasonable men.^[365] It had been a common charge against Caesar in former days that he paid excessive court to the populace of Rome, and now that he was master he still dazzled and delighted them by the splendour of the spectacles he provided, and by the liberality of his largesses. But he was no indiscriminate flatterer of the mob. The popular clubs and gilds which had helped to organize the anarchy of the last few years were dissolved.^[366] A strict inquiry was made into the distribution of the monthly doles of corn, and the number of recipients was reduced by one-half;^[367] finally, the position of the courts of justice was raised by the abolition of the popular element among the judices.^[368] Nor did Caesar shrink from the attempt, in which so many had failed before him, to mitigate the twin evils which were ruining the prosperity of Italy—the concentration of a pauper population in the towns, and the denudation and desolation of the country districts. His strong hand carried out the scheme so often proposed by the popular leaders since the days of Gaius Gracchus, the colonization of Carthage and Corinth. Allotments of land on a large scale were made in Italy; decaying towns were reinforced by fresh drafts of settlers; on the large estates and cattle farms the owners were required to find employment for a certain amount of free labour; and a slight and temporary stimulus was given to Italian industry by the reimposition of harbour dues upon foreign goods.^[369]

The reform of the calendar, which is described elsewhere,^[370] completes a record of administrative reform which entitles Caesar to the praise of having governed well, whatever may be thought of the validity of his title to govern at all. But how did Caesar deal with what was after all the greatest problem which he was called upon to solve, the establishment of a satisfactory government for the Empire? One point indeed was already settled. Some centralization of the executive authority was indispensable, and this part of his work Caesar thoroughly performed. From the moment when he seized the moneys in the treasury on his first entry into Rome^[371] down to the day of his death, he recognized no other authority but his throughout the Empire. He alone directed the policy of Rome in foreign affairs; the legions were led, and the provinces governed, not by independent magistrates, but by his “legates”;^[372] and the title Imperator which he adopted was intended to express the absolute and unlimited nature of the imperium he claimed, as distinct from the limited spheres of authority possessed by republican magistrates.^[373] In so centralizing the executive authority over the Empire at large, Caesar was but developing the policy implied in the Gabinian and Manilian laws, and the precedent he established was closely followed by his successors. It was otherwise with the more difficult question of the form under which this new executive authority should be exercised and the relation it should hold to the republican constitution. We must be content to remain in ignorance of the precise shape which Caesar intended ultimately to give to the new system. The theory that he contemplated a revival of the old Roman kingship^[374] is supported by little more than the popular gossip of the day, and the form under which he actually wielded his authority can hardly have been regarded by so sagacious a statesman as more than a provisional arrangement. This form was that of the dictatorship; and in favour of the choice it might have been urged that the dictatorship was the office naturally marked out by republican tradition as the one best suited to carry the state safely through a serious crisis, that the powers it conveyed were wide, that it was as dictator that Sulla had reorganized the state, and that a dictatorship had been spoken of as the readiest means of 701-2. legalizing Pompey's protectorate of the Republic in 53-52. The choice nevertheless was a bad one. It was associated with those very Sullan traditions from which Caesar was most anxious to sever himself; it implied necessarily the suspension for the time of all constitutional government; and, lastly, the dictatorship as held by Caesar could not even plead that it conformed to the old rules and traditions of the office. The “perpetual dictatorship” granted him after his crowning 709. victory at Munda (45) was a contradiction in terms and a repudiation of constitutional government which excited the bitterest animosity.^[375]

A second question, hardly less important, was that of the position to be assigned to the old constitution. So far as Caesar himself was concerned, the answer was for the time sufficiently clear. The old constitution was not formally abrogated. The senate met and deliberated; the assembly passed laws and elected magistrates; there were still consuls, praetors, aediles, quaestors and tribunes; and Caesar himself, like his successors, professed to hold his authority by the will of the people. But senate, assembly and magistrates were all alike subordinated to the paramount authority of the dictator; and this subordination was, in appearance at least, more direct and complete under the rule of Caesar than under that of Augustus. Caesar was by nature as impatient as Augustus was tolerant of established forms; and, dazzled by the splendour of his career of victory and by his ubiquitous energy and versatility, the Roman public, high and low, prostrated themselves before him and heaped honours upon him with a reckless profusion which made the existence of any authority by the side of his own an absurdity.^[376] Hence under Caesar the old constitution was repeatedly disregarded, or suspended in a way which contrasted unfavourably with the more respectful attitude assumed by Augustus. For months together Rome was left without any regular magistrates, and was governed like a subject town by Caesar's prefects.^[377] At another time a tribune was seen exercising authority outside the city bounds and invested with the imperium of a praetor.^[378] At the elections, candidates appeared before the people backed by a written recommendation from the dictator, which was equivalent to a command.^[379] Finally, the senate itself was transformed out of all likeness to its former self by the raising of its numbers to 900, and by the admission of old soldiers, sons of freedmen and even “semi-barbarous Gauls.”^[380] But, though Caesar's high-handed conduct in this respect was not imitated by his immediate successors, yet the main lines of their policy were laid down by him. These were—(1) the municipalization of the old republican constitution, and (2) its subordination to the paramount authority of the master of the legions and the provinces. In the first case he only carried further a change already in progress. Of late years the senate had been rapidly losing its hold over the Empire at large. Even the ordinary proconsuls were virtually independent potentates, ruling their provinces as they chose, and disposing absolutely of legions which recognized no authority but theirs. The 673. consuls and praetors of each year had since 81 been stationed in Rome, and immersed in purely municipal business; and, lastly, since the enfranchisement of Italy, the comitia, though still recognized as the ultimate source of all authority, had become little more than assemblies of the city populace, and their claim to represent the true Roman people was indignantly questioned, even by republicans like Cicero. The concentration in Caesar's hands of all authority outside Rome completely and finally severed all real connexion between the old institutions of the Republic of Rome and the government of the Roman Empire. But the institutions of the Republic not merely became, what they had originally been, the local institutions of the city of Rome; they were also subordinated even within these narrow limits to the paramount authority of the man who held in his hands the army and the provinces. Autocratic abroad, at home he was the chief magistrate of the commonwealth; and this position was marked, in his case as in that of those who followed him, by a combination in his person of various powers, and by a general right of precedence which left no limits to his authority but such as he chose to impose upon himself. During the greater 706. part of his reign he was consul as well as dictator. In 48, after his victory at Pharsalia, he was given the tribunicia potestas for life,^[381] and after his second success at Thapsus the praefectura morum for three years.^[382] As chief magistrate he convenes and presides in the senate, nominates candidates, conducts elections, carries laws in the assembly and administers justice in court.^[383] Finally, as a reminder that the chief magistrate of Rome was also the autocratic ruler of the Empire, he wore even in Rome the laurel wreath and triumphal dress, and carried the sceptre of the victorious imperator.^[384]

Nor are we without some clue as to the policy which Caesar had sketched out for himself in the administration of the Empire, the government of which he had centralized in his own hands. The much-needed work of rectifying the frontiers^[385] he was forced, by his premature death, to leave to other hands, but within the frontiers he anticipated Augustus in lightening the financial burdens of the provincials,^[386] and in establishing a stricter control over the provincial governors,^[387] while he went beyond him in his desire to consolidate the Empire by extending the Roman franchise^[388] and admitting provincials to a share in the government.^[389] He completed the Romanization of Italy by his enfranchisement of the Transpadane Gauls,^[390] and by establishing throughout the peninsula a uniform system of municipal government, which under his successors was gradually extended to the provinces.^[391]

On the eve of his departure for the East, to avenge the Attempted restoration of the republic, 44-43 = 710-11. 710. 723. death of Crassus and humble the power of Parthia, Caesar fell a victim to the wounded pride of the republican nobles; and between the day of his death (March 15, 44) and that on which Octavian defeated Antony at Actium (September 2, 31) lies a dreary period of anarchy and bloodshed.^[392]

For a moment, in spite of the menacing attitude of Caesar's self-constituted representative Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony), it seemed to one man at least as if the restoration of republican government was possible. With indefatigable energy Cicero strove to enlist the senate, the people, and above all the provincial governors in support of the old constitution. But, though his eloquence now and again carried all before it in senate-house and forum, it was powerless to alter the course 711. The second triumvirate, 43-28 = 711-726. 717. 714. of events. By the beginning of 43 civil war had recommenced; in the autumn Antony was already threatening an invasion of Italy at the head of seventeen legions. Towards the end of October Antony and his ally M. Aemilius Lepidus coalesced with the young Octavian, who had been recently elected consul at the age of twenty, in spite of senatorial opposition; and the coalition was legalized by the creation of the extraordinary commission for the “reorganization of the commonwealth” known as the “Second Triumvirate.”^[393] It was appointed for a period of five years, and was continued in 37 for five years more.^[394] The rule of the triumvirs was inaugurated in the Sullan fashion by a proscription, foremost among the victims of which was Cicero himself.^[395] In the next year the defeat of M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus at Philippi, by the combined forces of Octavian and Antony, destroyed the last hopes of the republican party.^[396] In 40 a threatened rupture between the two victors was avoided by the treaty concluded at Brundusium. Antony married Octavian's sister Octavia, and took command of the eastern half of the empire; Octavian appropriated Italy and the West; while Lepidus was forced to content himself with Africa.^[397] For the next twelve years, while Antony was indulging in dreams of founding for himself and Cleopatra an empire in the East, and shocking Roman feeling by his wild excesses and his affectation of oriental magnificence,^[398] Octavian was patiently consolidating his power. Lepidus his fellow-triumvir was in 718. 719. 722. 36 ejected from Africa and banished to Circeii, while Sextus Pompeius, who had since his defeat at Munda maintained a semi-piratical ascendancy in the western Mediterranean, was decisively defeated in the same year, and his death in 35 left Octavian sole master of the West. The inevitable trial of strength between himself and Antony was not long delayed. In 32 Antony openly challenged the hostility of Octavian by divorcing Octavia in favour of the beautiful and daring Egyptian princess, with whom, as the heiress of the Ptolemies, he aspired to share the empire of the Eastern world. By a decree of the senate Antony was declared deposed from his command, and war was declared against 723. 724. 725. Queen Cleopatra.^[399] On the 2nd of September 31 was fought the battle of Actium.^[400] Octavian's victory was complete. Antony and Cleopatra committed suicide (30), and the Eastern provinces submitted in 29. Octavian returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph and mark the end of the long-continued anarchy by closing the temple of Janus;^[401] at the end of the next year he formally laid down the extraordinary powers which 711. he had held since 43, and a regular government was established.

III. The Empire.

Period I.: The Princepate, 27 B.C.-A.D. 284—(a) The Constitution of the Princepate.—The conqueror of Antonius at Actium, the great-nephew and heir of the dictator Caesar, was now summoned, by the general consent of a world wearied out with twenty years of war and anarchy,^[402] to the task of establishing a government which should as far as possible respect the forms and traditions of the Republic, without sacrificing that centralization of authority which experience had shown to be necessary for the integrity and stability of the Empire. It was a task for which Octavian was admirably fitted. To great administrative capacity and a quiet tenacity of purpose he united deliberate caution and unfailing tact; while his bourgeois birth^[403] and genuinely Italian sympathies enabled him to win the confidence of the Roman community to an extent impossible for Caesar, with his dazzling pre-eminence of patrician descent, his daring disregard of forms and his cosmopolitan tastes.

The new system which was formally inaugurated by Octavian in 28-27 B.C.^[404] assumed the shape of a restoration of the republic The Augustan system, 28-27 = 726-27. under the leadership of a princeps.^[405] Octavian voluntarily resigned the extraordinary powers which he had system, held since 43, and, to quote his own words, “handed over the republic to the control of the senate and people of Rome.”^[406] The old constitutional machinery was once more set in motion; the senate, assembly and magistrates resumed their functions;^[407] and Octavian himself was hailed as the “restorer of the commonwealth and the champion of freedom.”^[408] It was not so easy to determine what relation he himself, the actual master of the Roman world, should occupy towards this revived republic. His abdication, in any real sense of the word, would have simply thrown everything back into confusion. The interests of peace and order required that he should retain at least the substantial part of his authority;^[409] and this object was in fact accomplished, and the rule of the emperors founded, in a manner which has no parallel in history. Any revival of the kingly title was out of the question, and Octavian himself expressly refused the dictatorship.^[410] Nor was any new office created or any new official title invented for his benefit. But by senate and people he was invested according to the old constitutional forms with certain powers, as many citizens had been before him, and so took his place by the side of the lawfully appointed magistrates of the republic;—only, to mark his pre-eminent dignity, as the first of them all, the senate decreed that he should take as an additional cognomen that of “Augustus,”^[411] while in common parlance he was henceforth styled princeps, a simple title of courtesy, familiar to republican usage, and conveying no other idea than that of a recognized primacy and precedence over his fellow-citizens.^[412] The ideal sketched by Cicero in his De Republica, of a constitutional president of a free republic, was apparently realized; but it was only in appearance. For in fact the special prerogatives conferred upon Octavian gave him back in substance the autocratic authority he had resigned, and as between the restored republic and its new princeps the balance of power was overwhelmingly on the side of the latter.

Octavian had held the imperium since 43; in 33, it 711, 721. The settlement of 27 = 727. 727. is true, the powers of the triumvirate had legally expired, but he had continued to wield his authority, as he himself puts it,^[413] “by universal consent.” In 27 he received a formal grant of the imperium from the senate and people for the term of ten years, and his provincia was defined as including all the provinces in which military authority was required and legions were stationed.^[414] He was declared commander-in-chief of the Roman army, and granted the exclusive right of levying troops, of making war and peace, and of concluding treaties.^[415] As consul, moreover, he not only continued to be the chief magistrate of the state at home, but took precedence, in virtue of his majus imperium, over the governors of the “unarmed provinces,” which were still nominally under the control of the senate. Thus the so-called “restoration of the republic” was in essence the recognition by law of the personal supremacy of Octavian, or Augustus, as he must henceforth be called.

In 23 an important change was made in the formal basis of Augustus's authority. In that year he laid down the consulship The re-settlement of 23 = 731. 723. which he had held each year since 31, and could therefore only exert his imperium pro consule, like the ordinary governor of a province. He lost his authority as chief magistrate in Rome and his precedence over the governors of senatorial provinces. To remedy these defects a series of extraordinary offices were pressed upon his acceptance; but he refused them all,^[416] and caused a number of enactments to be passed which determined the character of the principate for the next three centuries.^[417] Firstly, he was exempted from the disability attaching to the tenure of the imperium by one who was not an actual magistrate, and permitted to retain and exercise it in Rome. Secondly, his imperium was declared to be equal with that of the consuls, and therefore superior to that of all other holders of that power. Thirdly, he was granted equal rights with the consuls of convening the senate and introducing business, of nominating candidates at elections,^[418] and of issuing edicts.^[419] Lastly, he was placed on a level with the consuls in outward rank. Twelve lictors were assigned to him and an official seat between those of the consuls themselves (Dio liv. 10).

Thus the proconsular authority^[420] was for the first time admitted within the walls of Rome; but Augustus was too Tribunicia potestas. cautious a statesman to proclaim openly the fact that the power which he wielded in the city was the same as that exercised in camps and provinces by a Roman military commander. Hence he sought for a title which should disguise the nature of his authority, and found it in the “tribunician power,” which had been conferred upon him for life 718. 731. 731. in 36, and was well suited, from its urban and democratic traditions, to serve in Rome as “a term to express his supreme position.”^[421] From 23 onwards the tribunicia potestas appears after his name in official inscriptions, together with the number indicating the period during which it had been held (also reckoned from 23); it was in virtue of this power that Augustus introduced the social reforms which the times demanded;^[422] and, though far inferior to the imperium in actual importance, it ranked with or even above it as a distinctive prerogative of the emperor or his chosen colleague.^[423]

The imperium and the tribunicia potestas were the two pillars upon which the authority of Augustus rested, and the 731. 749, 752. 742. 732. other offices and privileges conferred upon him were of secondary importance. After 23 he never held the consulship save in 5 and 2 B.C., when he became the colleague of his grandsons on their introduction to public life. He permitted the triumvir Lepidus to retain the chief pontificate until his death, when Augustus naturally became pontifex maximus (12 B.C.).^[424] He proceeded with the like caution in reorganizing the chief departments of the public service in Rome and Italy. The cura annonae, i.e. the supervision of the corn supply of Rome, was entrusted to him in 22 B.C.,^[425] and this important branch of administration thus came under his personal control; but the other boards (curae), created during his reign to take charge of the roads, the water-supply, the regulation of the Tiber and the public buildings, were composed of senators of high rank, and regarded in theory as deriving their authority from the senate.^[426]

Such was the ingenious compromise by which room was found for the master of the legions within the narrow limits of the old Roman constitution. Augustus could say with truth that he had accepted no office which was “contrary to the usage of our ancestors,” and that it was only in dignity that he took precedence of his colleagues. Nevertheless, as every thinking man must have realized, the compromise was unreal, and its significance was ambiguous. It was an arrangement avowedly of an exceptional and temporary character, yet no one could suppose that it would in effect be otherwise than permanent. The powers voted to Augustus were (like those conferred upon 687. 727. Pompey in 67 B.C.) voted only to him, and (save the tribunicia potestas) voted only for a limited time; in 27 he received the imperium for ten years, and it was afterwards renewed for successive periods of five, five, ten and ten years.^[427] In this way the powers of the principate were made coextensive in time with the life of Augustus, but there was absolutely no provision for hereditary or any other form of succession, and various expedients were devised in order to indicate the destined successor of the princeps and to bridge the gap created by his death. Ultimately Augustus associated his stepson Tiberius with himself as co-regent. The imperium and the tribunicia potestas were conferred upon him, and he was thus marked out as the person upon whom the remaining powers of the principate would naturally be bestowed after the death of his stepfather. But succeeding emperors did not always indicate their successors so clearly, and, in direct contrast to the maxim that “the king never dies,” it has been well said that the Roman principate died with the death of the princeps.^[428]

In theory, at least, the Roman world was governed according to the “maxims of Augustus” (Suet. Ner. 10), down to the Changes in the constitution of the principate. time of Diocletian. Even in the 3rd century there is still in name at least, a republic, of which the emperor is in strictness only the chief magistrate, deriving his authority from the senate and people, and with prerogatives limited and defined by law. The case is quite different when we turn from theory to practice. The division of authority between the republic and its chief magistrate became increasingly unequal. Over the provinces the princeps from the first ruled autocratically; and this autocracy reacted upon his position in Rome, so that it became every year more difficult for a ruler so absolute abroad to maintain even the fiction of republican government at home. The republican institutions, with the partial exception of the senate, lose all semblance of authority outside Rome, and even as the municipal institutions of the chief city of the empire they retain but little actual power. The real government even of Rome passes gradually into the hands of imperial prefects and commissioners, and the old magistracies become merely decorations which the emperor bestows at his pleasure. At the same time the rule of the princeps assumes an increasingly personal character, and the whole work of government is silently concentrated in his hands and in those of his own subordinates. Closely connected with this change is the different aspect presented by the history of the empire in Rome and Italy on the one hand and in the provinces on the other. Rome and Italy share in the decline of the republic. Political independence and activity die out; their old pre-eminence and exclusive privileges gradually disappear; and at the same time the weight of the overwhelming power of the princeps, and the abuses of their power by individual principes, press most heavily upon them. On the other hand, in the provinces and on the frontiers, where the imperial system was most needed, and where from the first it had full play, it is seen at its best as developing or protecting an orderly civilization and maintaining the peace of the world.

The decay of the republican institutions had commenced before the revolutionary crisis of 49. It was accelerated by Decay of republican institutions. 705, 726. the virtual suspension of regular government between 49 and 28; and not even the diplomatic deference towards ancient forms which Augustus displayed availed to conceal the unreality of his work of restoration. The comitia received back from him “their ancient rights” (Suet. Aug. 40), and during his The comitia. lifetime they continued to pass laws and to elect magistrates. But after the end of the reign of Tiberius we have only two instances of legislation by the assembly in the ordinary way,^[429] and the law-making of the empire is performed either by decrees of the senate or by imperial edicts and constitutions. Their prerogative of electing magistrates was, even under Augustus, robbed of most of its importance by the control which the princeps exercised over their choice by means of his rights of nomination and commendation, which effectually secured the election of his own nominees.^[430] By Tiberius this restricted prerogative was still further curtailed. The candidates for all magistracies except the consulship were thenceforward nominated and voted for in the senate-house and by the senators,^[431] and only the formal return of the result (renuntiatio) took place in the assembly (Dio lviii. 20). And, though the election of consuls was never thus transferred to the senate, the process of voting seems to have been silently abandoned. In the time of the younger Pliny we hear only of the nomination of the candidates and of their formal renuntiatio in the Campus Martius.^[432] The princeps himself as long as the Principate lasted, continued to receive the tribunicia potestas by a vote of the assembly, and was thus held to derive his authority from the people.^[433]

Adapted from maps in Sieglin's Atlas, by permission of Justus Perthes	Emery Walker sc.

Adapted from maps in Sieglin's Atlas, by permission of Justus Perthes, Gotha.	Emery Walker sc.

This almost complete effacement of the comitia was largely due to the fact that they had ceased to represent anything but The magistracies. the populace of Rome, and the comparatively greater vitality shown by the old magistracies is mainly attributable to the value they continued to possess in the eyes of the Roman upper class. But, though they were eagerly sought (Plin. Epp. ii. 9, vi. 6), and conferred on their holders considerable social distinction, the magistrates ceased, except in name, to be the popularly chosen executive officers of the Roman state. In the administration of the empire at large they had no share, if we except the subordinate duties still assigned to the quaestor in a province. In Rome, to which their sphere of work was limited, they were overshadowed by the dominant authority of the princeps, while their range of duties was increasingly circumscribed by the gradual transference of administrative authority, even within the city, to the emperor and his subordinate officials. And their dependence on the princeps was confirmed by the control he exercised over their appointment. For all candidates the approval, if not the commendation, of the princeps became the indispensable condition of success, and the princeps on his side treated these ancient offices as pieces of preferment with which to reward his adherents or gratify the ambition of Roman nobles. The dignity of the office, too, was impaired by the practice, begun by Caesar and continued by Augustus and his Consulship. successors, of granting the insignia to men who had not held the actual magistracy itself.^[434] The consulship was still the highest post open to the private citizen, and consular rank a necessary qualification for high office in the provinces;^[435] but the actual consuls have scarcely any other duties than those of presiding in the senate and occasionally executing its decrees, while their term of office dwindles from a year to six and finally to two months.^[436] In the age of Tacitus and the younger Pliny, the contrast is striking between the high estimate set on the dignity of the office and the frankness with which its limited Praetorship. Aedileship. Tribunate. Quaestorship. powers and its dependence on the emperor are acknowledged.^[437] The praetors continued to exercise their old jurisdiction with little formal change down at least to the latter half of the second century, but only as subordinate to the higher judicial authority of the emperor.^[438] The aediles retained only such petty police duties as did not pass to one or another of the imperial prefects and commissioners. The tribunate fared still worse, for, by the side of the tribunicia potestas wielded by the princeps, it sank into insignificance.^[439] The quaestorship suffered less change than any other of the old offices. It kept its place as the first step on the ladder of promotion, and there was still a quaestor attached to each governor of a senatorial province, to the consuls in Rome, and to the princeps himself.^[440]

The senate alone among republican institutions retained some importance and influence, and it thus came to be regarded The Senate. as sharing the government of the Empire with the princeps himself. It nominally controlled the administration of Italy and of the “public provinces,” whose governors it appointed. It is to the senate, in theory, that the supreme power reverts in the absence of a princeps. It is by decree of the senate that the new princeps immediately receives his powers and privileges,^[441] though he is still supposed to derive them ultimately from the people. After the cessation of all legislation by the comitia, the only law-making authority, other than that of the princeps by his edicts, was that of the senate by its decrees.^[442] Its judicial authority was co-ordinate with that of the emperor, and at the close of the 1st century we find the senators claiming, as the emperor's “peers,” to be exempt from his jurisdiction.^[443] But in spite of the outward dignity of its position, and of the deference with which it was frequently treated, the senate became gradually almost as powerless in reality as the comitia and the magistracies. The senators continued indeed to be taken as a rule from the ranks of the wealthy, and a high property qualification was established by Augustus as a condition of membership; but this merely enabled the emperors to secure their own ascendancy by subsidizing those whose property fell short of the required standard, and who thus became simply the paid creatures of their imperial patrons.^[444] Admission to the senate was possible only by favour of the emperor, both as controlling the elections to the magistracies, which still gave entrance to the curia, and as invested with the power of directly creating senators by adlectio, a power which from the time of Vespasian onwards was freely used.^[445] As the result, the composition of the senate rapidly altered. Under Augustus and Tiberius it still contained many representatives of the old republican families, whose prestige and ancestral traditions were some guarantee for their independence. But this element soon disappeared. The ranks of the old nobility were thinned by natural decay and by the jealous fears of the last three Claudian emperors. Vespasian^[446] flooded the senate with new men from the municipal towns of Italy and the Latinized provinces of the West. Trajan and Hadrian, both provincials themselves, carried on the same policy, and by the close of the 2nd century even the Greek provinces of the East had their representatives in the senate. Some, no doubt, of these provincials, who constituted the great majority of the senate in the 3rd century, were men of wealth and mark, but many more were of low birth, on some rested the stain of a servile descent, and all owed alike their present position and their chances of further promotion to the emperor.^[447] The procedure of the senate was as completely at the mercy of the princeps as its composition. He was himself a senator and the first of senators;^[448] he possessed the magisterial prerogatives of convening the senate, of laying business before it, and of carrying senatus consulta;^[449] above all, his tribunician power enabled him to interfere at any stage, and to modify or reverse its decisions. The share of the senate in the government was in fact determined by the amount of administrative activity which each princeps saw fit to allow it to exercise, and this share became steadily smaller. The jurisdiction assigned it by Augustus and Tiberius was in the 3rd century limited to the hearing of such cases as the emperor thought fit to send for trial, and these became steadily fewer in number. Its control of the state treasury, as distinct from the imperial fiscus, was in fact little more than nominal, and became increasingly unimportant as the great bulk of the revenue passed into the hands of the emperor. Even in Rome and Italy its control of the administration was gradually transferred to the prefect of the city, and after the reign of Hadrian to imperial officers (juridici) charged with the civil administration.^[450] The part still played by its decrees in the modification of Roman law has been dealt with elsewhere (see Senate), but it is clear that these decrees did little else than register the expressed wishes of the emperor and his personal advisers.

The process by which all authority became centralized in the hands of the princeps and in practice exercised by an organized Centralization of authority: the imperial service. bureaucracy^[451] was of necessity gradual; but it had its beginnings under Augustus, who formed the equestrian order (admission to which was henceforth granted only by him) into an imperial service, partly civil and partly military, whose members, being immediately dependent on the emperor, could be employed on tasks which it would have been impossible to assign to senators (see Equites). From this order were drawn the armies of “procurators”—the term was derived from the practice of the great business houses of Rome—who administered the imperial revenues and properties in all parts of the empire. Merit was rewarded by independent governorships such as those of Raetia and Noricum, or the command of the naval squadrons at Misenum and Ravenna; and the prizes of the knight's career were the prefectures of the praetorian guard, the corn-supply and the city police, and the governorship of Egypt. The household offices and imperial secretary ships were held by freedmen, almost always of Greek origin, whose influence became all-powerful under such emperors as Claudius.^[452] The financial secretary (a rationibus) and those who dealt with the emperor's correspondence (ab epistulis) and with petitions (a libellis) were the most important of these.

This increase of power was accompanied by a corresponding elevation of the princeps himself above the level of all other Outward splendour. citizens. The comparatively modest household and simple life of Augustus were replaced by a more than regal splendour, and under Nero we find all the outward accessories of monarchy present, the palace, the palace guards, the crowds of courtiers, and a court ceremonial. In direct opposition to the republican theory of the principate, members of the family of the princeps share the dignities of his position. The males bear the cognomen of Caesar, and are invested, as youths, with high office; their names and even those of the females are included in the yearly prayers for the safety of the princeps;^[453] their birthdays are kept as festivals; the praetorian guards take the oath to them as well as to the princeps himself. The logical conclusion was reached in the practice of Caesar-worship,^[454] which was in origin the natural expression of a widespread sentiment of homage, which varied in form in different parts of the empire and in different classes of society, but was turned to account by the statecraft of Augustus to develop something like an imperial patriotism. The official worship of the deified Caesar, starting from that of the “divine Julius,” gave a certain sanctity and continuity to the regular succession of the emperors, but it was of less importance politically than the worship of “Rome and Augustus,” first instituted in Asia Minor in 29 B.C., and gradually diffused throughout the provinces, as a symbol of imperial unity. It must be observed that living emperors were not officially worshipped by Roman citizens; yet we find that even in Italy an unauthorized worship of Augustus sprang up during his lifetime in the country towns.^[455]

On the accession of Augustus, there could be little doubt as to the nature of the work that was necessary, if peace and prosperity were to be secured for the Roman world. He was called upon to justify his position by rectifying the frontiers and strengthening their defences, by reforming the system of provincial government, and by reorganizing the finance; and his success in dealing with these three difficult problems is sufficiently proved by the prosperous condition of the empire for a century and a half after his death. To secure peace it was necessary to The frontiers. establish on all sides of the empire really defensible frontiers; and this became possible now that for the first time the direction of the foreign policy of the state and of its military forces was concentrated in the hands of a single magistrate. To the south and west the generals of the republic, and Caesar himself, had extended the authority of Rome to the natural boundaries formed by the African deserts and the Atlantic Ocean, and in these two directions Augustus's task was in the main confined to the organization of a settled Roman government within these limits. In Africa the client state of Egypt was ruled by Augustus as the successor of the Ptolemies, and administered by his deputies (praefecti), and the kingdom of Numidia (25 B.C.) was incorporated with the old province of Africa. In Spain the hill-tribes of the north-west were finnally subdued and a third province, Lusitania, established.^[456] In Gaul Augustus (27 B.C.) established in addition to the “old province” the three new ones of Aquitania, Lugdunensis and Belgica,^[457] which included the territories conquered by Julius Caesar. The North. Towards the north the republic had left the civilized countries bordering on the Mediterranean with only a very imperfect defence against the threatening mass of barbarian tribes beyond them. The result^[458] of Augustus's policy was to establish a protecting line of provinces running from the Euxine to the North Sea, and covering the peaceful districts to the south,—Moesia (A.D. 6), Pannonia (A.D. 9), Noricum (15 B.C.), Raetia (15 B.C.) and Gallia Belgica. Roman rule was thus carried up to the natural frontier lines of the Rhine and the Danube. It was originally intended to make the Elbe the frontier of the empire; but after the defeat of P. Quintilius Varus (A.D. 9) the forward policy was abandoned. Tiberius recalled Germanicus as soon as Varus had been avenged; and after the peace with Maroboduus, the chief of the Marcomanni on the upper Danube, in the next year (A.D. 17), the defensive policy recommended by Augustus was adopted along the whole of the northern frontier. The line of the great rivers was held by an imposing mass of troops. Along the Rhine lay the armies of Upper and Lower Germany, consisting of four legions each; eight more guarded the Danube and the frontiers of Pannonia and Moesia. At frequent intervals along the frontier were the military colonies, the permanent camps and the smaller intervening castella. Flotillas of galleys cruised up and down the rivers, and Roman roads opened communication both along the frontiers and with the seat of government in Italy.

In the East, Rome was confronted with a well-organized and powerful state whose claims to empire were second only to her The East. own. The victory of Carrhae (53 B.C.) had encouraged among the Parthians the idea of an invasion of Syria and Asia Minor, while it had awakened in Rome a genuine fear of the formidable power which had so suddenly arisen in the East. Caesar was at the moment of his death preparing to avenge the death of Crassus by an invasion of Parthia, and Antony's schemes of founding an Eastern empire which should rival that of Alexander included the conquest of the kingdom beyond the Euphrates. Augustus, however, adhered to the policy which he recommended to his successors of “keeping the empire within its bounds”; and the Parthians, weakened by internal feuds and dynastic quarrels, were in no mood for vigorous action. Roman pride was satisfied by the restoration of the standards taken at Carrhae. Four legions guarded the line of the Euphrates, and, beyond the frontiers of Pontus and Cappadocia, Armenia was established as a “friendly and independent ally.”^[459]

Next in importance to the rectification and defence of the frontiers was the reformation of the administration, and the Administrative reforms in the provinces. restoration of prosperity to the distracted and exhausted provinces. The most serious defect of the republican system had been the absence of any effective control over the Roman officials outside Italy. This was now supplied by the general proconsular authority vested in the emperor. The provinces were for the first time treated as departments of a single state, while their governors, from being independent and virtually irresponsible rulers, became the subordinate officials of a higher authority.^[460] Over the legati of the imperial provinces the control of the emperor was as complete as that of the republican proconsul over his staff in his own province. They were appointed by him, held office at his good pleasure, and were directly responsible to him for their conduct. The proconsuls of the senatorial provinces were in law magistrates equally with the princeps, though inferior to him in rank; it was to the senate that they were as of old responsible; they were still selected by lot from among the senators of consular and praetorian rank. But the distinction did not seriously interfere with the paramount authority of the emperor. The provinces left nominally to the senate were the more peaceful and settled districts in the heart of the empire, where only the routine work of civil administration was needed, and where the local municipal governments were as yet comparatively vigorous. The senatorial proconsuls themselves were indirectly nominated by the emperor through his control of the praetorship and consulship. They wielded no military and only a strictly subordinate financial authority, and, though Augustus and Tiberius, at any rate, encouraged the fiction of the responsibility of the senatorial governors to the senate, it was in reality to the emperor that they looked for direction and advice, and to him that they were held accountable. Moreover, in the case of all governors this accountability became under the empire a reality. Prosecutions for extortion (de pecuniis repetundis), which were now transferred to the hearing of the senate, are tolerably frequent during the first century of the empire; but a more effective check on maladministration lay in the appeal to Caesar from the decisions of any governor, which was open to every provincial, and in the right of petition. Finally, the authority both of the legate and the proconsul was weakened by the presence of the imperial procurator, to whom was entrusted the administration of the fiscal revenues; while both legate and proconsul were deprived of that right of requisitioning supplies which, in spite of a long series of restrictive laws, had been the most powerful instrument of oppression in the hands of republican governors. The financial reforms of Augustus^[461] are marked by Financial reforms. the same desire to establish an equitable, orderly and economical system, and by the same centralization of authority in the emperor's hands. The institution of an imperial census, or valuation of all land throughout the empire, and the assessment upon this basis of a uniform land tax, in place of the heterogeneous and irregular payments made under the republic, were the work of Augustus, though the system was developed and perfected by the emperors of the 2nd century and by Diocletian. The land tax itself was directly collected, either by imperial officials or by local authorities responsible to them, and the old wasteful plan of selling the privilege of collection to publicani was henceforward applied only to such indirect taxes as the customs duties. The rate of the land tax was fixed by the emperor, and with him rested the power of remission even in senatorial provinces.^[462] The effect of these reforms is clearly visible in the improved financial condition of the empire. Under the republic the treasury had been nearly always in difficulties, and the provinces exhausted and impoverished. Under the emperors, at least throughout the 1st century, in spite of a largely increased expenditure on the army, on public works, on shows and largesses, and on the machinery of government itself, the better emperors, such as Liberal policy towards the provinces. Tiberius and Vespasian, were able to accumulate large sums, while the provinces show but few signs of distress. Moreover, while the republic had almost entirely neglected to develop the internal resources of the provinces, Augustus set the example of a liberal expenditure on public works, in the construction of harbours, roads and bridges, the reclamation of waste lands, and the erection of public buildings.^[463] The crippling restrictions which the republic had placed on freedom of intercourse and trade, even between the separate districts of a single province, disappeared under the empire. In the eyes of the Italy and the provinces under the empire. republican statesmen the provinces were merely the estates of the Roman people, but from the reign of Augustus dates the gradual disappearance of the old pre-eminence of Rome and Italy. It was from the provinces that the legions were increasingly recruited; provincials rose to high rank as soldiers, statesmen and men of letters;^[464] and the methods of administration, formerly distinctive of the provinces, were adopted even in Rome and Italy. From Augustus himself, jealous as he was of the traditions and privileges of the ruling Roman people, date the rule of an imperial prefect^[465] in the city of Rome, the division of Italy into regiones in the provincial fashion, and the permanent quartering there of armed troops.^[466]

Augustus founded a dynasty which occupied the throne for more than half a century after his death. The first and by far The Julio-Claudian line. the ablest of its members was Tiberius (A.D. 14-37). He was undoubtedly a capable and vigorous ruler, who enforced justice in the government of the provinces, maintained the integrity of the frontiers and husbanded the finances of the empire, but he became intensely unpopular in Roman society, and was painted as a cruel and odious tyrant. His successor, Gaius (A.D. 37-41), generally known as Caligula, was the slave of his wild caprices and uncontrolled passions, which issued in manifest insanity. He was followed by his uncle, Claudius (A.D. 41-54), whose personal uncouthness made him an object of derision to his contemporaries, but who was by no means devoid of statesmanlike faculties. His reign left an abiding mark on the history of the empire, for he carried forward its development on the lines intended by Augustus. Client-states were absorbed, southern Britain was conquered, the Romanization of the West received a powerful impulse, public works were executed in Rome and Italy, and the organization of the imperial bureaucracy made rapid strides. Nero (A.D. 54-68), the last of the Julio-Claudian line, has been handed down to posterity as the incarnation of monstrous vice and fantastic luxury. But his wild excesses scarcely affected the prosperity of the empire at large; the provinces were well governed, and the war with Parthia led to a compromise in the matter of Armenia which secured peace for half a century.^[467] The fall of Nero and the extinction of the “progeny of the Caesars” was followed by a war of succession which revealed the military basis of the Principate and the weakness of the tie connecting the emperor with Rome. Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian represented in turn the legions of Spain, the household troops, the army of the Rhine, and a coalition of the armies of the Danube and the Euphrates; and all except Otho were already de facto emperors when they entered Rome. The final survivor in the struggle, Vespasian (A.D. 69-79), was a man of comparatively humble origin, and as the Principate ceased to possess the prestige of high descent it became imperatively The Flavian and Antonine emperors. necessary to remove, as far as possible, the anomalies of the office and to give it a legitimate and permanent form. Thus we find an elaborate and formal system of titles substituted for the personal names of the Julio-Claudian emperors, an increasing tendency to insist on the inherent prerogatives of the Principate (such as the censorial power), and an attempt to invest Caesarism with an hereditary character, either by natural descent or by adoption, while the worship of the Divi, or deified Caesars, was made the symbol of its continuity and legitimacy. The dynasty of Vespasian and his sons (Titus, A.D. 79-81, Domitian, A.D. 81-96) became extinct on the murder of the last named, whose highhanded treatment of the senate earned him the name of a tyrant; his successor, Nerva (A.D. 96-98), opened the series of “adoptive” emperors (Trajan, A.D. 98-117, Hadrian, 117-38, Antoninus Pius, 138-61, Marcus Aurelius, 161-80) under whose rule the empire enjoyed a period of internal tranquillity and good government. Its boundaries were extended by the subjugation of northern Britain (by Agricola, A.D. 78-84; see Britain, § Roman), by the annexation of the districts included in the angle of the Rhine and Danube under the Flavian emperors, and by the conquest of Dacia (the modern Transylvania) under Trajan (completed in A.D. 106). Trajan also annexed Arabia Petraea and in his closing years invaded Parthia and formed provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia and Assyria; but these conquests were surrendered by his successor, Hadrian, who set himself to the task of consolidating the empire and perfecting its defences. To him is due the system of permanent limites or frontier fortifications, such as the wall which protected northern Britain and the palisade which replaced the chain of forts established by the Flavian emperors from the Rhine to the Danube.^[468] The construction of these defences showed that the limit of expansion had been reached, and under M. Aurelius the tide began to turn. A great part of his reign was occupied with wars against the Marcomanni, Quadi, Sarmatians, &c., whose irruptions seriously threatened the security of Italy. Henceforth Rome never ceased to be on the defensive. Condition of the provinces. Spread of the municipal systems. Within the frontiers the levelling and unifying process commenced by Augustus had steadily proceeded. A tolerably uniform provincial system covered the whole area of the empire. The client states had one by one been reconstituted as provinces, and even the government of Italy had been in many respects assimilated to the provincial type. The municipal system had spread widely; the period from Vespasian to Aurelius witnessed the elevation to municipal rank of an immense number of communities, not only in the old provinces of the West, in Africa, Spain and Gaul, but in the newer provinces of the North, and along the line of the northern frontier; and everywhere under the influence of the central imperial authority there was an increasing uniformity in the form of the local constitutions, framed and granted as Extension of the Roman franchise. they all were by imperial edict.^[469] Throughout the empire again the extension of the Roman franchise was preparing the way for the final act by which Caracalla assimilated the legal status of all free-born inhabitants of the empire,^[470] and in the west and north this was preceded and accompanied by the complete Romanizing of the people in language and civilization. Yet, in spite of the internal tranquillity and the good government which have made the age of the Antonines famous, we can detect signs of weakness. It was in this period that the centralization of authority in the hands of the princeps was completed; the “dual control” established by Augustus, which had been unreal enough in the 1st century, was now, though not formally abolished, systematically ignored in practice. The senate ceased to be an instrument of government, and became an imperial peerage, largely composed of men not qualified by election to the quaestorship but directly ennobled by the emperor.^[471] The restricted sphere of administration left by Augustus to the old magistracies was still further narrowed; their jurisdiction, for example, tended to pass into the hands of the Greek officers appointed by Caesar—the prefect of the city and the prefect of the guards. The complete organization of Caesar's own administrative service, and its recognition as a state bureaucracy, was chiefly the work of Hadrian, who took the secretaryships out of the hands of freedmen and entrusted them to procurators of equestrian rank.^[472] All these changes, inevitable, and in some degree beneficial, as they were, brought with them the attendant evils of excessive centralization. Though these were hardly felt while the central authority was wielded by vigorous rulers, yet even under Trajan, Hadrian and the Antonines we notice a failure of strength in the empire as a whole, and a corresponding increase of pressure on the imperial government itself. The reforms of Augustus had given free play to powers still fresh and vigorous. The ceaseless labours of Hadrian were directed mainly to the careful husbanding of such strength as still remained, or to attempts at reviving it by the sheer force of imperial authority. Among the symptoms of incipient decline were the growing depopulation, especially of the central districts of the empire, the constant financial difficulties, the deterioration in character of the local governments in the provincial communities,^[473] and the increasing reluctance exhibited by all classes to undertake the now onerous burden of municipal office.

