A manual of moral theology for English-speaking countries/Book 4
BOOK IV
ON SIN
PART I
ON SIN IN GENERAL
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF SIN
I. A SIN is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God. For a bad human act is a disturbance of right order either because in itself it is against right reason, as murder or suicide, or because it is against the command of a legitimate superior, which imposes a strict obligation, and which right reason bids us obey. But such a disturbance of right order is against the law of God.
Every voluntary act against right reason is an offence against God and a sin, for although the sinner in committing sin does not always think explicitly of God, yet he always apprehends that he is doing a wrong action, an action which his conscience condemns, and in the condemnation of conscience is implicitly contained the condemnation of God himself.
A sin must be distinguished from an imperfection, which is either negative or positive. A negative imperfection is merely the omission of a good action which is not of precept; and such an omission when grace moves one to perform the act, though not a sin, yet is a falling short of the perfection which was within one's reach. A positive imperfection is a violation of God's will made known to us, but which does not strictly oblige us. God wishes a religious to observe his rule, but frequently this does not bind under sin. A positive imperfection, then, is a falling short not only of the perfection which was offered to us and which we might have had, but also of that which God wished us to have, though he did not oblige us to have it.
2. Sin in the sense defined is called actual sin; habitual sin is the state which follows the commission of actual sin until this be forgiven.
A formal sin is committed knowingly and wilfully; a material sin is committed without knowledge or free consent.
Sin is said to be against God, our neighbour, or ourself, as it is against some virtue which immediately regards God, or our neighbour, or ourself. All sin is ultimately against God.
Sins of ignorance are committed through culpable ignorance; sins of infirmity through passion or bad habit; sins of malice with cool deliberation and forethought. The last, as is obvious, are the least excusable.
A sin of commission is an act against a negative precept; a sin of omission is the wilful neglect of a positive precept.
The meaning of the terms sins of thought, word, and deed, is obvious.
3. To commit sin there must be actual advertence to the malice of the action done, either when the action is performed, or when the cause is put. This follows from what was said above about human acts, which must be voluntary either in themselves or at any rate in their cause. But no act is voluntary without previous knowledge and advertence. It is not sufficient, then, for sin that a man could physically advert to the wrongfulness of his action, and should have done so; if there was no advertence, either at the time of the action or when its cause was put, there is no sin. However, advertence to what is likely to follow when the cause is put is sufficient to contract the malice of sin; and so wrong done through wilful negligence, or passion, or habit, or carelessness, is imputable to the agent.
Advertence to an evil thought or motion does not constitute sin without free consent of the will. The will consents when it voluntarily accepts an evil suggestion presented by the mind, and it is immaterial whether the evil originates in the will, or whether the will accedes to evil when suggested to it from without. For sin, then, there must be both advertence to the evil and free consent to it; a man who takes another's money, thinking it to be his own, does not commit theft, nor does the kleptomaniac who is powerless to refrain.
CHAPTER II
THE GRAVITY OF SIN
I. WITH reference to the gravity of its malice, sin is divided into mortal and venial. Holy Scripture teaches us that there are certain sins which exclude from the kingdom of God, [1] and, on the other hand, that the just, even while they remain just, frequently fall into slight faults. [2] The same truth is taught by the Church. [3] There are, then, mortal and venial sins.
The essence of mortal sin consists in turning aside from God, our last end, and virtually placing our supreme happiness in some created good. But our last end is the vital and guiding principle of moral conduct, and to throw that aside is to make complete shipwreck of the moral life. It is not merely to wander out of the direct path, as is done by committing venial sin; however much this is done, if the ship be kept moving toward the port, it will come to harbour at last; but if the ship be steered altogether away from the port, it will never get there. By committing mortal sin, then, we turn away from God, our last end; we rob our souls of the sanctifying grace of God which is their life, and we incur liability to eternal separation from God and punishment in hell. Venial sin is indeed an offence against God, but it does not turn the soul away from him, nor rob it of his sanctifying grace; and it is more easily pardoned than mortal sin.