It is to such facts as these that we must look in passing a final judgment on the imperial government, which is admittedly seen in its best and most perfect form in the Antonine period. In our review of the conditions which brought about the fall of the Roman Republic, we saw that the collapse of the city state made Caesarism inevitable, since the extension of federal and representative institutions to a world-empire lay beyond the horizon of ancient thought. The benefits which Caesarism conferred upon mankind are plain. In the first place, the Roman world, which had hitherto not been governed in the true sense of the word, but exploited in the interests of a dominant clique, now received an orderly and efficient government, under which the frightful ravages of misrule and civil strife were repaired. The financial resources of the empire were husbanded by skilled and, above all, trained administrators, to whom the imperial service offered a carrière ouverte aux talents; many of these were Greeks, or half-Greek Orientals, whose business capacity formed an invaluable asset hitherto neglected. Augustus caused an official survey of the empire to be made, and a scientific census of its resources was gradually carried out and from time to time revised; thus the balance of revenue and expenditure could be accurately estimated and adjusted, and financial stability was established. The system of tax-farming was gradually abolished and direct collection substituted; commerce was freed from vexatious restrictions and large customs-districts were formed, on whose borders duties were levied for revenue only. The government took even more direct measures for the encouragement of industry and especially of agriculture. The most remarkable of these were the “alimentary” institutions, originally due to Nerva and developed by succeeding emperors. Capital was advanced at moderate rates of interest to Italian landowners on the security of their estates, and the profits of this system of land banks were devoted to the maintenance and education of poor children. The foundation of colonies for time-expired soldiers who received grants of land on their discharge, contributed something to the formation of a well-to-do agricultural class; and although the system was not successful in lower Italy, where economic decline could not be arrested, there can be no doubt that central and northern Italy, where the vine and olive were largely cultivated, and manufacturing industries sprang up, enjoyed a considerable measure of prosperity. The extension of the Roman municipal system to the provinces, and the watchful care exercised by the imperial government over the communities, together with the profuse liberality of the emperors, which was imitated by the wealthier citizens of the towns, led to the creation of a flourishing municipal life still evidenced by the remains which in districts such as Asia Minor or Tunis stand in significant contrast with the desolation brought about by centuries of barbaric rule. Mommsen^[474] has, indeed, expressed the opinion that “if an angel of the Lord were to strike the balance whether the domain ruled by Severus Antoninus were governed with the greater intelligence and the greater humanity at that time or in the present day, whether civilization and national prosperity generally had since that time advanced or retrograded, it is very doubtful whether the decision would prove in favour of the present.”

But there is another side to the picture. The empire brought into being a new society and a new nationality, due to the fusion of Roman ideas with Hellenic culture, beside which other elements, saving only, as we shall see, those contributed by the Oriental religions, were insignificant. This new nationality grew in definition through the gradual disappearance of distinctions of language and manners, the assimilating influence of commercial and social intercourse, and the extinction of national jealousies and aspirations. But the cosmopolitan society thus formed was compacted of so many disparate elements that a common patriotism was hard to foster, and doubly hard when the autocratic system of government prevented men from aspiring to that true political distinction which is attainable only in a self-governing community. It is true that there was much good work to be done, and that much good work was done, in the service of the emperors; true, also, that the carrière ouverte aux talents was in large measure realized. Distinctions of race were slowly but steadily effaced by the grant of citizen rights to provincials and by the manumission of slaves; and the career open to the Romanized provincial or the liberated slave might culminate in the highest distinctions which the emperor could bestow. In the hierarchy of social orders—senate, equites and plebs—ascent was easy and regular from the lower grade to the higher; and the more enlightened of the emperors—especially Hadrian—made a genuine endeavour to give a due share in the work of government to the various subject races. But nothing could compensate for the lack of self-determination, and although during the first century and a half of imperial rule a flourishing local patriotism in some degree filled the place of the wider sentiment, this gradually sank into decay and became a pretext under cover of which the lower classes in the several communities took toll of their wealthier fellow-citizens in the shape of public works, largesses, amusements, &c., until the resources at the disposal of the rich ran dry, the communities themselves in many cases became insolvent, and the inexorable claims of the central government were satisfied only by the surrender of financial control to an imperial commissioner. Then the organs of civic life became atrophied, political interest died out, and the whole burden of administration, as well as that of defence, fell upon the shoulders of the bureaucracy, which proved unequal to the task.

In a world thus governed the individual was thrown more and more upon his own resources—the pursuit of wealth^[475] and pleasure, or the satisfaction of intellectual interests. Under the rule of the Caesars much was done for education. Julius Caesar bestowed Roman citizenship on “teachers of the liberal arts”; Vespasian endowed professorships of Greek and Latin oratory at Rome;^[476] and later emperors, especially Antoninus Pius, extended the same benefits to the provinces. Local enterprise and munificence were also devoted to the cause of education; we learn from the correspondence of the younger Pliny that public schools were founded in the towns of northern Italy. But though there was a wide diffusion of knowledge under the empire, there was no true intellectual progress. Augustus, it is true, gathered about him the most brilliant writers of his time, and the debut of the new monarchy coincided with the Golden Age of Roman literature; but this was of brief duration, and the beginning of the Christian era saw the triumph of classicism and the first steps in the decline which awaits all literary movements which look to the past rather than the future. Political oratory could not exist under an absolute ruler; public life furnished no inspiring theme to poet or historian; and literature became didactic or imitative, while rhetoric degenerated into declamation. It is true that for some time both literature and philosophy maintained an alliance with the old republican aristocracy and voiced the undercurrent of opposition to the empire; but both had ceased to be irreconcilable before the time of Hadrian. Under his rule classicism gave way to the archaism of which Fronto and Apuleius furnish the most notable examples, and which preferred Cato and Ennius to Cicero and Virgil. But this return to the past was not followed by any renewed creative energy. It was a confession of weakness and little more; and the widely diffused culture of the Antonine period, though outwardly brilliant, had no progressive energy and presented but a feeble resistance to the dissolving forces of barbarism.

To strike the balance of loss and gain in the field of morals is an exceedingly difficult task. The denunciations of the satirists, especially of Juvenal, might lead us to believe that an appalling state of depravity existed in the society of the early empire; but satirists notoriously paint in glaring colours for literary effect, and whatever may be said of the morality of Rome—which was probably no better and no worse than that of any cosmopolitan capital—there were sound and healthy elements in plenty amongst the population of Italy and the provinces. Doubtless the craving for amusement—especially for the shows of the amphitheatre and the chariot-races of the circus—infected the idle masses of the populace in Rome and the larger towns, and was fostered by the policy of despotism, which always aims at securing cheap popularity with the proletariat; but the tendency of the time, not only in the higher ranks, but also amongst humbler folk, was towards a broader humanity and a more serious view of life and its problems. Greek philosophy, especially the Stoic system, in order to appeal to the practical Roman intelligence, found itself obliged to elaborate a rule of conduct, and in many households the philosopher, generally a Greek, played the part of a director of consciences. The influence of these doctrines is shown in the humane provisions of the civil law as elaborated in the Antonine period, which did much to mitigate the lot of the slave and to smooth the process by which freedom might be attained.^[477] Above all, a religious movement which drew its motive power not from Greek philosophy, but from Oriental mysticism, carried the human race far from its old moorings, and culminated in the triumph of Christianity. All the Eastern cults—whether of Cybele, of Isis, of the Syrian Baalim or of the Persian Mithras—had this in common, that they promised to their adherents redemption from the curse of the flesh and a glorious immortality after death; and this fact gave them an irresistible attraction for the disillusioned and overburdened subjects of the emperors. The religion of Mithras, whose doctrines were specially suited to the military temperament, made its way wherever the armies of the empire were stationed, and seemed likely at one moment to become universal; but it was forced to yield to Christianity, which refused to tolerate any rival, faced the empire with a claim to absolute dominion in the spiritual sphere, and at length made that claim good (see Roman Religion; Mithras; Great Mother of the Gods).

Marcus Aurelius died in 180, and the reign of his worthless son, Commodus (A.D. 180-93), was followed by a century of war The empire from 180-284. and disorder, during which nothing but the stern rule of soldier emperors saved the empire from dissolution. The first and ablest of these was Septimius Severus (193-211), whose claims were disputed by Clodius Albinus in the West, and by Pescennius Niger in the East; in these struggles rival Roman forces, for the first time since the accession of Vespasian, exhausted each other in civil war.^[478] Severus emphasized strongly the military character of the Principate; he abstained from seeking confirmation for his authority from the senate, and deprived that body of most of the share in the government which it still retained; he assumed the title of proconsul in Rome itself, made the prefect of the guard the vicegerent of his authority, and heaped privileges upon the army, which, although they secured its entire devotion to his family, impaired its efficiency as a fighting force and thus weakened Rome in face of the barbarian invader.^[479] He succeeded in founding a short-lived dynasty, which ended with the attempt of the virtuous but weak Alexander (222-35) to restore the independence of the senate. This led to a military reaction, and the elevation of the brutal Maximinus, a Thracian peasant, to the throne. The disintegration of the empire was the natural result; for the various provincial armies put forward their commanders as claimants to the purple. A hundred ties bound them closely to the districts in which they were stationed; their permanent camps had grown into towns, they had families and farms; the unarmed provincials looked to them as their natural protectors, and were attached to them by bonds of intermarriage and by long intercourse. Now that they found themselves left to repel by their own efforts the invaders from without, they reasonably enough claimed the right to ignore the central authority which was powerless to aid them, and to choose for themselves imperatores whom they knew and trusted. These “tyrants,” as they were called when unsuccessful, sprang up in ever-increasing numbers, and weakened Rome's power of resistance to the new enemies who were threatening her frontiers—the Alamanni and Franks, who broke through the German limes in 236; the Goths, who crossed the Danube in 247, raided the Balkan provinces, and defeated and slew the emperor, Decius, in 251, and the restored Persian kingdom of the Sassanidae (see Persia), whose rulers laid claim to all the Asiatic possessions of Rome and in 260 captured Antioch and made the emperor, Valerian, a prisoner. During the reign of Gallienus, the son of Valerian (260-68), the evil Reign of Gallienus, 260-268. reached its height. The central authority was paralysed; the Romanized districts beyond the Rhine were irrevocably lost; the Persians were threatening to overrun the Eastern provinces; the Goths had formed a fleet of 500 sail which harried Asia Minor and even Greece itself, where Athens, Corinth, Sparta and Argos were sacked; and the legions on the frontiers were left to repel the enemies of Rome as best they could. A provincial empire was established by M. Cassianius Latinius Postumus in Gaul and maintained by his successors, M. Piavonius Victorinus and C. Pius Esuvius Tetricus.^[480] Their authority was acknowledged, not only in Gaul and by the troops on the Rhine, but by the legions of Britain and Spain; and under Postumus at any rate (259-69) the existence of the Gallic Empire was justified by the repulse of the barbarians and by the restoration of peace and security to the provinces of Gaul. On the Danube, in Greece and in Asia Minor none of the “pretenders” enjoyed more than a passing success. In the Far East, the Syrian Odaenathus, prince of Palmyra^[481] (q.v.), though officially only Odaenathus and Zenobia at Palmyra. the governor of the East (dux Orientis) under Gallienus, drove the Persians out of Asia Minor and Syria, recovered Mesopotamia, and ruled Syria, Arabia, Armenia, Cappadocia and Cilicia with all the independence of a sovereign. Odaenathus was murdered in 266. His young son Vaballathus (Wahab-allath) succeeded him in his titles, but the real power was vested in his widow Zenobia, under whom not only the greater part of Asia Minor but even the province of Egypt was forcibly added to the dominions governed by the Palmyrene prince, who ceased to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome.

Gallienus was murdered at Milan in 268, and after the brief reign of Claudius II. (A.D. 268-70), who checked the advance of the Goths, Aurelian (270-75) restored unity to Restoration of unity by Aurelian, 273. the distracted empire. Palmyra was destroyed and Zenobia led a prisoner to Rome (in 273) and in the next year the Gallic empire came to an end by the surrender of Tetricus. Aurelian, it is true, abandoned the province of Dacia, but the defences of the Danube were strengthened, and in 276 Probus repulsed the Franks and Alamanni, who had been pressing on the Rhine frontier for some forty years. Finally, Carus (282) recovered Armenia and Mesopotamia from the Persians and restored the frontier fixed by Septimius Severus.

Although any serious loss of territory had been avoided, the storms of the 3rd century had told with fatal effect upon the State of the empire at the close of the 3rd century. general condition of the empire. The “Roman peace” had vanished; not only the frontier territories, but the central districts of Greece, Asia Minor, and even Italy itself, had suffered from the ravages of war, and the fortification of Rome by Aurelian was a significant testimony to the altered condition of affairs. War, plague and famine had thinned the population and crippled the resources of the provinces. On all sides land was running waste, cities and towns were decaying, and commerce was paralysed. Only with the greatest difficulty were sufficient funds squeezed from the exhausted taxpayers to meet the increasing cost of the defence of the frontiers. The old established culture and civilization of the Mediterranean world rapidly declined, and the mixture of barbaric rudeness with Oriental pomp and luxury which marked the court, even of the better emperors, such as Aurelian, was typical of the general deterioration, which was accelerated by the growing practice of settling barbarians on lands within the empire, and of admitting them freely to service in the Roman army.

Period II: The Dominate, A.D. 284-476.—(a) From the Accession of Diocletian to the Death of Theodosius (A.D. 284-395). The reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. Augusti and Caesares. The work of fortifying the empire alike against internal sedition and foreign invasion, begun by Aurelian and Probus, was completed by Diocletian and Constantine the Great, whose system of government, novel as it appears at first sight, was in reality the natural and inevitable outcome of the history of the previous century.^[482] Its object was twofold, to give increased stability to the imperial authority itself, and to organize an efficient administrative machinery throughout the empire. In the second year of his reign Diocletian associated Maximian with himself as colleague, and six years later (293) the hands of the two “Augusti” were further strengthened by the proclamation of Constantius and Galerius as “Caesares.” Precedents for such an arrangement were to be found in the earlier history of the Principate^[483]; and it divided the burdens and responsibilities of government, without sacrificing the unity of the empire; for, although to each of the Augusti and Caesars a separate sphere was assigned, the Caesars were subordinate to the higher authority of the Augusti, and over all his three colleagues Diocletian claimed to exercise a paramount control. It also reduced the risk of a disputed succession by establishing in the two Caesars the natural successors to the Augusti, and it satisfied the jealous pride of the rival armies by giving them imperatores of their own. The distribution of power between Diocletian and his colleagues followed those lines of division which the feuds of the previous century had marked out. The armies of the Rhine, the Danube and of Syria fell to the lot respectively of Constantius, Galerius and Diocletian, the central districts of Italy and Africa to Maximian.^[484]

In the new system the imperial authority was finally emancipated from all constitutional limitation and control and Altered character of the imperial authority. Levelling policy of Diocletian. Degradation of Italy and Rome. The new administrative system. the last traces of its republican origin disappeared. The emperors from Diocletian onwards were autocrats in theory as well as in practice. This avowed despotism Diocletian, following in the steps of Aurelian, hedged round with all the pomp and majesty of Oriental monarchy. The final adoption of the title dominus, the diadem on the head, the robes of silk and gold, the replacement of the republican salutation of a fellow-citizen by the adoring prostration even of the highest in rank before their lord and master, were all significant marks of the new regime.^[485] In the hands of this absolute ruler was placed the entire policy of control of an elaborate administrative machinery. Most of the old local and national distinctions, privileges and liberties which had once flourished within the empire had already disappeared under the levelling influence of imperial rule, and the process was now completed. Roman citizenship had, since the edict of Caracalla, ceased to be the privilege of a minority. Diocletian finally reduced Italy and Rome to the level of the provinces: the provincial land-tax and provincial government were introduced into Italy,^[486] while Rome ceased to be even in name the seat of imperial authority.^[487] Throughout the whole area of the empire a uniform system of administration was established, the control of which was centred in the imperial palace.^[488] Between the civil and military departments the separation was complete. At the head of the former were the praetorian prefects,^[489] next below them the vicarii, who had charge of the dioceses; below these again the governors of the separate provinces (praesides, correctores, consulares),^[490] under each of whom was a host of minor officials. Parallel with this civil hierarchy was the series of military officers, from the magistri militum, the duces, and comites downwards.^[491] In both there is the utmost possible subordination and division of authority. The subdivision of provinces, begun by the emperors of the 2nd century, was systematically carried out by Diocletian, and each official, civil or military, was placed directly under the orders of a superior; thus a continuous chain of authority connected the emperor with the meanest official in his service. Finally, the various grades in these two imperial services were carefully marked by the appropriation to each of distinctive titles, the highest being that of illustris, which was confined to the prefects and to the military magistri and comites, and to the chief ministers.^[492]

There can be little doubt that on the whole these reforms prolonged the existence of the empire, by creating a machinery Effects of these reforms. which enabled the stronger emperors to utilize effectively all its available resources, and which even to some extent made good the deficiencies of weaker rulers. But in many points they failed to attain their object. Diocletian's division of the imperial authority among colleagues, subject to the general control of the senior Augustus, was effectually discredited by the twenty years of almost constant conflict which followed his own abdication (305-23). Constantine's partition of the empire among his three sons was not more successful in ensuring tranquillity, and in the final division of the East and West between Valens and Valentinian (364) the essential principle of Diocletian's scheme, the maintenance of a single central authority, was abandoned. The “tyrants,” the curse of the 3rd century, were far from unknown in the 4th. The system, moreover, while it failed altogether to remove some of the existing evils, aggravated others. The already overburdened financial resources of the empire were strained still further by the increased expenditure necessitated by the substitution of four imperial courts for one, and by the multiplication in every direction of paid officials. The gigantic bureaucracy of the 4th century proved, in spite of its undoubted services, an intolerable weight upon the energies of the empire.

Diocletian and Maximian formally abdicated their high office in 305. Nineteen years later Constantine I., the Great, the Constantine the Great. sole survivor of six rival emperors, united the whole empire under his own rule. His reign of fourteen years was marked by two events of first-rate importance,—the recognition of Christianity as the religion of the empire, and the building of the new capital at Byzantium. Recognition of Christianity. Contantinople. The alliance which Constantine inaugurated between the Christian church and the imperial government, while it enlisted on the side of the state one of the most powerful of the new forces with which it had to reckon, imposed a check, which was in time to become a powerful one, on the imperial authority. The establishment of the new “City of Constantine” as a second Rome paved the way for the final separation of East and West by providing the former for the first time with a suitable seat of government on the Bosphorus. The death of Constantine in 337 was followed, as the abdication of Diocletian had been, by the outbreak of quarrels among rival Caesars. Of the three sons of Constantine who in 337 divided the empire between them, Constantine the eldest fell in civil war against his brother Constans; Constans himself was, ten years afterwards, defeated and slain by Magnentius; and the latter in his turn was in 353 vanquished by Constantine's only surviving son Constantius. Contantius II., 351-63. Thus for the second time the whole empire was united under the rule of a member of the house of Constantine. But in 355 Constantius granted the title of Caesar to his cousin Julian and placed him in charge of Gaul, where the momentary elevation of a tyrant, Silvanus, and still more the inroads of Franks and Alamanni, had excited alarm. But Julian's successes during the next five years were such as to arouse the jealous fears of Constantius. In order to weaken his suspected rival the legions under Julian in Gaul were suddenly ordered to march eastward against the Persians Julian, 361-63. (360). They refused; and when the order was repeated, replied by proclaiming Julian himself emperor and Augustus. Julian, with probably sincere reluctance, accepted the position, but the death of Constantius in 361 saved the empire from the threatened civil war. Julian's attempted restoration of pagan and in especial of Hellenic worships had no more permanent effect than the war which he courageously waged against the multitudinous abuses which had grown up in the luxurious court of Constantius.^[493] But his vigorous administration in Gaul undoubtedly checked the barbarian advance across the Rhine, and postponed the loss of the Western provinces; on the contrary, his campaign in Persia, brilliantly successful at first, ended in his own death Jovian, 363-64. Valentinian I., 364-75. Division of the Empire, 364. Valens, 364-78. Revolt of the Goths. (363), and his successor, Jovian, immediately surrendered the territories beyond the Tigris won by Diocletian seventy years before. Jovian died on the 17th of February 364; and on the 26th of February Valentinian was acknowledged as emperor of the army at Nicaea. In obedience to the wish of the soldiers that he should associate a colleague with himself, he conferred the title of Augustus upon his brother Valens, and the division of the empire was at last effected,—Valentinian became emperor of the West, Valens of the East. Valentinian maintained the integrity of the empire until his death (in 375), which deprived the weaker Valens of a trusted counsellor and ally, and was followed by a serious crisis on the Danube. In 376 the Goths, hard pressed by their new foes from the eastward, the Huns, sought and obtained the protection of the Roman Empire. They were transported across the Danube and settled in Moesia, but, indignant at the treatment they received, they rose in arms against their protectors. In 378 at Adrianople Valens was defeated and killed, and the victorious Goths advanced eastward to the very walls of Constantinople. Once more, however, the danger passed away. The skill and tact Theodosius I., 378-95. of Theodosius, who had been proclaimed emperor of the East by Gratian,^[494] conciliated the Goths; they were granted an allowance, and in large numbers entered the service of the Roman emperor. The remaining years of Theodosius's reign (382-95) were mainly engrossed by the duty of upholding the increasingly feeble authority of his western colleague against the attacks of pretenders. Maximus, the murderer of Gratian (383), was at first recognized by Theodosius as Caesar, and left in undisturbed command of Gaul, Spain and Britain; but, when in 386 he proceeded to oust Valentinian II; from Italy and Africa, Theodosius marched westward, crushed him, and installed Valentinian as emperor of the West. In the very next year, however, the murder of Valentinian (392) by Arbogast, a Frank, was followed by the appearance of a fresh tyrant in the person of Eugenius, a domestic officer and nominee of Arbogast himself. Once more Theodosius marched westward, and near Division of the empire between Arcadius and Honorius. Fall of the Western Empire. Distress of the provinces in the 4th century. Aquileia decisively defeated his opponents. But his victory was quickly followed by his own illness and death (395), and the fortunes of East and West passed into the care of his two sons Arcadius and Honorius.

(b) From the Death of Theodosius to the Extinction of the Western Empire (395-476).—Through more than a century from the accession of Diocletian the Roman Empire had succeeded in holding at bay the swarming hordes of barbarians. But, though no province had yet been lost, as Dacia had been lost in the century before, and though the frontier lines of the Rhine and the Danube were still guarded by Roman forts and troops, there were signs in plenty that a catastrophe was at hand.

From all the writers who deal with the 4th century we have one long series of laments over the depression and misery of the provinces.^[495] To meet the increased expenditure necessary to maintain the legions, to pay the hosts of officials, and to keep up the luxurious splendour of the imperial courts, not only were the taxes raised in amount, but the most oppressive and inquisitorial methods were adopted in order to secure for the imperial treasury every penny that could be wrung from the wretched taxpayer. The results are seen in such pictures as that which the panegyrist Eumenius^[496] draws of the state of Gaul (306-12) under Constantine, in the accounts of the same province under Julian fifty years later, in those given by Zosimus early in the 5th century, and in the stringent regulations of the Theodosian code, dealing with the assessment and collection of the taxes. Among the graver symptoms of economic ruin were the decrease of population, which seriously diminished not only the number of taxpayers, but the supply of soldiers for the legions;^[497] the spread of infanticide; the increase of waste lands whose owners and cultivators had fled to escape the tax collector; the declining prosperity of the towns; and the constantly recurring riots and insurrections, both among starving peasants, as in Gaul,^[498] and in populous cities like Antioch.^[499] The distress was aggravated by the civil wars, by the rapacity of tyrants, such as Maxentius and Maximus, but above all by the raids of the barbarians, who seized every opportunity afforded by the dissensions or incapacity of the emperors to cross the frontiers and harry the lands of the provincials. Constantine (306-12), Julian (356-60) and Valentinian I. (364-75) had each to give a temporary breathing-space to Gaul by repelling the Franks and Alamanni. Britain was harassed by Picts and Scots from the north (367-70), while the Saxon pirates swept the northern seas and the coasts both of Britain and Gaul. On the Danube the Quadi, Sarmatae, and above all the Goths, poured at intervals into the provinces of Pannonia and Moesia, and penetrated to Macedon and Thrace. In the East, in addition to the constant border feud with Persia, we hear of ravages by the Isaurian mountaineers, and by a new enemy, the Saracens.^[500]

Even more ominous of coming danger was the extent to which the European half of the empire was becoming barbarized. Barbarians within the empire. The policy which had been inaugurated by Augustus himself of settling barbarians within the frontiers had been taken up on a larger scale and in a more systematic way by the Illyrian emperors of the 3rd century, and was continued by their successors in the 4th. In Gaul, in the provinces south of the Danube, even in Macedon and Italy, large barbarian settlements had been made—Theodosius in particular distinguishing himself by his liberality in this respect. Nor did the barbarians admitted during the 4th century merely swell the class of half-servile coloni. On the contrary, they not only constituted to an increasing extent the strength of the imperial forces, but won their way in ever-growing numbers to posts of dignity and importance in the imperial service. Under Constantine the palace was crowded with Franks.^[501] Julian led Gothic troops against Persia, and the army with which Theodosius defeated the tyrant Maximus (388) contained large numbers of Huns, and Alans, as well as of Goths. The names of Arbogast, Stilicho and Rufinus are sufficient proof of the place held by barbarians near the emperor's person and in the control of the provinces and legions of Rome; and the relations of Arbogast to his nominee for the purple, Eugenius, were an anticipation of those which existed between Ricimer and the emperors of the latter half of the 5th century.

It was by barbarians already settled within the empire that the first of the series of attacks which finally separated the Barbaric invasions. Alaric and the Visigoths. western provinces from the empire and set up a barbaric ruler in Italy were made, and it was in men of barbarian birth that Rome found her ablest and most successful defenders. The Visigoths whom Alaric led into Italy had been settled south of the Danube as the allies of the empire since the accession of Theodosius. But, like the Germans of the days of Caesar, they wanted land for their own, and Alaric himself aspired to raise himself to the heights which had been reached before him by the Vandal Stilicho at Ravenna and the Goth Rufinus at Constantinople. The jealousy which existed between the rulers of the western and eastern empires furthered his plans. In the name of Arcadius, the emperor of the east, or at least with the connivance of Arcadius's minister Rufinus, he occupied the province of Illyricum, and from thence ravaged Greece, which, according to the existing division of provinces, belonged to the western empire. Thence in 396 he retreated before Stilicho to Illyricum, with the command of which he was now formally invested by Arcadius; he thus gained a base of operations against Italy.^[502] In 400 he led his people, with their wives and families, their wagons and treasure, to seek lands for themselves south of the Alps. But in this first invasion he penetrated no farther than the plains of Lombardy, and after the desperate battle of Pollentia (402 or 403) he slowly withdrew from Italy, his retreat being hastened by the promises of gold freely made to him by the imperial government. Not until the autumn of 408 did Alaric again cross the Alps. Stilicho was dead; the barbarian troops in Honorius's service had been provoked into joining Alaric by the anti-Teutonic policy of Honorius and his ministers, and Alaric marched unopposed to Rome. The payment of a heavy ransom, however, saved the city. Negotiations followed between Alaric and the court of Ravenna. Alaric's demands were moderate but Honorius would grant neither lands for his people nor the honourable post in the imperial service which he asked for himself. Once more Alaric sat down before Rome, and the citizens were forced to agree to his terms. Attalus, a Greek, the prefect of the city, was declared Augustus, and Alaric accepted the post of commander-in-chief. But after a few months Alaric formally deposed Attalus, on account of his incapacity, and renewed his offers to Honorius. Again they were declined, and Alaric marched to the siege and sack of Rome (410).^[503] His death followed hard on his capture of Rome. Two The Visigoths in Gaul. years later (412) his successor Ataulf led the Visigoths to find in Gaul the lands which Alaric had sought in Italy. It is characteristic of the anarchical condition of the west that Ataulf and his Goths should have fought for Honorius in Gaul against the tyrants,^[504] and in Spain against the Vandals, Suebi and Alani; and it was with the consent of Honorius that in 419 Wallia, who had followed Ataulf as king of the Visigoths, finally settled with his people in south-western Gaul and founded the Visigothic monarchy.^[505]

It was about the same period that the accomplished fact of the division of Spain between the three barbarian tribes of Vandals, Suebi and Alani in Spain. Vandals, Suebi and Alani was in a similar manner recognized by the paramount authority of the emperor of the west.^[506] These peoples had crossed the Rhine at the time when Alaric was making his first attempt on Italy. A portion of the host led by Radagaisus^[507] actually invaded Italy, but was cut to pieces by Stilicho near Florence (405), the rest pressed on through Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees, and entered the as yet untouched province of Spain.

Honorius died in 423. With the single exception of Britain,^[508] no province had yet formally broken loose from the empire. Death of Honorius, 423. But over a great part of the west the authority of the emperors was now little more than nominal; throughout the major part of Gaul and in Spain the barbarians had settled, and barbarian states were growing up which recognized the supremacy of the emperor, but were in all essentials independent of his control.

The long reign of Valentinian III. (423-55) is marked by two events of first-rate importance—the conquest of Africa by Valentinian III., 423-55. Vandal conquest of Africa. the Vandals^[509] and the invasion of Gaul and Italy by Attila. The Vandal settlement in Africa was closely akin in its origin and results to those of the Visigoths and of the Vandals themselves in Gaul and Spain. Here, as there, the occasion was given by the jealous quarrels of powerful imperial ministers. The feud between Boniface, count of Africa, and Aëtius, the “master-general” or “count of Italy,” opened the way to Africa for the Vandal king Gaiseric (Genseric), as that between Stilicho and Rufinus had before set Alaric in motion westward, and as the quarrel between the tyrant Constantine and the ministers of Honorius had paved the way for the Vandals, Suebes and Alans into Spain. In this case, too, land-hunger was the impelling motive with the barbarian invader, and in Africa, as in Gaul and Spain, the invaders' acquisitions were confirmed by the imperial authority which they still professed to recognize. In 429 Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, crossed with his warriors, their families and goods, to the province of Africa, hitherto almost untouched by the ravages of war. Thanks to the quarrels of Boniface and Aëtius, their task was an easy one. The province was quickly overrun. In 435^[510] a formal treaty secured them in the possession of a large portion of the rich lands which were the granary of Rome, in exchange for a payment probably of corn and oil. Carthage was taken in 439, and by 440 the Vandal kingdom was firmly established.

Eleven years later (451) Attila invaded Gaul, but this Hunnish movement was in a variety of ways different from those of the Attila and the Huns. Visigoths and Vandals. Nearly a century had passed since the Huns first appeared in Europe, and drove the Goths to seek shelter within the Roman lines. Attila was now the ruler of a great empire in central and northern Europe and, in addition to his own Huns, the German tribes along the Rhine and Danube and far away to the north owned him as king. He confronted the Roman power as an equal; and, unlike the Gothic and Vandal chieftains, he treated with the emperors of east and west as an independent sovereign. His advance on Gaul and Italy threatened, not the establishment of one more barbaric chieftain on Roman soil, but the subjugation of the civilized and Christian West to the rule of a heathen and semi-barbarous conqueror. But the Visigoths in Gaul, Christian and already half Romanized, rallied to the Battle of Châlons. aid of the empire against a common foe. Attila, defeated at Châlons^[511] by Aëtius, withdrew into Pannonia (451). In the next year he overran Lombardy, but penetrated no farther south, and in 453 he died. With the murder of Valentinian III. (455) the western branch of the house of Theodosius came to an end, and the next twenty years witnessed the accession and deposition of nine emperors.

Under the three-months' rule of Maximus, the Vandals under Gaiseric invaded Italy and sacked Rome. From 456-72 the actual Sack of Rome by the Vandals. Ricimer supreme in Italy. Orestes, the Pannonian. ruler of Italy was Ricimer, the Suebe. Of the four emperors whom he placed on the throne, Majorian (457-61) alone played any imperial part outside Italy.^[512] Ricimer died in 472, and two years later a Pannonian, Orestes, attempted to fill his place. He deposed Julius Nepos and proclaimed as Augustus his own son Romulus. But the barbarian mercenaries in Italy determined to secure for themselves a position there such as that which their kinsfolk had won in Gaul and Spain and Africa. Their demand for a third of the lands of Italy was refused by Orestes,^[513] and they instantly rose in revolt. On the defeat and death of Orestes they proclaimed their leader, Odoacer the Rugian,^[514] king of Italy. Romulus Augustulus. King Odoacer. Romulus Augustulus laid down his imperial dignity, and the court at Constantinople was informed that there was no longer an emperor of the West.^[515]

The installation of a barbarian king in Italy was the natural climax of the changes which had been taking place in the West throughout the 5th century. In Spain, Gaul and Africa barbarian chieftains were already established as kings. In Italy, for the last twenty years, the real power had been wielded by a barbarian officer. Odoacer, when he decided to dispense with the nominal authority of an emperor of the West, placed Italy on the same level of independence with the neighbouring provinces. But the old ties with Rome were not severed. The new king of Italy formally recognized the supremacy of the one Roman emperor at Constantinople, and was invested in return with the rank of “patrician,” which had been held before him by Aëtius and Ricimer. In Italy too, as in Spain and Gaul, the laws, the administrative system and the language remained Roman.^[516] But the emancipation of Italy and the Western provinces from direct imperial control, which is signalized by Odoacer's accession, has rightly been regarded as marking the opening of a new epoch. It made possible in the West the development of a Romano-German civilization; it facilitated the growth of new and distinct states and nationalities; it gave a new impulse to the influence of the Christian church, and laid the foundations of the power of the bishops of Rome.

Chronological Table of the Roman Emperors

B.C.

 27. Augustus.

A.D.

 14. Tiberius.

 37. Gaius.

 41. Claudius.

 54. Nero.

68, 69.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Galba.
		Otho.
		Vitellius.

 69. Vespasian.

 79. Titus.

 81. Domitian.

 96. Nerva.

 98. Trajan.

117. Hadrian.

138. Antoninus Pius.

161. Marcus Aurelius.

180. Commodus.

193.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Pertinax.
		Didius Julianus.
		Septimius Severus.

211. Caracalla.

217. Macrinus.

218. Elagabalus.

222. Alexander Severus.

235. Maximinus.

238.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	The two Gordiani.
		Pupienus and Balbinus.
		Gordian III.

244. Philip.

249. Decius.

251. Gallus.

253. Aemilianus.

260.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Valerian.
		Gallienus.

268. Claudius.

270.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Quintillus.
		Aurelian.

275. Tacitus.

276. Probus.

282. Carus.

283. Carinus and Numerian.

284. Diocletian (Maximian associated with him, 286).

305. Constantius and Galerius.

311.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Licinius.
		Constantine I.

324. Constantine I.

337.	$\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$	Constantine II.
		Constantius II.
		Constans.

350. Constantius II., sole emperor.

361. Julian.

363. Jovian.

Division of the Empire.

A.D.West.	A.D.East.
364. Valentinian I.	364. Valens.
375. Gratian and Valentinian II.	379. Theodosius I.
383. Valentinian II.
392.Theodosius I.
395. Honorius.	395. Arcadius.
423. Valentinian III.	408. Theodosius II.
455. Maximus.	450. Marcian.
455. Avitus.
457. Majorian.	457. Leo I.
461. Severus.
467. Anthemius.
472. Olybrius.
473. Glycerius.
474. Julius Nepos.	474. Leo II.
475. Romulus Augustulus.

(H. F. P.; H. S. J.)

Authorities.—I. Republican Period: Ancient Sources.—The writing of history, like other branches of literature, was a late growth amongst the Romans, and it is very difficult to determine how far authentic records were preserved of the earlier republican period. It seems that the calendars issued yearly by the pontifices and posted on the walls of the Regia were inscribed with brief notices of important events (“digna memoratu . . . domi militiaeque terra marique gesta per singulos dies,” Serv. Ad Aen. i. 373); these tabulae were preserved and edited in 80 books by P. Mucius Scaevola (pontifex maximus, 130-?114 B.C.) under the name of Annales Maximi. The Commentarii preserved in the archives of the various priestly colleges and official boards (e.g. consuls and censors), which appear to have consisted mainly of instructions as to official procedure, doubtless furnished historical material in the shape of precedents and decisions. It is hard to say how much of this documentary evidence survived the burning of Rome by the Gauls; the fact that the earliest solar eclipse mentioned in the Annales Maximi was that of the 5th of June, 351 B.C., casts doubt on the completeness of the earlier records.

Many modern scholars have supposed that these meagre official records were supplemented by—(a) popular poetry, more or less legendary in content; (b) family chronicles, the substance of which was worked up into the funeral orations (laudationes funebres) pronounced at the grave of distinguished Romans. The existence of the former class of documents is, however, quite unsupported by evidence; as to family tradition, we cannot say more than that it has probably left a deposit in the accounts of republican history handed down to us, and caused the exploits of the members of illustrious houses to be exaggerated in importance.

Setting aside the works of Greek historians who incidentally touched on Roman affairs, such as Hieronymus of Cardia, who wrote of the wars of Pyrrhus as a contemporary, and Timaeus of Tauromenium (c. 345-250 B.C.), who treated of the history of Sicily and the West down to 272 B.C., the earliest writers on Roman history were Q. Fabius Pictor^[517] and L. Cincius Alimentus, who lived during the Second Punic War and wrote in Greek. We are told by Dionysius that they treated the earlier history summarily, but wrote more fully of their own times. The were followed in their use of the Greek language by C. Acilius (introduced a Greek embassy to the senate, 155 B.C.) and A. Postumius Albinus (consul, 151 B.C.). In the meantime, however, M. Porcius Cato the Elder (234–149 B.C.), the leader of the national party at Rome and a vigorous opponent of Greek influence, had treated of Roman antiquities in his Origines. This work was not purely annalistic, but treated of the ethnography and customs of the Italian peoples, &c. Cato founded no school of antiquarian research, but his use of the Latin language as the medium of historical writing was followed by the annalists of the Gracchan period, L. Cassius Hemina, L. Calpurnius Piso (consul, 133 B.C.), C. Sempronius Tuditanus (consul, 129 B.C.), Cn. Gellius, Vennonius, C. Fannius (consul, 122 B.C.), and L. Caelius Antipater.^[518] By these writers some attempt was made to apply canons of criticism to the traditional accounts of early Roman history, but they did little more than rationalize the more obviously mythical narratives; they also followed Greek literary models and introduced speeches, &c., for artistic effect. Where they wrote as contemporaries, however, e.g. Fannius in his account of the Gracchan movement, their works were of the highest value. About the beginning of this period Polybius (q.v.) had published his history, which originally embraced the period of the Punic wars, and was afterwards continued to 146 B.C. His influence was not fully exerted upon Roman historians until the close of the 2nd and early part of the 1st century B.C., when a school of writers arose who treated history with a practical purpose, endeavouring to trace the motives of action and to point a moral for the edification of their readers. To this school belonged Sempronius Asellio, Claudius Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias and C. Licinius Macer (d. 66 B.C.). Their writings were diffuse, rhetorical and inaccurate; Livy complains of the gross exaggerations of Valerius (whom he followed blindly in his earlier books), and Macer seems to have drawn much of his material from sources of very doubtful authenticity. Contemporary history was written by Cornelius Sisenna (119–67 B.C.), and the work of Polybius was continued to 86 B.C. by the Stoic Posidonius (c. 135–45 B.C.), a man of encyclopaedic knowledge. From the Gracchan period onwards the memoirs, speeches and correspondence of distinguished statesmen were often published; of these no specimens are extant until we come to the Ciceronian period, when the Speeches and Letters of Cicero (q.v.) and the Commentaries of Julius Caesar (q.v.)—the latter continued to the close of the Civil War by other hands—furnish invaluable evidence for the history of their times. We possess examples of historical pamphlets with a strong party colouring in Sallust's tracts on the Jugurthine War and the conspiracy of Catiline. During the same period Roman antiquities, genealogy, chronology, &c., were exhaustively treated by M. Terentius Varro (116–27 B.C.) (q.v.) in his Antiquitates (in 41 books) and other works. Cicero's friend, M. Pomponius Atticus, also compiled a chronological table which was widely used, and Cornelius Nepos (q.v.) wrote a series of historical biographies which have come down to us.

In the Augustan age the materials accumulated by previous generations were worked up by compilers whose works are in some cases preserved. The work of Livy (q.v.) covered the history of Rome from its foundation to 9 B.C. in 142 books; of these only 35 are preserved in their entirety, while the contents of the rest are known in outline from an epitome (periochae) and from the compendia of Florus and later authors. Diodorus Siculus (q.v.) of Agyrium in Sicily followed the earlier annalists in the sections of his Universal History (down to Caesar) which dealt with Roman affairs; Dionysius of Halicarnassus (q.v.), in his Roman Archaeology (published in 7 B.C.), treated early Roman history in a more ambitious and rhetorical style, with greater fulness than Livy, whose work he seems to have used. Universal histories were also written in the Augustan age by Nicolaus of Damascus, a protégé of Herod the Great, and Trogus Pompeius, whose work is known to us from the epitome of Justin (2nd century A.D.). Juba, the learned king of Mauretania installed by Augustus, wrote a History of Rome as well as antiquarian works. Strabo (q.v.), whose Geography is extant, was the author of a continuation of Polybius's history (to 27 B.C.). The learning of the time was enshrined in the encyclopedia of Verrius Flaccus, of which we possess part of Festus's abridgment (2nd century A.D.), together with an Epitome of Festus by Paulus Diaconus (temp. Charlemagne). An official list of the consuls and other chief magistrates of the republic was inscribed on the walls of the Regia (rebuilt 36 B.C.), followed somewhat later by a similar list of triumphatores; the former of these is known as the Fasti Capitolini, (C.I.L.I.², 1 sqq.), since the fragments which have been recovered are preserved in the Palace of the Conservatori on the Capitol. The Forum of Augustus (see Rome, section Archaeology) was decorated with statues of famous Romans, on the bases of which were inscribed short accounts of their exploits; some of these elogia are preserved (cf. Dessau, Inscr. Lat. sel. 50 sqq.).

Amongst writers of the imperial period who dealt with republican history the most important are Velleius Paterculus, whose compendium of Roman history was published in A.D. 30; Plutarch (c. A.D. 45–125), in whose biographies much contemporary material was worked up; Appian, who wrote under the Antonines and described the wars of the republic under geographical headings (partly preserved) and the civil wars in five books, and Dio Cassius (v. infra), of whose history only that portion which deals with events from 69 B.C. onwards is extant. The date of Granius Licinianus, whose fragments throw light on the earlier civil wars, is not certain.

The evidence of inscriptions (q.v.) and coins (q.v.) begins to be of value during the 150 years of the republic. A series of laws and Senatus consulta (beginning with the Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus, 189 B.C.) throws light on constitutional questions, while the coins struck from about 150 B.C. onwards bear types illustrative of the traditions preserved by the families to which the masters of the mint (III viri monetales) belonged.

Modern Authorities.—The principles of historical criticism may be said to have been formulated by Giambattista Vico (q.v.), whose principi di scienza nuova were published in 1725. The credibility of the traditional account of Roman republican history was called in question by Louis de Beaufort (Dissertation sur l'incertitude des cinq premiers siècles de l'histoire romaine, 1738); but the modern critical movement dates from Niebuhr, two volumes of whose Römische Geschichte appeared in 1811–12 (the third was published after his death in 1832, his lectures in 1846). The early history of Rome was fully treated by Niebuhr's follower, F. C. A. Schwegler, whose Römische Geschichte in 3 vols. (1853–58) was continued to 327 B.C. by O. Clason (vols. 4 and 5, 1873–76). A reaction against the negative criticism of Niebuhr was headed by J. Rubino, who showed in his Untersuchungen über römische Verfassung und Geschichte (1839) that the growth of the Roman constitution might be traced with some approach to certainty by the analysis of institutions. It was left for Theodor Mommsen (Römische Geschichte, 1st ed., 1854–56; Eng. trans. new ed. in 5 vols., 1894; Römische Forschungen, 1864–79; Römisches Staatsrecht, 1st ed., 1872–75 [in the Handbuch der römischen Alterthümer, begun by Becker in 1843 and continued under the supervision of J. Marquardt]; Römisches Strafrecht, 1899, and many other works) to reduce Roman constitutional history to a science. Mommsen substituted for the detailed criticism of the traditional narrative a picture of the growth of Italian civilization based on linguistic, literary and monumental evidence. W. Ihne (Römische Geschichte, 8 vols., 1868–90) dealt more fully with the course of events as related by ancient historians. L. Lange's Römische Alterthümer (1856–71), 3 vols., treated constitutional history in a narrative form. In more recent times Eduard Meyer has treated of early Italian history in his Geschichte des Alterthums, vols. ii.-v. (1893–1902); and Ettore Pais, in his Storia di Roma, vols. i.-ii. (1893–99), has subjected the narratives of Roman history down to the Samnite wars to a searching and in many cases exaggerated criticism. De Sanctis, in his Storia dei Romani (2 vols., 1907) (down to the establishment of the Roman hegemony in Italy), combines radical criticism of tradition with a constructive use of archaeological and other evidence. Heitland's Roman Republic (3 vols., 1909) is a fresh and independent work. The last century of the republic has been the subject of many works (see reff. in text and biographical articles). W. Drumann (Geschichte Roms, 1834–44; new ed. by Groebe in progress) gave an exhaustive biographical account of the contemporaries of Caesar and Cicero; A. H. J. Greenidge's History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 70 (vol. i. 1904) was unfortunately cut short by the author's early death in 1906; G. Ferrero's Grandezza e Decadenza di Roma (in progress, Eng. trans. of vols. i., ii., 1907; iii.-v., 1909) is ambitious but unsound.

II. Imperial Period: Ancient Sources.—The memoirs of Augustus as well as those of his contemporaries (Messalla, Agrippa, Maecenas, &c.) and successors (Tiberius, Agrippina the younger, &c.) have perished, but we possess the Res gestae divi Augusti inscribed on the walls of his temple at Ancyra (ed. Mommsen, 1883). Few historical works were produced under the earlier Julio-Claudian emperors; Cremutius Cordus lost his life under Tiberius for the freedom with which his opinion of the triumvirs was expressed. Aufidius Bassus wrote the history of the civil wars and early empire, perhaps to A.D. 49, and this was continued by Pliny the Elder (q.v.) in 31 books, probably to the accession of Vespasian.^[519] These works, together with those of Fabius Rusticus, a friend of Seneca, and Cluvius Rufus, a courtier under Nero, were amongst the authorities used by Tacitus (q.v.), whose Annals (properly called ab excessu divi Augusti) and Histories, when complete, carried the story of the empire down to A.D. 96.^[520] Tacitus wrote under Trajan, upon whom the younger Pliny pronounced his Panegyric; Pliny's correspondence with Trajan about the affairs of Bithynia, which he administered in A.D. 111–13, is of great historical value. Suetonius (q.v.), who was for some time secretary of state to Hadrian, wrote biographies of the emperors from Julius Caesar to Domitian, which contain much interesting gossip. Arrian, a Bithynian Greek promoted by Hadrian to important posts, wrote on Rome’s policy and wars in the East. Appian (v. supra) dealt with the wars waged under the early empire in the closing books of his work, which have not been preserved. Dio Cassius, a Bithynian who attained to the dignity of a second consulship as the colleague of Severus Alexander, wrote a history of Rome to the death of Elagabalus in 80 books. We possess only epitomes and excerpts of the portion dealing with events from A.D. 46 onwards, except for parts of the 78th and 79th books, in which Dio’s narrative of contemporary events is especially valuable. Herodian, a Syrian employed in the imperial service, wrote a history of the emperors from Commodus to Gordian III., which as the work of a contemporary is not without value, although the author had no historical insight. L. Marius Maximus compiled biographies of the emperors from Nerva to Elagabalus which, like those of Suetonius, contained much worthless gossip. His work was amongst the sources used in the compilation of the Historia Augusta (see further Augustan History), upon which we are obliged to rely for the history of the 3rd century A.D. This work consists in a series of lives of the emperors (including most of the pretenders to that title) from Hadrian to Carinus, professedly written by six authors, Spartianus, Vulcacius Gallicanus, Capitolinus, Lampridius, Trebellius Pollio, and Vopiscus, under Diocletian and Constantine. Modern criticism has shown that (at least in its present form) it is a compilation made towards the close of the 4th century; it is not even certain that any of the above-named writers really existed, and the documents inserted in the text are palpable forgeries. The earlier biographies, however, contain much authentic information, which seems to have been derived from a good contemporary source. The fragments of Dexippus, an Athenian who successfully defended his native town against the Goths, throw much light on the barbaric invasions of the 3rd century. Under Diocletian and his successors (A.D. 289–321) were delivered twelve Panegyrics by Eumenius and other court rhetoricians which possess slight historical value. The history of the final struggle between church and empire is told from the Christian point of view by the author of the De mortibus persecutorum—perhaps Lactantius, the tutor of Crispus. Eusebius’s Ecclesiastical History and Life of Constantine give an ex parte version of the events which they relate; the first of two tracts published under the name of the Anonymus Valesianus furnishes a brief contemporary narrative of the period 305–37, without Christian prepossessions; while the lost work of Praxagoras treated the history of Constantine from the pagan standpoint. The most important historian of the 4th century was Ammianus Marcellinus, a native of Antioch and an officer in the imperial guard, who continued the work of Tacitus (in Latin) to the death of Valens. We possess the last eighteen books of his history which cover the years A.D. 353–78. Two compendia of imperial history pass under the name of Aurelius Victor, the Caesares, or lives of the emperors from Augustus to Julian, and the Epitome de Caesaribus (not by the same author,) which goes down to Theodosius I. Similar works are the Breviarum of Eutropius (secretary of state under Valens) and the still more brief epitome of Festus. The writings of the Emperor Julian and of the rhetoricians Libanius, Themistius and Eunapius—the last-named continued the history of Dexippus to A.D. 404—are of great value for the latter part of the 4th century A.D. They wrote as pagans, while the Christian version of events is given by the three orthodox historians Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret, and the Arian Philostorgius, all of whom wrote in the 5th century. An imperial official, Zosimus, writing in the latter half of that century, gave a sketch of imperial history to A.D. 410; the latter part is valuable, being based on contemporary writings, e.g. those of the Egyptian Olympiodorus, of whose work some fragments are preserved. The bishops Synesius and Palladius, who lived under Arcadius and Theodosius II., furnish valuable information as to their own times; while the fragments of Priscus tell us much of Attila and the Hunnish invasions. Mention must also be made of the poets and letter-writers of the 4th and 5th centuries—Ausonius, Claudian, Symmachus, Paulinus of Nola, Sidonius Apollinaris, Prudentius, Merobaudes and others—from whose writings much historical information is derived. Cassiodorus, the minister of Theodoric, wrote a history of the Goths, transmitted to us in the Historia Gothorum of Jordanes (c. A.D. 550), which gives an account of the earlier barbaric invasions.

Several chronological works were compiled in the 4th and 5th centuries. It will suffice to name the Chronology of Eusebius (to A.D. 324), translated by Jerome and carried down to A.D. 378; the Chronicle of Prosper Tiro, based on Jerome and continued to A.D. 455; the Chronography of A.D. 354, an illustrated calendar containing miscellaneous information; and the works based on the so-called Chronica Constantinopolitana (not preserved), such as the Fasti of Hydatius (containing valuable notices of the period A.D. 379–468). Some minor chronological works such as the Chronicon Ravennae are published in Mommsen’s Chronica Minora. The Chronicon Paschale, primarily a table giving the cycle of Easter celebrations, was compiled in the 7th century A.D.

The Codes of Law, especially the Codex Theodosianus (A.D. 438) and the Code of Justinian, as well as the Army List of the early 5th century, known as the Notitia Dignitatum, possess great historical value. For the inscriptions of the empire, which are of incalculable importance as showing the working of the imperial system in its details, see Inscriptions; the coins (q.v.) also throw much light on the dark places of history in the lack of other authorities. Egyptian papyri are not only instructive as to legal, economic and administrative history, but also (by the formulae employed in their dating) contribute to our general knowledge of events. The Zeitschrift für Papyrusforschung, edited by U. Wilcken, gives an account of progress in this branch of study.

Modern Authorities.—Tillemont’s Histoire des empereurs (6 vols., 1690–1738), supplemented by his Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique, a laborious and erudite compilation, furnished Gibbon with material for his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–1788), which has never been superseded as a history of the entire imperial period, and has been rendered adequate for the purposes of the modern reader by Professor J. B. Bury s edition (1897–1900). The history of the empire has yet to be written in the light of recent discoveries. Mommsen’s fifth volume (Eng. tr., as Provinces of the Roman Empire, 1886) is not a narrative, but an account of Roman culture in the various provinces. C. Merivale’s History of the Romans under the Empire (8 vols., 1850–62, to Marcus Aurelius) is literary rather than scientific. H. Schiller’s Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit (1883–88) is a useful handbook. For the later period we have Bury’s History of the Later Roman Empire (1889), beginning from A.D. 395, and T. Hodgkin’s Italy and her Invaders (8 vols., 1880–99), which tells the story of the barbaric invasions at great length. The imperial constitution is described by Mommsen in the second volume of his Staatsrecht (v. supra); divergent views will be found in Herzog’s Geschichte und System der römischen Staatsverfassung (1884–91); the working of the imperial bureaucracy is treated by O. Hirschfeld, Die römischen Verwaltungsbeamten (1905). The Prosopographia Imperii Romani, compiled by Dessau and Klebs (1897–98), is a mine of information, as is the new edition of Pauly’s Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (in progress). Von Domaszewski’s Geschichte der römischen Kaiser (2 vols., 1909) is popularly written and gives no references to authorities. See further the articles on individual emperors and provinces.

A general history of Rome to the barbarian invasions, popular in character and richly illustrated, was written in French by Victor Duruy (Eng. tr. in 6 vols., 1883–86). The 2nd, 3rd and 4th vols. of Leopold von Ranke’s Weltgeschichte deal with Roman history. An outline of Roman history is given by B. Niese in the 3rd vol. of Müller’s Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft (3rd ed., 1906). A. H. J. Greenidge’s Roman Public Life (1901) is an excellent guide to Roman institutions. The principal authorities on Roman chronology are: Ideler, Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie (1825–26); Fynes-Clinton, Fasti Romani (1845) (a continuation of the same author’s Fasti Hellenici, 1830–41, which goes down to A.D. 14); Fischer, Römische Zeittafeln (1846); Mommsen, Römische Chronologie (2nd ed., 1859); Matzat, Römische Chronologie (1883–84) and Römische Zeittafeln (1889); Holzapfel, Römische Chronologie (1885); Soltau, Römische chronologie (1889); Unger, “Römische Zeitrechnung” in the 1st vol. of Müller’s Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft (2nd ed., 1892). Goyau’s Chronologie de l’empire romain (Paris, 1891) is a useful handbook.  (H. S. J.) 

IV. The Roman Republic in the Middle Ages

The history of the Roman commune as distinguished from the papacy during the middle ages has yet to be written, and only by the discovery of new documents can the difficulties of the task be completely overcome. Although very different in its origin, the Roman Republic gradually assumed the same form as the other Italian communes, and with almost identical institutions. But, owing to the special local conditions amid which it arose, it maintained a distinct physiognomy and character. The deserted Campagna surrounding the city checked any notable increase of trade or industry, and prevented the establishment of the gilds on the solid footing that elsewhere made them the basis and support of the commune. There was also the continual and oppressive influence of the empire, and, above all, the presence of the papacy, which often appeared to absorb the political vitality of the city. At such moments the commune seemed annihilated, but it speedily revived and reasserted itself. Consequently there are many apparent gaps in its history, and we have often extreme difficulty in discovering the invisible links connecting the visible fragments.

Even the aristocracy of Rome had a special stamp. In the other republics, with the exception of Venice, it was feudal, of German origin, and in perpetual conflict with the popular and commercial elements which sought its destruction. The history of municipal freedom in Italy lay in this struggle. But the infiltration of Teutonic and feudal elements broke up the ancient aristocracy of Rome, gave it a special character and left it at the mercy of the people. Then the popes, by the bestowal of lucrative offices, rich benefices and vast estates, and, above all, by raising many nobles to the purple, introduced new blood into the Roman aristocracy, and endued it with increasing strength and vitality. Always divided, always turbulent, this irrepressible body was a continual source of discord and civil war, of permanent confusion and turmoil. Amidst all these difficulties the commune struggled on, but never succeeded in preserving a regular course or administration for long. What with continual warfare, attacks on the Capitol and consequent slaughter, pillage and incendiarism, it is no wonder that so few original documents are left to illustrate the history of the Roman Republic. Nor have chroniclers and historians done much to supply this want, since, in treating of Roman affairs, their attention is mainly devoted to the pope and the emperor. Nevertheless, we will attempt to connect in due order all the facts gleaned from former writers and published records.

The removal of the seat of the empire to Constantinople effected a radical change in the political situation of Rome; nor was this change neutralized by the formation of the weak Western empire soon to be shattered by the Germanic invasions. But we still find Roman laws and institutions; and no sign is yet manifest of the rise of a medieval municipality. The earliest germ of this new type of municipality is seen during the barbarian invasions. Of these we need only enumerate the four most important—those of the Goths, Byzantines (who, however, were not mere barbarians but civilized and corrupt), Lombards and Franks. The Gothic rule merely superimposed upon the Roman social order a Teutonic stratum, that never The Goths. penetrated beneath its surface. The Goths always remained a conquering army; according to the German custom, they took possession of one-third of the vanquished territory, but, while forbidding the Romans to bear arms, left their local administration intact. The senate, the curiae, the principal magistrates, both provincial and municipal, the prefect of the city, and the Roman judges enforcing the enactments of the Roman law, were all preserved. Already, under the empire, the civil power had been separated from the military, and this separation was maintained. Hence there was no visible change in the constitution of the state. Only, now there were conquered and conquerors. All real and effective power was on the side of brute force, and the Goths alone bore arms. In every province they had their comites, or heads of the army, who had judicial power over their countrymen, especially in criminal cases. Here, then, was a combination of civil and military jurisdiction altogether contrary to Roman ideas. Nor can it be denied that the comites, as chiefs of the armed force, necessarily exerted a direct or indirect influence on the civil and administrative power of the provinces, and especially upon the collection of the imposts. The civil arm, being virtually subordinate to the military, suffered unavoidable change. Notwithstanding the praise lavished on Theodoric, the kingdom founded by him in Italy had no solid basis. It was composed of two nations differing in race and traditions and even in religion, since the Goths were Arians and the Romans Catholics. The latter were sunk in degeneracy and corruption; their institutions were old and decrepit. It was necessary to infuse new life into the worn-out body. This was difficult, perhaps impossible; and at any rate Theodoric never attempted the task. Little wonder then if the Gothic kingdom succumbed to the Byzantine armies from Constantinople.

The wars of Belisarius and Narses against the Goths lasted twenty years (535-55 A.D.), caused terrible slaughter and The Byzantine rule. devastation in Italy, and finally subjected her to Constantinople. In place of a Gothic king she was now ruled by a Greek patrician, afterwards entitled the exarch, who had his seat of government at Ravenna as lieutenant of the empire. In the chief provincial cities the ruling counts were replaced by dukes, subrule ordinate to the exarch; and the smaller towns were governed by military tribunes. Instead of dukes, we sometimes find magistri militum, apparently of higher rank. The praefectus praetorio of Italy, likewise a dependent of the exarch, was at the head of the civil administration. The pragmatic sanction (554), promulgating the Justinian code, again separated the civil from the military power, which was no longer allowed to intervene in the settlement of private disputes, and, by conferring on the bishops the superintendence of and authority over the provincial and municipal government, soon led to the increase of the power of the church, which had already considerable influence.

The new organization outwardly resembled that of the Goths: one army had been replaced by another, the counts by dukes; there was an exarch instead of a king; the civil and military jurisdictions were more exactly defined. But the army was not, like that of the Goths, a conquering nation in arms; it was a Graeco-Roman army, and did not hold a third of the territory which was now probably added to the possessions of the state (fisc). The soldiery took its pay from Constantinople, whence all instructions and appointments of superior officers likewise proceeded. In Rome we find a magister militum at the head of the troops. The Roman senate still existed, but was reduced to a shadow. Theodoric had left it intact until he suspected it of hostile designs and dealings with the Byzantines, but then began to persecute it, as was proved by the wretched fate of Boetius and Symmachus. Nevertheless the senate survived, added the functions of a curia or municipal council to those of a governmental assembly, and took part in the election of the pope—already one of the chief affairs of Rome. So many senators, however, were slaughtered during the Byzantine War that it was commonly believed to be extinct. The pragmatic sanction, conferring on senate and pope the superintendence of weights and measures in Italy, might seem a convincing proof to the contrary, although, in the general chaos, now that Rome was a mere provincial city, constantly exposed to attack, we may imagine to what the senate was reduced.

All Roman institutions were altered and decayed; but their original features were still to be traced, and no heterogeneous element had been introduced into them. The first dawn of a completely new epoch can only be dated from the invasion of The Lombards. the Lombards (568-72). Their conquest of a large portion of Italy was accompanied by the harshest oppression. They abolished all ancient laws and institutions, and not only seized a third of the land, but reduced the inhabitants almost to slavery. But, in the unsubdued parts of the country—namely, in Ravenna, Rome and the maritime cities—a very different state of things prevailed. The necessity for self-defence and the distance of the empire, now too worn out to render any assistance, compelled the inhabitants to depend solely on their own strength. Thus, certain maritime cities, such as Naples, Amalfi, Pisa and Venice, soon attained to a greater or less degree of liberty and independence.

This is the moment in which ancient society seems to disappear completely and a new one begins to rise. Ancient customs disappear, Christian processions take the place of the ancient games, ancient temples are transformed into churches and dedicated to new saints. If Roman tradition in Italy can ever be said to have been completely broken, this could only be during the Longobard domination. It is certain, however, that soon the elements of ancient culture began to revive once more.

A special state of things now arose in Rome. We behold the rapid growth of the papal power and the continual increase The popes. Gregory I. of its moral and political influence. This had already begun under Leo I., and been further promoted by the pragmatic sanction. Not only the superintendence but often the nomination of public functionaries and judges was now in the hands of the popes. And the accession to St Peter's chair of a man of real genius in the person of Gregory I., surnamed the Great, marked the beginning of a new era. By force of individual character, as well as by historic necessity, this pope became the most potent personage in Rome. Power fell naturally into his hands; he was the true representative of the city, the born defender of church and state. His ecclesiastical authority, already great throughout Italy, was specially great in the Roman diocese and in southern Italy. The continual offerings of the faithful had previously endowed the church with enormous possessions in the province of Rome, in Sicily, Sardinia and other parts. The administration of all this property soon assumed the shape of a small government council in Rome. In the middle ages the owner of the land was also master of the men who cultivated it, and exercised political authority as well; these administrators therefore protected and succoured the oppressed, settled disputes, nominated judges and controlled the ecclesiastical authorities. The use made by the pope of his revenues greatly contributed to the increase of his moral and political authority. When the city was besieged by the Lombards, and the emperor left his army unpaid, Gregory supplied the required funds and thus made resistance possible. And, when the defence could be no longer maintained, he alone, by the weight of his personal influence and the payment of large sums, induced the Lombards to raise the siege. He negotiated in person with Agilulph, and was recognized by him as the true representative of the city. Thus Rome, after being five times taken and sacked by the barbarians, was, on this occasion, saved by its bishop. The exarch, although unable to give any help, protested against the assumption of so much authority by the pope; but Gregory was no usurper; his attitude was the natural result of events. “For twenty-seven years”—so wrote this pontiff to the imperial government of Constantinople—“we lived in terror of the Longobards, nor can I say what sums we had to pay them. There is an imperial treasurer with the army at Ravenna; but here it is I who am treasurer. Likewise I have to provide for the clergy, the poor and the people, and even to succour the distress of other churches.”

It was at this moment that the new Roman commune began to take shape and acquire increasing vigour owing to its The Roman commune. distance from the seat of the empire and its resistance to the Lombard besiegers. Its special character was now to be traced in the preponderance of the military over the civil power. A Roman element had penetrated into the army, which was already possessed of considerable political importance. The prefect of Rome loses authority and seems almost a nullity compared with the magister militum. Hardly anything is heard of the senate. “Quia enim Senatus deest, populus interiit,” exclaims Gregory in a moment of despair. The popes now make common cause with the people against the Lombards on the one hand and the emperor on the other. But they avoid an absolute rupture with the empire, lest they should have to face the Lombard power without any prospect of help. Later, when the growing strength of the commune becomes menacing, they remain faithful to the empire in order not to be at the mercy of the people. It was a permanent feature of their policy never to allow the complete independence of the city until they should be its sole and absolute masters. But that time was still in the future. Meanwhile pope and people joined in the defence of their common interests.

This alliance was cemented by the religious disputes of the East and the West. First came the Monothelite controversy regarding the twofold nature of Christ. Later a long and violent struggle ensued, in which the people of Rome and of other Italian cities sided so vigorously with the popes that John VI. (701-5) had to interpose in order to release the exarch from captivity and prevent a definitive rupture with the empire. Then (710-11) Ravenna revolted against the emperor, organized its armed population under twelve flags, and almost all the cities of the exarchate joined in a resistance that was the first step towards the independence of the Italian communes. A still fiercer religious quarrel then broke out concerning images. Pope Gregory II. (715-31) opposed the celebrated edict of the iconoclastic emperor Leo the Isaurian. Venice and the Pentapolis took up arms in favour of the pope, and elected dukes of their own without applying to the emperor. Again public disorder rose to such a pitch that the pope was obliged to check it lest it should go too far.

In the midst of these warlike tumults a new constitution, almost a new state, was being set up in Rome. During the The duchy of Rome. conflict with Philippicus, the Monothelite and heretical emperor who ascended the throne in 711, the Liber Pontificalis makes the first mention of the duchy of Rome (ducatus Romanae urbis), and we find the people struggling to elect a duke of their own. In the early days of the Byzantine rule the territory appertaining to the city was no greater than under the Roman Empire. But, partly through the weakness of the government of Constantinople, and above all through the decomposition of the Italian provinces under the Lombards, who destroyed all unity of government in the peninsula, this dukedom was widely extended, and its limits were always changing in accordance with the course of events. It was watered by the Tiber, and stretched into Tuscia to the right, starting from the mouth of the Marta, by Tolfa and Bleda, and reaching as far as Orte. Viterbo was a frontier city of the Lombards. On the left the duchy extended into Latium as far as the Garigliano. It spread very little to the north-east and was badly defended on that side, inasmuch as the duchy of Spoleto reached to within fourteen miles of the Salara gate. On the other side, towards Umbria, the river Nera was its boundary line.

The constitution of the city now begins to show the results of the conditions amid which it took shape. The separation The first constitution of the commune. of the civil from the military power has entirely disappeared. This is proved by the fact that, after the year 600, there is no further mention of the prefect. His office still survived, but with a gradual change of functions, until, in the 8th century, he once more appears as president of a criminal tribunal. The constitution of the duchy and of the new republic formed during the wars with the Lombards and the exarch was substantially of an aristocratic-military nature. At its head was the duke, first appointed by the emperor, then by the pope and the people, and, as his strength and influence grew with those of the commune, he gradually became the most respected and powerful personage in Rome. The duke inhabited the palace of the Caesars on the Palatine Hill, and had both the civil and the military power in his hands; he was at the head of the army, which, being composed of the best citizens and highest nobility of Rome, was a truly national force. This army was styled the felicissimus or florens exercitus Romanus or also the militia Romana. Its members never lost their citizen stamp; on the contrary they formed the true body of the citizens. We find mention of other duces in Rome, but these were probably other leaders or superior officers of the army. Counts and tribunes are found in the subject cities bound to furnish aid to the capital. In fact during the pontificate of Sergius II. (844), when the duchy was threatened by a Saracenic invasion, they were requested to send troops to defend the coast, and as many soldiers as possible to the city.

At that time the inhabitants of Rome were divided into four principal classes—clergy, nobles, soldiers and simple citizens. The different classes of society in Rome. The nobles were divided into two categories, first the genuine optimates, i.e. members of old and wealthy families with large estates, and filling high, and often hereditary, offices in the state, the church and the army. These were styled proceres and primates. The second category comprised landed proprietors, of moderate means but exalted position, mentioned as nubiles by Gregory I., and constituting in fact a numerous petty nobility and the bulk of the army. Next followed the citizens, i.e. the commercial class, merchants and craftsmen, who, having as yet no fixed organization and but little influence, were simply designated as honesti cives. These, however, were quite distinct from the plebeians, plebs, vulgus populi, viri humiles, who in their turn ranked above bondsmen and slaves. The honesti cives did not usually form part of the army, and were only enrolled in it in seasons of emergency. Nevertheless the army was not only national, but became increasingly democratic, so that in the 10th century it included every class of inhabitants except churchmen and slaves. At that period we sometimes find the whole people designated as the exercitus, those actually under Scholae militum. arms being distinguished as the militia exercitus Romani. This again was divided into bands or “numbers,” i.e. regiments, and also, in a manner peculiar to Rome, into scholae militum. These scholae were associations derived from antiquity, gaining strength and becoming more general in the middle ages as the central power of the state declined. There were scholae of notaries, of church singers, and of nearly every leading employment; there were scholae of foreigners of diverse nationalities, of Franks, Lombards, Greeks, Saxons, &c. Even the trades and crafts began to form scholae. These were at first very feeble institutions, and only later gained importance and became gilds. As early as the 8th century there were scholae militum in the army, which was thus doubly divided. But we have no precise definition of their functions. They were de facto corporations with separate property, churches and magistrates of their own. The latter were always optimates, and guarded the interests of the army. But the real chiefs of the bands or numeri were the duces or tribunes, and under the Franks the latter became comites. These chiefs were styled magnifici consules, optimates de militia, often too judices de militia, since, as was the custom of the middle ages, they wielded political and judicial as well as military authority. The title of consul was now generally given to superior officers, whether civil or military. The importance of the scholae militum began to decline in the 10th century; towards the middle of the 12th they disappeared altogether, and, according to Felix Papencordt, were last mentioned in 1145. It is probable that the scholae militum signified local divisions of the army, corresponding with the city wards, which were twelve in number during the 10th and 11th centuries, then increased to thirteen and occasionally to fourteen. It is certain that from the beginning the army was distributed under twelve flags; after the scholae had disappeared, we find it classified in districts, which were subdivided into companies. The division of cities into quarters, sestieri or rioni, corresponding with that of the army, and also with that of the municipal government, was the common practice of Florence, Siena and almost all the Italian communes. But, while usually losing importance as the gilds acquired power, in Rome the insignificance of the gilds added to the strength of the regioni or rioni, which not only became part of the army but finally grasped the reins of government. This was a special characteristic of the political constitution of the Roman commune.

We now come to a question of weightier import for all desiring to form a clear idea of the Roman government at that period. The senate in the middle ages. What had become of the senate? It had undoubtedly lost its original character now that the empire was extinct. But, after much learned discussion, historical authorities are still divided upon the subject. Certain Italian writers of the 18th century—Vendettini, for example—asserted with scanty critical insight that the Roman senate did not disappear in the middle ages. The same opinion backed by much learned research was maintained by the great German historian Savigny. And Leo, while denying the persistence of the curia in Lombard Italy, adhered to Savigny's views as regarded Rome. Papencordt did the same, but held the Roman senate to be no more than a curia. This judgment was vigorously contested, first by Hegel and Giesebrecht, then by Gregorovius. These writers believe that after the middle of the 6th century the senate had a merely nominal existence. According to Gregorovius its last appearance was in the year 579. After that date it is mentioned in no documents, and the chroniclers are either equally silent or merely allude to its decay and extinction. In the 8th century, however, the terms senator, senatores, senatus again reappear. We find letters addressed to Pippin, beginning thus: Omnis senatus atque universi populi generalitas. When Leo III. returned from Germany he was met by tam proceres clericorum cum omnibus clericis, quamque optimates et senatus, cunctoque militia (see Anastasius, in Muratori, vol. iii. 198c). But it has been noted that the senate was never found to act as a political assembly; on occasions when it might have been mentioned in that capacity we hear nothing of it, and only meet with it in ceremonials and purely formal functions. Hence the conclusion that the term senator was used in the sense of noble, senatus of nobility, and no longer referred to an institution but only to a class of the citizens. Even when we find that the emperor Otto III. (who sought to revive all the ancient institutions of Rome) addressed an edict to the “consuls and senate of Rome,” and read that the laws of St Stephen were issued senatus decreto, the learned Giesebrecht merely remarks that no important changes in the Roman constitution are to be attributed to the consuls and senate introduced by Otto III. Thus for the next glimpse of the senate we must pass to the 12th century, when it was not only reformed, as some writers believe, but entirely reconstituted.

But in this case a serious difficulty remains to be disposed of. Gregorovius firmly asserts that the nobles acquired great power between the 7th and 10th centuries, not only filling the highest military, judicial and ecclesiastical offices, “but also directing the municipal government, presumably with the prefect at their head.” He further adds: “Notwithstanding the disappearance of the senate, it is difficult to suppose that the city was without governing magistrates, or without a council.” Thus, after the 7th century, the optimates at the head of the army were also at the head of the citizens, and “formed a communal council in the same manner in which it was afterwards formed by the banderesi.”^[521] Now, if the nobles were called senatores and the nobility senatus, and if this body of nobles met in council to administer the affairs of the republic, there is no matter for dispute, inasmuch as all are agreed that the original senate must have had a different character from the senate of the middle ages. And, since the absence of all mention of a prefect after the 7th century is not accepted as a proof of his non-existence, and we find him reappear under another form in the 8th century, so the silence as to the senate after the year 579, the fresh mention of it in the 8th century, and its reappearance in the 12th as a firmly reconstituted body reasonably lead to the inference that, during that time, the ancient senate had been gradually transformed into the new council. Its meetings must have been held very irregularly, and probably only in emergencies when important affairs had to be discussed, previously to bringing them before the parliament The consuls. or general assembly of the people. Historians are better agreed as to the significance of the term consul. At first this was simply a title of honour bestowed on superior magistrates, and retained that meaning from the 7th to the 11th century, but then became—as in other Italian cities—a special title of the chief officers of the state.

During this period the Roman constitution was very simple. The duke, commanding the army, and the prefect, presiding over the criminal court, were the chiefs of the republic; the armed nobility constituted the forces, filled all of superior offices, and occasionally met in a council called the senate, although it had, as we have said, no resemblance to the senate of older times. In moments of emergency a general parliament of the people was convoked. This constitution differed little from that of the other Italian communes, where, in the same way, we find all the leading citizens under arms, a parliament, a council, and one or more chiefs at the head of the government.

But Rome had an element that was lacking elsewhere. We have already noted that, in the provinces, the administrators of church lands were important personages, and exercised during the middle ages, when there was no exact division of power, both judicial and political functions. It was very natural that the heads of this vast administration resident in Rome should have a still higher standing, and in fact, from the 6th century, their power increased to such an extent that in the times of the Franks they already formed a species of papal Judices de clero. cabinet with a share and sometimes a predominance in the affairs of the republic. There were seven principal administrators, but two of them held the chief power—the primicerius notariorum and the secundicerius, i.e. the first and under secretaries of state. When, on the constitution of the new empire, these ministers were declared to be palatine or imperial as well as papal officials, the primicerius and the secundicerius were also in waiting on the emperor, who sat in council with them when in Rome. Next came the arcarius, or treasurer; the sacellarius, or cashier; the protoscriniarius, who was at the head of the papal chancery; the primus defensor, who was the advocate of the church and administered its possessions. Seventh and last came the nomenclator, or adminiculator, who pleaded the cause of widows, orphans and paupers. There were also some other officials, such as the vestiarius, the vicedominus or steward, the cubicularius or major-domo, but these were of inferior importance. They were ecclesiastics, but not bound to be in priest's orders. The first seven were those specially known as proceres clericorum and oftener still as judices de clero, since they speedily assumed judicial functions and ranked among the chief judges of Rome. But as ecclesiastics they did not give decisions in criminal cases. Thus Rome had two tribunals, that of the judices de clero, or ordinarii, presided over by the pope, and that of the judices de militia, leaders of the army, dukes and tribunes, also bearing the generic title of consuls. First appointed by the exarch and then frequently by the pope, these decided both civil and criminal cases. In the latter they were sole judges under the presidency of the prefect.

The pope was thus at the head of a large administrative body with judicial and civil powers that were continually on the increase, and, in addition to his moral authority over Christendom, was possessed of enormous revenues. So in course of time he considered himself the real representative of the Roman Republic. Gregory II. The popes and the papal power. (715–31) accepted in the name of the republic the submission of other cities, and protested against the conquest by the Lombards of those already belonging to Rome. He seemed indeed to regard the territory of the duchy as the patrimony of the church. The duke was always at the head of the army, and, officially, was always held to be an imperial magistrate. But the empire was now powerless in Italy. Meanwhile the advance of the Lombards was becoming more and more threatening; they seized Ravenna in 751, thus putting an end to the exarchate, and next marched towards Rome, which had only its own forces and the aid of neighbouring cities to rely upon. To avoid being crushed by the brute force of a foreign nation unfit to rule, and only capable of oppression and pillage, it was necessary to make an energetic stand.