2. Mortal sin is sin in the fullest and most complete sense; it is an act of consummate wickedness. A bad act must have three conditions in order to be mortally sinful:
(a) There must be full advertence to the grave malice of the act. A child that has not yet attained the full use of reason, a person half asleep, or half drunk, or half-witted, cannot know and appreciate sufficiently the malice of mortal sin, and so cannot commit it. It is not, however, necessary to reflect explicitly on God; or on the grave wickedness contained in the act in order to sin mortally. It will be sufficient if one who has the full use of reason consciously does what he knows to be seriously wrong, although there is no actual weighing of motives for doing or avoiding the act, no actual thought of God, no explicit calling to mind of the terrible consequences of mortal sin. Men who never think of God from morning till night, men who do not believe in hell, certainly commit mortal sins when they do what their consciences tell them is seriously wrong. Their conscience, as we saw above, is the voice of God.
(b) Besides advertence of the mind to the malice of the act, there must be full and free consent of the will to do it. If a man does not give full consent, but only dallies with the temptation, there is venial but not mortal sin; if, through being only half conscious or partially deranged, he has not full control over his will, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin.
After a temptation to sin is over, the conscience is sometimes uncertain and troubled as to whether full consent was given to sin. Often one may form one's conscience on the point by reflecting whether he was fully awake or conscious of what he was doing, whether the sinful act to which temptation impelled him was executed if there was the opportunity of doing so. If doubt remains, it should be settled by presumptions drawn from what usually happens. If he usually yields to such temptations, the presumption is that he did so on this doubtful occasion; the presumption is in his favour if he does not usually yield consent.
(c) The object or the matter to which consent is given must be seriously against the moral law in order that a sin may be mortal.
The matter is serious as a rule when the sin committed is directly against our duty to God, as blasphemy, heresy, hatred of God, idolatry, despair of God's mercy.
The matter is also serious when the sin causes great harm to our neighbour, as do sins against justice, charity, and obedience.
When sins cause great harm to the sinner himself the matter will also be serious and the sins mortal. This is the case with sins of intemperance and lust.
3. Some grievous sins are always mortal if there be full advertence and consent in the act. They do not admit parvity of matter, as theologians say. On the other hand, some sins, which if the matter be serious are mortal, become venial when the matter is light; sins against justice and charity are of this kind. It is a mortal sin to steal ten pounds, it is a venial sin to steal a penny. Some sins are of their nature venial, and only become mortal when they contract some special malice from the circumstances. Fidelity to a simple promise binds under pain of venial sin, but when the promise is bilateral and the matter serious, as in espousals, it binds under grave sin and in justice.
4. From what has been said about mortal sin, it will be clear that a sin will be venial if anyone of the three conditions required for mortal sin be wanting.
5. Mortal sin may in certain circumstances become venial, and, on the contrary, venial sin may become mortal. The following paragraphs will make this clear:
(a) Mortal sin may become venial on account of an erroneous conscience which wrongly judges a grave sin to be only venial.
(b) The same may happen on account of imperfect advertence or imperfect consent to an act which in itself is gravely sinful. '
On the other hand, a venial sin may become mortal:
(a) On account of an erroneous conscience which falsely judges a venial sin to be mortal.
(b) On account of a gravely sinful intention with which a venial sin is committed, as when a lie is told in order to commit adultery.
(c) On account of the proximate danger to which one is exposed of committing grave sin, as when one reads a slightly indecent book, but foreseeing that it will be the proximate occasion of grave sin.
(d) On account of grave scandal caused by venial sin.
(e) When light matter coalesces and becomes grave by additions, as when one who is bound to fast frequently in the day takes small quantities of food, which are notable in the aggregate; or when a considerable amount of money is stolen in small thefts.