Accordingly, the reigning pope, Stephen II. (752–57), appealed to Pippin, king of the Franks, and concluded with that monarch an alliance destined to inaugurate a new epoch of the world's history. The pope consecrated Pippin king of the Franks, and named him patricius Romanorum. This title, as introduced by Constantine, The popes appeal to the Franks for aid. had no longer the ancient meaning, but now became a sign of lofty social rank. When, however, it was afterwards conferred on barbarian chieftains such as Odoacer and Theodoric, and then on the representative of the Byzantine empire in Italy, it acquired the meaning of a definite dignity or office. In fact, the title was now given to Pippin as defender of the church, for the pope styled him at the same time patricius Romanorum and defensor or protector ecclesiae. And the king pledged himself not only to defend the church but also to wrest the exarchate and the Pentapolis from the Lombards and give them to Rome, or rather to the pope, which came to the same thing. This was considered as a restitution made to the head of the church, who was also the representative of the republic and the empire. And, to preserve the character of a restitution, the famous “donation of Constantine” was invented during this period (752–77). Pippin brought his Donation of Pippin. army to the rescue (754–55) and fulfilled his promise. The pope accepted the donation in the name of St Peter, and as the visible head of the church. Thus in 755 central Italy broke its connexion with the empire and became independent; thus was inaugurated the temporal power of the papacy, the cause of so much subsequent warfare and revolution in Rome.

Its first consequences were speedily seen. In 767 the death of Paul I. was followed by a fierce revolt of the nobles under Duke Toto (Theodoro) of Nepi, who by violent means raised his brother Constantine to the chair of St Peter, although Constantine was a layman and had first to be ordained. For more than a year the new pontiff was a pliable tool in the hands of Toto and of the nobles. But the genuine papal faction, headed by a few judices de clero, asked the aid of the Lombards and made a formidable resistance. Their adversaries were defeated, tortured and put to death. Toto was treacherously slain during a fight. The pope was blinded and left half dead on the highway. Fresh and no less violent riots ensued, owing to the public dread lest the new pope, Stephen III. (768–72), elected by favour of the Lombards, should give them the city in return. But Stephen went over to the Franks, whom he had previously deserted, and his successor, Adrian I. (772–95), likewise adhered to their cause, called the city to arms to resist King Desiderius and his Lombard hordes, and besought the assistance of Charlemagne. This monarch accordingly made a Charlemagne
in Italy. descent into Italy in 773, and not only gained an easy victory over Desiderius, but destroyed the Lombard kingdom and seized the iron crown. Entering Rome for the first time in 774, he confirmed and augmented the donation of Pippin by the addition of the dukedom of Spoleto. He returned several times to Italy and Rome, making new conquests and fresh concessions to Adrian I., until the death of the latter in 795.

The position of Rome and of the pope is now substantially changed. Duke, prefect, militia and the people exist as heretofore, but are all subordinate to the head of the church, who, by the donations of Pippin and Charlemagne, has been converted into a powerful temporal sovereign. Henceforth all connexion with The papacy, the republic and the Franks. Byzantium is broken off, but Rome is still the mainspring of the empire, the Roman duchy its sole surviving fragment in Italy, and the pope stands before the world as representative of both. And, although it is difficult to determine how this came about, the pope is now regarded and regards himself as master of Rome. In the year 772 he entrusts the vestiarius with judicial powers over the laity, ecclesiastics, freemen and slaves nostrae Romanae reipublicae. He writes to Charlemagne that he has issued orders for the burning of the Greek ships employed in the slave trade, “in our city of Civita Vecchia” (Centumcellae), and he always speaks of Rome and the Romans as “our city,” “our republic,” “our people.” The donations of Pippin and Charlemagne are restitutions made to St Peter, the holy church and the republic at the same time. It is true that Charlemagne held the supreme power, had an immensely increased authority and actively fulfilled his duties as patricius. But his power was only occasionally exercised in Rome; it was the result of services rendered to the church, and of the church's continual need of his help; it was, as it were, the power of a mighty and indispensable ally. The pope, however, was most tenacious of his own authority in Rome, made vigorous protest whenever rebels fled to Charlemagne or appealed to that monarch's arbitration, and contested the supremacy of the imperial officials in Rome. Yet the pope was no absolute sovereign, nor, in the modern sense of the term, did any then exist. He asserted supremacy over many lands which continually rebelled against him, and which, for want of an army of his own, he was unable to reduce to obedience without others' help. Neither did the republic acknowledge him as its head. It profited by the growing power of the pope, could not exist without him, respected his moral authority, but considered that he usurped undue power in Rome. This was specially the feeling of the nobles, who had hitherto held the chief authority in the republic, and, being still the leaders of the army, were by no means willing to relinquish it. The Roman nobles were very different from other aristocratic bodies elsewhere. They were not as they pretended, descendants of the Camilli and the Scipios, but neither were they a feudal aristocracy, inasmuch as the Teutonic element had as yet made small way among them. They were a mixture of different elements, national and foreign, formed by the special conditions of Rome. Their power was chiefly derived from the high offices and large grants of money and land conferred on them by the popes; but, as no dynasty existed, they could not be dynastic. Every pope aggrandized his own kindred and friends, and these were the natural and often open adversaries of the next pontiff and his favourites. Thus the Roman nobility was powerful, divided, restless and turbulent; it was continually plotting against the pope, threatening not only his power, but even his life; it continually appealed to the people for assistance, stirred the militia to revolt and rendered government an impossibility. Hence, notwithstanding his immense moral authority, the pope was the effective head neither of the aristocracy, the army nor of the as yet unorganized lower classes. The lord of vast but often insubordinate territories, the recognized master of a capital city torn by internecine feud and plots against himself, he needed the support of an effective force for his own preservation and the maintenance of the authority proffered him from all quarters. Hence the necessity of creating an empire of the West, after having snapped every link with that of the East. Thus the history of Rome is still, as in the past, a history of continual strife between pope, emperor and republic; and the city, while imbibing strength from all three, keeps them in confusion.

Leo III. (796-816) further strengthened the ties between Charlemagne and the church by sending the former a letter with the keys of the shrine of St Peter and the banner of Rome. Charlemagne had already joined to his office of patrician the function of high justice. The new symbols now sent constituted him miles of Rome and general of the church. The pope urged him to despatch an envoy to receive the oath of fealty, thus placing himself, the representative of the republic, in the subordinate position of one of the bishops who had received the immunities of counts. And all these arrangements took place without the slightest reference to the senate, the army or the people. Much resentment was felt, especially by the nobles, and a revolution ensued headed by the primicerius Paschalis and the secundicerius Campulus, and backed by all who wished to liberate the city from the papal rule. During a solemn procession the pope was attacked and barbarously maltreated by his assailants, who tried to tear out his eyes and tongue (799). He was thrown into prison, escaped and overtook Charlemagne at Paderborn, and returned guarded by ten of the monarch's envoys, who condemned to death the leaders of the revolt, reserving, however, to their sovereign the right of final judgment. Charlemagne arrived in December 800, and as high justice assembled a tribunal of the clergy, nobles, citizens and Franks; he pronounced Leo to be innocent, and confirmed the capital sentence passed on the rebels. But through the intercession of the pope, who dreaded the wrath of the nobles, this was presently Charlemagne crowned emperor. commuted into perpetual exile. And finally on Christmas day, in St Peter's, before an assemblage of Roman and Frankish lords, the clergy and the people, the pontiff placed the imperial crown on Charlemagne's head and all proclaimed him emperor.

Thus the new emperor was elected by the Romans and consecrated by the pope. But he was their real master and supreme judge. The pope existed only by his will, since he alone supplied the means for the maintenance of the temporal power, and already pretended to the right of controlling the papal elections. Yet Charlemagne was not sovereign of Rome; he possessed scarcely any regalia there, and was not in command of the army; he mainly represented a principle, but this principle was the law which is the basis of the state. The pope still nominated the Roman judges, but the emperor or his missi presided over them, together with those of the pope, and his decision was appealed to in last resort. During the Carolingian times no mention is found of the prefect, and it would seem that his office was filled by the imperial missus, or legate, the judices de clero and judices de militia. The power of the pope was now entangled with that of the republic on the one hand and that of the empire on the other. The consequent confusion of sacred and secular functions naturally led to infinite complications and disputes.

The death of Charlemagne in 814 was the signal for a fresh conspiracy of the nobles against the pope, who, discovering their design, instantly put the ringleaders to death, and was severely blamed by Louis for this violation of the imperial prerogative. While the matter was under discussion the nobles broke out in fiercer tumults, both in Rome and the Campagna. At last, in 824, the emperor Lothair came to re-establish order in Rome, and proclaimed a new and noteworthy constitution, to which Pope Eugenius II. (824-27) gave his oath of adherence. By this the partnership of pope and emperor in the temporal rule of Rome and the states of the church was again confirmed. The more direct power appertained to the pope; the supreme authority, presidency of the tribunals, and final judgment on appeal to the emperor. The new constitution also established the right of contending parties to select either the Roman or the Teutonic code for the settlement of their disputes. During the Carolingian period it is not surprising that the commune should have been, as it were, absorbed by the church and the empire. In fact, it is scarcely mentioned in history throughout that time. Decline of the empire. And when, no longer sustained by the genius of its founder, the Frankish empire began to show signs of dissolution, the popes, finding their power thereby strengthened, began to assume many of the imperial attributes. Soon, however, as a natural consequence of the loss of the main support of the papacy, the nobles regained vigour and were once more masters of the city. Teutonic and feudal elements had now largely penetrated into their organization. The system of granting lands, and even churches and convents, as benefices according to feudal forms, became more and more general. It was vain for the popes to offer opposition, and they ended by yielding to the current. The fall of the Frankish empire left all Italy a prey to anarchy, and torn by the faction fights of Berengar of Friuli and Guido of Spoleto, the rival claimants to the crowns of Italy and the empire. The Saracens were advancing from the south, the Huns from the north; the popes had lost all power; and in the midst of this frightful chaos a way was opened for the rise of the republics. Anarchy was at its climax in Rome, but the laity began to overpower the clergy to such an extent that the judices de militia prevailed over the judices de clero. For a. long time no imperial missi or legates had been seen, and the papacy was incredibly lowered. The election of the popes had positively fallen into the hands of certain beautiful women notorious for their evil life and depravity. The Renewed power of the aristocracy. aristocracy alone gained strength; now freed from the domination of the emperor, it continually wrested fresh privileges from the impotent pontiffs, and became organized as the ruling force of the republic. Gregorovius, notwithstanding his denial of the continuation of the senate after the 6th century, is obliged to acknowledge that it appeared to have returned to life in the power of this new baronage. And, although this body was now permeated with the feudal principle, it did not discard its ancient traditions. The nobles claimed to be the main source of the empire; they wished to regain the dignity and office of patricius, and to make it, if possible, hereditary in some of their families. Nothing is known of their system of organization, but it seems that they elected a chief bearing the title of consul, senator, princeps Romanorum, who was officially recognized by the pope, as a patricius presided over the tribunals, and was the head of the commune.

Theophylact was one of the first to assume this dignity. His wife Theodora, known as the senatrix, was one of the women dominating Rome by force of their charms and licentiousness. She was supposed to be the concubine of Pope John X. (914-28), whose election was due to her influence. Her daughter Marozia, in all things her worthy rival, was married to Alberic, a foreign mercenary, of uncertain birth who rose to a position of great influence, and, although an alien, played a leading part in the affairs of the city. He helped to increase the power of Theophylact, who seemingly shared the rule of the city with the pope. In the bloody war that had to be waged against the Saracens of southern Italy, and at the defeat of the latter on the Garigliano (916), Theophylact and Alberic were the Roman leaders, and distinguished themselves by their valour. They disappeared from the scene after this victory, but Marozia retained her power, and bore a son, Alberic, who was destined to greater deeds. The pope found himself caught in this woman's toils, and struggled to escape, but Marozia, gaining fresh influence by her marriage with Hugo, margrave of Tuscany, imprisoned the pontiff himself in the castle of St Angelo (928). This fortress was the property of Marozia and the basis of her strength. The unfortunate John died within its walls. Raised to the chair by Theodora, he was deposed and killed by her daughter. The authority of the latter reached its culminating point in 931, when she succeeded in placing her son John XI. on the papal throne. On the death of her second husband she espoused Hugh of Provence, the same who in 928 had seized the iron crown at Pavia, and now aspired to the empire. Dissolute, ambitious and despotic, he came to Rome in 932, and, leaving his army outside the walls, entered the castle of St Angelo with his knights, instantly began to play the tyrant, and gave a blow to Alberic his stepson, who detested The revolt of the Romans. Alberic at the head of the commune. him as a foreign intruder. This blow proved the cause of a memorable revolution; for Alberic rushed from the castle and harangued the people, crying that the time was come to shake off the tyrannous yoke of a woman and of barbarians who were once the slaves of Rome. Then, putting himself at the head of the populace, he closed the city gates to prevent Hugh's troops from coming to the rescue, and attacked the castle. The king fled; Marozia was imprisoned, Alberic proclaimed lord of the Romans, and the pope confined to the Lateran in the custody of his own brother. Rome was again an independent state, a republic of nobles. Rid of the temporal dominion of emperor and pope, and having expelled the foreigners with great energy and courage, it chose Alberic for its chief with the title of princeps atque omnium Romanorum senator. The tendency of the Roman Republic to elect a supreme authority, first manifested in the case of Theophylact, was repeated in those of Alberic, Brancaleone, Crescenzio, Cola di Rienzo and others. One of the many causes of this tendency maybe traced to the conception of the new empire of which Rome was the original and enduring fountainhead. As Rome had once transferred the empire from Byzantium to the Franks, so Rome was surely entitled to reclaim it. The imperial authority was represented by the office of patrician, now virtually assumed by Alberic. That he gave the name of Octavian to his son is an additional proof of this fact. In the Eternal City the medieval political idea has always the aspect of a resurrection or transformation of classic antiquity. This is another characteristic of the history of the Roman commune.

Alberic's strength was due to his connexion with the nobility, to his father's valiant service against the Saracens at the battle of Garigliano, and to the militia under his command, on which everything depended amid the internal and external dangers now threatening the new state. As yet no genuine municipal constitution was possible in Rome, where neither the people nor the wealthy burghers engaged in industry and commerce had any fixed organization. All was in the hands of the nobles, and Alberic, as their chief, frequently convened them in council, although obliged to use pressure to keep them united and avoid falling a prey to their disputes. Hence the whole power was concentrated in his grasp; he was at the head of the tribunals as well as of the army. The judices de clero and judices de militia still existed, but no longer met in the Lateran or the Vatican, under the presidency of emperor and pope or their missi. Alberic himself was their president; and, a still more significant fact, their sittings were often held in his private dwelling. There is no longer any mention of prefect or patricius. The papal coinage was inscribed with Alberic's name instead of the emperor's. His chief attention was given to the militia, which was still arranged in scholae, and it is highly probable that he was the author of the new division of the city into twelve regions, with a corresponding classification of the army in as many regiments under twelve flags and twelve banderesi, one for every region. The organization of the scholae could not have been very dissimilar, but doubtless Alberic had some important motive for altering the old method of classification. By means of the armed regions he included the people in the forces. It is certain that after his time we find the army much changed and far more democratic. It was only natural that so excellent a statesman should seek the aid of the popular element as a defence against the arrogance of the nobles, and it was requisite to reinforce the army in order to be prepared for the attacks threatened from abroad. This change effected, Alberic felt prepared for the worst, and began to rule with energy, moderation and justice. His contemporaries award him high praise, and he seems to have been exempt from the vices of his mother and grandmother.

In 933 Hugh made his first attack upon the city, and was repulsed. A second attempt in 936 proved still more unfortunate, for his army was decimated by a pestilence. Thoroughly disheartened, he not only made peace, but gave his daughter in marriage to Alberic, thus satisfying the latter's desire to ally himself with a royal house. But this union led to no conciliation with Hugh. For Alberic, finding his power increased, marched at the head of his troops to consolidate his rule in the Campagna and the Sabine land. On the death of his brother, Pope John XI., in 936, he controlled the election of several successive popes, quelled a conspiracy formed against him by the clergy and certain nobles instigated by Hugh, and brilliantly repulsed, in 941, another attack by that potentate. At last, however, this inveterate foe withdrew from Rome, being summoned to the north by the victories of his rival Berengarius. But Alberic, after procuring the election of various popes who were docile instruments of his will, experienced a check when Agapetus II. (946-55), a man of firmness and resource, was raised to the papal throne. The fortunes of Berengarius were now in the ascendant. In 950 he had seized the iron crown, and ruled in the Pentapolis and the exarchate. This being singularly painful to the pope, he proceeded to make alliance with all those enemies of Berengarius preferring a distant emperor to a neighbouring and effective sovereign, with the Roman nobles who were discontented with Alberic, and with all who foresaw danger, even to Rome, from the extended power of Berengarius. And Agapetus recurred to the old papal policy, by making appeal to Otto I., whose rule in Germany was distinguished by a prestige almost comparable with that of Charlemagne.

Otto immediately responded to the appeal and descended into Italy; but his envoys were indignantly repulsed by Alberic, and, being prudent as well as firm, he decided to wait a more opportune moment for the accomplishment of his designs. Meanwhile Alberic died in 954, and the curtain fell on the first great drama of the Roman Republic. He had reigned for twenty-two years with justice, energy and prudence; he had repelled foreign invaders, maintained order and authority. He seems, however, to have realized that the aspect of affairs was about to change, that the work he had accomplished would be exposed to new dangers. These dangers, in fact, had already begun with the accession of an enterprising pope to the Holy See. The name of Octavian given by Alberic to his son leads to the inference that he meant to make his power hereditary. But, suddenly, he began to educate this son for the priesthood, and, assembling the nobles in St Peter's shortly before his death, he made them swear to elect Octavian as pope on the decease of Agapetus II. They kept their word, for in this way they freed themselves from a ruler. Possibly Alberic trusted that both offices might be united, and that his son would be head of the state as well as the church. But the nobles knew this to be a delusion, especially in the case of a nature such as Octavian's. The lad was sixteen years old when his father died, received princely honours until the death of Agapetus, and was then elected pope with the name of John XII. He had inherited the ungoverned passions of his grandmother Marozia and great-grandmother Theodora, but without their intelligence and cunning. His palace was the scene of the most scandalous licence, while his public acts were those of a baby tyrant. He conferred a bishopric on a child of ten, consecrated a deacon in a stable, invoked Venus and Jupiter in his games, and drank to the devil's health. He desired to be both pope and prince, but utterly failed to be either. Before long, realizing the impossibility of holding in check Berengarius, who still ruled over the exarchate, he sought in 960 the aid of Otto I., and promised him the imperial crown. Thus the new ruler was summoned by the son of the man by whom he had Otto I. crowned emperor. been repulsed. Otto vowed to defend the church, to restore her territories, to refrain from usurping the power of the pope or the republic, and was crowned on the 2nd of February 962 with unheard-of pomp and display.

Accordingly, after being extinct for thirty-seven years, the empire was revived under different but no less difficult conditions. The politico-religious unity founded by Charlemagne had been dissolved, partly on account of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, and partly because other nations were in course of formation. Now too the feudal system was converting the officers of the empire into independent princes, and the new spirit of communal liberty was giving freedom to the cities. Otto once more united the empire and the church, Italy and Germany, in order to combat these new foes. But the difficulties of the enterprise at once came to light. John XII., finding a master in the protector he had invoked, now joined the discontented nobles who were conspiring with Berengarius against the emperor. But the latter hastened to Rome in November 963, assembled the clergy, nobles and heads of the people, and made them take an oath never again to elect a pope without his consent and that of his son. He also convoked a synod presided over by himself in St Peter's, which judged, condemned and deposed Pope John and elected Leo VIII. (863-65), a Roman noble, in his stead. All this was done at the direct bidding of the emperor, who thus deprived the Romans of their most valued privilege, the right of choosing Rising importance of the people. their own pope. But the people had now risen to considerable importance, and, for the first time, we find it officially represented in the synod by the plebeian Pietro, surnamed Imperiola, together with the leaders of the militia, which had also become a popular institution since Alberic's reign. It was no longer easy to keep the lower orders in subjection, and by their junction with the malcontent nobles they formed a very respectable force. On the 3rd of January 964 they sounded the battle-peal and attacked the Vatican, where the emperor was lodged. The German knights repulsed them with much slaughter, and this bloodshed proved the beginning of an endless feud. Otto departed in February, and John XII., as the chosen pope of the Romans, returned with an army of followers and compelled the defenceless Leo VIII. to seek safety in flight. Soon afterwards Leo was deposed and excommunicated by a new synod, and many of his adherents were cruelly murdered. But on the 14th of May 964 John suddenly expired; the Romans, amid violent struggles and tumults, resumed their rights, elected Benedict V., and procured his consecration in spite of the emperor's veto. Otto now appeared at the head of an army, committed fresh slaughter, besieged the city, reduced it by famine, and, after holding a council which deposed Benedict and sent him a prisoner to Hamburg, restored Leo VIII. to the papal throne.

But, although the emperor thus disposed of the papacy at his will, his arbitrary exercise of power roused a long and Another revolution. obstinate resistance, which had no slight effect upon the history of the commune. Leo VIII. died in 965, and the imperial party elected John XIII. (965-72). Upon this the nobles of the national party joined the people and there was a general revolt. The nobles were led by Pietro, prefect of Rome. As we have noted, this office seemed to be extinct during the Carolingian rule, but we again meet with it in 955, after an interval of a century and a half. The leaders of the people were twelve decarconi, a term of unknown derivation, but probably indicating chiefs of the twelve regions (dodecarchi, dodecarconi, decarconi). The new pope was seized and confined, first in the castle of St Angelo, then in a fortress in the Campagna. But the emperor quickly marched an army against Rome, and this sufficed to produce a reaction which recalled the pope (November 966), sent the prefect into exile, and put several of the rebellious nobles to death. And shortly after the emperor sacked the city. Many Romans were exiled, some tortured, others, including the twelve decarconi, killed. John XIII. died in 972 and Otto in 973.

All these events clearly prove how great a change had now taken place in the conditions of Rome. The people (plebs) had made its appearance upon the stage; the army had become democratic; the twelve regions were regularly organized under leaders. Opposed to them stood the nobles, headed by the prefect, also a noble, precisely as in Florence the nobles and the podestà were later opposed to the gilds and the people. So far, it is true, nobles and people had made common cause in Rome; but this harmony was soon to be interrupted. The feudal spirit had made its way among the Roman aristocrats, had split them into two parties and diminished their strength. It was now destined to spread, and, as it was always vigorously detested and opposed by the people elsewhere in Italy, so the same consequence was inevitable in Rome. Another notable Judices dativi. change, and a subject of unending controversy, had also occurred in the administration of justice. So far there were the judices de clero, also known as ordinary or palatine judges, and the judices de militia, also styled consules or duces. These judges generally formed a court of seven, three being de clero, four de militia, or vice versa, under the presidency of the papal or imperial missi. In criminal cases the judices de militia had the prefect or the imperial missus for their president. But there was a third order of judges called pedanei, a consulibus creati. It seems clear that the duces, being distributi per judicatus, found themselves isolated in the provinces, and to obtain assistance nominated these pedanei, who were legal experts. In Rome, with its courts of law, they were less needed, but possibly in those sections of the city where cases of minor importance were submitted to a single magistrate reference was made to the pedanei. But many changes were made under the Franks, and when the edict of Lothair (824) granted free choice of either the Roman or Germanic law, and the duces were replaced by comites and gastaldiones, chiefly of German origin, the use of legal experts became increasingly necessary. And the custom of employing them was the more easily diffused by being already common among the Franks, whose scabini were legal experts acting as judges, though not qualified to pass sentence. Thus the pedanei multiplied, came to resemble the scabini, and were designated judices dativi (a magistratu dati) or simply dativi. These were to be found in the exarchate in 838, but not in Rome until 961, when the judices de militia had ceased to exist. The great progress of the German legal procedure may then have contributed to the formation of the new office.

Meanwhile Pope John XIII. had been succeeded by Benedict VI. (973-74) and Otto I. by his son Otto II., a youth of eighteen married to the Byzantine princess Theophano. Thereupon the Romans, who had supported the election of another pope, and were in no awe of the new emperor, rose to arms under the command of Crescenzio, a rich and powerful noble. They not only seized Benedict VI. by force, but strangled him in the castle of St Angelo. The national and imperial parties then elected several popes who were either exiled or persecuted, and one of them was said to be murdered. In 985 John XV. was elected (985-96). During this turmoil, Giovanni Crescenzio. the national party, composed of nobles and people, led by Giovanni Crescenzio, son of the other Crescenzio mentioned above, had taken complete possession of the government. This Crescenzio assumed the title of patrician, and sought to imitate Alberic, although far his inferior in capacity. Fortunately for him, the reigning pope was a detested tyrant, and the emperor a child entirely guided by his mother. But the new emperor Otto III. was backed by a powerful party, and on coming to Rome in 996 was able, although only aged fifteen, to quell the rebellion, oust Crescenzio from public life, and elect as successor to John XV. his own cousin, Pope Gregory V. (996-99). But this first German pope surrounded himself with compatriots, and by raising them to lofty posts even in the tribunals excited a revolt that drove him from the throne (29th September 999). Crescenzio, being master of the castle of St Angelo, resumed the title of patrician or consul of the Romans, expelled the German judges, reconstituted the government, prepared his troops for defence, and created a new pope. But the following year Otto III. came to Rome, and his party opened the gates to him. Although deserted by nearly all his adherents, Crescenzio held the castle valiantly against its besiegers. At last, on the 29th of April 998, he was forced to make terms, and the imperialists, violating their pledges, first put him to torture and then hurled him from the battlements. Gregory V. dying shortly after these events, Sylvester II., another native of southern France, who had been tutor to the emperor Otto III., was raised to the papacy (999-1003).

Thus Otto III. was enabled to establish his mastery of Rome. But, as the son of a Greek mother, trained amid Greek Otto III. influences, his fantastic and contradictory nature seemed only to grasp the void. He wished to reconstitute a Romano-Byzantine empire with Rome for his capital. His discourse always turned on the ancient republic, on consuls and senate, on the might and grandeur of the Roman people; and his edicts were addressed to the senate and the people. The senate is now constantly mentioned, and its heads bear the title of consuls. The emperor also gave renewed honour to the title of patrician, surrounded himself with officials bearing Greek and Roman designations, and raised the prestige of the prefect, who, having now almost the functions of an imperial vicar, bore the eagle and the sword as his insignia. Nevertheless Otto III. was thoroughly German, and during his reign all Germanic institutions made progress in Rome. This was particularly the case with feudalism, and Sylvester II. was the first pope to treat it with favour. Many families of real feudal barons now arose. The Crescenzii held sway in the Sabine hills, and Praeneste and Tusculum were great centres of feudalism in the 11th century. The system of feudal benefices was recognized by the church, which made grants of lands, cities and provinces in the feudal manner. The bishops, like feudal barons, became actual counts. And, in consequence of these changes, when the emperor, as head of the feudal system, seeks to impose his will upon the church (which has also become feudal) and control the papal elections, he is met by the great question of the investitures, a question destined to disturb the whole world. Meanwhile the Roman barons were growing more and more powerful, and were neither submissive nor faithful to the emperor. On the contrary, they resented his attitude as a master of Rome, and, when he subjected Tivoli to the Holy See, attacked both him and the pope with so much vigour as to put both to flight (16th February 1001). Thereupon Rome again became a republic, headed by Gregory of Tusculum, a man of a powerful family claiming descent from Alberic.

By the emperor's death in January 1002 the race of the Ottos became extinct, the papacy began to decline, as at the end of the Carolingian period, and the nobles, divided into an imperial and a national party, were again predominant. They reserved to themselves the office of patrician, and, electing popes from their own ranks, obtained enlarged privileges and power. At the time when Ardoin, marquis of Ivrea, profiting by the extinction of the Ottos and the anarchy of Germany, was stirring Italy in the vain hope of constituting a national The second Giovanni Crescenzio. kingdom, the Roman Republic was being consolidated under another Giovanni Crescenzio, of the national faction. He was now elected patrician; one of his kinsmen was invested with the office of prefect, and the new pope John XVIII. (1003-9) was one of his creatures. Although the power of Henry of Bavaria was then gaining ascendancy in Germany, and giving strength to the imperialist nobles, Crescenzio still remained supreme ruler of the city and the Campagna. Surrounded by his judges, the senators and his kinsman the prefect, he continued to dispense justice in his own palace until his death in 1012, after ten years' rule. And, Pope Sergius IV. having died the same year, the counts of Tusculum compassed the election of Benedict VIII. (1012-24), one of their own kin. This pope expelled the Crescenzii, changed the prefect and reserved the title of patrician for Henry II., whom he consecrated emperor on the 14th February 1014. A second Alberic, bearing the title of “eminentissimus consul et dux,” was now at the head of the republic and dispensed placita in the palace of his great ancestor, from whom the counts of Tusculum were also descended.

The new emperor endeavoured to re-establish order in Rome, and strengthen his own authority together with that of the Henry II. pope. But the nobles had in all things the upper hand. They were regularly organized under leaders, held meetings, asserted their right to nominate both pope and emperor, and in fact often succeeded in so doing. Even Henry II. himself was obliged to secure their votes before his coronation. The terms senate and senator now recur still more frequently in history. Nevertheless, Benedict VIII. succeeded in placing his own brother, Romano, at the head of the republic with the title of “consul, dux and senator,” thus making him leader of the nobles, who met at his bidding, and chief of the militia and the tribunals. The prefect still retained his authority, and the emperor was by right supreme judge. But, a violent revolt breaking out, the emperor only stayed to suppress it and then went to Germany in disgust. The pope, aided by his brother, conducted the government with energy; he awed the party of Crescenzio, and waged war against the Saracens in the south. But he died in 1024, and in the same year Henry II. was succeeded by Conrad II. There was now beheld a repetition of the same strange event that had followed the death of Alberic, and with no less fatal consequences. Benedict's brother Romano, head of the republic, and still retaining office, was, although a layman, elected pope. He took the name of John XIX. (1024-33), and in 1027 conferred the imperial crown on Conrad the Salic, who, abolishing the Lothairian edict of 824, decreed that throughout Rome and its territory justice should be henceforth administered solely by the Justinian code. Thus, notwithstanding the spread of feudalism and Germanic procedure, the Roman law triumphed through the irresistible force of the national character, which was already manifested in many other ways.

Meanwhile John XIX. was succeeded by his nephew, Benedict IX. (1033-45), a lad of twelve, who placed his own brother at the head of the republic. Thus church and state assumed the aspect of hereditary possessions in the powerful house of the counts of Tusculum. But the vices and excesses of Benedict were so monstrous that the papacy sank to the lowest depth of corruption; there followed a series of tumults and reactionary attempts, and so many conflicting elections that in 1045 three popes were struggling for the tiara in the midst of scandal and anarchy. The streets and neighbourhood of Rome swarmed with thieves and assassins; pilgrims were plundered; citizens trembled for their lives; and a hundred petty barons threatened the rival popes, who were obliged to defend themselves by force. This state of things lasted until Henry III. came to re-establish order. He appointed a synod to depose the three popes, and then, with the consent of the wearied, and anarchy-stricken Romans, assuming the right of election, proposed a German, Clement II., who was consecrated at Christmas 1046. Henry III. was then crowned, and also took the title of patrician. Thus the emperor was lord over church and state. This, however, stirred both people and pope against him, and led to the terrible contest of the investitures, although for the moment the Romans, being exhausted by past calamities, seemed not only resigned and to emancipate the church from all dependence but contented.

In fact, the idea of reform and independence was already germinating in the church and was soon to become tenacious Hildebrand and the question of investiture. and irresistible. Hildebrand was the prompter and hero of this idea. He sought to abolish the simony and concubinage of the priesthood, to give the papal elections into the hands of the higher ecclesiastics, and to emancipate the church from all dependence on the empire. Henry III. procured the election of four German popes in succession, and Hildebrand was always at hand to inspire their actions and dominate them by his strength of intellect and still greater strength of will. But the fourth German pope, Victor II., died in 1057, and Henry III. had been succeeded in 1056 by the young Henry IV. under the regency of a weak woman, the empress Agnes. Hildebrand seized this favourable moment for trying his strength and procured the election of Stephen IX. (1057-58), a candidate he had long had in view. Stephen, however, died in 1058; the nobles instantly rose in rebellion; and Gregory of Tusculum, who had assumed the patriciate, caused an incapable cousin to be named pope (Benedict X.). Upon this Hildebrand postponed his design of maintaining the papacy by the help of Italian potentates and had recourse to the empress. In a synod held at Siena with her consent Benedict was deposed and Nicholas II. (1059-61) elected in his stead. This pope entered Rome escorted by the troops of Godfrey of Tuscany, and, when also assured of help from Naples, assembled a council of one hundred and thirteen bishops (1059), who condemned the deposed pontiff and renewed the prohibition of simony and concubinage among the priesthood. Finally Nicholas instituted the college of cardinals, entrusting it with the election of the pope, who was in future to be chosen from its ranks. The assent of the clergy and people was left purely formal. The decree also contained the proviso—“saving the honour and reverence due to the emperor”; but this too was an empty expression.

The new decree was a master-stroke of Hildebrand's genius, for by means of it he placed the papal election in the hands of a genuine ecclesiastical senate and gave a monarchical form to the church. Backed by the Normans who were in Rome, and whose commander, Richard of Capua, did not scruple to strike off the heads of many recalcitrant nobles, Hildebrand and the pope could now pursue their work of reform. Nevertheless the nobles again revolted on the death of Nicholas II. in 1061, and declared their purpose of restoring to Henry IV. the patriciate and right of election; but Hildebrand, by speedily convoking the cardinals, procured the election of Alexander II. (1061-73). This pope, although friendly to the empire, did not await the imperial sanction, but, protected by the Romans, at once entered the Lateran and put some other riotous nobles to death. The German bishops, however, elected Honorius II., who had the support of the barons. Thus the city was split into two camps and a deadly civil war ensued, terminating, despite the vigorous resistance of the nobility, in the defeat of Honorius II. But the nobles persevered in the contest and were the real masters of Rome. By conferring the patriciate on the emperor, as their feudal chief, they hoped to organize themselves under the prefect, who now, with greatly increased authority, presided over both the civil and criminal courts in the absence of the pope's representative. In a general assembly the Romans elected their prefect, whose investiture was granted by the emperor, while the pope elected another. Thus disorder was brought to a climax.

Alexander died on the 21st April 1073, and thereupon Hildebrand was at last raised to the chair as pope Gregory VII. Gregory VII. (1073-85). He reconfirmed his predecessors' decrees, dismissed all simoniacal and non-celibate priests, and then in a second council (1075) forbade the clergy to receive investiture at the hands of laymen. No bishop nor abbot was again to accept ring or crozier from king or emperor. Now, as ecclesiastical dignities included the possession of extensive benefices, privileges and feudal rights, this decree gave rise to tremendous dispute and to fierce contest between the empire and the church. The nobles took a very decided part in the struggle. With Cenci, their former prefect, at their head, they rose in revolt, assailed the pope on Christmas day 1075, and threw him into prison. But their fear of the popular wrath compelled his speedy release; and he then decreed the excommunication and deposition of the emperor who had declared him deposed. That monarch afterwards made submission to Gregory at Canossa (1077), but, again turning against him, was again excommunicated. And in 1081 he returned to Italy bringing the antipope Clement III., and besieged Rome for forty days. Assembling the nobles in his camp, he there arranged a new government of the city with prefect and senate, palatine judges and other magistrates, exactly similar to the existing government within the walls. He then took his departure, returned several times in vain, but at last forced his way into the city (March 1084) and compelled Gregory VII. to seek refuge in the castle of St Angelo. The emperor was then master of Rome, established the government he had previously arranged and, calling a parliament of nobles and bishops, procured the deposition of Gregory and the consecration of Clement III., by whom he was crowned in 1084. He then attacked and seized the Capitol, and assaulted the castle in order to capture the pope. But Robert Guiscard brought his army to the rescue. Emperor and antipope fled; the city was taken, the pope liberated and Rome reduced to ruin by fire and pillage. Upon this Gregory VII., broken with grief, went away with the Normans, and died at Salerno on the 25th May 1085. He had separated the church from the people and the empire by a struggle that, as Gregorovius says, disturbed the deep sleep of the middle ages.

Pope Paschal II. (1099-1118) found himself entirely at the mercy of the tyrannous nobles who were alike masters of Rome, Paschal II. and the nobles. of its government, and its spiritual lord. As they were divided among themselves, all the pope could do was to side with one party in order to overcome the other. With the help of his own nephew Gualfredo, the prefect Pietro Pierleone, and the Frangipani, he was able to keep down the Corsi, and hold the Colonna in check. Being compelled to repair to Benevento in 1108, he left Gualfredo to command the militia, Tolomeo of Tusculum to guard the Campagna, and the consuls Pierleone and Leone Frangipani, together with the prefect, in charge of the government. The consulship was no longer a mere title of honour. The consuls seem to have been elected, as at Ravenna, in imitation of those of the Lombard cities, and were at the head of the nobles and senate. The expressions “praefectus et consules,” “de senatoribus et consulibus,” are now of frequent occurrence. We have no precise knowledge of the political organization of the city at this moment; but it was an aristocratic government, similar to that originally formed in Florence, as Villani tells us, with a senate and consuls. The nobles were so completely the masters that the pope, in spite of having trusted them with the government, could only return to Rome with the aid of the Normans. Being now absorbed in the great investiture question, he had recourse to a daring plan. He proposed to Henry V. that the bishops should resign all property derived from the crown and depend solely on tithes and donations, while the empire should resign the right of investiture. Henry seemed disposed to accept the suggestion, but, suddenly changing his mind, took the pope prisoner and forced him to yield the right of investiture and to give him the crown (1111). But the following year the party of reform annulled in council this concession, which the pope declared to have been extorted by force. By the death of Countess Matilda in 1115 and the bequest of her vast possessions to the Holy See, the pope’s dominions were greatly enlarged, but his authority as a ruler was nowise increased. Deeds of violence still continued in Rome; and then followed the death of the prefect Pietro. The nobles of the imperial party, joined with the people, wished to elect Pietro’s son, also nephew to Tolomeo of Tusculum, who then held the position of a potent imperial margrave, had territories stretching from the Sabine mountains to the sea, was the dictator of Tusculum, master of Latium and consul of the Romans. The pope opposed this election to the best of his strength; but the nobles carried the day, and their new prefect received investiture from the emperor. Upon this the pope again quitted Rome, and on his return, two years later, was compelled to shut himself up in the castle of St Angelo, where he died in 1118.

The popes were now the sport of the nobles whom they had aggrandized by continual concessions for the sake of peace. And peace seemed at hand when Innocent II. (1130–43), after triumphing over two anti popes, came to terms with Roger I., recognized him as king of Sicily, and New power of
the people. gained his friendship and protection. But now still graver tumults took place. In consequence of the division of the nobles neither party could overcome its foes without the aid of the people, which thus became increasingly powerful. Throughout upper and central Italy the cities were being organized as free and independent communes on a democratic basis. Their example soon followed in the ancient duchy of Rome and almost in the immediate neighbourhood of the city. Even Tivoli was converted into a republic. This excited the deepest jealousy in the Romans, and they became furious when this little city, profiting by its strong position in the Teverone valley, not only sought to annex Roman territory, but dared to offer successful resistance to the descendants of the conquerors of the world. In 1141 Tivoli openly rebelled against the mother city, and the pope sent the Romans to subdue it. They were not only repulsed, but ignominiously pursued to their own gates. Afterwards, returning to the assault in greater numbers, they conquered the hostile town. Its defenders surrendered to the pope, and he immediately concluded a treaty of peace without consulting either the people or the republic. The soldiery, still flushed with victory, were furious at this slight. They demanded not only submission of Tivoli to the Roman people, but also permission to demolish its walls and dwellings and expel its population. Innocent II. refused consent to these excesses, and a memorable revolution ensued by which the temporal power of the papacy was entirely overthrown.

In 1143 the rebellious people rushed to the Capitol, proclaimed the republic, reconstituted the senate, to the almost entire exclusion of the nobles, declared the abolition of the temporal power, issued coin inscribed to the senate, the people and St Peter, and began to reckon Popular revolution. Reconstruction of senate and republic. time from the day of the restoration of liberty. Arnold of Brescia was not, as has been incorrectly stated, the author of this revolution, for he had not yet arrived in Rome. It was the outcome of an historic necessity—above all, of the renewed vigour of the people and its detestation of the feudal aristocracy. This body, besides being divided into an imperial and a national party, had almost excluded from the government the powerful baronage of the Campagna and the provinces. Also, as we have before noted, the Roman aristocracy was by no means an exclusive caste. Between the great aristocrats and the people there stood a middle or new nobility, which made common cause with the people, whose chief strength now lay in the army. This, divided into twelve and then into thirteen or fourteen regions, assembled under its banners all arm-bearing citizens. Thus the exercitus was also the real populus Romanus, now bent on the destruction of the temporal power. This purpose, originating in the struggle of the investitures, was the logical and inevitable result of the proposals of Paschal II., which, despite their rejection, found a loud echo in Italy. Lucius II. (1144–45) tried to withstand the revolution by seeking Norman aid and throwing himself into the arms of the feudal party, but this only precipitated the course of events. The people, after having excluded nearly all aristocrats from the senate, now placed at its head the noble Giordano dei Pierleoni, who had joined the revolutionary party. They named him patrician, but without prejudice to the authority of the empire, still held by them in respect, and also conferred on him the judicial powers appertaining to the aristocratic and imperial office of prefect. The pope was requested to resign the temporal power, the regalia and every other possession, and content himself with the tithes and offerings of the faithful according to the scheme of Paschal II. He indignantly refused, marched at the head of the nobles against the Capitol, but was violently repulsed, and received a blow on the head from a stone, which is supposed to have occasioned his speedy death on the 15th February 1145. Eugenius III. was then elected (1145–53), but soon had to fly to Viterbo in quest of armed assistance, in consequence of the senate’s resolve to prevent his consecration by force until he recognized the new state of things in the Eternal City.

It was at this moment that Arnold of Brescia arrived in Rome. His ideas, already well known in Italy, had inspired and promoted the Roman revolution, and he now came to determine its method and direction. Born at Brescia in the beginning of the 12th century, Arnold Arnold of Brescia. had studied in France under the celebrated Abelard, who had instructed him in theology and philosophy, inspired him with a great love for antiquity, and stimulated his natural independence of mind. On returning to his native land he assumed the monkish habit, and proved the force and fervour of his character by taking part in all struggles for liberty. And, together with political reform, he preached his favourite doctrine of the necessary renunciation by the clergy of all temporal wealth. Expounded with singular eloquence, these doctrines had a stirring effect on men’s minds, spread throughout the cities of northern Italy, and were echoed on all sides. It seems undoubted that they penetrated to Rome and helped to promote the revolution, so that Arnold was already present in spirit before he arrived there in person. It is known that at the Lateran council of 1139 Innocent II. had declared these doctrines to be inimical to the church and enjoined silence on their author. And, as at that time the party hostile to liberty was triumphant in Brescia, Arnold left his native place, crossed the Alps and returned to France, where other struggles awaited him. He professed no anti-Catholic dogmas,—only maintaining that when the pope and the prelacy deviated from the gospel rule of poverty they should not be obeyed, but fearlessly opposed. In France, finding his master, Abelard, exposed to the persecutions of St Bernard, he assumed his defence with so much ardour that St Bernard directed the thunders of his eloquence against the disciple as well as the master, saying of the former, “He neither eats nor drinks, suffers hunger, and, being leagued with the devil, only thirsts for the blood of souls.” In 1142 we find Arnold a wanderer in Switzerland, and then, suddenly reappearing in Italy, he arrived in Rome.

Three different elements entered into his nature and inspired his eloquence—an exalted and mystic temperament, a great and candid admiration for classic antiquity added to an equal admiration for republican freedom independent of the church and the empire, and a profound conviction, derived from the Vaudois and Paterine doctrines, that the church could only be purified by the renunciation of temporal wealth. Finding Rome already revolutionized in accordance with his own ideas, he immediately began to preach there. His mystic exhortations against the riches of the church had an inflammatory effect, while his classical reminiscences aroused the enthusiasm of the Romans, and his suggestion that they should imitate the republican institutions of upper Italy met the necessities of the time that had created the revolution. He urged the reconstitution of the ancient senate and senatorial order, which indeed was already partially accomplished, and of the ancient equestrian order, and the reconstruction and fortification of the Capitol. His proposed senate was a body somewhat resembling the communal councils of upper Italy, his equestrian order a mounted force composed of the lesser nobility, since at Rome as elsewhere, the lower classes had neither time nor means to form part of it. All his suggestions were accepted; the citizens laboured strenuously on the fortification of the Capitol. The pope soon beheld the revolution spread beyond the walls, and several cities of the state proclaimed their independence. The barons of the Campagna profited by the opportunity to act as independent sovereigns. Thus the whole domain of the church was threatened with dissolution. The pope marched towards Rome with his newly gathered army, but hoped to come to terms. The Romans in fact recognized his authority, and he in his turn recognized the republic. The office of patrician was abolished, and seems to have been replaced by that of gonfalonier, and the prefect, answering to the podestà of the other republics, was revived. The senators received investiture from the pope, who returned to Rome at Christmas 1145.

There public now seems to have been fully constituted. The senate was drawn from the lower classes and the petty nobility, and this was the special characteristic of the new revolution. In 1144 there were fifty-six senators, probably four to each of the fourteen regions, but the number often varied. By the few existing documents of the period we notice that the senators were divided into senatores consiliarii and ordinary senators. The former constituted a smaller council, which, like the credenza or lesser council found in other cities, consulted with the head or heads of the republic on the more urgent and secret affairs of the state. And, conjointly with the rest of the senators, it formed the greater council. Thus classic traditions were identified with new republican usages, and the commonwealth of Rome resembled those in other parts of Italy. But, of course, every republic had special local customs of its own. So the Roman senate had judicial as well as political attributes, and there was a curia senatus composed of senators and legal experts.

As was easily to be foreseen, the agreement with the pope was of short duration. The revolution could not be checked; the Romans desired independence, and their spiritual lord fled to France, whence, in 1147, he proclaimed a new crusade, while the Romans were employed in demolishing Tivoli, banishing its inhabitants, and waging war on other cities. Giordano Pierleone was gonfalonier and head of the republic, and Arnold, supported by the popular favour and the enthusiasm of the lower clergy, was preaching with even greater fervour than before. But the pope now re-entered Italy, proclaimed Arnold a schismatic, and then advancing to Tusculum assembled an army in order to attack Rome. In this emergency the Romans applied to Conrad III., the first emperor of the house of Hohenstaufen; and their urgent letters are clearly expressive of Arnold's theories and his medley on ancient and modern, sacred and profane, ideas. “Rome,” so they said, “is the fountain of the empire confided to you by the Almighty, and we seek to restore to Rome the power possessed by her under Constantine and Justinian. For this end we conquered and destroyed the strongholds of the barons who, together with the pope and the Normans, sought to resist us. These are now attacking us on all sides. Haste to Rome, the capital of the world, thus to establish thy imperial sway over the Italian and German lands.”

After long hesitation the king of the Romans, at last replied to these appeals, stating that he would come “to re-establish order, reward the faithful, and punish the rebellious.” These words promised ill. In fact Conrad had already arranged terms with the pope; but his life came to an end on the 15th of February 1152.

He was succeeded by Frederick I. surnamed Barbarossa, who took no notice of the numerous letters urging him to come and Frederick I. receive the empire from the Roman people, which alone had the right of conferring it. In accordance with his design of subduing all the independent cities, he made an agreement with the pope, in which he vowed to give no truce to the Romans, but subject them to their spiritual lord, whose temporal power should be restored. The pope, on his side, promised to crown him emperor. Thereupon the people again rose to arms, and Arnold broke off all negotiations with Eugenius III. The senate was reorganized, formed of one hundred members, and, according to the old Roman precedent, had two consuls, one for internal and the other for external affairs. Frederick was a daring statesman, a valiant soldier in command of a powerful army, and was no friend of half measures. Accordingly the nobles ventured on reaction. Finally, to increase the gravity of the situation, an English pope, Adrian IV., was elected (1154-59), who was also a man of strong and resolute temper. In fact, even before being able to take possession of the Lateran, he requested the Romans to banish Arnold, who, with greater eloquence than ever, was directing his thunders against the papacy. These utterances increased the wrath of Adrian, who, encouraged by the knowledge that Frederick and his host were already in Italy, at last launched an interdict against Rome. It was the first time that a pope had ventured to curse the Eternal City. The interdict put a summary stop to the religious life of the inhabitants. Men's minds were seized with a sudden terror, and a fierce tumult broke out. Thereupon the senators, whose opposition to the pope was less courageous than that of the fallen magnates, prostrated themselves at his feet and implored pardon. But Adrian demanded the expulsion of Arnold before consenting to raise the interdict. Arnold was therefore obliged to leave Rome. After having for nine years preached successfully in favour of liberty, after having been the moving spirit of the new revolution, the new constitution, he was now abandoned by all, and forced to wander from castle to castle, in the hope of reaching some independent city capable of shielding him from the fierce enmity of the pope. Meanwhile Frederick I. had achieved his first victories in Lombardy, and, leaving ruined cities and bloodshed in his track, was rapidly advancing towards central Italy. The pope sent three cardinals to him, with a request for the capture and consignment of Arnold, who had taken refuge in the castle of the Visconti of Campagnatico. Frederick without delay caused one of the Visconti to be seized and kept prisoner until Arnold was given up, and then consigned the latter to the papal legates. The pope in his turn gave the reformer into the hands of the Arnold's execution. prefect, Pietro di Vico, who immediately hanged his prisoner, burnt his body at the stake and cast his into the Tiber. The execution took place in June 1155. The exact date and place of it are unknown; we only know that Arnold met his fate with great serenity and firmness.

But the Romans who had so basely deserted their champion would not give up their republic. Their envoys went to meet Frederick near Sutri, and made an address in the usual fantastic style on the privileges of the Roman people and its sole right to confer the imperial crown. But Frederick indignantly cut short their harangue, and they had to depart full of rage. He then continued his march, and, entering Rome on the 18th of June 1155, was forthwith crowned in St Peter's by the pope. Thereupon the Romans rushed to arms, and made a furious attack on the Leonine city and the imperial camp. A desperate battle went on throughout the day, and the knights proved that the equestrian order instituted at Arnold's suggestion was no empty sham. About a thousand Romans perished by the sword or by drowning, but their fellow-citizens made such determined preparations to continue the struggle that Frederick, on the 19th of June, hastily retreated, or rather fled, and was escorted as far as Tivoli by the pope and the cardinals. After all, the temporal power of the papacy was not restored, and the republic still The republic still remains. survived in the form bestowed on it by Arnold of Brescia. Its existence was in truth favourable rather than injurious to Frederick, whose aim was to rule over Rome and treat the bishops as his vassals. He had not yet discerned that his best policy would have been to use the republic as a lever against the pope. The latter, with keener acumen, while remaining faithful to the feudal party in Rome, made alliance with the communes of Lombardy and encouraged them in their resistance to the emperor. Adrian IV. died in 1159, and the national party elected Alexander III. (1159-81), who energetically opposed the pretensions of Frederick, but, having to struggle with three antipopes successively raised against him by the imperial party, was repeatedly driven into exile. During these schisms the senate quietly carried on the government, administered justice, and made war on some neighbouring cities and barons. An army comprising many nobles of the national party marched against Tusculum, but found it defended by several valiant officers and a strong band of German soldiery, who, on the 29th of May 1167, inflicted on the Romans so severe a defeat that it is styled by Gregorovius the Cannae of the middle ages. Shortly afterwards the emperor arrived in Rome with his antipope Paschal III., and Alexander had to fly before him to Benevento. Then, at last, Frederick came to terms with the republic, recognized the senate, which accepted investiture at his hands, re-established the prefecture as an imperial office, and bestowed it on Giovanni, son of Pietro di Vico. He then hastily departed, without having advanced outside the Leonine city.

Meanwhile Pope Alexander continued the crafty policy of Adrian and with better success, for the Lombard cities had Agreement between the republic and the pope. now formed a league and inflicted a signal defeat on the emperor at Legnano on the 29th of May 1176. One of the results of this battle was the conclusion of an agreement between the pope and the emperor, the latter resigning his pretensions on Rome and yielding all that he had denied to Adrian. And by the treaty of Venice (1st of August 1177) the antipope was forsaken, Alexander III. recognized and hailed as the legitimate pontiff, and the prefect of Rome again nominated by the pope, to whom the emperor restored the temporal power, acknowledging him the independent sovereign of Rome and of the ecclesiastical state, from Acquapendente to Ceprano. Frederick's troops accompanied the pope to Rome, where the republic was forced to make submission to him. But, proudly conscious as it still was of its strength, its surrender wore the aspect of a voluntary concession, and its terms began with these words: “Totius populi Romani consilio et deliberatione statutum est,” &c. The senators, elected yearly in September, had to swear fealty to the pope, and a certain proportion of nobles was included in their number. On his return to Rome, Alexander received a solemn welcome from all, but he had neither extinguished nor really subdued the republic. On the contrary, men's minds were more and more inflamed by the example of freedom displayed in the north of Italy. He died on the 30th of August 1181. The fact that between 1181 and 1187 there were three popes always living in exile proves that the republic was by no means crushed. During the same period another blow was inflicted on the papacy by the marriage of Henry VI., son and successor to Frederick I., with Constance, sole heiress of the Norman line in Naples. For thus the kingdom was joined to the empire, and the popes were more than ever in the latter's power. On the 20th of December 1187 Clement III. (1187-91), being raised to the pontificate, made a solemn agreement with the government of the Capitol before coming to Rome. And this peace or concordia had the air of a treaty between potentates of equal importance. Rome confronted the pope from the same standpoint from which the Lombard cities had confronted the emperor after Legnano. This treaty, the basis of the new constitution, was confirmed on the last day of May 1188 (Anno XLIV. of the senate). It begins with these words: “Concordia inter Dominum Papam Clementem III. et senator es populumque Romanum super regalibus et aliis dignitatibus urbis.” The pope was recognized as supreme lord, and invested the senators with their dignity. He resumed the privilege of coinage, but allowed one-third of the issue to be made by the senate. Almost all the old pontifical rights and prerogatives were restored to him. The pope might employ the Roman militia for the defence of his patrimony, but was to furnish its pay. The rights of the church over Tivoli and Tusculum were confirmed; but the republic reserved to itself the right of making war on those cities, and declared its resolve to dismantle and destroy the walls and castle of Tusculum. In this undertaking the pope was to co-operate with the Romans, even should the unhappy city make surrender to him alone.

From all this it is clear that the church had been made independent of the empire, and that the republic, despite its numerous Rome independent of the empire. concessions, was by no means subject to the church. The pope, in fact, had obtained liberty of election, and Frederick I., by resigning the investiture of the prefect, had virtually renounced his claim to imperial power in Rome. The republic had no patrician nor any other imperial magistrate, and preserved its independence even as regarded the pope, who merely granted investiture to magistrates freely chosen by the people, and had no legislative nor administrative power in the city. His temporal dominion was limited to his great possessions, to his regalia, to a supreme authority that was very indefinite, and to a feudal authority over the barons of the Campagna and many cities of a state that seemed ever on the point of dissolution. The senate continued to frame laws, to govern, and to administer justice. The army carried on the wars of the republic, as we see by the tragic fate of Tusculum, which was razed to the ground on the 19th of April 1191. Thus the powerful counts of Tusculum disappeared; they sought refuge in the Campagna, and according to all probability the no less potent family of the Colonna sprang from their line. In consequence of these events, the nobles realized that the papacy sought The nobles re-enter the senate. to reduce them to vassalage. And, seeing that the republic remained firmly established and able to help them, they began to adhere to it and succeeded in obtaining admission to the new senate. In fact, whereas since 1143, plebeians and petty nobles had prevailed in its ranks, nobles of ancient descent are now found outnumbering the knights and burghers. But in 1191 this state of things caused a sudden popular outbreak Popular revolution and counter-revolution of the aristocracy. which abolished the aristocratic senate popular and gave the headship of the republic to a single senator, summus senator, named Benedetto “Carissimus” or “Carus Homo” or “Carosomo,” of unknown, but undoubtedly plebeian, origin. During the two years he remained in office this personage stripped the pope of his revenues, despatched justitiarii even to the provinces, and with the aid of the parliament and other popular assemblies promulgated laws and statutes. But he was overthrown by a counter-revolution, and Giovanni Capoccio of the party of the nobles became senator for two years, and had been succeeded by one of the Pierleoni when, in 1197, a fresh revolution re-established a senate of fifty-six members, chiefly consisting of feudal barons in high favour with Henry VI., who had revived the imperial faction in Rome. But this emperor's life ended the same year as the pope's, in 1198, and the new pontiff, Innocent III. (1198-1216), began to make war on the nobles, who were again masters of the republic. Their leader was the prefect Pietro di Vico. Owing to the revolution of 1143, most of the prefectorial attributes were now vested in the senate; nevertheless, Pietro still retained a tribunal of police both within and without the city. But his main strength was derived from the vast possessions The office of prefect becomes hereditary. of the Vico family, in which the office of prefect now became hereditary. Very soon, however, these prefects of Vico were chiefly regarded as the great feudal lords of Tuscia, and the independent municipal office lost its true character. Then the popes made a point of according great pomp and dignity to this nominal prefect, in order to overshadow the senator, who still represented the independence of the republic and had assumed many of the attributes wrested from the prefect.

But Innocent III., dissatisfied with this state of things, contrived by bribing the people to arrogate to himself the Innocent III. elects the senate. right of electing the senator, who had now to swear fealty and submission to the pope, and also that of nominating the provincial justitiarii, formerly chosen by the government of the Capitol. This was a deadly blow to the republic, for the principal rights of the people—i.e. the election of pope and emperor, prefect and senate—were now lost. The general discontent provoked fresh revolutions, and Innocent III. employed all his political dexterity to ward off their effects. But shortly afterwards the people made a loud outcry for a senate of fifty-six members; and the pope, again making a virtue of necessity, caused that number to be chosen by twelve mediani specially named by him for the purpose. Even this did not calm the popular discontent, which was also stirred by other disputes. The consequence was that when, six months later, the pope again elected a single senator the Romans rose to arms, and in 1204 formed a government of Buoni Uomini in opposition to that created by the pope. But an amicable arrangement being concluded, the pope once more nominated fifty-six senators; and when, soon after, he again reduced them to one, the people were too weary to resist (1205). Thus the Capitol was subdued, and Innocent III. spent his last years in tranquillity.

On the 22nd of November 1220 Honorius III. (1216-27) conferred the imperial crown on Frederick II., who confirmed to the church the possession of her former states, of those bequeathed to her by Countess Matilda, and even of the March of Ancona. But it was soon seen that he sought to dominate all Italy, and was therefore a foe to be dreaded. The The republic regains independence. successor of Honorius, Pope Gregory IX. (1227-41), was speedily insulted and put to flight by the Ghibelline nobles, whose courage had revived, and the republic began to subdue the Latian cities on its own account. Peace was several times made and unmade by pope and people; but no enduring harmony was possible between them, since the former wished to subject the entire state to the church, and the latter to escape from the rule of the church and hold sway over “the universal land from Ceprano to Radicofani” formerly belonging to the duchy. Accordingly, the Roman people now appointed judges, imposed taxes, issued coin, and made the clergy amenable to secular tribunals. In 1234 the senator Luca Savelli published an edict declaring Tuscia and Campania territories of the republic, and sent judges thither to exact an oath of obedience. He also despatched the militia to the coast, where it occupied several cities and erected fortresses; and columns were raised everywhere inscribed with the initials S. P. Q. R. The pope, unable to prevent but equally unable to tolerate these acts, fled from Rome, hurling his anathema against Savelli, “et omnes illos consiliarios urbis quorum consilio,” &c. The Romans sacked the Lateran and the houses of many cardinals, and marched The republic submits to the people. on Viterbo, but were driven back by the papal troops. When Savelli left office and Angelo Malabranca was elected in his stead, the people made peace and submission in 1235, and were obliged to give up their pretensions of subjecting the clergy to ordinary tribunals and the urban territory to the republic. Thus matters were virtually settled on the footing established by Innocent III., thanks to the aid given to the pope by Frederick II., who had been one of the promoters of the rebellion.

It may appear strange that, at this period of their history, the Romans, after showing such tenacious adherence to the republic and senate, should have accepted the rule of a single senator without rushing to arms, and passed and repassed from one form of government to another with such surprising indifference. But on closer examination it is plain that these changes were greater in appearance than reality. We have already seen, in treating of Carosomo, how the single senator Formation of the greater and lesser councils. convoked the people in parliament to pass sanction on the laws. But, whenever there is only one senator, we also continually meet with the expression “consilium vel consilia urbis.” It is evident that when, instead of laws to be approved in parliament by a simple placet or rejected by a non-placet, matters requiring consideration had to be discussed, the senator convoked a much smaller council, consisting only of the leaders of the people. These leaders were the heads of the twelve or thirteen regions of the guilds, now becoming organized and soon to be also thirteen in number, and of the militia. As in the other Italian republics, all these associations had been formed in Rome.

The senator therefore held consultation with the leading men of the city; and, although, especially at first, these meetings were rather loosely organized, it is clear that they took the form of two councils—one numerous (consiglio maggiore), the other limited (consiglio minore or speciale), co-operating with and forming part of the first. Such was the prevailing custom throughout Italy at the time when Roman institutions most nearly resembled those of the other republics. We already know that, from the date of Arnold's reforms, the senate, with its junta of counsellors, had been divided into two parts, forming when united a species of greater council. Therefore the transition from a senate divided into two parts to the greater and lesser councils must have been very easy and natural. And, seeing that later, when the nomination of a single senator had become a constant practice, the meetings of the two councils are frequently mentioned without the slightest remark or hint as to their origin, it is clear that they had been gradually formed and long established. Not long after the revolution of 1143 the grandees sought to re-enter the senate; and the popes themselves, partly from dread of the people and partly to aggrandize their own kindred, contributed to build up the power of a new and no less turbulent nobility. This class, arising between the 12th and 13th centuries, was composed of families newly created by the popes, together with remnants of the old aristocracy, such as the Frangipani, Colonna, &c. These nobles, regaining possession of the senate, so completely eliminated the popular element that, when the popes again opposed them, and, obtaining from the parliament the right of electing the senators, adopted the expedient of appointing one only, the senator was always chosen from the ranks of the nobles. And then the people, unable and unwilling to renounce republican forms, replaced their suppressed senate by a greater and a lesser council. This was an easy task—a natural consequence of the fact that the people now began to constitute the real strength of the republic. Later, with an increasing detestation for their nobility, the Romans decreed that the single senator should be of foreign birth, and, as we shall see, chose Brancaleone in the middle of the 13th century.

Thus, after a long series of frequent changes and revolutions, the Roman republic became a commonwealth, with an increasing resemblance to those of the other Italian cities. The people were organized and armed, the gilds almost established, the two councils gradually constituted, and the aristocracy, while retaining special local characteristics, assumed its The Roman statutes. definitive shape. It is not surprising to find that Rome, like other Italian cities, now possessed statutes of its own. There has been much controversy on this point. Certain writers had alluded to a statute of 1246. As no one, however, could discover any statute of that date, others decided that it had never existed. A statute of 1363 was recently published by Professor Camillo Re, who asserted it to be the first and most ancient that Rome had possessed. But the still more recent researches of Messrs La Mantia and Levi prove that Professor Re's assertions were somewhat too bold. There is certain evidence of a statutum senatus existing between 1212 and 1227, of a statutum vel capitulare senatoris vel senatus of 1235, followed in 1241 by a statutum urbis. This brings us very near to the statute of 1246 mentioned by Vitale and others. So it is well ascertained that, in the first half of the 13th century. Rome possessed statutes at large composed of older limited statutes. The consuls of the trade gilds were from 1267 regular members of the councils; and the merchants' gild held general meetings in 1255. Its statutes were confirmed in 1296 by the senator Pandolfo Savelli, and the compilation of these, published in 1880 by Signor Gatti, refers to 1317.

Meanwhile the struggle between Frederick II. and the pope was once more renewed. The former sought to dominate Frederick II. and the pope. Italy, separate the state from the church, and repress the republics. The latter, although really hostile to the Roman free government, joined it against the emperor, who on his side favoured the republic of Rome and the nobles most adverse to the pope. Thus the new nobility, composed, as we have seen, of two different elements, was again split into a Guelph party headed by the Orsini and a Ghibelline party under the Colonna. And in 1238 it was deemed advisable to elect two senators instead of one, in the hope of conciliating both factions by simultaneously raising them to power. Afterwards one only was elected, alternately an Orsini and a Colonna, then again two, and so on. But all these changes failed in their aims, since the struggle between emperor and pope exasperated party feeling in Rome. Frederick was king of southern Italy and emperor; had he been able to enforce the whole of his authority he would have been absolute master of all Italy, a state of things which the popes could not in any way tolerate. Hence the obstinate and uninterrupted struggle which proved injurious both to the papacy and the empire. The political genius of Frederick might have wrought great harm to the city had not his mind teemed with contradictory ideas. Although desirous to emancipate the state from the church, he was opposed to the communal democracy, which was then the chief strength of the secular state in Italy. While combating the church and persecuting her defenders, he yet sent heretics to the stake; although excommunicated, he undertook a crusade; he feasted at his table philosophers, sceptic and atheist poets, bishops and Mussulmans; he proclaimed anti-Christian the possession of wealth by the church, yet made lavish gifts to altar and monastery. Thus, although he had a strong party in Rome, it seemed to dissolve at his approach, inasmuch as all feared that he might abolish the statutes and liberties of the commune. In fact, when he advanced towards Rome on the death of Gregory IX. in 1241 he was energetically repulsed by the people, and later even by Viterbo, a city that had always been faithful to him. But after he had withdrawn, his adherents gained strength and put to flight his opponent, Innocent IV. (1243-54), the newly elected pope, who then from his asylum at Lyons hurled an excommunication against him. Frederick's death in December 1250 determined the fall of the Ghibelline party and the close of the imperial epoch in Italy. The pope instantly returned to Rome with the set purpose of destroying the power of the Hohenstaufens. This was no longer difficult when, by the decease of Conrad IV. (1254), the child Conradin became the last legitimate representative of that line, and negotiations were already on foot for placing the Angevins on the Neapolitan throne.

The republic meanwhile preserved its independence against the pope, who, among other concessions, had entirely given up to it the right of coinage. Nevertheless, being much harassed by the fractiousness of the nobility, it was obliged in 1252 to decide on the election of an alien senator armed with ample powers, precisely as other communes gave the government into the hands of a podestà. Accordingly a Bolognese noble, Brancaleone degli Andalò, the first foreign senator. Brancaleone degli Andalò, count of Casalecchio, and a Ghibelline of much energy and talent, was invited to Rome. But before accepting office he insisted on making definite terms. He desired to hold the government for three years; and this, although contrary to the statutes, was granted. Further, to ensure his personal safety, he demanded that many scions of the noblest Roman houses should be sent as hostages to Bologna; and to this also the republic consented. Then, in August 1252, he came with his judges and notaries, made oath to observe justice and the laws, and began to govern. He was head of the republic in peace and in war, supreme judge and captain in chief. He nominated the podestàs of subject territories, dispatched ambassadors, issued coin, concluded treaties and received oaths of obedience. The pope, who was then at Perugia, was greatly afflicted by the arrival of this new master, but, despairing of aid from any quarter, was forced to make a virtue of necessity. Thus Brancaleone was able to seize the reins of power with a firm grasp. The parliament still met in the square of the Capitol, and the greater and lesser councils in the church of Ara Coeli. There were besides frequent assemblies of the college of Capitoline judges or assectamentum. Unfortunately, no records having been preserved of the proceedings of the Roman councils and parliament, little can be said of the manner in which affairs were conducted. Certainly Brancaleone's government was not very parliamentary. He convoked the councils as seldom as was possible, although he frequently assembled the people in parliament. The chief complaint made against him was of undue severity in the administration of justice. He rendered the clergy amenable to secular tribunals, subdued the neighbouring cities of Tivoli, Palestrina, &c., and commanded in person the attacking force. But his greatest energy was directed to the repression of the more turbulent nobles who were opposed to him; and he soon made them feel the weight of his hand by hanging some, banishing others, and persecuting several more. But he too recognized the expediency of winning the popular favour. He was the first senator to add to his title that of captain of the people (“Almae Urbis Senator Ill: et Romani Populi Capitaneus”). He befriended the people by promoting the organization of gilds after the manner of those of his native Bologna. There were already a few in Rome, such as the merchants' gild and that of the agriculturists, Bobacteriorum or Bovattari, who must have resembled the so-called mercanti di campagna or graziers of the present day, since no peasant gild existed in Italian republics. The merchants' gild, definitely established in 1255 under Brancaleone's rule, had four consuls and twelve councillors, held meetings and made laws. The other gilds, thirteen in all, were organized much on the same plan. The admission of their heads into the councils of the republic in 1267 shows how efficaciously their interests had been promoted by Brancaleone.

The death of Innocent IV. and the election of Alexander IV. (1254-61), who was milder and less shrewd than his predecessor, were favourable events for Brancaleone; but he failed to check the growing discontent of the clergy and the more powerful nobles, who had received deadly injuries at his hands. And when, on the expiration of his three years' term of office, his re-election was proposed, his enemies rose against him, accused him before the sindacato, threw him into prison, and vehemently protested against the continuance of “foreign tyranny.” His life was only spared on account of the hostages sent to Bologna. The next senator chosen was a Brescian Guelph, Emanuele de Madio, a tool of the nobles, who were now masters of the situation. But soon afterwards, in 1257, the gilds rose in revolt, drove the nobles from power, put the pope to flight, and recalled Brancaleone for another three years' term. He ruled more sternly than before, hung several nobles, and made alliance with Manfred, the representative of the Swabian party in Italy. This rendered him increasingly odious to the pope and procured his excommunication. But, disregarding the thunders of the church, he marched against Anagni, the pope's birthplace, and Alexander was quickly obliged to humiliate himself before the senator of Rome. Brancaleone next set to work to destroy the fortified towers of the nobility, and in razing them to the ground ruined many of the adjacent dwellings. Accordingly, a considerable number of nobles became homeless exiles. In 1258, while engaged on the siege of Corneto, Brancaleone was attacked by a violent fever, and, being carried back to Rome, died on the Capitoline Hill. Thus ended the career of a truly remarkable statesman. He was succeeded by his uncle, Castellano degli Andalò, who, lacking the political genius of his nephew, only retained office until the following spring (1259), in the midst of fierce and perpetual disturbances. Then the people, being bribed by the pope, joined with the nobles and drove him away. His life too was saved by having followed his nephew's shrewd plan of sending hostages to Bologna. Two senators of Roman birth were next elected; and on the death of Alexander IV. a French pope was chosen, Urban IV. (1261-64), thus giving fresh predominance in the church to the anti-Swabian policy. But the internal disturbances of the city soon drove Urban to flight.

At this period the fall of the empire had induced many Italian republics to seek strength by placing their governments in the hands of some prince willing to swear respect to their laws and to undertake their defence against neighbouring states and the pope. In Rome the Guelphs and Ghibellines proposed various candidates for this office, and after many fierce quarrels ended by electing a committee of boni homines, charged with the revision of the statutes, reorganization of the city, and choice of a senator. This committee sat for more than a year without nominating any one, so, the Guelph party being now predominant, and all being wearied of this provisional state of things, the majority agreed on the election as senator of Charles of Anjou, who, at Charles of Anjou senator. the pope's summons, was already preparing for the conquest of Naples. The Romans thought that he would defend Rome against the pope, and the pope would defend Rome against him; and by thus taking advantage of either's jealousy the citizens hoped to keep their republic intact. In fact, although Urban IV. had incited Charles to attack Naples, he was by no means willing to see him established as master in Rome. He accordingly declared that, if Charles really wished to obtain the Neapolitan crown, he must only accept the offered dignity pending the conquest of that kingdom. And he must likewise promise to recognize the supremacy of the pope over the senate. Charles soothed him with the amplest verbal promises, but in fact accepted the senatorship for life. In 1265, when Urban was succeeded by Clement IV. (1265-68), who as a Provençal was a subject of Charles, the latter entered Rome and was immediately made senator. Seven days later (28th of June) he received the investiture of the Neapolitan kingdom, and in the following January its crown. On the 26th of February 1266 the battle of Benevento was fought, and, the valiant Manfred being killed, the triumph of the Guelph Angevins in Italy was assured. Then, at the urgent command of the pope, Charles was forced to resign the senatorship in the May of the same year. Two Romans were elected in his stead, but soon fell out with the pope, because the Guelph nobles again tried to exercise tyranny. The people, however, profited by these disturbances to rise on its own account, and formed a democratic government of twenty-six boni homines with Angelo Capocci, Don Henry of Castile senator. a Ghibelline, as its captain. By this government Don Henry, son of Ferdinand III. of Castile, was elected senator; and he came to Rome for the purpose of promoting a Ghibelline and Swabian policy in favour of Conradin, who was preparing for conflict. The rule of the new senator was very energetic, for he kept down the clergy, subdued the Campagna, persecuted the Guelph nobles, made alliance with the Tuscan Ghibellines, forcibly drove back the troops of King Charles, who was advancing towards Rome, and gave a splendid reception to Conradin. But the battle of Tagliacozzo (23rd of August 1268), followed by the murder of Conradin, proved fatal to the Ghibelline party. Charles was re-elected senator immediately after the battle, and the pope confirmed his powers for a term of ten years, after having already named him imperial vicar in Tuscany. On the 16th of September Charles for the second time took possession of the Capitol, and ruled Rome firmly by means of vice-governors or vicars.

The Swabian line was now extinct, and in Charles's hands the Neapolitan kingdom had become a fief of the church. The empire had fallen so low as to be no longer formidable. Now therefore was the moment for treating with it in order to restrain Charles, and also for making use of the French king to keep the empire in check. And this was the policy of Nicholas III. (1277-80), who hastened to extract advantageous promises from Rudolph of Habsburg, the new candidate for the imperial crown. In 1278, the ten years' term having expired, he deprived Charles of the senatorship and appointed Rudolph vicar of Tuscany. After declaring that he left to the people the right of electing the senator, he promulgated a new constitution (18th of July 1278) which, while confirming the rights of the church over the city, prohibited the election of any foreign emperor, prince, marquis, count or baron as senator of Rome. Thus the Colonna, Savelli, Orsini, Annibaldi and other Roman nobles again rose to power, and the republic was again endangered and The senate in the hands of the popes. plunged in disorder. The Romans then gave the reconstitution of the city into the pope's hands by yielding to him the right of nominating senators, declaring, however, that this was a personal concession to himself, and not to the popes in general. So Nicholas proceeded to name senators, alternating a Colonna with an Orsini, or simultaneously choosing one of each faction. The same power over the senate was granted with the same restriction to Martin IV. (1281-85), and he at once re-elected Charles of Anjou. Thus, greatly to the disgust of the Romans, the Capitol was again invaded by French vicars, notaries, judges and soldiery. But the terrible blow dealt at Charles's power by the Sicilian Vespers (31st of March 1282) resounded even in Rome. The Orsini, backed by the people, rose to arms, massacred the French garrison, and quickly re-established a popular government. Giovanni Cencio, a kinsman of the Orsini, was elected captain and defender of the people, and ruled the city with the co-operation of the senator and a council of priors of the gilds. This government was of brief duration, for, although the pope had professed his willingness to tolerate the experiment, he quickly arranged fresh terms, and, forsaking Charles of Anjou, again nominated two Roman senators. Pope and king both died in 1285, and Nicholas IV. (1288-92), also holding sway over the senate, favoured the Colonna in order to curb the growing mastery of the Orsini. But thus there were two powerful houses instead of one. In fact, Giovanni Colonna, when elected senator, ruled from the Capitol as an independent sovereign, conducted in person the campaign against Viterbo, and subjected that city to the republic on the 3rd of May 1291.

When one of the Gaetani, Boniface VIII. (1294-1303), was raised to the papal chair, the extent of the Colonnas' power Boniface VIII. became evident to all. Boniface opposed them in order to aggrandize his own kin, and they showed equal virulence in return. The Cardinals Colonna refused to acknowledge him as the legitimate pope, and he excommunicated them and proclaimed a crusade against their house. Even after he had subdued them and destroyed Palestrina, their principal fief, the drama did not yet come to an end. Boniface had a very lofty conception of the church, and desired to establish her supremacy over the state. The king of France (Philip the Fair) believed, on the contrary, that the Angevin successes entitled him to fill the place in Italy vacated by the Swabians, and to play the master there. This led to a tremendous contest in which all the French sided with their king. And shortly afterwards a plot was hatched against the pope by the agents of France and the Colonna. These determined enemies of the pope met with much favour in Rome, on account of the general irritation against the Gaetani and the enormous power conferred on them by Boniface. Suffice it to say that they were now lords of the whole of lower Latium, from Capo Circeo to Ninfa, from Ceprano to Subiaco. Thus Sciarra Colonna and a Frenchman named Nogaret were able to fall on the pope at Anagni, insult him, and take him prisoner. The people rising to his rescue, the conspirators were put to flight. But when Boniface returned to Rome with the escort and protection of the Orsini, who had made themselves masters of the city, he found that he was virtually a captive in their hands. He felt this so keenly that he died of rage and exhaustion on the 11th of October 1303. The brief pontificate of his successor Benedict XI. was followed by that of Clement V. (1305-14), a Frenchman, who, instead of coming to Rome, summoned the cardinals to France. This was the beginning of the church's so called exile in Avignon, which, although depriving Rome of a scource of wealth and influence, left the republic to pursue its own course. It employed this The republic again takes a democratic form. freedom in trying to hold its own against the nobles, whose power was much lessened by the absence of the pope, and endeavoured to gain fresh strength by organizing the thirteen regions, which, as we have shown, were associations of a much firmer nature in Rome than the gilds. Accordingly, in 1305, a captain of the people was elected with thirteen elders and a senator, Paganino della Torre, who governed for one year. The pope was opposed to these changes at first, but in 1310 he issued a brief granting Rome full permission to select its own form of government. Thus, the first pope in Avignon restored the rights of the Romans. But the latter, even with church and empire so far removed, still considered Rome the Eternal City, the source of all law, and the only natural seat of the spiritual and temporal government of the world. To their republic, they thought, appertained a new and lofty destiny, nor could it ever be content to descend to the level of other Italian municipalities.

On the 6th of January 1309 Henry VII. was crowned king of the Romans at Aix-la-Chapelle; and so greatly were men's Henry VII. minds changed in Italy that, throughout the land, he was hailed as a deliverer. He wished to restore the grandeur of the empire, and the Italians, above all Dante Alighieri, beheld in him the champion of the state against the church, who, after becoming the foe of communal liberty, had forsaken Italy and withdrawn to France. The Roman people shared these ideas, and awaited Henry with equal impatience, but the nobles rose in opposition. The Orsini, leaders of the Guelphs, and allied with Robert of Naples, took possession of the castle of St Angelo and the Trastevere. Hence, when Henry reached Rome in May 1312, after seizing the iron crown at Milan, he was obliged to act on the offensive. He took the Capitol by assault, but, failing in his attack on the castle of St Angelo, was pursued by its Neapolitan garrison. Forsaken by many discouraged adherents, he was forced to recognize the expediency of departure. First, however, he desired to be crowned at the Lateran, St Peter's being held by his foes. The cardinals refused his request, but were compelled to yield by the threats of the people, who, reasserting their ancient rights, insisted that the coronation should take place without delay. And the ceremony was performed on the 29th of June 1312. The emperor then resolved to depart in spite of the popular protest against his leaving the natural seat of the empire, and on the 20th of August started for Tuscany, where worse fortune awaited him.