Although no mere multiplication of venial sins can ever amount to a mortal sin, yet venial sin frequently committed disposes the soul to commit mortal sin both directly and indirectly. Directly, by forming a habit which becomes stronger and stronger, continually requiring greater indulgence for its satisfaction, and finally leads to mortal sin. This is often seen in such sins as theft and lust. Indirectly, because venial sin familiarizes the soul with wrongdoing, lessens the fear of God in the soul, diminishes the fervour of charity, and causes God to withhold those more abundant graces which he would otherwise give, and which would preserve the soul from sin, but without which the soul falls grievously.
6. To deliberate whether we shall commit mortal sin or not, weighing the reasons on either side, is itself a grievous sin. It is against the precept of charity, by which we are obliged ever to cling unswervingly to God; it is a grievous injury to God, as if a subject were seriously to deliberate whether he should or should not be faithful to his king and country.
7. In this chapter we have for the most part kept in view the objective malice of sin. As a rule, the confessor should judge of sins confessed according to the objective malice, but he will, of course, bear in mind that the subjective malice of sin may be very different from the objective. The subjective malice of sin will depend upon the degree of instruction and knowledge, the graces which the sinner had received, the violence of the temptation to which he was subjected, whether he was influenced by habit, perhaps unconsciously formed, or whether he was the subject of hereditary tendency, and many other considerations. It is obvious that the question of subjective malice must be generally left to the infinite knowledge of God, who alone sees and penetrates the inmost recesses of the heart.
CHAPTER III
ON DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SINS
I. THE Council of Trent teaches [4] that all Catholics are bound by divine law to confess to a priest all the mortal sins into which they may have fallen after baptism. A confession of sin in general terms will not suffice, but as far as is possible the confession must be integral that is, each and every mortal sin must be confessed according to number and species. The confessor, then, must know when this duty is sufficiently fulfilled, or he must know how to distinguish the different species of sin. To enable him to do this, theologians have formulated three rules, of which sometimes one, sometimes another, is more serviceable for determining the species of any particular sin.
2. RULE I - Sins differ specifically according as their formal object differs. This rule is merely an application of the universal principle that acts are specified by their formal objects. Sins are bad human acts, and so, as we saw when treating of human acts, their formal object gives them their specific moral quality. The formal, not the material, object specifies the sin that is, the object, inasmuch as it is morally wrong, causes the will which tends to it to be a vicious will in a certain definite way. And so adultery is a specifically different sin from fornication, because in the former case right order is doubly violated in a way that does not belong to fornication.
3. RULE II - Sins are specifically different according as they are opposed to specifically different virtues. The reason of this rule is fundamentally the same as that of the former, for virtues are specifically distinguished according to their acts, and acts are specifically distinguished according to their formal objects. And so, inasmuch as charity is a different virtue from justice, hatred, as being opposed to charity, is a specifically distinct sin from theft or detraction, which are against justice.
4. RULE III - Those sins are specifically distinct which are transgressions of formally distinct laws.
Laws, however, are formally distinct not because they are made by different authorities; the same sin of theft is against the natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law. But when the motives of two laws are different, and the legislators wished to impose on their subjects the obligation of the special motive which they had in view, the laws will be specifically different, and sins against them will be specifically distinct. Thus the Church commands her children to abstain from flesh meat on Fridays, in order to exercise themselves in the virtue of temperance by curbing their appetite; she forbids anyone to receive Holy Communion who has not been fasting from midnight, out of reverence to the Blessed Sacrament; these two laws, then, are formally different laws, and violations of them are specifically distinct sins. Sometimes the Church, in forbidding an action, does not choose to clothe her precept with the obligation of the motive which induced her to make the law, and then violations of the law will be simply sins of disobedience. Thus bad books are frequently forbidden with a view to safeguarding the faith, but one who reads such books unlawfully does not thereby and necessarily sin against the faith.