Their differences settled, the nobles expelled the captain of the people left by Henry, and elected as senators Sciarra Colonna and Francesco Orsini. But this was the Jacopo Arlotti, captain of the people. signal for a popular revolt. The Capitol was attacked, the senators put to flight, and Jacopo Arlotti elected captain with a council of twenty-six worthies (buoni homini). The new leader instantly summoned the chief nobles before his tribunal, had them chained and cast into prison, and demolished many of their houses and strongholds. But, having thus humiliated their pride, Arlotti dared not put them to death, and, releasing them from confinement, banished them to their estates, where they plunged into hostile preparations. Meanwhile the victorious people convoked a parliament and decreed that, the aristocracy being now overthrown, the tribunitia potestas alone should invite the emperor to make his triumphal entry into the Capitol, and receive his authority from the people of Rome. This conception of the Roman power will now be seen to become more and more definite until finding its last expression in Cola di Rienzi. Pope Clement, resigning himself to necessity, acknowledged the new government under the energetic rule of Arlotti. The latter now joined the Ghibellines of the Campagna against the Orsini and the Neapolitans, subdued Velletri, and gave it a podestà. But then the Gaetani, who were Guelphs, united with the Orsini and the Neapolitans, and, giving battle to the Ghibellines in the Campagna, routed them in such wise as to put an end to the popular government. The nobles forced their way into the city, attacked the Capitol, made Arlotti their prisoner, and re-elected the senators Sciarra Colonna and Francesco Orsini. Close upon these reverses came the death of Henry VII. (24th of August 1313) at Buonconvento near Siena, which put an end to the Ghibelline party in Italy. Thereupon King Robert of Naples, being named senator by the pope, immediately appointed a vicar in Rome. Clement likewise profited by the vacancy of the imperial throne to name the king imperial vicar in Tuscany. And he died on the 20th of April 1314, well content to have witnessed the triumphs of the Guelphs in Italy.

Affairs took a fresh turn under Pope John XXII. (1316-34). Rome was still ruled by the vicars of King Robert; but, owing to the continued absence of the popes, matters grew daily worse. Trade and industry declined, revenue diminished, the impoverished nobles were exceedingly turbulent, deeds of murder and violence occurred on all sides; even by day the streets of the city were unsafe. Hence there was universal discontent. Meanwhile Louis the Bavarian, who in 1314 had been crowned king of the Romans, having overcome his German enemies at Mühldorf in 1322, turned against the pope, one of his fiercest opponents. Louis was surrounded by Minorite friars, supporters of the poverty of the church, and consequently enemies to the temporal power. They were men of the stamp of William of Occam, Marsilio of Padua, Giovanni Janduno, and other philosophers favourable to the rights of the empire and the people. Accordingly the Italian Ghibellines hailed Louis as they had previously hailed Henry. Even the Roman people were roused to action, and, driving out the representatives and partisans of King Robert, in the spring of 1327, seized on the castle of St Angelo, and again established a democratic government. “Nearly all Italy was stirred to new deeds,” says G. Villani, “and the Romans rose to arms and organized the people” (bk. x. c. 20). Regardless of the Sciarra Colonna, captain of the people. reproofs of the pope, they elected a haughty Ghibelline, Sciarra Colonna, captain of the people and general of the militia, with a council of fifty-two popolani, four to each region. Then, ranged under the standards of the militia, the Romans gave chase to the foes of the republic, and Sciarra, returning victorious, ascended to Louis the Bavarian. the Capitol and invited Louis the Bavarian to Rome. Louis the The summons was obeyed; on the 7th of January 1328 the king was already encamped in the Neronian Fields with five thousand horse and a considerable number of foot soldiers, and, with better fortune than Henry VII., was able to enter the Vatican at once.

Encircled by a crowd of heretics, reformers and Minorite brethren, he convoked a parliament on the Capitol, asking that the imperial crown might be conferred upon him by the people, from whom alone he wished to receive it. And the people proclaimed him their captain, senator and emperor. On the 17th of January his coronation took place in St Peter's. But, as he had neither money nor practical sense, his method of taxation and the excesses committed by himself and his over-excited philosophers speedily aroused the popular discontent. His ecclesiastical vicar, Marsilio of Padua, and Giovanni Janduno placarded the walls with insulting manifestoes against the pope, whom the Minorites stigmatized as a heretic and wished to depose. In April Louis twice assembled the parliament in St Peter's Square, and, after obtaining its sanction to several anti-papal edicts, declared John XXII. degraded and deposed as a heretic. This was a very strange and novel spectacle, the more so that, as was speedily proved, the Romans were stirred by no anti-Catholic spirit, no yearning for religious reform. Jacopo Colonna, a canon of the Lateran, was able to make his way into Rome with four masked companions, to publicly read, at the top of his voice and before a great multitude, the excommunication launched against the emperor by the deposed pope, to traverse the entire city, and to withdraw unmolested to Palestrina. Meanwhile the emperor contented himself with decreeing that henceforth the popes must reside in Rome,—that if, when invited, they should fail to come they would be thereby held deposed from the throne. As a logical consequence, proceedings were immediately begun for the election of the new pope, Nicholas V., who on the 12th of May was proclaimed by the popular voice in St Peter's Square, and received the imperial sanction. But this ephemeral drama came to an end when the emperor departed with his antipope on the 4th of August. This caused the immediate downfall of the democratic government. Bertoldo Orsini, who had returned to Rome with his Guelphs, and Stefano Colonna were elected senators, and confirmed in the office by Cardinal Giovanni Orsini in the name of the pope. A new parliament cancelled the emperor's edicts, and had them burnt by the public executioner. Later, Nicholas, the antipope, went with a rope about his neck to make submission to John XXII., and Louis promised to disavow and retract all that he had done against the church, provided the sentence of excommunication were withdrawn. This, however, was refused. Never had the empire fallen so low. Meanwhile King Robert was again supreme in Rome, and, being re-elected senator, appointed vicars there as before. Anarchy reigned. The city was torn by factions, and the provinces rebelled against the French representatives of the pope, who, in their ignorance of Italian affairs, were at a loss how to act.

And after the election of Benedict XII. (1334-42) confusion reached so great a pitch that, on the expiration of Robert's senatorial term, the Romans named thirteen heads of regions to carry on the government with two senators, while the king still sent vicars as before. The people, for the sake of peace, once more granted the supremacy of the senate to the pope, and he nominated two knights of Gubbio, Giacomo di Cante dei Gabrielli and Bosone Novello dei Gabrielli, who were succeeded by two other senators the following year. But in Reconstitution of the republic. 1339 the Romans attacked the Capitol, named two senators of their own choice, re-established a democratic government, and sent ambassadors to Florence to ask for the ordinances of justice (ordinamenti della giustizia), by which that city had broken the power of the nobles, and also that a few skilled citizens should lend their help in the reconstitution of Rome. Accordingly some Florentines came with the ordinamenti, some portions of which may be recognized in the Roman statutes, and, after first rearranging the taxes, elected thirteen priors of the gilds, a gonfalonier of justice, and a captain of the people after the Florentine manner. But there was a dissimilarity in the conditions of the two cities. The gilds having little influence in Rome, the projected reform failed, and the pope, who was opposed to it, re-elected the senators. Thereupon public discontent swelled, and especially when, by the foundation of the papal palace of Avignon, it was evident that Benedict XII. had no intention of restoring the Holy See to Italy. This pope was succeeded in 1342 by Clement VI. (1342-52), and King Robert in 1343 by his niece Joanna; and the latter event, while plunging the kingdom in anarchy, likewise aggravated the condition of Rome. For not only were the Neapolitan sovereigns still very powerful there, but the principal Roman nobles held large fiefs across the Neapolitan borders.

Shortly before this another revolution in Rome had re-established the government of the thirteen elders and the Cola di Rienzi. two senators. The people, being anxious to show their intention of respecting the papal authority, had dispatched to Avignon as ambassador of the republic, in 1343, a man destined to make much noise in the world. This was Cola di Rienzi, son of a Roman innkeeper, a notary, and an impassioned student of the Bible, the fathers, Livy, Seneca, Cicero, and Valerius Maximus. Thoroughly imbued with a half pagan, half Christian spirit, he believed that he had a divinely inspired mission to revive the ancient glories of Rome. Of handsome presence, full of fantastic eloquence, and stirred to enthusiasm by contemplation of the ruined monuments of Rome, he harangued the people with a stilted oratory that enchanted their ears. He hated the nobles, because one of his brothers had been killed by them; he loved the republic, and in its name addressed a stately Latin speech to the astonished pope, and, offering him the supreme power, besought his instant return to Rome. He also begged him to allow the city to celebrate a jubilee every fifty years, and then, as a personal request, asked to be nominated notary to the urban chamber. The pope consented to everything, and Rienzi communicated this good news to Rome in an emphatically worded epistle. After Easter, in 1344, he returned to Rome, and found to his grief that the city was a prey to the nobles. He immediately began to admonish the latter, and then, draped in a toga adorned with symbols, exhibited and explained allegorical designs to the people, and announced the speedy restoration of the past grandeur of Rome. Finally he and a few burghers and merchants, whom he had secretly inflamed by his discourses, made a solemn vow to overthrow the nobility and consolidate the republic. The moment was favourable, owing to the anarchy of Naples, the absence of the pope, the weakness of the empire and the disputes of the barons, although the latter were still very potent and constituted, as it were, a separate government opposed to that of the people. Rienzi, having gained the pope's ecclesiastical vicar to his side, passed in prayer the night of the 10th of May 1347, placing his enterprise under the protection of the Holy Spirit, and the following day marched to the Capitol, surrounded by his adherents, convoked a parliament of the people, and obtained its sanction for the following proposals:—that all pending lawsuits should be at once decided; that justice should be equally administered to all; that every region should equip one hundred foot soldiers and twenty-five horse; that the dues and taxes should be rearranged; that the forts, bridges and gates of the city should be held by the rector of the people instead of by the nobility; and that granaries should be opened for the public use. On the same day, amid general homage and applause, Rienzi was proclaimed head of the republic, with the title of tribune and liberator of the Holy Roman Republic, “by authority of the most merciful Lord Jesus Christ.” The nobles withdrew scoffing but alarmed. Rienzi engaged a body-guard of one hundred men, and assumed the command of thirteen hundred infantry and three hundred and ninety light horse; he abolished the senators, retained the Thirteen and the general and special councils, and set the administration on a new footing. These measures and the prompt submission of the other cities of the state brought an instant increase of revenue to Rome.

This revolution, as will be noted, was of an entirely novel stamp. For its leader dispatched envoys to all the cities of Italy, exhorting them to shake off the yoke of their tyrants, and send representatives to the parliament convoked for the 1st of August, inasmuch as the liberation of Rome also implied the “liberation of the sacred land of Italy.” In Rienzi's judgment the Roman revolution must be, not municipal, but national, and even in some points universal. And this idea was welcomed with general enthusiasm throughout the peninsula. Solemn festivals and processions were held in Rome; and, when the tribune went in state to St Peter's, the canons met him on the steps chanting the Veni, Creator Spiritus. Even the pope, willingly or unwillingly, accorded his approval to Rienzi's deeds. The provincial cities did homage to Rome and her tribune, and almost all the rest of Italy gave him its enthusiastic adherence. The ancient sovereign people seemed on the point of resuscitation. And others besides the multitude were fascinated and carried off their feet. Great men like Petrarch were transported with joy. The poet lauded Cola di Rienzi as a sublime and supernatural being, the greatest of ancient and modern men. But it was soon evident that all this enthusiasm was mainly factitious. On the 26th of July a new parliament was called, and this decreed that all the rights and privileges granted to the empire and church must now be vested in the Roman people, from whom they had first emanated. But on the convocation of the national parliament few representatives obeyed the summons and the scheme was a failure. All had gone well so long as principles only were proclaimed, but when words had to be followed by deeds the municipal feeling awoke and distrust began to prevail. Nevertheless, on the 1st of August Rienzi assumed the spurs of knighthood and passed a decree declaring that Rome would now resume her old jurisdiction over the world, invoking the Holy Spirit upon Italy, granting the Roman citizenship to all her cities, and proclaiming them free in virtue of the freedom of Rome. This was a strange jumble of the ancient Roman idea combined with the medieval. It was a dream of Rienzi's brain, but it was also the dream of Dante and Petrarch. The conception of the empire and the history of Italy, particularly that of ancient and medieval Rome, were inevitably preparing the way for the national idea. This Rienzi foresaw, and this constitutes the true grandeur of his character, which in other respects was not exempt from pettiness and infirmity. He pursued his course, therefore, undismayed, and had indeed gone too far to draw back. On the 15th of August he caused himself to be crowned tribune with great pomp, and confirmed the rights of Roman citizenship to all natives of Italy. But practical matters had also to be taken into account, and it was here that his weakness and lack of judgment were shown. The nobles remained steadily hostile, and refused to yield to the charm of his words. Hence conflict was unavoidable; and at first Rienzi succeeded in vanquishing the Gaetani by means of Giovanni Colonna. He next endeavoured to suppress the Guelph and Ghibelline factions, and to restore Italy to “holy union” by raising her from her present abasement.

The pope, however, was weary of toleration, and, coming to terms with the nobles, incited them to war. They accordingly moved from Palestrina, and on the 30th of November were encamped before Rome. Rienzi now put forth his energy. He had already called the militia to arms, and a genuine battle took place in which eighty nobles, chiefly of the Colonna clan, were left dead. This was a real catastrophe to them, and the aristocracy never again achieved the rule of the republic. But Rienzi's head was turned by this sudden success. In great need of money, he began to play the tyrant by levying taxes and exacting instant obedience. The papal legate saw his opportunity and seized it, by threatening to bring a charge of heresy against the tribune. Rienzi was dismayed. He declared himself friendly to the pope and willing to respect his authority; and he even sought to conciliate the nobles. At this moment certain Neapolitan and Hungarian captains, after levying soldiers with the tribune's consent, joined the nobles and broke out in revolt. On their proving victorious in a preliminary encounter with some of Rienzi's guards, the tribune suddenly lost heart, resigned the power he had held for seven months, and took refuge with a few trusty adherents in the castle of St Angelo on the 15th December 1347. Thence he presently fled to Naples, vainly hoping to find aid, and afterwards disappeared for some time from the scene.

Meanwhile the Romans remained tranquil, intent on making money by the jubilee; but no sooner was this over than disorders broke out and the tyranny of the baronage recommenced. To remedy this state of things, application was made to the pope. He consulted with a committee of cardinals, who sought the advice of Petrarch, and the poet suggested a popular government, to the complete exclusion of the nobles, since these, he said, were strangers who ruined the city. The people had already elected the Thirteen, and now, encouraged by these counsels, on the 26th of December 1351 chose Giovanni Perrone as head of the republic. But the new leader was unable to withstand the hostilities of the nobles; and in September 1353 Francesco Baroncelli was elected tribune. He was a follower of Rienzi, had been his ambassador to Florence and did little beyond imitating his mode of government and smoothing the way for his return.

Rienzi had spent two years in the Abruzzi, leading a life of mystic contemplation on Monte Maiella. Then, in 1350, he had gone to Prague and endeavoured to convert to his ideas the yet uncrowned emperor Charles IV. When apparently on the point of success, he was sent under arrest to the new pope, Innocent VI. (1352-62), a man of great shrewdness and practical sense. On Rienzi's arrival at Avignon it became evident that his popularity was still very great, and that it would be no easy task to dispose of him. The Romans were imploring his return; Petrarch lauded him as a modern Gracchus or Scipio; and the pope finally released him from confinement. Innocent had decided to send to Italy, in order to settle affairs and bring the state into subjection to the church, that valiant captain and skilled politician, Cardinal Albornoz. And, having no fear that the latter's hand would be forced, he further decided that Rienzi should be sent to give him the support of his own popularity in Rome. In fact, directly the pair arrived Baroncelli was overthrown, the supremacy of the senate granted to the pope and the government confided to Albornoz, who, without concerning himself with Rienzi, nominated Guido Patrizi as senator. He then marched at the head of his troops against Giovanni, prefect of Vico, and forced him to render submission at Montefiascone on the 5th of June 1354. With the same promptitude and skill he reduced Umbria and the Tuscan and Sabine districts, consented to leave the privileges of the cities intact in return for their recognition of the papal authority and planted fortresses in suitable positions. In the meantime Rienzi's popularity was increasing in Rome; without either money or arms, the ex-tribune succeeded by his eloquence in winning over the two Provençal leaders, brothers of the famous free captain Fra Monreale; and, seduced by his promises and hopes, they supplied him with funds. Then, profiting by his prestige, the apparent favour of the pope, and the sums received, he was able to collect a band of five hundred soldiers of mixed nationalities and returned towards Rome. On Monte Mario he was met by the cavallerotti. On the 1st of August 1354 he entered the Castello gate, took possession of the government, named Monreale's two brothers his captains, and sent them to lay siege to Palestrina, which was still the headquarters of the Colonna. But then money ran short, and he again lost his head. Inviting Fra Monreale to a banquet, he put him to death for the sake of his wealth, and kept the two brothers in confinement. This act excited general indignation. And when, after his ill-gotten gains were spent, he again recurred to violence to fill his purse, the public discontent was vented in a sudden revolt on the 8th of October. The people stormed the Capitol with cries of “Death to the traitor.” Rienzi presented himself at a window waving the flag of Rome. But the charm was finally broken. Missiles were hurled at him; the palace was fired. He hid himself in the courtyard, shaved his beard and, disguised as a shepherd with a cloth over his head, slipped into the crowd and joined in their cries against himself. Being recognized, however, by the golden bracelets he had forgotten to remove, he was instantly stabbed. For two days his corpse was left exposed to the insults of the mob, and was then burned. Such was the wretched end of the man who, at one moment, seemed destined to fill the world with his name as the regenerator of Rome and of Italy.

In all the Italian cities the overthrow of the aristocracy had led to military impotence and pressing danger of tyranny. The same thing had happened in Rome when the nobility, weakened by the absence of church and empire, received its death-blow from Rienzi. But, whereas elsewhere tyrants were gradually arising in the citizen class, Rome was always in danger of oppression by the pope. Nor was any aid available from the empire, which had never recovered from its abasement under Louis the Bavarian. In fact, when Charles of Luxemburg came to Rome to be crowned, he was obliged to promise the pope that he would not enter the city. On Easter day 1355 The popes seek to constitute a temporal kingdom. he received the crown, and departed after counselling the Romans to obey the pope. And the pontiffs had greater need than ever of an established kingdom. Their position in France was much endangered by that country's disorder. New states were being formed on all sides; the medieval unity was shattered; and the shrunken spiritual authority of the church increased her need of material strength. As Italian affairs stood, it would be easy for the popes to found a kingdom, but their presence was required in Rome before it could be firmly established. The blood-stained sword of Albornoz had prepared the way before them. In 1355-56 he vanquished the lords or tyrants of Rimini, Fano, Fossombrone, Pesaro, Urbino and other cities. And all these places had been so rudely oppressed that the cardinal was often hailed as a liberator after subduing their masters by fire and sword. But everywhere he had been obliged to leave existing governments and rulers in statu quo after exacting their oaths of fealty. Thus the state was still dissevered, and it was impossible to bind it together with the pope at Avignon and Rome a republic. Bologna was still independent, Ordelaffi still lord of Forli; Cesena and other cities were still rebellious; and the Campagna was still in the hands of the barons. Some places were ruled by rectors nominated by the pope; at Montefiascone there was an ecclesiastical rector, with a bench of judges, and a captain commanding a mixed band of adventurers. Rome had submitted to the haughty cardinal, but hated him mortally, and, on his departure for Avignon in 1357 to assist the threatened pontiff, immediately conceded to the latter the supremacy of the senate. And the pope, instead of two senators, hastened to name a single one of foreign birth. This was a shrewd device of Albornoz and another blow to the nobles, with whom he was still at war. Thus was inaugurated, by the nomination of Raimondo de' Foreign senators. Tolomei in 1358, a series of foreign senators, fulfilling the functions of a podestà, and changed every six months, together with their staff of judges, notaries and knights. The people approved of this reform as being inimical to the nobles and favourable to the preservation of liberty. Hitherto the senators had been assisted, or rather kept in check, by the thirteen representatives of the regions. These were now replaced by seven reformers, in imitation of the priors of Florence, the better to follow that city's example. The reformers were soon the veritable chiefs of the republic. They first appeared in 1360, were either popolani or cavallerotti, and were elected by ballot every three months. When Albornoz returned to Italy, although desirous to keep Rome in the same subjection as the other cities, he had first to vanquish Ordelaffi and reduce Bologna. The latter enterprise was the more difficult task, and provoked a lengthy war with Matteo Visconti of Milan. Thus Rome, being left to herself, continued to be governed by her reformers; and the nobles, already shut out from power, were also excluded from the militia, which had been reorganized, like that of Florence, on the democratic system. The banderesi. Three thousand men, mostly archers, were enrolled under the command of two banderesi, “in the likeness,” says M. Villani, “of our gonfaloniers of the companies,” with four antepositi constituting a supreme council of war. And the whole body was styled the “Felix Societas Balestrariorum et Pavesatorum.” It was instituted to support the reformers and re-establish order in the city and Campagna, to keep down the nobles and defend the republic. It fulfilled these duties with much, and sometimes excessive, severity. Banderesi and antepositi had seats in the special council beside those of the reformers, as, in Florence, the gonfaloniers of the companies were seated beside the priors. Later these officials constituted the so-called signoria dei banderesi. In 1362, the Romans having subjected Velletri, which was defended by the nobles, the latter made a riot in Rome. Thereupon the banderesi drove them all from the city, killed some of their kindred, and did not even spare the cavallerotti. The fight became so furious that from gate to gate all Rome was in arms, and even mercenaries were hired. But in the end renewed submission was made to the pope.

On the death of Innocent VI. in 1362, an agreement was concluded with his successor, Urban V. (1362-70), also a Frenchman, who was obliged to give his sanction to the government of the reformers and banderesi. And then, Albornoz being recalled in disgrace to Avignon, and afterwards sent as legate to Naples, these Roman magistrates were able, with or without the co-operation of the foreign senator, to rule in their own way. They did justice on the nobles by hanging a few more; and they defended the city from the threatening attacks of the mercenaries, who had now become Italy's Worst foes. It was at this period that the Roman statutes were revised and rearranged in the compilation erroneously attributed by some writers to Albornoz, which has come down to us supplemented by alterations of a later date.

But now the popes, being no longer in safety at Avignon, really decided to return to Italy. Even Urban V. had to pay ransom to escape from the threatened attacks of the free companies. The Romans implored his return, and he was further urged to it by the Italian literati, with Petrarch at their head. In April 1367 he finally quitted Avignon, and, entering Rome on the 16th of October, was given the lordship of the city. Cardinal Albornoz had fallen mortally ill at Viterbo, but, though unable to accompany the pope to Rome, had, before dying, suggested Urban V. begins to destroy the republic. his course of action. Certainly Urban showed much acumen in profiting by the first burst of popular enthusiasm to effect quick and dexterous changes in the constitution of the republic. After naming a senator, he abolished the posts of reformers and banderesi, substituting three conservators, or rather a species of municipal council, alone charged with judicial and administrative powers, which has lasted to the present day. The thirteen leaders of the regions and the consuls of the gilds still sat in the councils, which were left unsuppressed. But all real power was in the hands of the pope, who, in Rome, as in his other cities, nominated the principal magistrates. Thus, by transforming political into civil institutions and concentrating the supreme authority in his own grasp, Urban V. dealt a mortal blow to the liberties of Rome. Yet he felt no sense of security among a people who, after the first rejoicings over the return of the Holy See, were always on the brink of revolt. Besides, he felt himself a stranger in Italy, and was so regarded. Accordingly, in April 1370 he decided to return to France; on the 20th of that month he wrote from Viterbo that no change was to be made in the government; and he died in Avignon on the 19th of December.

The Romans retained the conservators, conferring on them the political power of the reformers; they re-established the Re-establishment of the republic and the banderesi. banderesi with the Florentine title of executores justitiae and the four antepositi with that of consiliarii. Thus the “Felix Societas Balestrariorum et Pavesatorum Urbis” was restored, and the two councils and the met as before. The new French pope, Gregory XI. (1370-78), had to be content with obtaining supremacy over the senate and the possession of the castle of St Angelo. It was a difficult moment for him. The Florentines had come to an open rupture with his legates, and had adopted the expedient of inviting all the cities of the Roman state to redeem their lost freedom. Accordingly, in 1375 many of them rose against the legates, who were mostly French and regarded with dislike as foreigners. Florentine dispatches, full of classical allusions and chiefly composed by the famous scholar Secretary Coluccio Salutati, were rapidly sent in all directions. Those addressed to the Romans were specially fervid, and emphatically appealed to their patriotism and memories of the past. But the Romans received them with doubt and mistrust, for they saw that the revolution threatened to dismember the state, by promoting the independence of every separate city. Besides, while maintaining their republic, they also desired the pope's presence in Rome. Nevertheless, they went with the current to the extent of reforming their constitution. In February 1376 they nominated Giovanni Cenci captain of the people, and gave him uncontrolled power over the towns of the patrimony and the Sabine land. The conservators, with their new political authority, the executores, the antepositi and the two councils were all preserved, and a new magistracy was created, the “Tres Gubernatores Pacis et Libertatis Reipublicae Romanae.” This answered to the Eight (afterwards Ten) of War in Florence, likewise frequently called the Eight of Liberty and Peace. It was this Council of Eight that was now directing the war against the pope and braving his sentence of excommunication; and their fiery zeal had won them the title of the Holy Eight from the Florentines.

Realizing that further absence would cost him his state, Gregory XI. quitted Avignon on the 13th of September 1376, and, reaching Corneto in December, dispatched to Rome three legates, who, on the 21st of the month, concluded an agreement with the parliament. The people gave up the gates, the fortresses and the Trastevere, and promised that if the pope returned to Rome he should have the same powers which had been granted to Urban V. But, on his side, he must pledge himself to maintain the executores and their council, and allow the Romans the right of reforming the banderesi, who would then swear fealty to him. The terms of this peace and the pope's epistles clearly prove that the two councils still exercised their functions, that the banderesi were still the virtual heads of the government, and that their suppression was not contemplated. In fact, when the pope made his entry on the 17th of January 1377, accompanied by two thousand armed men, he perceived that there was much public agitation, that the Romans did not intend to fulfil their agreement, and that the government of the banderesi went on as before. Accordingly, after naming Gomez Albornoz, a nephew of the deceased cardinal, to the office of senator, he retired to Anagni, and remained there until November 1377. The Romans presently waited on him with conciliating offers, and begged him to negotiate a peace for them with the prefect of Vico. In fact, the treaty was concluded at Anagni in October, and on the 10th of November confirmed in Rome by the general council. The meeting was held in the great hall of the Capitol, ubi consilia generalia urbis fieri solent, in the presence of all the members of the republican government. But the pope was enraged by the survival of this government, and, being worn out by the persistent hostility of the Florentines, which reduced his power to a low ebb, had determined to make peace, when surprised by death on the 27th of March 1378.

The next pope, Urban VI. (1378-89), a Neapolitan, was the spirit of discord incarnate. His election was not altogether regular: the French party among the cardinals was against him; and the people were ripe for insurrection. But, regardless of all this, Urban threatened the cardinals in his first consistory, saying that church reform must begin with them; and he used the same tone with the people, reproving them for failing to suppress the banderesi. In consequence of this the cardinals of the French party, assembling at Fondi, elected the antipope Clement VII. (1378-94) and started a long and painful schism in the church. Clement resided in Avignon, while Urban in Rome was engaged in opposing Queen Joanna I. of Naples and favouring Charles of Durazzo, who, on conquering the Neapolitan kingdom, was made gonfalonier of the church and senator of Rome, where he left a vicar as his deputy. Shortly afterwards the pope went to Naples, and made fierce war on the king. Then, after many adventures, during which he tortured and put to death several cardinals whom he suspected of hostile intentions, he returned to Rome, where the utmost disorder prevailed. The conservators and Urban VI. undertakes the destruction of the republic. the banderesi were still at the head of the government, and, the pope speedily falling out with them, a riot ensued, after which he excommunicated the banderesi. These at last made submission to him, and Urban VI. became master of Rome before his death in 1389. He was succeeded by Boniface IX. (1389-1404), another Neapolitan, but a man of greater shrewdness and capacity. His first act was to crown Ladislaus king of Naples, and secure the friendship and protection of this ambitious and powerful prince. In all the principal cities of the state he chose the reigning lords for his vicars. But he allowed Fermo, Ascoli and Bologna the privilege of assuming their own vicariate for twenty-five years. And, as these different potentates and governments had only to pay him an annual tribute, all parties were satisfied, and the pope was able to bestow at least an appearance of order and unity on his state. But fresh tumults soon arose, partly because the conservators and banderesi sought to govern on their own account, and especially because the pope seems for a time to have omitted naming the senator. Boniface was a prudent man; he saw that events were turning in his favour, now that throughout Italy liberty was tottering to its fall, and bided his time. He was satisfied for the moment by obtaining a recognition of the immunities of the clergy, rendering them solely amenable to ecclesiastical tribunals, and thus distinguishing the powers of the church from those of the state in Rome. The republic also pledged itself neither to molest the prelates nor to levy fresh contributions on them towards repairing the walls, to aid in recovering the estates of the church in Tuscia, and to try to conciliate the baronage. This concordat, concluded with the conservators and banderesi on the 11th of September 1391, was also confirmed on the 5th of March 1392 by the heads of the regions, together with a fresh treaty binding both parties to furnish a certain number of armed men to combat the prefect of Vico and the adherents of the antipope at Viterbo. With the exception of this city, Orchi and Civita Vecchia, all other conquered territory was to belong to the republic. But the Romans soon discovered that they were playing into the hands of the pope, who kept everything for himself, without even paying the troops. Upon this a riot broke out; Boniface fled to Perugia in October 1392, and resolved to exact better terms when next recalled to Rome. Meanwhile the Romans subdued the prefect, captured Viterbo, and, being already repentant, handed it over to the pope and implored his return. He then proposed his own terms, which were Boniface IX. continues the destruction of the republic. approved, not only by the conservators, banderesi and four councillors, but also by the special council and by the unanimous vote of a general assembly, composed of the above-mentioned authorities, heads of regions, other officials and a hundred citizens (8th August 1393). These terms prescribed that the pope was to elect the senator, and that, on his failing so to do, the conservators would carry on the government after swearing fealty to him. The senatorial function was to be neither controlled nor hampered by the banderesi. The immunities of the clergy were to be preserved, and all church property was to be respected by the magistrates. The expenses of the pope's journey were to be paid, and he was to be escorted to Rome in state. Boniface tried to complete his work by abolishing the banderesi, the last bulwarks of freedom; but the people, although weakened and weary, made efforts to preserve them and, although their fall was inevitable, the struggle went on for some time.

During the spring of 1394 the banderesi provoked an insurrection in which the pope's life was endangered; it was only saved by the arrival of King Ladislaus, who came from Naples with a large force in the early autumn. But for the Neapolitan soldiery Boniface could not have withstood the long series of revolts that continually exposed him to fresh perils and the anxiety caused by the persistent schism of the church. The death of Clement VII. in 1394 was followed by the election of another antipope, Benedict XIII. But a new jubilee was in prospect for the year 1400, and this was always an efficacious Fall of the banderesi and of the republic. means of bending the will of the Romans. Depending upon this and the assistance of Ladislaus, Boniface not only demanded full powers to nominate senators (none having been recently elected), but insisted on the suppression of the banderesi. Both requests were granted; but, directly Angelo Alaleoni was made senator, a conspiracy was hatched for the re-establishment of the banderesi. However, the pope felt sure of his strength; the plot was discovered and the conspirators were beheaded on the stairs of the Capitol. This proved the end of the banderesi and of the liberties of Rome. The government was again directed by an alien senator together with three conservators; but the latter were gradually deprived of their political attributes, and became mere civil officers. The militia, regions, gilds and other associations now rapidly lost all political importance, and before long were little more than empty names. Thus in 1398 the Romans submitted to the complete sway of the pope, and in July of the same year the senator chosen by him was Malatesta dei Malatesti of Rimini, one of a line of tyrants, a valiant soldier, who was also temporal vicar and captain-general of the church. Boniface continued to appoint foreign senators during the rest of his life; he fortified the castle of St Angelo, the Vatican and the Capitol; he stationed galleys at the mouth of the Tiber, and proved himself in all things a thoroughly temporal prince. He aggrandized all his kindred, especially his brother, and, with the aid of his senator, his armed force and the protection of Ladislaus, succeeded in keeping down all the surviving nobles. In 1400, however, these made an attempt to upset the government. Niccolò Colonna forced his way into the city with cries of “Popolo, popolo! death to Boniface!” But the Romans had grown deaf to the voice of liberty; they refused to rise, and the senator, a Venetian named Zaccaria Trevisan, behaved with much energy. Colonna and his men had to beat a swift retreat to Palestrina. A charge of high treason was immediately instituted against him, and thirty-one rebels were beheaded. The pope then proclaimed a crusade against all the Colonna, and sent a body of two thousand men and some of the Neapolitan soldiery to attack them. Several of their estates were seized and devastated, but Palestrina continued to hold out, and on the 7th of January 1401 the Colonna finally made submission to the pope. Nevertheless, they obtained advantageous terms, for Boniface left them their lands, appointed them vicars of other territories, and made similar agreements with the Gaetani and Orsini. In this way he became absolute master of Rome. One chronicler remarks that “Romanis tanquam rigidus imperator dominabatur,” and the same tone is taken by others. But he did not succeed in putting an end to the schism of the church, which was still going on when he died in the Vatican on the 1st of October 1404.

Innocent VII. (1404–6) was the next pope. He too was a Neapolitan, and on his election the people again rose in revolt and refused to acknowledge him unless he consented to resign the temporal power. But Ladislaus of Naples hastened to his help, and an agreement was made which, under the cover of apparent concessions, really riveted the people's chains. Rome was recognized as the seat of the temporal and spiritual sovereignty of the pope, and the pope continued to appoint the senator. The people were to elect seven governors of the city, who were to swear fealty to the pope and carry on the government in conjunction with three other governors chosen by the pontiff or Ladislaus. The stipulations of Boniface IX. concerning ecclesiastical immunities were again confirmed. The barons were forbidden to place more than five lances each at the service of the people, and—which was the real gist of the covenant—the people were henceforth forbidden to make laws or statutes without the permission of the pope. The captain of the people, deprived of his political and judicial functions and reduced to a simple judge, was also to be chosen by the pope. But this treaty, drawn up on the 27th of October 1404, was not signed at the time, and many difficulties and disturbances arose when its terms were to be put into effect. The Romans nominated the seven governors, but, without waiting until the pope had chosen three more, placed the state in their hands, and styled them “governors of the liberty of the Roman Republic.” They were, in fact, banderesi or reformatori under a new name. But the attempt proved inefficacious, for, at the pope's first threat of departure, the Romans made their submission, and the treaty of October was subscribed on the 15th of May 1405. Nevertheless, as it only bears the signatures of the “seven governors of the liberty of the Roman Republic,” the pope would seem to have made some concessions. His position was by no means assured. Ladislaus was known to aspire to absolute dominion in Italy, and, although willing to aid in suppressing the republic, tried to prepare the way for his own designs, and frequently held out a helping hand to the vanquished. On the 6th of August fourteen influential citizens of Rome boldly presented themselves at the Vatican, and in a threatening manner called the pope to account for giving his whole attention to worldly things, instead of endeavouring to put a stop to the schisms of the church. But, on leaving his presence, they were attacked by Luigi Migliorati, the pope's nephew, and notorious for his violence, who killed eleven of their number, including several heads of the regions and two of the governors. An insurrection ensued, and the pope and his nephew fled to Viterbo. The Colonna tried to profit by these events, and applied to Ladislaus, who, hoping that the moment had come to make himself master of Rome, sent the count of Troia thither with a troop of three thousand horse. But the people, enraged by this treachery, and determined not to fall under the yoke of Naples, awoke for an instant to the memory of their past glories, and bravely repulsed the Colonna and the Neapolitans. And, on the speedy arrival of the Orsini with some of the papal troops, the people voluntarily restored the papal government, and, assembling the parliament, besought the pope to return on his own terms. Accordingly, after first naming Francesco Panciatichi of Pistoia to the senatorship, the pope came back on the 13th of March 1406, bringing his whole Curia with him, and also the murderer Migliorati, who, triumphing in impunity, became more arrogant than before. Here indeed was a proof that the Romans were no longer worthy of liberty! And now, by means of the Orsini, Innocent had only to reduce the Colonna and other nobles raised to power by Ladislaus; nor was this very difficult, seeing that the king, in his usual fashion, abandoned them to their fate, and, making terms with the pope, was named gonfalonier of the church and again protected her cause.

Innocent, dying in 1406, was succeeded by Gregory XII., a Venetian, who, as we shall presently see, resigned the chair in 1415. On his accession, finding his state firmly established, he seemed to be seriously bent on putting an end to the Great Schism, and for that purpose arranged a meeting with the antipope Benedict XIII. at the congress of Savona in 1408. But Gregory and Benedict only used the congress as a pretext for making war upon each other, and were urged on by Ladislaus, who hoped by weakening both to gain possession of Rome, where, although opposed by the Orsini, he had the support of the Colonna. Gregory, who had then fled from Rome, made a momentary attempt to win the popular favour by restoring the government of the banderesi; but Ladislaus marched into Ladislaus master
of Rome. Rome in June 1408 and established a senator of his own. Meanwhile the two popes were continuing their shameful struggle, and the council of Pisa (March 1409), in attempting to check it, only succeeded in raising up a third pontiff, first in the person of Alexander V. (1409–10), and then in the turbulent Baldassare Cossa, who assumed the name of John XXIII. The latter began by sending a large contingent to assist Louis of Anjou against Ladislaus. But the enterprise failed, and, seeing himself deserted by all, Pope John next embraced the cause of his foe by naming him gonfalonier of the church. Thereupon Ladislaus concluded a sham peace, and then, seizing Rome, put it to the sack and established his own government there. Thus John, like the other two popes, became a wanderer in Italy. In August 1414 Ladislaus died, and was succeeded by the scandalous Queen Joanna II. The Roman people promptly expelled the Neapolitans, and Cardinal Isolani, John's legate, succeeding in rousing a reaction in favour of the church, constituted a government of thirteen “conservators” on the 19th of October.

In November 1414 the council of Constance assembled and at last ended the schism by deposing all the popes and incarcerating John XXIII., the most turbulent of the three. On the 11th of November 1417 Oddo Colonna was unanimously elected to the papal chair; End of the schism, and election of Martin V.

Rome in a state
of anarchy. he was consecrated in the cathedral on the 27th as Pope Martin V., and, being acknowledged by all, hastened without delay to take possession of his see. Meanwhile disorder was at its height in Rome. The cardinal legate Isolani governed as he best could, while the castle of St Angelo remained in the hands of the Neapolitans, who still had a party in the city. In this divided state of affairs, Braccio, a daring captain of adventurers, nicknamed Fortebraccio, was inspired with the idea of making himself master of Rome. Overcoming the feeble resistance opposed to him, he succeeded in this on the 16th of June 1416, and assumed the title of “Defensor Urbis.” But Joanna of Naples dispatched Sforza, an equally valiant captain, against him, and, without offering battle, Fortebraccio withdrew on the 26th of August, after having been absolute master of the Eternal City for seventy days. Sforza marched in on the 27th and took possession of the city in the name of Joanna. Martin V. instantly proved himself a good statesman. He confirmed the legate Isolani as his vicar and Giovanni Savelli as senator. Leaving Constance on the 16th of May 1418, he reached Milan on the 12th of October, and slowly proceeded on his journey. While in Florence he dispatched his brother and nephew to Naples to make alliance with Joanna, and caused her to be crowned on the 28th of October 1419 by his legate Morosini. Upon this she promised to give up Rome to the pope. Her general, Sforza, then entered the service of Martin V., and compelled Fortebraccio, who was lingering in a threatening attitude at Perugia, to make peace with the pope. The latter entrusted Fortebraccio with the conduct of the campaign against Bologna, and that city was reduced to submission on the 15th of July 1420. The Romans had already yielded to Martin's brother the legate, and now earnestly besought the arrival of their pope. Accordingly, he left Florence on the 19th of September 1420, and entered the Vatican on the 28th. Rome was in ruins; nobility and burghers were equally disorganized, the people unable to bear arms and careless of their rights, while the battered walls of the Capitol recorded the fall of two republics.

Martin V. had now to fulfil a far more difficult task than that of taking possession of Rome. Throughout Italy municipal freedom was overthrown, and the Roman Republic had ceased to exist. The Middle Ages were ended; the Renaissance was beginning. The universal unity The popes of the Renaissance. both of church and of empire was dissolved; the empire was now Germanic, and derived its principal strength from direct dominion over a few provinces. Independent and national states were already formed or forming on all sides. The papacy itself had ceased to claim universal supremacy over the wor1d's governments, and the possession of a temporal state had become essential to its existence. In fact, Martin V. was the first of the series of popes who were real sovereigns, and more occupied with politics than religion. Involved in all the foreign intrigues, falsehoods and treacheries of Italian diplomacy in the 15th century, their internal policy was imbued with all the arts practised by the tyrants of the Renaissance, and nepotism became necessarily the basis of their strength. It was natural that men suddenly elected sovereigns of a new country where they had no ties, and of which they had often no knowledge, should seek to strengthen their position by aggrandizing so-called nephews who were not infrequently their sons.

Martin V. reduced the remains of the free Roman government to a mere civil municipality. Following the method of the other despots of Italy, the old republican institutions were allowed to retain their names and forms, their administrative and some of their The temporal kingdom of the popes raised on the ruins of the republic. judicial attributes, while all their political functions were transferred to the new government. Order was re-established, and justice rigidly observed. Many rebellious places were subdued by the sword, and many leaders of armed bands were hanged. The pope, however, was forced to lean on his kinsmen the Colonna and again raise them to power by grants of vast fiefs both in his own state and the Neapolitan territory. And, after first supporting Joanna II., who had assisted his entry into Rome, he next sided with her adversary, Louis of Anjou, and then with Alphonso of Aragon, the conqueror of both and the constant friend of the pope, who at last felt safe on his throne. Rome now enjoyed order, peace and security, but had lost all hope of liberty. And when Martin died (20th February 1431) these words were inscribed on his tomb, “Temporum suorum felicitas.”

Eugenius IV. (1431–47) leant on the Orsini, and was fiercely opposed by the Colonna, who excited the people against him. Accordingly on the 29th of May 1434 the Romans rose in revolt to the old cry of “Popolo e popolo,” and again constituted the rule of the seven governors A revolution expels the pope. of liberty. The pope fled by boat down the Tiber, and, being pursued with stones and shots, narrowly escaped with his life. On reaching Florence, he turned his energies to the recovery of the state. It was necessary to quell the people; but, first of all, the Colonna and the clan of the prefects of Vico, with their renewed princely power, had to be overthrown. The Orsini were still his friends. Eugenius entrusted the campaign to Patriarch (afterwards Cardinal) Vitelleschi, a worthy successor of Albornoz, and of greater ferocity if less talent. This leader marched his army towards Rome, and, instantly attacking Giovanni, prefect of Vico, captured and beheaded him. The family was now extinguished; and its possessions reverting to the church, the greater part of them were sold or given to Count Everso d'Anguillara, of the house of Orsini. The prefecture, now little more than an honorary title, was bestowed at will by the popes. Eugenius gave it to Francesco, founder of the powerful line of the Gravina-Orsini. Thus one noble family was raised to greatness while another perished by the sword. Vitelleschi had already begun to persecute the Colonna and the Savelli, and committed terrible slaughter among them. Many castles were demolished, many towns destroyed, and their inhabitants, driven to wander famine-stricken over the Campagna, had to sell themselves as slaves for the sake of bread. Finally the arrogant patriarch marched into Rome, as into a conquered city, at the head of his men, and the Romans crouched at his feet. The pope now began to distrust him, and sent Scarampo, another prelate of the same stamp, to take his place. This new commander Eugenius IV. resumes possession. soon arrived, and, perceiving that Vitelleschi proposed to resist, had him surrounded by his soldiers, who were obliged to use force to compel his surrender. Vitelleschi was carried bleeding to the castle of St Angelo, where he soon afterwards died. The pope at last returned to Rome in 1443, and remained there quietly till his death in 1447.

His successor Nicholas V. (1447–55) was a scholar solely devoted to the patronage of literati and artists. During his reign there was a fresh attempt to restore the republic, but it was rather prompted by literary and classical enthusiasm than by any genuine patriotic ardour. Political passions Conspiracy of Stefano Porcari. and interests had ceased to exist. The conspiracy was headed by Stefano Porcari, a man of the people, who claimed to be descended from Cato. He had once been captain of the people in Florence, and was made podestà of Bologna by Eugenius IV. He was a caricature of Cola di Rienzi, and extravagantly proud of his Latin speeches in honour of ancient republican liberty. The admiration of antiquity was then at its height, and Porcari found many enthusiastic hearers. Directly after the death of Eugenius IV. he made a first and unsuccessful attempt to proclaim the republic. Nevertheless Nicholas V., with the same indulgence for scholars that had prompted him to pardon Valla for denying the temporal power of the papacy and laughing to scorn the pretended donation of Constantine, freely pardoned Porcari and named him podestà of Anagni. He filled this office with credit, but on his return to Rome again began to play the agitator, and was banished to Bologna with a pension from the pope. Nicholas V. had conferred all the state offices upon priests and abbots, and had erected numerous fortresses. Hence there were many malcontents in Rome, in communication with Porcari at Bologna, and ready to join in his plot. Arms were collected, and on the day fixed he presented himself to his fellow-conspirators adorned with rich robes and a gold chain, and harangued them in Latin on the duty of freeing their country from the yoke of the priests. His design was to set fire to the Vatican on the 6th of January 1453, the feast of the Epiphany; he and his followers were to seize the pope, the cardinals and the castle of St Angelo. But Nicholas received timely warning; the conspirators' house was surrounded; and Porcari himself was seized while trying to escape, confined in the castle of St Angelo, and put to death with nine of his companions on the 9th of January. Others shortly suffered the same fate.

Under Calixtus III. and Pius II. affairs went on quietly enough, but Paul II. (1464-71) had a somewhat troubled reign. Yet he was a skilled politician. He re-ordered the finances and the courts of justice, punished crime with severity, was an energetic foe to the Malatesta of Rimini, put an end to the oppression exercised in Rome by the wealthy and arrogant house of Anguillara, and kept the people in good humour with continual festivities. But—and this was a grave defect at that period—he extended no favour to learning, and, by driving many scholars from the curia to make room for his own kinsmen, brought a storm about his ears. At that time the house of Pomponio Leto was the rendezvous of learned men and the seat of the Roman Academy. Leto was an enthusiast of antiquity; and, as the members of the Academy all assumed old Latin names, they were suspected of a design Men of learning persecuted on suspicion of republican tendencies. to re-establish paganism and the republican government. It is certain that they all inveighed against the pope; and, as the latter was no man of half measures, during the carnival of 1468 he suddenly imprisoned twenty Academicians, and even subjected a few of them to torture. Pomponio Leto, although absent in Venice, was also arrested and tried; but he exculpated himself, craved forgiveness, and was set at liberty. His friends were also released, for the charge of conspiracy proved to be unfounded. Certain members of the Academy, and notably Platina in his Lives of the Popes, afterwards revenged themselves by stigmatizing Paul II. as the persecutor of philosophy and letters. But he was no more a persecutor than a patron of learning; he was a politician, the author of some useful reforms, and solely intent on the consolidation of his absolute power. Among his reforms may be classed the revision of the Roman statutes in 1469, for the purpose of destroying the substance while preserving the form of the old Roman legislation, and entirely stripping it of all political significance. In fact the pope's will was now absolute, and even in criminal cases he could trample unhindered on the common law.

There was still a senator of Rome, whose nomination was entirely in the hands of the pope, still three conservators, the heads of the rioni, and an elected council of twenty-six citizens. Now and then also a shadowy semblance of a popular assembly was held to cast dust in the eyes of the public, but even this was not for long. All these officials, together with the judges of the Capitol, retained various attributes of different kinds. They administered justice and gave sentence. There were numerous tribunals all with undefined modes of procedure, so that it was very difficult for the citizens to ascertain in which court justice should be sought. But in last resort there was always the supreme decision of the pope. Thus matters remained to the time of the French Revolution.

For the completion of this system a final blow had to be dealt to the aristocracy, whose power had been increased by nepotism; and it was dealt by bloodshed under the three following popes—Sixtus IV. (1471-84), Innocent VIII. (1484-92) and Alexander VI. (1492-1503)—each of whom was worse than his predecessor. The first, by means of his nephews, continued the slaughter of the Colonna, sending an army against them, devastating their estates at Marino, and beheading the protonotary Lorenzo Colonna. Innocent VIII. was confronted by the power of the Orsini, who so greatly endangered his life by their disturbances in the city that he was only saved by an alliance with Naples. Neither peace nor order could be lastingly established until these arrogant barons were overthrown. This task was accomplished by the worst of the three pontiffs, Alexander VI. All know how the massacre of the Orsini was compassed, almost simultaneously, by the pope in Rome and his equally iniquitous son, Caesar Borgia, at Sinigaglia (1502). This pair dealt the last blow to the Roman aristocracy and the tyrants of Romagna, and thus the temporal dominion of the papacy was finally assured. The republic was now at an end; it had shrivelled to a civil municipality. Its institutions, deprived of all practical value, lingered on like ghosts of the past, subject from century to century to unimportant changes. The history of Rome is henceforth absorbed in that of the papacy.

Nevertheless the republic twice attempted to rise from its grave, and on the second occasion gave proofs of heroism Post-medieval Rome. worthy of its most glorious past. It was first resuscitated in February 1798, by the influence of the medieval French Revolution, and the French constitution of R°m"the year III. was rapidly imitated. Rome had again two councils—the tribunate and the senate, with five consuls constituting the executive power. But in the following year, owing to the military reverses of the French, the government of the popes was restored until 1809, when Napoleon I. annexed to his empire the States of the Church. Rome was then governed by a consulta straordinaria—a special commission—with the municipal and provincial institutions of France. In 1814 the papal government was again reinstated, and the old institutions, somewhat modified on the French system, were recalled to life. Pius IX. (1846-77) tried to introduce political reforms, and to improve and simplify the old machinery of state; but the advancing tide of the Italian revolution of 1848 drove him from Rome; the republic was once more proclaimed, and had a brief but glorious existence. Its programme was dictated by Giuseppe Mazzini, who with Safii and Armellini formed the triumvirate at the head of the government. United Italy was to be a republic with Rome for her capital. The rhetorical idea of Cola di Rienzi became heroic in 1849. The constituent assembly (9th February 1849) proclaimed the fall of the temporal power of the popes, and the establishment of a republic which was to be not only of Rome but of all Italy. France, although then herself a republic, assumed the unenviable task of re-establishing the temporal power by force of arms. But the gallant defence of Rome by Garibaldi covered the republic with glory. The enemy was repulsed, and the army of the Neapolitan king, sent to restore the pope, was also driven off. Then, however, France dispatched a fresh and more powerful force; Rome was vigorously besieged, and at last compelled to surrender. On the 2nd of July 1849 the heroic general departed from the city with some thousands of his followers. Almost at the same time the constituent assembly proclaimed in the Capitol the constitution of the Roman Republic. Immediately afterwards the French restored the government of Pius IX., whose reign down to 1870 was that of an absolute sovereign. Then the Italian government entered Rome (20th September 1870), proclaimed the national constitution (9th October 1870), and the Eternal City became the capital of Italy. Thus the scheme of national unity, the natural outcome of the history of Rome and of Italy, impossible of accomplishment under the rule of the popes, was finally achieved by the monarchy of Savoy, which, as the representative and personification of Italian interests, abolished the temporal power of the papacy and made Rome the seat of government of the united country (see Italy).

Authorities.—The history of the commune of Rome in the middle ages has to be collected from the scattered materials in special treatises, or from the general histories of the papacy. The greater part of the facts are to be found in the Liber Pontificalis, edited by the Abbé Duchesne (2 vols., Paris, 1886–92), and in the excellent histories of Rome by Felix Papencordt and Gregorovius (see below). Vitale, Storia diplomatica de' Senatori di Roma (2 vols., Rome, 1791); Galletti, Del primicerio della Santa Seda Apostolica e di altri ufficiali maggiori del sagro palazzo Lateranense (Rome, 1776); Vendettini, Del Senato Romano (Rome, 1782); Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, continued by Raynaldus (42 vols. fol., 1738–56), and the recent continuations of Theiner relating to the years 1572–85; J. Ficker, Forschungen zur Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte Italiens (4 vols., Innsbruck, 1868–74); Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter (frequently reprinted and translated into all the principal languages); Leo, Entwickelung der Verfassung der lombardischen Städte (Hamburg, 1824); M. A. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Ursprung der lombardischen Städtefreiheit (Anhang: Schicksale der römischen Stadtverfassung im Exarchat und in Rom) (Bonn, 1846); Hegel, Geschichte der Städteverfassung von Italien (Leipzig, 1847); Giesebrecht, “Ueber die städtischen Verhältnisse im X. Jahrhundert,” at end of vol. i. of Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit (Brunswick, 1863); “Studi e documenti di Storia e Diritto,” in Annuario di Conferenze storico-giuridiche (Rome, 1880 seq.); Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria (the other publications of the same society, as, e.g. the Regesto di Farfa, may also be consulted with advantage); F. Papencordt, Geschichte der Stadt Rom (Paderborn, 1857); Id. Cola di Rienzo (Hamburg, 1841); Gregorovius, Geschichte der Stadt Rom (8 vols., Stuttgart, finished in 1872; 3rd ed., Stuttgart, 1875–81); A. von Reumont, Geschichte der Stadt Rom (3 vols., Berlin, 1867–68).

Among more recent works see especially M. Creighton, History of the Papacy (London, 1897); L. Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters (Freiburg i/B., 1886, &c.), a learned work, but written in an extremely clerical spirit; more impartial, although written by a Jesuit, is P. H. Grisar’s Storia di Roma e dei Papi nel Medio Evo (Italian edition, Rome, 1899, &c., not yet completed). For the history of the republic in 1849 accounts will be found in all the histories of the Italian Risorgimento (see under Italy). A very important and complete work on the events of Rome in 1848–49 is G. Trevelyan’s Garibaldi’s Defence of the Roman Republic (London, 1907), which contains a full bibliography.  (P. V.) 

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1. Varro, L.L. vi. 34.
2. Fest. 258; Varro ap. Solinus i. 17.
3. Tac. Ann. xii. 24. For a full discussion of the exact limits of the Palatine city see Smith, Dict. Geog., s.v. “Roma”; Jordan, Topog. d. Stadt Rom, i, cap. 2; Gilbert, Topog. u. Gesch. d. Stadt Rom, i. caps. 1, 2; and “Topography” below.
4. L.L. v. 48; cf. ibid. 50.
5. Festus 348; Jordan i. 199; Gilbert i. 161. The seven “montes” are the Palatine with the Velia and Germalus, the Subura, and the three points of the Esquiline (Fagutal, Oppius and Cispius).
6. See Mommsen, R.G. (7th ed.), i. 51.
7. Varro, L.L. v. 45, vii. 44; Jordan ii. 237.
8. See Latin Language.
9. The title “rex” occurs on inscriptions at Lanuvium, Tusculum, Bovillae; Henzen, Bullettino dell' Inst. (1868), p. 159; Orelli, 2279; Corp. I. Lat. vi. 2125. For “dictator” and “praetor,” see Livy i. 23, , viii. 3; cf. Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung, i. 475; for “curia,” Serv. on Aen. i. 17; Marquardt i. 467.
10. B. Modestov, Introduction à l'histoire romaine (translated from the Russian by M. Delines), Paris, 1907, supersedes other authorities such as Helbig, Die Italiker in d. Poebene; Pohlmann, Anfänge Roms, 40; Abeken, Mittel-Italien, 61 seq.
11. The existence of a Tuscan quarter (Tuscus vicus) in early Rome may point to nothing more than the presence in Rome of Etruscan artisans and craftsmen. But see Etruria, § Language.
12. Varro, L.L. v. 51.
13. Ibid. v. 74; Schwegler i. 248 seq.
14. Ibid. v. 55; Livy i. 13.
15. Mommsen, R.G. i. 43., Schwegler (R.G. i. 478) accepted the tradition of a Sabine settlement on the Quirinal, and considered that in the united state the Sabine element predominated. Volquardsen (Rhein. Mus. xxxiii. 559) believed in a complete Sabine conquest; and so did Zöller (Latium u. Rom, Leipzig, 1878), who, however, placed it after the expulsion of the Tarquins.
16. Cato ap. Dionys. ii. 48, 49.
17. Ibid. ii. 48, 49. For the institution of the “ver sacrum” see Schwegler, Röm. Gesch. i. 240; Nissen, Templum iv.
18. The tradition connecting the Ramnes with Romulus and the Tities with Tatius is as old as Ennius (Varro, L.L. v. 55). The best authorities on the question, earlier than Schulze's epoch making treatise, are Schwegler i. 505, and Volquardsen, Rhein. Mus. xxxiii. 538.
19. They are traditionally connected only with the senate of 300 patres, with the primitive legion of 3000, with the vestal virgins, and with the augurs (Varro, L.L. v. 81, 89, 91; Livy x. 6; Festus 344; Mommsen i. 41, 74, 75; Genz, Patricisch. Rom, 90).
20. It is possible that the curiae were originally connected with separate localities; cf. such names as Foriensis, Veliensis (Fest. 174; Gilbert i. 213).
21. Niebuhr's supposition of ten gentes in each curia has nothing in its favour but the confused statement of Dionysius as to the purely military δέκαδες (Dionys. ii. 7; cf. Müller, Philologus, xxxiv. 96).
22. Rubino, Genz and Lange insisted on the hereditary patriarchal character of the kingship, Ihne on its priestly side, Schwegler on its elective. Mommsen came nearest to the view taken in the text, but failed to bring out the nature of the compromise on which the kingship rests.
23. Cic. De Legg. iii. 3; Livy iv. 7.
24. “Patres auctores facti,” Livy i. 22; “patres fuere auctores,” ibid. i. 32. In 336 B.C. (Livy viii. 12) the Publilian law directed that this sanction should be given beforehand, “ante initum suffragium,” and thus reduced it to a meaningless form (Livy i. 11). It is wrongly identified by Schwegler with the “lex curiata de imperio,” which in Cicero's day followed and did not precede election. According to Cicero (De Rep. ii. 13, 21), the proceedings included, in addition to the “creation” by the comitia curiata and the sanction of the patres, the introduction by the king himself of a lex curiata conferring the imperium and ausipicia; but this theory, though generally accepted, is probably an inference from the practice of a later time, when the creatio had been transferred to the comitia centuriata.
25. For the references, see Schwegler i. 646 seq.
26. If the analogy of the rex sacrorum is to be trusted, the “king” could only be chosen from the ranks of the patricii. Cic. Pro Domo, 14; Gaius i. 122.
27. Cic. De Rep. ii. 13; Dionys. ii. 14, &c.
28. Varro, L.L. v. 155. For the position of the Comitium, see Smith, Dict. Geog., s.v. “Roma,” and Jordan, Topog. d. Stadt Rom. (Petersen).
29. Dionys. l.c.
30. Livy i. 26; Dionys. iii. 22.
31. Gaius ii. 101.
32. Gell. xv. 27.
33. Gell. v. 19, “Comitia praebentur, quae curiata appellantur.” Cf. Cic. Pro Domo, 13, 14; and see Roman Law.
34. By far the most complete criticism of the traditional accounts of the first four kings will be found in Schwegler's Röm. Geschichte, vol. i.; compare also Ihne's Early Rome and Sir G. C. Lewis's Credibility of Early Roman History. More recently, E. Pais (Storia d'Italia) has subjected the early legends to learned and often suggestive criticism, but without attaining very solid results.
35. The fossa Cluilia, 5 m. from Rome (Livy ii. 39), is regarded by Schwegler (i. 585) and by Mommsen (i. 45) as marking the Roman frontier towards Latium. Cf. Ovid. Fast. ii. 681; Strabo 230, “μεραξὺ γοῦν τοῦ πέμπτου καὶ τοῦ ἔκτου λίθου . . . τόπος Φῆστοι . . . ὄριον τῆς τότε Ῥωμαίων γῆς.”
36. Livy i. 36.
37. Ibid. i. 38, 55; Plin. N.H. xxxvi. 15.
38. This was the view of O. Müller, and more recently of Deecke, Gardthausen and Zöller.
39. W. Schulze, Gesch. d. Lat. Eigennamen, passim (esp. pp. 79 ff.); Zöller, Latium u. Rom, 166, 189; Gardthausen, Mastarna (Leipzig, 1882).
40. Dionys. i. 29.
41. Livy i. 2; Dionys. i. 64, 65; Plut. Q.R. 18.
42. Cato ap. Serv. Aen. xi. 567.
43. Helbig, Ann d. Inst. (1865).
44. Plut. Rom. 2. παρανομώτατος καὶ ὠμότατος; cf. Rutulian Tarquitius, Virg. Aen. x. 550.
45. Müller-Deecke, i. 69, 70; Zöller, Latium u. Rom, 168; cf. Strabo, p. 219; Serv. on Aen. x. 179, 198. The existence of an independent “gens Tarquinia” of Roman extraction (Schwegler, i. 678) is unproven and unlikely. See now Schulze, Lat. Eigennamen, pp. 95 and 402 n. 6.
46. See speech of Claudius, Tab. Lugd. App. to Nipperdey's edition of the Annals of Tacitus, “Tusce Mastarna ei nomen erat.” For the painting in the François tomb at Vulci, see Gardthausen, Mastarna, 29 seq.; Annali dell. Instit. (Rome, 1859).
47. Cf. the traditions of Mezentius, of Caeles Vibenna, Porsena, &c.
48. Schwegler, R.G. i. 679 seq.
49. Ibid. i. 791, 792. He accepts as genuine, and as representing the extent of Roman rule and connexions under the Tarquins, the first treaty between Rome and Carthage mentioned by Polybius (iii. 22); see, for a discussion of the question, Vollmer, Rhein. Mus. xxxii. 614 seq.; Mommsen, Röm. Chronologie, 20; Dyer, Journ. of Philol. ix. 238.
50. Livy i. 35; Dionys. iii. 67; Cic. De Rep. ii. 20.
51. Varro, L.L. v. 89.
52. Livy i. 36; Dionys. iii. 71.
53. The six centuries of horsemen were thenceforward known as “primi secundique Ramnes” (Fest. 344; cf. Schwegler, i. 685 seq.) It is possible that the reforms of Tarquinius Priscus were limited to the cavalry.
54. Cic. De Rep. ii. 22; Livy i. 42; Dionys, iv. 16.
55. This is recognized by Mommsen, Genz and Soltau, as against Niebuhr, Schwegler and Ihne. Even in the later comitia centuriata the traces of the originally military character of the organization are unmistakable.
56. The century ceased to represent companies of one hundred when the whole organization ceased to be military and became exclusively political.
57. The property qualification for service in the first class is given at 100,000 asses (Livy), for the second at 70,000, third 50,000, fourth 25,000, fifth 11,000. It was probably originally a certain number of cows, afterwards translated into terms of money; cf. W. Ridgeway, The Origin of Coinage and Metallic Currency (Cambridge, 1892), p. 391. The same scholar, in his Who were the Romans? p. 17, has pointed out the ethnical meaning of the varieties of armature in the early army.
58. Polyb. vi. 20; Mommsen, Röm. Trib. 132 seq.
59. Livy i. 43. Dionys. (iv. 18) and Cic. (De Rep. ii. 22) ascribe the whole eighteen to Servius. But the six older centuries remained distinct, as the “sex suffragia” of the comitia centuriata; Cic. De Rep. ii. 22.
60. Dionys. iv. 14, εἰς τὰς καταγραφὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.
61. Livy i. 43. The four were Palatina, Suburana, Exquilina, Colina.
62. Livy ii. 9–14, Pliny (N.H. 34, 14) and Tacitus (Ann. iii. 72) imply the existence of a tradition, possibly that of “Tuscan annalists,” according to which Porsena actually made himself master of Rome. The whole story is fully criticized by Schwegler (ii. 181 seq.) and Zöller (Latium u. Rom, p. 180).
63. See the exhaustive criticism in Schwegler (ii. pp. 66–203).
64. The traditional account of early republican history, given in annalistic form by Livy, has been subjected to severe criticism in recent times, notably by Pais in his Storia di Roma, vols. i. and ii. It is true that the dearth of contemporary documents, especially for the period before the sack of Rome by the Gauls (390 B.C.), must have led to the filling of gaps by episodes drawn mainly from popular traditions, and it is therefore impossible to guarantee the accuracy of the narrative in details. Nevertheless, the general truth of the story of Rome’s early wars and constitutional growth cannot be seriously impugned.
65. Schwegler (ii. 92) suggests that the dictatorship formed an intermediate step between the monarchy and the consulate; cf. Ihne, Röm. Forsch. 42.
66. That the consuls were originally styled praetores is stated by Varro, ap. Non. p. 23, and Liv. iii. 55; cf. Cic. Legg. viii. 3, 8. When additional praetors were created, the two originally appointed were called praetores maximi and hence στρατηγοὶ ὕπατοι or simply ὕπατοι in Greek.
67. The view of the patrum auctoritas here adopted is that taken by T. Mommsen (Forsch. i.).
68. This is the view taken by the present writer, as against Schwegler and others. For Ridgeway's theory, see above.
69. Cf. aedilis, aedilicius, &c.; Cic. De Rep. ii. 12; Livy i. 8; for a full discussion of other views, see Soltau 179 seq.; Christensen, Hermes, ix. 196.
70. For the clientela, see Mommsen (Forsch. i. 355 sqq.; Staatsr. iii. 54 sqq.); Schwegler (i. 638 sqq.); Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyklopädie, iv. 23 sqq. (von Premerstein).
71. The offspring of such a union ranked as plebeians.
72. Livy ii. 8, lex Valeria de provocatione; Cic. De Rep. ii. 31; cf. Livy iii. 20.
73. Greenidge, Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, pp. 344 sqq.
74. Schwegler ii. 226 seq.
75. Ibid. ii. 251 n.; Livy i. 33.
76. Cic. De Rep. ii. 34, “contra consular imperium creati.”
77. Livy iii. 55.
78. Festus 318.
79. Gell. xiii. 12, “ut injuria quae coram fieret arceretur.”
80. Livy ii. 56, 60; Dionys. ix. 41; Schwegler ii. 54l; Soltau 493.
81. For theories as to the original mode of appointing tribunes see Mommsen, Forsch. i. 185, Staatsr. ii. 274 sqq.
82. Livy iii. 9.
83. Ibid. iii. 32.
84. On the disputed question of the date of the XII. Tables see Pais, Storia di Roma, vol. i. chap. iv., and Greenidge, Eng. Hist. Review (1905), pp. 1 sqq.
85. Livy iii. 55. “quum veluti in controverso jure esset, tenerenturne patres plebiscitis legem comitiis centuriatis tulere, ut quod tributim plebs jussisset populum teneret, qua lege tribuniciis rogationibus telum acerrimum datum est.” What were the precise conditions under which a plebiscitum became law can only be conjectured. The control of the patres over legislation certainly remained effective until 287 B.C. (See below.)
86. After the decemvirate, the tribunes no longer pronounce capital sentences. They propose fines, which are confirmed by the comitia tributa.
87. Livy iv. 6; cf. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 181.
88. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 331.
89. Livy vi. 35, 42; Appian, B.C. i. 8.
90. Livy vi. 42.
91. Ibid. vii. 17, 22; viii. 15; x. 6.
92. Ibid. viii. 12, “ut . . . ante initum suffragium patres auctores fierent,” cf. Livy. i. 17. For the lex Maenia, see Cic. Brut. 14, 55; Soltau 112.
93. Plin. N.H. xvi. 10; Gell. xv. 27; Gaius i. 3, “plebiscita lege Hortensia non minus valere quam leges.”
94. For details of these wars see articles on the various cities, districts and tribes. For ethnographic and philological evidence see Italy, Ancient Peoples.
95. Livy ii. 332 Cic. Pro Balbo, 23.
96. Livy viii. 2.
97. Ibid. ii. 41.
98. From the Celts in the north especially.
99. For the status of Caere and the “Caerite franchise,” see Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 28 seq.; Madvig, R. Verf. i. 39; Beloch, Ital. Bund, 120; Mommsen, Staatsr. iii. 583 sqq.
100. Livy vii. 15.
101. Ibid. vi. 26.
102. Mommsen, R.G. i; 347 n.; Beloch, Ital. Bund, cap. ix.
103. Livy vii. 27. For the whole question of the early treaties with Carthage, see Polybius iii. 22; Mommsen, vol. ii. Appendix (p. 523); Strachan-Davidson, Polybius, pp. 50 ff.; Pais, Storia di Roma, i. 2, 305, n. 1; also article Carthage.
104. For the Samnites in Campania, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, i. 453; Schwegler-Clason, R.G. v. 98 seq.; Beloch, Campanien (Berlin, 1879).
105. Livy vii. 32.
106. For the difficulties in the traditional accounts of this war, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, i. 459 n.; Schwegler-Clason, R.G., v. 14 seq.
107. At the foot of Mount Vesuvius, Livy viii. 9; at Trifanum, ibid. viii. 11.
108. Livy viii. 11.
109. Livy viii. 14; Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, Pedum, Tusculum.
110. Ibid., loc. cit., “ceteris Latinis populis conubia commerciaque et concilia inter se ademerunt.”
111. For the controversy as to the precise status of Capua and the “equites Campani” (Livy viii. 14), see Beloch, Ital. Bund, 122 seq.; idem, Campanien, 317; Mommsen, Staatr. iii. 574.
112. Livy viii. 3, 17, 24.
113. Livy viii. 22.
114. Ibid. ix. 29; see Appia, Via.
115. Ibid. ix. 45.
116. Ibid. ix. 43.
117. Livy x. 9.
118. Ibid. ix. 45.
119. Ibid. x. 2.
120. Ibid. ix. 39. Ihne (Römische Geschichte, i.² 394 seq.) throws some doubts on the traditional accounts of this war and of that in 296.
121. It received the name of Narnia (Livy x. 10).
122. Livy x. 27.
123. Livy, Epit. xi., “pacem petentibus Samnitibus foedus quarto renovatum est.”
124. Dion. Hal. Exc. xvi. xvii. 5; Vell. Pat. i. 14.
125. Livy, Epit. xi.; Vell. Pat. i. 14.
126. Livy, Epit. x.
127. Ibid. xii.; Polyb. ii. 20.
128. Livy, Epit. xii.; Plut. Pyrrh. 13.
129. For his career and for the story of his wars with Rome, see the article Pyrrhus.
130. Livy, Epit. xiv.; Plut. Pyrrh. 26.
131. Vell. Pat. i. 14, “suffragii ferendi jus Sabinis datum.”
132. Ibid.; Livy, Epit. xv.
133. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 60, note 1; Nissen, Ital. Landeskunde, i. p. 71.
134. Beloch, Ital. Bund, 203; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 60, note 2.
135. For the coloniae Latinae founded before the First Punic War, see Beloch, 136 seq.
136. The year of the foundation of Ariminum, the first Latin colony with the restricted rights; Cic. Pro Caec. 35, 202; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 52 n.; Staatsr. iii. 624; Marquardt, Staatverw. i. 54; Beloch, 155-58, takes a different view.
137. Beloch, Camp. 39; Cic. Pro Balbo, 8, 21, 22, 50.
138. For the relation of the socii Italici to Rome, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 53 ff.; Beloch, Ital. Bund, cap. x.
139. Beloch, 203. The importance of this duty of the allies is expressed in the phrase, “socii nominisve Latini quibus ex formula togatorum milites in terra Italia imperare solent.”
140. Four in South Etruria (387), two in the Pomptine territory (358), two in Latium (332), two in the territory of the southern Volsci and the Ager Falernus (313), two in the Aequian and Hernican territory (299). The total of thirty-five was completed in 241 by formation of the Velina and Quirina, probably in the Sabine and Picentine districts, enfranchised in 268. See Beloch, 32.
141. Livy, Epit. xvi.; Eutrop. ii. 18; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 55 n.; Beloch, cap. iv. pp. 77 seq.
142. Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa, and, on the Adriatic, Sena and Castrum Novum.
143. To both these classes the term municipia was applied.
144. For details, see Beloch, Ital. Bund, caps. v., vi., vii. The enfranchised communities in most cases retained the old titles for their magistrates, and hence the variety in their designations.
145. For the praefecti, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 49, 67, and Staatsr. ii. 608; Beloch, 130–33.
146. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 72 seq.; Livy viii. 8; Polyb. vi. 17–42.
147. Livy iv. 59.
148. This system was probably introduced in order to meet the charge of the Celtic swordsmen, but it was perfected during the Samnite wars. See Marquardt, Staatsverw. iii. 350 seq.; Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités, ssv. “Legio” (Cagnat).
149. Livy viii. 23, “ut pro consule rem gereret quoad debellatum esset.”
150. Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 243; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 209; Appian, Sic. 2.
151. Livy, Epit. xx.
152. Polyb. ii. 8 seq.
153. Ibid. ii. 12.
154. Livy xxi. 2, 5; Polyb. iii. 15, 31.
155. Livy xxvi. 40. The union was apparently effected in 210.
156. Ibid. xxxii. 27; cf. Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 252, and Hübner in Hermes, i. 105 seq.
157. Livy xxvii. 5, “pace ac bello fidissimum annonae subsidium”; cf. xxxii. 27.
158. Some fresh light has been thrown upon the later campaigns in Spain by the recently discovered fragment of an epitome of Livy (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, iv. 668; Kornemann, Die neue Liviusepitome aus Oxyrhynchos (1904).
159. Italica (206), Appian, Iber. 38; Carteia (171), Livy xliii. 3.
160. Livy xlii. 4.
161. E.g. Tarentum, Livy xliv. 16. A Roman colony was established at Croton in 194, and a Latin colony (Copia) at Thurii in 193 (Livy xxxiv. 45, 53).
162. Brundusium was established in 246 (Liv. Epit. xix.) or 245 (Vell. i. 14). Puteoli was fortified during the Second Punic War and became a Roman colony in 194 (Livy xxxiv. 45).
163. Appian, Hann. 61; Aul. Gell. x. 3; cf. Beloch, Ital. Bund.
164. Egypt had supplied corn to Italy during the Second Punic War (Polyb. ix. 44).
165. Polyb. iii. 2, xv. 20; Livy xxxi. 14.
166. Ibid. xxxi. 6, 7.
167. Ibid. xxxiii. 3.
168. Ibid. 18.
169. Polyb. xviii. 44-47; Livy xxxiii. 30-34.
170. Ibid. xxxiii. 32, 33.
171. Ibid. xxxiv. 48-52.
172. For the conflicting views of moderns on the action of Rome, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 442; Holm, Hist. of Greece, iv. 349; and on the other side Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iii. 76 ff., and C. Peter, Studien zur röm. Gesch. (Halle, 1863), pp. 158 seq.
173. Livy xxxiii. 38; Polyb. xviii. 50.
174. Livy xxxv. 43.
175. Ibid. xxxv. 20, xxxvi. 1.
176. Ibid. xxxvi. 7.
177. Livy (xxxvii. 40) describes the composition of Antiochus's army.
178. Livy xxxvii. 55, xxxviii. 38; Polyb. xxi. 17.
179. Livy xxxix. 24 seq.
180. Ibid. xlii. 5.
181. Ibid. xlii. 19, 36.
182. Ibid. xliv. 36–41; Plut. Aemil. 15 seq.
183. Diod. xxxi. 9; Livy xlv. 42; Polyb. xxxvii. 16.
184. Livy xlv. 9.
185. Ibid. xlv. 17, 29; Plut. Aemil. 28; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 508; Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iii. 258; Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 316.
186. Polyb. xxxvii. 2; Livy, Epit. l.
187. For the boundaries of the province, see Ptolemy iii. 13; Marquardt, loc. cit., 318 f.
188. Livy xlv. 31.
189. Ibid. Epit. li., lii.
190. Ibid. Epit. lii.; Polyb. xl. 9 seq.; Pausanias vii. 16; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 270.
191. Mommsen, loc. cit. note; Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 321 seq.; Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten, iii. 358.
192. North of the Drilo the former kingdom of Perseus's ally Genthius had been treated as Macedon was in 167 (Livy xlv. 26); cf. Zippel, Röm. Herrschaft in Illyrien (Leipzig, 1877). Epirus, which had been desolated after Pydna (Livy xlv. 34), went with Greece; Marquardt i. 319.
193. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, ii. 510 ff., iii. 274 ff.
194. Livy xiv. 20; Polyb. xxx. 5.
195. Polyb. xxxi, 7. The Rhodian harbour dues suffered severely.
196. Rome had already intervened between Syria and Egypt: Livy xlv. 12; Polyb. xxix. 11, xxxi. 12.
197. Livy xlv. 13, “Regni maximum presidium in fide populi Romani.”
198. Ibid. Epit. xlvi., xlvii.
199. Polyb. iii. 4.
200. The most important change was the assimilation of the division by classes and centuries with that by tribes, a change possibly due to the censorship 534.of Gaius Flaminius in 220 (Mommsen, Staatsr. iii. 270). On this point see Comitia.
201. A few offices of a more or less priestly character were still filled only by patricians, e.g. rex sacrorum, flamen Dialis. A plebeian first became curio maximus545. in 209 (Livy xxvii. 8).
202. The lectio senatus was in the hands of the censors, but whether before Sulla’s time their choice was subject to legal restrictions is doubtful (see Senate).
203. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 7; Lange, Röm. Alterth. ii. 1 ff.
204. “Ex auctoritate senatus.” The lex Flaminia agraria of 232 was an exception (Cic. De senect. 4; Polyb. ii. 21). In 167 B.C. a praetor brought the question of war with Rhodes directly before the assembly, but this was condemned as unprecedented (novo maloque exemplo, Liv. xlv. 21).
205. Livy xxxi. 5, xxxiii. 25, xxxvii. 55.
206. Ibid. xxx. 27, &c.
207. Polyb. (vi. 15) expressly includes the prorogation of a command among the prerogatives of the senate.
208. Livy xxvi. 1, “consules de republica, de administratione belli, de provinciis exercitibusque patres consuluerunt.”
209. Ibid. xlv. 18.
210. Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iv. 43; Polyb. vi. 13.
211. Pro Sestio 65, “quasi ministros gravissimi consilii.”
212. Livy xxvii. 5, xxviii. 45.
213. Ibid. xxii. 7. In 191 the senators were forbidden to leave Rome for more than a day, nor were more than five to be absent at once (Livy xxxvi. 3).
214. Ibid. xxvii. 35.
215. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 7 ff.
216. E.g. Livii, Sempronii, Caecilii, Licinii, &c.
217. Livy xxii. 34, “plebeios nobiles . . . contemnere plebem, ex quo contemni a patribus desierint, coepisse”; cf. Sall, Jug. 41, “paucorum arbitrio belli domique agitabatur; penes eosdem aerarium, provinciae, magistratus.” Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 15 n. The number of new families ennobled dwindles rapidly after 200 B.C.; Willems, Le Sénat de la république romaine, i. 366 seq. (Paris, 1878).
218. The senators' whole duty is “sententiam dicere.” The senator was asked “quid censes?” the assembly “quid velitis jubeatis?” Cf. also the saving clause, “Si eis videretur” (sc. consulibus, &c.) in Scta., e.g. Cic. Phil. v. 19, 53.
219. By declaring his action to be “contra rempublicam.” The force of this anathema varied with circumstances. It had no legal value.
220. Livy xxxviii. 42, of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia, 189 B.C.; cf. also the position of the two Scipios.
221. Hence the same things, e.g. founding of colonies, are done in one year by a Sctum., in another by a lex; cf. Cic. De rep. ii. 32, 56; Phil. i 2, 6, of Antony as consul, “mutata omnia, nihil per senatum, omnia per populum.”
222. There was no legal necessity, before Sulla's time, for getting the senatus auctoritas for a proposal to the assembly.
223. See generally Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, i. bk. iii. cap. 6; Lange, Röm. Alterth. vol. ii.; Ihne, bk. v. cap. i. The first law against bribery at elections was passed in 181 B.C. (Livy xl. 19), and against magisterial extortion in the provinces in 149 (Lex Calpurnia de pecuniis repetundis). The senators had special seats allotted to them in the theatre in 194 B.C.; Livy xxxiv. 44, 54.
224. The tributum was no longer levied after 167 B.C. (Cic. Off. 11- 22; Plin. H.N. xxxiii. 56).
225. See, however, p. 637, note 1 and reff.
226. From 181 B.C. onwards a succession of laws de ambitu were passed to prevent bribery, but without effect.
227. Cf. Tacitus's account of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, and Aurelia, the mother of Julius Caesar, in the dialogue De oratoribus, c. 28.
228. It is to be noted that these subjects were, generally speaking, taught by freedmen or slaves.
229. In 161 B.C. a decree of the senate was passed against “philosophi et rhetores Latini, uti Romae ne essent” (Gell. xv. 11). In 155 B.C. the philosopher Carneades was expelled from Rome (Plut. Cato. 22).
230. The elder Cato complained of this as early as 195 B.C. (Liv. xxxiv. 2).
231. Divorce was unknown at Rome until 231 B.C. (Dionys. ii. 25). In the last century of the Republic it was of daily occurrence.
232. In the Ciceronian period the lower classes of Rome, with whom the voting power in the comitia rested, were openly organized for purposes of bribery by means of collegia and sodalicia, nominally religious bodies.
233. Caesar had accumulated debts amounting to £800,000 by the time of his praetorship. Catiline and his fellow-bankrupts, amongst whom were several women, including a certain Sempronia who, as we are told by Sallust, “danced and played better than an honest woman need do,” hoped to bring about a cancelling of debts (novae tabulae).
234. For authorities, see under Gracchus.
235. To Spain alone more than 150,000 men were sent between 196 and 169 (Ihne iii. 319); compare the reluctance of the people to declare war against Macedon in 200 B.C., and also the case of Spurius Ligustinus in 171 (Livy, xlii. 34).
236. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 75 seq. Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iv. 364, argues that Mommsen has exaggerated the depressing effects of foreign competition: cf. Salvioli, Le Capitalisme dans le monde antique, chaps. v.-vii.
237. Beloch, Ital. Bund. 80 seq.
238. Livy xliii. 14; Epit. xlviii., lv. During the period the minimum qualification for service in the legion was reduced from 11,000 to 4000 asses.
239. Livy xxxii. 26, xxxiii. 36, xxxix. 29, 41.
240. Sixteen Roman and four Latin colonies. See Marquardt, Staatsverw, i.
241. E.g. Livy xxxi. 4, 49, xxxii. 1.
242. Livy xl. 38.
243. Livy, Epit. xlvi.
244. Sipontum and Buxentum in 186; Livy xxxix. 23.
245. Plut. T. G. 9-14; Appian, B.C. i. 9-13; Livy, Epit. lviii. Compare also Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 320 seq.; Lange, Röm. Alterth. iii. 8 seq.; Nitzsch, Gracchen, 294; Greenidge, Hist. of Rome, i. (1904), pp. 110 seq.
246. For the details, see the article Agrarian Laws.
247. On the legislation of C. Gracchus, see Warde Fowler in Eng. Hist. Review (1905), pp. 209 seq., 417 seq.
248. Lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus; Cic. Pro domo, 9, 24; De Prov. Cons. 2, 3; Sallust, Jug. 27.
249. Lex de provincia Asia; Cic. Verr. 3, 6, 12; Fronto, Ad Ver. ii. 125.
250. Plut. C.G. 5; Diod. xxxiv. 25.
251. Plut. C.G. 4; Cic. Pro domo, 31, 82; Pro Rob. Perd. 4, 12.
252. Quaestio de repetundis, est. 149 B.C. See Plut. C.G. 5; Livy, Epit. lx.; Tac. Ann. xii. 60; App. B.C. i. 22. For the lex Acilia, see C.I.L. i. 189; Wordsworth, Fragm. 424; Bruns, Fontes juris Romani, ed. 6, pp. 56 seq.
253. They had succeeded in 129 in suspending the operations of the agrarian commission. App. B.C. i. 18; Livy, Epit. lix.; Cic. De Rep. iii. 29, 41.
254. Lange, R.A. iii. 32; Lex Agr. line 21.
255. The rogatio Fulvia, 125 B.C.; Val. Max. ix. 5, 1; App. B.C. 1. 21.
256. Plut. C.G. 5; App. i. 21; Livy, Epit. lx.; Festus, 290.
257. Hence Gaius ranked as the founder of the equestrian order. Plin. N.H. xxxiii. 34, “judicum appellation separare eum ordinem . . . instituere Gracchi”; Varro ap. Non. 454, “bicipitem civitatem fecit.”
258. Traces of the work of the commission survive in the Miliarium Popilianum, C.I.L. i. 551, in a few Gracchan “termini,” ib. 552, 553, 554, 555, in the “limites Gracchani,” Liber Colon., ed. Lachmann, pp. 209, 210, 211, 229, &c. Compare also the rise in the numbers of the census of 125 B.C.; Livy, Epit. lx.
259. See App. i. 27. The lex agraria, still extant in a fragmentary condition in the museum at Naples, is that of 111. See Mommsen, C.I.L. i. 200; Wordsworth, 441 seq.; Bruns, Fontes juris Rom. ed. 6, pp. 74 seq., and cf. the article Agrarian Laws.
260. Cic. Agr. ii. 25, 65.
261. Sallust, Jug. 5 seq.; Livy, Epit. lxii., lxiv.
262. L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune 121; Sall. Jug. 28.
263. Ibid. 38, 39.
264. Ibid. 40.
265. Sallust, Jug. 63; Plut. Marius, 2, 3. For the question as to the position of his parents, see Madvig, Verf. i. 170; Diod. xxxiv. 38.
266. Sallust, Jug. 73.
267. Ibid. 114. For the chronology of the Jugurthine war, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 398; Pelham, Journ. of Phil. vii. 91; Meinel, Zur Chronologie des jugurthinischen Kriegs (1883).
268. Livy, Epit. lxvii.; Plut. Mar. 12; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 414 seq.
269. Livy, Epit. lxix.; Appian, B.C. i. 28 seq.
270. For the leges Appuleiae, see Saturninus, L. Appuleius, and authorities there quoted.
271. Sallust, Jug. 86, “ipse interea milites scribere, non more majorum neque ex classibus, sed uti cujusque cupido erat, capite censos plerosque.” For details, cf. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 456 seq.; Madvig, Verf. ii. 468, 493; Marquardt, Staatsv. iii. 430 seq.
272. Livy, Epit. lxx.; Vell. ii. 13.
273. Lex Junia, Cic. De Off. iii. 11, 47; lex Licinia Mucia, Cic. Pro Corn. fr. 10; Ascon. p. 60.
274. Cic. De orat. i. 7, 24 f., and De domo, 19, 50; Appian, B.C. i. 35; Diod. Sic. xxxvii. 10; Ihne, bk. vii. cap. xiii.
275. For the provisions of the leges Liviae, see App. B.C. i. 35; Livy, Epit. lxxi. They included, according to Pliny, N.H. xxxiii. 3, a proposal for the debasement of the coinage.
276. Cic. Pro domo, 16, 41.
277. For the Social War, see, besides Mommsen, Ihne and Lange, Kiene, Der römische Bundesgenossenkrieg (Leipzig, 1845).
278. App. B.C. i. 39-49; Livy, Epit. lxxii.-lxxvi.
279. For the lex Julia, see Cicero, Pro Balbo, 8, 21; Gell. iv. 4; App. B.C. i. 49. For the lex Plautia Papiria, see Cic. Pro Archia, 4, 7, and Schol. Bob. p. 353.
280. Vell. ii. 20; App. B.C. i. 49, 53. It is impossible to reconcile in detail the statements of these authors.
281. App. B.C. i. 54, and Mithr. 22; Oros. v. 18; Livy, Epit. lxxiv.
282. It had been already declared a consular province for 87, and early in 88 seems to have been assigned to Sulla by decree of the senate.
283. See Sulpicius Rufus, P.
284. Marius finally escaped to Africa (see Marius); Sulpicius was taken and killed; App. i. 60.
285. App. B.C. i. 59, μηδὲν ἔτι ἀπροβούλευτον ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐσφέρεσθαι. For the other laws mentioned by Appian, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 541 f.
286. Livy, Epit. lxxix.; Vell. ii. 20.
287. Cic. Pro Sestio, 36, 77; Catil. iii. 10, 24.
288. Tibur and Praeneste especially.
289. The consuls of 86, 85, 84 were all nominated without election. Livy, Epit. lxxx. lxxxiii.; App. i. 75.
290. Brut. 227.
291. The nobles had fled to Sulla in large numbers; Vell. ii. 23.
292. This work was accomplished apparently by the censors of 86; but cf. Lange iii. 133; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iv. 70; Livy, Epit. lxxxiv.
293. Livy, Epit. lxxxii; Appian, Mithr. 52; Plut. Sulla, 23.
294. Livy, Epit. lxxxiii.; Vell. ii. 23; Plut. Sulla, 24.
295. In 84; App. B.C. i. 78; Livy, Epit. lxxxiii.
296. Livy, Epit. lxxxviii., “cum Samnitibus ante portam Collinam debellavit”; Plut. Sulla, 29, and Crassus, 6. According to App. i. 93, and Livy, loc cit., 8000 captives were massacred. Florus, iii. 21, gives 4000. Praeneste surrendered, was razed to the ground, and its population put to the sword.
297. Compare especially Mommsen's brilliant chapter, which is, however, too favourable (bk. iv. cap. x.), and also Lange (iii. 146 seq.). Further references will be found in the article Sulla (q.v.).
298. App. i. 95 seq.; Dio Cassius, fr. 109; Plut. Sulla, 31. The number of the proscribed is given as 4700 (Val. Max.), including, according to Appian, 2600 members of the equestrian order.
299. E.g. Catiline, in 63. Sall. Cat. 21, 37. For the liberi proscriptorum, see Vell. ii. 28.
300. Cic. Pro. Cluent. 55, 151.
301. Cic. Phil. v. 16, 43, “tot municipiorum maximae calamitates." Cic. Pro Domo, 30, 79; Cic. Ad Att. i. 19; Florus iii. 21; Strabo, 223, 254.
302. Livy, Epit. lxxxix.; App. B.C. i. 100; Cicero, Catil. ii. 79. 20.
303. Sall. Cat. 28.
304. Cic. Agr. ii. 269.
305. Cic. Agr. ii. 26, 69 seq.; 28, 78; iii. 2, 8—the territories of Praeneste and of the Hirpini.
306. Ibid. iii. 4, 14.
307. See especially Cicero's oration Pro Tullio. For the pastores of Apulia, Sall. Cat. 28.
308. For Sulla's dictatorship as in itself a novelty, see App. i. 98; Plut. Sulla, 33; Cic. Ad Att. 9, 15; Cic. De Legg. i. 15, 42.
309. Cic. De Legg. iii. 9, 22, “injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit, auxilii ferendi reliquit.” Cf. Cic. Verr. i. 60, 155; Livy, Epit. lxxxix.
310. Cic. Pro Cornel. fr. 78; Ascon. In Corn. pp. 59, 70; Appian i. 100.
311. Vell. ii. 32; Tac. Ann. xi. 22; Cic. Verr. Act. i. 13, 37.
312. App. B.C. i. 100; cf. Livy vii. 42 (342 B.C.), “ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet.”
313. The custom had gradually established itself. Cf. Livy xxxii. 7. The “certus ordo magistratuum” legalized by Sulla was—quaestorship, praetorship, consulate; App. i. 100.
314. Pompon. De orig. juris (Dig. i. 2, 2, 32); Vell. ii. 89. Compare also Cicero, In Pison. 15, 35 with Cic. Pro Milone, 15, 39. The increase was connected with his extension of the system of quaestiones perpetuae, which threw more work on the praetors as the magistrates in charge of the courts.
315. Tac. Ann. xi. 22. The quaestorship henceforward carried with it the right to be called up to the senate. By increasing the number of quaestors, Sulla provided for the supply of ordinary vacancies in the senate and restricted the censors' freedom of choice in filling them up. Fragments of the lex Cornelia de XX quaestoribus survive. See C.I.L. i. 108; Bruns, Fontes juris Romani (ed. 6), p. 91.
316. Dio xxxvii. 57; Ps. Ascon. 102 (Orelli). He also increased their numbers; Livy, Epit. lxxxix.
317. He did propose to deprive several communities which had joined Cinna of the franchise, but the deprivation was not carried into effect; Cic. Pro domo, 30, 79.
318. The inadequacy of the comitia as a representative body was increased by the unequal distribution of the new citizens amongst the thirty-five tribes, each of which formed a single voting unit. Some tribes represented only a thinly populated district in the Campagna with one or two outlying communities, others included large and populous territories. See Mommsen, Staatsr. iii. 187; Hermes, xxii. 101 sqq.
319. Sulla does not appear to have passed any general municipal law; the necessary resettlement of the local constitutions after the Social War was seemingly carried out by commissioners. The fragment of a municipal charter found at Tarentum (Ephem. epigr. ix. 1, Dessau, Inscr. Lat. sel. 6086) is probably a specimen of such leges datae.
320. Sall. Cat. 11. “L. Sulla exercitum, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem majorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat.”
321. There was a lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis, but only two of its provisions are known; (1) that a magistrate sent out with the imperium should retain it till he re-entered the city (Cic. Ad Fam. i. 9, 25), a provision which increased rather than diminished his freedom of action; (2) that an outgoing governor should leave his province within thirty days after his successor's arrival (Cic. Ad Fam. iii. 6. 3). A lex Cornelia de majestate contained, it is true, a definition of treason evidently framed in the light of recent experience. The magistrate was forbidden “exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum injussu populi ac senatus accedere,” Cic. Pis. 21, 50. Sulla also added one to the long list of laws dealing with extortion in the provinces. But the danger lay, not in the want of laws, but in the want of security for their observance by an absolutely autocratic proconsul. The present writer cannot agree with those who would include among Sulla's laws one retaining consuls and praetors in Rome for their year of office and then sending them out to a province. This was becoming the common practice before 81. After 81 it is invariable for praetors, as needed for the judicial work, and invariable but for two exceptions in the case of consuls; but nowhere is there a hint that there had been any legislation on the subject, and there are indications that it was convenience and not law which maintained the arrangement. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iv. 118 sqq.; Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 518; cf. also Cic. Att. 8, 15; “consules, quibus more majorum concessum est vel omnes adire provincias.”
322. For this, the most lasting of Sulla's reforms, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iv. 127 q.; Rein, Criminal-Recht; Zumpt, Criminal-Prozess d. Römer; Greenidge, Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, p. 415 sqq.
323. Plut. Pomp. 17; Livy, Epit. xci. For Pompey's earlier life, see Pompey.
324. For the Slave War, see Spartacus.
325. The exact provisions of Pompey's law are nowhere given; Livy, Epit. xcvii., “tribuniciam potestatem restituerunt.” Cf. Vell. ii. 30. A lex Aurelia, in 75, had already repealed the law disqualifying a tribune for further office; Cic. Corn. fr. 78.
326. This was the work of L. Aurelius Cotta, praetor in this year. The judices were to be taken in equal proportions from senators, equites and tribuni aerarii. For the latter and for the law generally, see Lange, R. Alt. iii. 1935 Greenidge, Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, pp. 443 sqq.; and article Aerarium. Compare also Cicero's language, In Verr., Act. i. 1. The prosecution of Verres shortly preceded the lex Aurelia.
327. Livy, Epit. xcviii. Sixty-four senators were expelled. Cf. Plut. Pomp. 22.
328. Vell. ii. 31; Plut. Pomp. 23.
329. Plut. Pomp. 25; Dio xxxvi. 6; Livy, Epit. c.
330. Cic. Pro Lege Manilia; Dio xxxvi. 25; Plut. Pomp. 30.
331. See Pompey and Mithradates.
332. For his early life, see Caesar.
333. Prof. Beesly has vainly endeavoured to show that Catiline and not Caesar was the popular leader from 67 to 63. That this is the inference intentionally conveyed by Sallust, in order to screen Caesar, is true, but the inference is a false one.
334. The story is so told by Suetonius, Jul. 8. In Sallust, Cat. 18, it appears as an intrigue originating with Catiline, and Caesar's name is omitted.
335. Cic. Agr. ii. 6, 15, “nihil aliud actum nisi ut decem reges constituerentur.”
336. That Caesar and Crassus had supported Catiline for the consulship in 65 is certain, and they were suspected naturally enough of favouring his designs in 63, but their complicity is in the highest degree improbable.
337. Mommsen is throughout unfair to Cicero, as also are Drumann and Professor Beesly. The best estimates of Cicero's political position are those given by Mr Strachan-Davidson in his Cicero (1894), and by Professor Tyrrell in his Introductions to his edition of Cicero's Letters.
338. Cic. Ad Att. i. 19, 4, “noster exercitus . . . locupletium.”
339. Cic. Pro Sulla, 7, 22; Sall. Cat. 31, “inquilinus urbis Romae.”
340. See the De petitione consulatus, passim.
341. De Domo, 28, 75; Pro Plancio, 41, 97.
342. Cic. Pro Quinctio, 8, 31; Pro Cluentio, 46, 153.
343. Cic. In Verr. ii. 73; De Pet. Cons. i. He shared with them their dislike of Sulla, as the foe of their order; Pro Cluentio, 55, 151.
344. De Legg. iii. 12.
345. Pro Sestio, 65, 136; De Legg. iii. 4.
346. Pro Sestio, 45.
347. Ad Att. i. 18.
348. For the history of the next eighteen years, the most important ancient authority is Cicero in his letters and speeches.
349. Misleading, because the coalition was unofficial. The “triumvirs” of 43 were actual magistrates, “IIIviri reipublicae constituendae causa.”
350. For the lex Julia Agraria and the lex Campana, see Dio Cass. xxxviii. 1; App. B.C. ii. 10; Suet. Jul. 20; Cic. Ad Att. ii. 16, 18.
351. Suet. Jul. 22; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 8; App. B.C. ii. 13; Plut. Caes. 14.
352. Both laws were carried in the concilium plebis. The first merely reaffirmed the right of appeal, as the law of Gaius Gracchus had done. The second declared Cicero to be already by his own act in leaving Rome “interdicted from fire and water”—a procedure for which precedents could be quoted. Clodius kept within the letter of the law.
353. Cicero's speech Pro Sestio gives expression to these feelings; it contains a passionate appeal to all good citizens to rally round the old constitution. The acquittal of Sestius confirmed his hopes. See Ad Q. Fr. ii. 4.
354. Livy, Epit. cv.; Dio Cass. xxxix. 33. For Cicero's views, see Ep. ad Fam. i. 9; Ad Att. iv. 5.
355. A dictatorship was talked of in Rome; Plut. Pomp. 54; Cic. Ad Q. Fr. iii. 8. Cicero himself anticipated Augustus in his picture of a princeps civitatis sketched in a lost book of the De republica, written about this time, which was based upon his hopes of what Pompey might prove to be; Ad Att. viii. 11; August. De civ. Dei, v. 13.
356. Plut. Pomp. 54; App. B.C. ii. 24.
357. For the rights of the question involved in the controversy between Caesar and the senate, see Mommsen, Rechtsfrage zw. Caesar and d. Senat; Guiraud, Le Différend entre César et le Sénat (Paris, 1878), and the article Caesar.
358. Cicero severely censures Pompey for abandoning Italy, but strategically the move was justified by the fact that Pompey's strength lay in the East, where his name was a power, and in his control of the sea. Politically, however, it was a blunder, as it enabled Caesar to pose as the defender of Italy.
359. For the Civil Wars, see Caesar; Cicero; and Pompey.
360. On this, as on many other points connected with Caesar, divergence has here been ventured on from the views expressed by Mommsen in his brilliant chapter on Caesar (Hist. of Rome, bk. v. cap. xi.). Too much stress must not be laid on the gossip retailed by Suetonius as to Caesar's early intentions.
361. Cicero vividly expresses the revulsion of feeling produced by Caesar's energy, humanity and moderation on his first appearance in Italy. Compare Ad Att. vii. 11, with Ad Att. viii. 13.
362. Dio xli. 18.
363. App. ii. 48; Dio xli. 36.
364. Plut. Caes. 51; Suet. 38, “adsignavit agros, sed non continuous, ne quis possessorum expelleretur.” Cf. App. ii. 94.
365. For the lex Julia de pecuniis mutuis, see Suet. Jul. 42; Caesar, B.C. iii. 1; Dio xli. 37; App. ii. 48. The faeneratores were satisfied; Cic. Ad Fam. viii. 17. But the law displeased anarchists like M. Caelius Rufus and P. Cornelius Dolabella.
366. Suet. Jul. 42.
367. Ibid. 41; Dio xliii. 21.
368. Suet. Jul. 41; Dio xliii. 25.
369. Suet. Jul. 42, 43.
370. See Calendar; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, v. 438, and Fischer, Röm. Zeittafeln, 292 seq.
371. Plut. Caes. 35.
372. Dio xliii. 47.
373. Dio xliii. 44. For this use of the title Imperator, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome. v. 332, and note.
374. See Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, v. 333, and Ranke, Weltgeschichte, ii. 319 seq. According to Appian ii. 110, and Plutarch, Caes. 64, the title rex was only to be used abroad in the East, as likely to strengthen Caesar's position against the Parthians.
375. Cicero, Phil. i. 2, 4, praises Antony, “quum dictatoris nomen . . . propter perpetuae dictaturae recentem memoriam funditus ex republic sustulisset.”
376. For the long list of these, see Appian ii. 106; Dio xliii. 43-45; Plut. Caes. 57; Suet. Jul. 76. Cf. also Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, v. 329 ff.; Watson, Cicero's Letters, App. x.; Zumpt, Studia Romana, 199 seq. (Berlin, 1859).
377. Zumpt, Stud. Rom. 241; Suet. Jul. 76.
378. Cic. Ad Att. x. 8a.
379. Suet. Jul. 41, “Caesar dictator . . . commendo vobis illum et illum, ut vestro suffragio suam dignitatem teneant.”
380. Suet. Jul. 41, 76; Dio xliii. 47.
381. Dio xlii. 20.
382. Dio xliii. 14; Suet. Jul. 76. The statement is rejected by Mommsen; see Caesar.
383. Suet. Jul. 43, “jus laboriosissime ac severissime dixit.”
384. App. ii. 106; Dio xliii. 43.
385. Plut. Caes. 58, “συνάψαι τὸν κύκλον τῆς ἡγεμονίας”; Suet. Jul. 44; Dio xliii. 51.
386. Plut. Caes. 48; App. v. 4.
387. He limited the term of command to two years in consular and one year in praetorian provinces; Cicero, Phil. i. 8, 19; Dio xliii. 25.
388. Suet. Jul. 42; Cic. Ad. Att. xiv. 12.
389. Suet. Jul. 76.
390. Dio xli. 36; Tac. Ann. xi. 24.
391. Lex Julia municipalis; see Caesar.
392. For this period see Merivale, Romans under the Empire, vol. iii.; Lange, Röm. Alterth. iii. 506 seq.; Gardthausen, Augustus, bk. i.
393. The triumvirate was formally constituted in Rome (Nov. 27th) by a plebiscitum; App. iv. 7; Dio xlvi. 56, xlvii. 2; Livy, Epit. cxx., “ut IIIviri reipublicae constituendae per quinquennium essent.”
394. Dio xlviii. 54; App. v. 95. For the date, cf., Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 718.
395. Livy, Epit. cxx.; App. iv. 7; and article Cicero.
396. Dio xlvii. 35-49; App. iv. 87-138.
397. Vell. ii. 76; Dio xlviii, 28; App. v. 65.
398. For Antony's policy and schemes in the East, see Ranke, Weltgeschichte, ii. 381-85; Mommsen, Provinces of the Roman Empire, ii. p. 24 sqq.; Lange, Röm. Alterth. iii. 573 sqq.
399. Suet. Aug. 17; Dio l. 1-8; Plutarch, Anton. 53.
400. Dio li. 1; Zonaras x. 30.
401. He celebrated his triumph on the 13th, 14th and 15th of August; Dio li. 21; Livy, Epit. cxxxiii. For the closing of the temple of Janus, see Livy i. 19; Vell. ii. 38; Suet. Aug. 22.
402. Tac. Ann. i. 2, “cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.”
403. Suet. Aug. i. His grandfather was a citizen of Velitrae; “municipalibus magisteriis contentus.”
404. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 745 ff.; Mon. Ancyranum (ed. Mommsen, Berlin, 1883), vi. 13-23, pp. 144-53; Herzog, Gesch. u. System d. röm. Verfassung, ii. p. 126 sqq.
405. Tac. Ann. iii. 28, “sexto demum consulatu . . . quae IIIviratu jusserat abolevit, deditque jura quis pace et principe uteremur”; Ibid. i. 9, “non regno neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rempublicam.”
406. Mon. Anc. vi. 13.
407. Vell. ii. 89, “prisca et antiqua reipublicae forma revocata.”
408. Ovid, Fasti, i. 589. On a coin of Asia Minor Augustus is styled “libertatis P. R. vindex.” The 13th of January, 27 B.C., was marked in the calendar as the day on which the republic was restored (C.I.L. i. p. 384).
409. Dio Cassius describes Augustus as seriously contemplating abdication (lii. 1; liii. 1-11); cf. Suet. Aug. 28.
410. Suet. Aug. 52; Mon. Anc. i. 31.
411. Mon. Anc. vi. 16, 21-23.
412. The explanation of princeps as an abbreviated form of princeps senatus is quite untenable. For its real significance, see Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 774; Pelham, Journ. of Phil. vol. viii. It is not an official title.
413. Mon. Anc. 6, 14, “per consensus universorum.”
414. Dio liii. 12; Suet. Aug. 47.
415. Dio, l.c.
416. He was offered the dictatorship, a life-consulship, a “cura legum et morum.” It is stated by Suetonius (Aug. 53) and Dio (liv. 10) that he accepted the last named; but this is disproved by his own language in the Mon. Anc. (i. 31); cf. Pelham, Journ. of Philol. xvii. 47.
417. Dio liii. 32. Part of the law by which the rights essential to the principate were conferred upon Vespasian is extant; see Rushforth, Latin Historical Inscriptions, No. 70 (the Lex de imperio Vespasiani).
418. Tac. Ann. i. 81.
419. Lex de imperio, ll. 17-21.
420. The term proconsulare imperium, which we find used, e.g., by Tacitus, was not employed in republican times, and Augustus himself speaks of his consulare imperium (Mon. Anc. 2, 5, 8).
421. Tac. Ann. iii. 56; “summi fastigii vocabulum.”
422. Mon. Anc. Graec. 3, 19.
423. Tac. Ann. i. 3 (of Tiberius), “collega imperii, consors tribuniciae potestatis”; cf. Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 1160.
424. Suet. Aug. 31.
425. Mon. Anc. 1, 32; Dio liv. 1.
426. See Hirschfeld, Verwaltungsgesch. i. 173.
427. Dio liii. 13, 16.
428. Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 1143.
429. The plebiscita of Claudius, Tac. Ann. xi. 13, 14, and the lex agraria of Nerva; Digest, xlvii. 21, 3; Dio lxviii. 2; Plin. Epp. vii. 31.
430. On these rights, the latter of which was not exercised in the case of the consulship until the close of Nero's reign, see Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 916-28; Tac. Ann. i. 14, 15, 81; Suet. Aug. 56; Dio lviii. 20.
431. Tac. Ann. i. 15, “comitia e campo ad patres translata sunt”; compare Ann. xiv. 28. The magistracy directly referred to is the praetorship, but that the change affected the lower magistracies also is certain; see, e.g., Pliny's Letters, passim, especially iii. 20, vi. 19.
432. Plin. Paneg. 92.
433. Gaius i. 5, “cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat.”
434. On the permission to use the ornamenta consularia, praetoria, &c., see Mommsen, Staatsr. i. 455 sqq.; Suet. Jul. 76; Claud. v. 24; Tac.Ann. xii. 21, xv. 72; Dio Cass. lx. 8. Cf. also Friedländer, i. 691.
435. For a consular senatorial province and for the more important of the imperial legateships.
436. Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 82 sqq. Six months was the usual term down to the death of Nero; we have then four or two months; in the 3rd century two is the rule. The consuls who entered on office on the 1st of January were styled consules ordinarii, and gave their name to the year, whilst the others were distinguished as consules suffecti or minores; Dio Cass. xlviii. 35.
437. Plin. Paneg. 92; Tac. Hist. i. 1, Agric. 44.
438. Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 225.
439. Plin. Epp. i. 23, “inanem umbram et sine honore nomen.” There are a few instances of the exercise by the tribunes of their power of interference within the senate; Tac. Ann. i. 77, vi. 47, xvi. 26; Plin. Epp. ix. 13.
440. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 567-69. Pliny was himself “quaestor Caesaris,” Epp. vii. 16.
441. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 842; Tac. Ann. xii. 69, Hist. i. 47. In the 3rd century the honours, titles and powers were conferred en bloc by a single decree; Vit. Sev. Alex. 1.
442. Gaius i. 4; Ulpian, Dig. i. 3, 9.
443. Under Domitian; Dio Cass. lxvii. 2. Even Septimius Severus caused a decree to be passed “ne liceret imperatori inconsulto senatu occidere senatorem”; Vita Severi, 7.
444. Suet. Nero, 10, Vesp. 17.
445. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 939 sqq. The power was derived from the censorial authority. Domitian was censor for life; Suet. Dom. 8. After Nerva it was exercised as falling within the general authority vested in the princeps; Dio liii. 17.
446. Suet. Vesp. 90; Tac. Ann. iii. 55.
447. See on this point Friedländer, Sittengeschichte Roms, i. 237 sqq.
448. Mon. Ancyr. Gr. iv. 3, πρῶτον ἀξιώματος τόπον.
449. Lex de imp. Vesp., C.I.L. vi. 930: “Senatum habere, relationem facere, remittere; Scta. per relationem discessionemque facere.”
450. Vit. Hadr. 22; “Juridici” were appointed by Marcus Aurelius, Vit. Ant. 11; Marquardt i. 224.
451. On the growth of the imperial bureaucracy see Hirschfeld, Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian (1905).
452. For the position of the imperial freedmen under Claudius, see Friedländer i. 88 sqq.; Tac. Ann. xii. 60, xiv. 39, Hist. ii. 57, 95.
453. Acta Fr. Arval. (ed. Henzen), 33, 98, 99.
454. For Caesar-worship, see Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 755 sqq.; Wissowa, Religion und Kultus der Römer, p. 283 sqq., and Kornemann in Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, i.
455. See Rushforth, Roman Historical Inscriptions, Nos. 38 sqq. and notes.
456. Marquardt i. 257; Mommsen, Provinces, i. 64.
457. Marquardt i. 264; Mommsen, Provinces, i. 84. seq.
458. See especially Mommsen, Provinces, i. caps. 4 and 6.
459. Mommsen, Provinces, cap. 9. Armenia, however, long continued to be a debatable ground between Rome and Parthia—passing alternately under the influence of one or the other.
460. For the provincial reforms of Augustus, see Marquardt, Staatsverw., i. 544 sqq.
461. Marquardt, ii. 204 sqq.; Hirschfeld, Verwaltungsbeamten, 55 sqq.
462. Tac. Ann. ii. 47.
463. Suet. Aug. 18, 47.
464. Jung, Die romanischen Landschaften (Innsbruck, 1881); Budinsky, Die Ausbreitung d. lateinischen Sprache (Berlin, 1881).
465. The praefectus urbi, unlike the other imperial prefects, was always a senator. He commanded the three cohortes urbanae, which preserved order in the city, and possessed a power of jurisdiction which tended to increase in importance. The office, which was only temporary under Augustus, became a permanent one under his successor.
466. Besides the cohortes urbanae mentioned above, the nine regiments of the imperial guard (cohortes praetorianae) were quartered in Rome. The guards were not at first concentrated but billeted in Rome and the neighbouring towns; the praetorian barracks on the Esquiline were built under Tiberius (Tac. Ann. iv. 2). Augustus also formed the quasi-military police force of the vigiles (in seven cohorts), which performed the duties of a fire brigade and night watch. Police duties in those parts of Italy which were subject to brigandage were performed by stationes militum (Suet. Aug. 32).
467. For an estimate of the Julio-Claudian Caesars, based on the results of recent research, see Pelham in Quarterly Review (April 1905). It is now generally admitted that Tacitus's picture is overdrawn.
468. On the limes imperii, see Pelham, “A Problem of Roman Frontier Policy” (Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 1906), and Kornemann, “Die neueste Limesforschung” (Klio, 1907, pp. 73 ff.). The limes connecting the Rhine with the Danube has been systematically excavated in recent years; for the results see Der obergermanisch-rätische Limes (Heidelberg, 1894- ), and Der römische Limes in Österreich (Vienna, 1900- ).
469. Marquardt, i. 132 ff.; cf. especially the leges Salpensanae et Malacitanae; Bruns, Fontes Juris Romani (ed. 6, p. 142).
470. Dio lxxvii. 9 (A.D. 212).
471. For the use of adlectio see Mommsen, Staatsr. ii. 877.
472. Vit. Hadr. 21. Besides Hirschfeld's Verwaltungsbeamten reference may be made to Liebenam, Die Laufbahn der Procuratoren (Jena, 1886), and Schurz, De mutationibus in imperio Romano ordinando ab imperatore Hadriano factis (Bonn, 1883).
473. This led to the appointment of the curatores and correctores in the 2nd century. The younger Pliny was one of these imperial commissioners, and his correspondence with Trajan throws much light on the condition of the provinces.
474. Provinces, i. p. 5.
475. Immense fortunes were accumulated under the early empire, especially by imperial freedmen, such as Pallas, who is said to have possessed the equivalent of £3,000,000 sterling; and there were instances of extravagant luxury, which was encouraged by Nero. But we are told that there was a return to simpler habits of life under the Flavian dynasty.
476. Quintilian occupied the chair of Latin rhetoric, and received the ornamenta consularia.
477. The massacre of the slaves of Pedanius Secundus, who had been murdered by some person unknown (Tac. Ann. xiv. 42), was, it is true, decreed by the senate; but it was a highly unpopular act, and is chiefly significant as showing that the senatorial aristocracy was out of harmony with the spirit of the time.
478. Gibbon (ed. Bury), i. chap. v.; Schiller, Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit, i. (2) 660.
479. The common soldier was now permitted to marry, and ceased to live in camp (Herodian iii. 8. 5).
480. Gibbon, i. chap. x.; Mommsen, Provinces, i. 164; Schiller, i. (2) 827.
481. Gibbon, i. chap. x.; Mommsen, Provinces, ii. 103; cf. Palmyra.
482. See Gibbon (ed. Bury), ii. chap. xvii. 158 ff.; Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. pp. 81, 336, 337, ii. 217 seq,; Madvig, Verf. d. Röm. Reichs, i. 585; Böcking, Notitia dignitatum (Bonn, 1853); Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders (ed. 2), bk. i. chap. xii.; Preuss, Diocletian (Leipzig, 1869); Seeck, Untergang der antiken Welt, vols. i., ii. (1897-1902).
483. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, ii. 1168 seq. Verus was associated with Marcus Aurelius as Augustus; Severus gave the title to his two sons. The bestowal of the title “Caesar” on the destined successor dates from Hadrian. Mommsen, op. cit. 1139.
484. The division was as follows:—(1) Diocletian—Thrace, Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor; (2) Maximian—Italy and Africa; (3) Galerius—Illyricum and the Danube; (4) Constantius—Britain, Gaul, Spain. See Gibbon, i. 354; Aurelius Victor, c. 39.
485. Aurel. Victor, 39; Eutrop. ix. 26.
486. Marquardt, Staatsverw. i. 233 ff. Italy, together with Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, was divide into 17 provinciae. Each had its own governor; the governors were subject to the two vicarii (vic. urbis, vic. Italiae), and they in turn to the prefect of Italy, whose prefecture, however, included as well Africa and Western Illyricum.
487. The seats of government for Diocletian and his three colleagues were Mediolanum, Augusta Trevirorum, Sirmium, Nicomedia.
488. For these last, see Gibbon, ii. chap. xvii. p. 188; cf. also Notitia Dignitatum and Böcking's notes.
489. At first the number of these varied and there was no fixed division of provinces between them; but by the close of the 4th century there were four prefectures, viz. Oriens, Illyricum, Italia, Gallia, to which must be added the prefectures of Rome and Constantinople. See Mommsen in Hermes, xxxvi. 204 ff.
490. There were 12 dioceses and 101 provinces; cf., in addition to the authorities mentioned above, Bethmann-Hollweg, Civil-Prozess, iii.; Kuhn, Die städtische und bürgerliche Verfassung des römischen Reichs (1877).
491. The army was completely remodelled, and the old frontier garrisons (now called Limitanei) were supplemented by a field force attached to the persons of the Augusti and Caesares, and hence called Comitatenses. The change was accompanied by the subdivision of the old legions into units of about 2000 men. For these reforms see Seeck, Untergang der antiken Welt, bk. iii. chap. V.; Mommsen in Hermes, xxiv. 225 ff.
492. The grades were as follows: illustres, spectabiles, clarissimi, perfectissimi, egregii. For the other insignia, see Madvig, ii. 590, and the Notitia Dignitatum.
493. In especial against the overweening influence of the eunuchs, an influence at once greater and more pernicious than even that of the imperial freedmen in the days of Claudius.
494. The son of Valentinian and ruler of the West.
495. F. Dill, Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire (2nd ed., 1899).
496. Eumenius, Paneg. Vet. vii.
497. Gibbon ii. 179.
498. For the Bagaudae, see Jung, Die romanischen Landschaften, p. 264, where the authorities are given.
499. In 387; Hodgkin i. 483.
500. Amm. Marc. xiv. 4.
501. Amm. Marc. xv. 5.
502. Hodgkin op. cit. i. 661.
503. For the treatment of Rome by Alaric, see Hodgkin i. 798; Gibbon iii. 321 sqq.; Ranke iv. 246. Allowance must be made for the exaggerations of the ecclesiastical writers.
504. For these tyrants, see Freeman in the Eng. Hist. Rev. i. 53-86.
505. The capital of the new state was Tolosa (Toulouse).
506. Jung, Die Romanischen Landschaften, 73 seq.
507. For the connexion between his movement and those of Alaric and of the Vandals, see Hodgkin i. 711; Gibbon iii. 262 seq.
508. The Roman troops were withdrawn from Britain by Constantine in 407; Mommsen, Chron. min. i. 465.
509. Hodgkin vol. ii. bk. iii. chap. ii.; Gibbon ii. 400 sqq.; Jung, 183. The leading ancient authority is Procopius. See Ranke iv. (2) 285; Papencordt, Gesch. d. Vandal. Herrschaft in Africa.
510. Prosper 659; Ranke iv. (1) 282.
511. For the battle of Châlons, see Gibbon iv. 464; Hodgkin ii. 124 n. 6, 143, where the topography is discussed.
512. Majorian was the last Roman emperor who appeared in person in Spain and Gaul.
513. Hodgkin ii. 520.
514. The nationality of Odoacer is a disputed point. Hodgkin ii. 516; Ranke iv. (1) 372.
515. Gibbon iv. 50 seq. The authority for the embassy to Zeno is Maichus (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. iv. 119).
516. Gibbon iv. 54 seq.; Jung 66 seq.; Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 24-33. See also Roman Law.
517. For these writers see further under Annalists and Livy.
518. Caelius's work dealt only with the Second Punic War.
519. The Jewish Antiquities and Jewish War of Josephus (q.v.), composed under the Flavian dynasty, are of great value for the events of the writer's time.
520. The Histories (A.D. 69–96) were written before the Annals.
521. Gregorovius, Geschichte, vol. ii. pp. 427-28 and note (2nd ed.).