CHAPTER IV
THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS
I. IF a man steals five pounds from A on one day, and another five pounds from B the day after, he commits two distinct sins of theft. There is no difficulty about such cases. But how many sins does a man commit who, with the intention of seducing a woman, begins with bad talk, immodest looks and touches, and finally attains his end? Or how many sins are committed by one who is almost all day long occupied with bad desires, which are, however, interrupted by his taking his meals and by other occupations? Or how many sins does he commit who sets fire to a building where a dozen people were asleep who all perished in the flames? In order to decide as far as possible such difficult questions as these, and enable penitents to confess the number of their sins according to the divine precept, theologians have drawn up the following rules:
2. RULE I - There are as many sins as there are total objects in sinful actions. By total object is meant an object of the will which either in itself or by the intention of the agent forms a complete whole, and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. Thus the theft of a sum of money is a complete whole in itself, and forms a total object of the will. Immodest touches may form a complete whole if the intention be restricted to them without an idea of going farther; but if immodest touches are intended as a means to commit further sin, they form one complete whole with the subsequent sin, and make one sin with it.
The reason of the rule is clear from what has been said before. The object specifies the act, and if there be one whole object from a moral point of view, there will be one complete moral action and one sin.
3. RULE II - There are as many sins as there are moral interruptions in the sinful act. We say " moral interruptions " because the laws for confession are to be understood according to the common estimation of ordinary men, not according to the subtle distinctions of the philosopher. And so, if common sense tells us that on account of some interruption in the course of a bad desire, there are two human [acts, and not |one continuous action, there will be two sins and not one. However, the main difficulty in this question is to decide what moral interruption is sufficient and necessary to break the moral continuity in an action and to multiply the sin.
It is clear that if a person gives up his sinful design, and then returns to it again, there will be a break of continuity, and two distinct sins. Moreover, without explicitly relinquishing his evil design, there may be such an interruption in entertaining it that when it is taken up again there will be a new action and a distinct sin. The interval which is necessary for such an interruption will vary according to the nature of the act and the circumstances.
(a) In merely internal sins of thought, any complete cessation from the bad thought would seem to be sufficient to interrupt the moral continuity of the action and to multiply the sin. However, if the interval is short, and the thoughts proceed from the same impulse of passion, or one depends on another and issues from it, the moral unity will not be broken, and there will be only one sin.
(b) A determinate purpose to commit an external sin murder, for example is not multiplied by ordinary interruptions demanded by sleep, meals, or daily occupations. Such a purpose, persevered in for a week or so, would constitute only one sin. The same would hold for a longer period if the purpose were renewed at short intervals, and never retracted. If, however, it were not renewed within a short interval, mere lapse of time would eventually cause the purpose to evaporate and cease to exist, so that renewal of the purpose after a considerable interval would constitute a new and distinct sin.
It is very difficult to define precisely what interval of time would be required to break the moral continuity of the act. Much depends upon circumstances; a longer interval would be required when the act was not renewed through forgetfulness, or because no occasion of renewal presented itself; a shorter would suffice if the ceasing to entertain the sinful purpose were voluntary. No better rule can be given than that the question of time must be left to the judgement of a prudent man.
(c) If the purpose to commit sin is from time to time externalized by the taking of some means to the end in view, the act remains one and the same for a long interval of time, and such a purpose entertained for months and years under those circumstances would constitute only one sin. Similarly a purpose persevered in for years not to pay a debt that is owing constitutes only one sin, though, of course, it is more grievous the longer it is entertained.
4. It is a disputed point among theologians whether a sinful act which is directed to many distinct objects is only one or many sins. An example will illustrate the difficulty. If an anarchist throws a bomb into a crowd of people and kills a score of them, does he commit a score of distinct sins of murder which must be mentioned in confession if he goes to confession, or does he commit only one big sin, whose malice indeed equals twenty, but which is adequately confessed by saying, " I killed a number of people by throwing a bomb "? It will not suffice to say, " I committed homicide," for that would mean the taking of one life only, which was not precisely what was done.
In this controverted question it would seem better to distinguish, and say that if the objects were capable of being grouped together and actually were conceived as one object by the mind, there was one act and one sin. If, however, the criminal distinctly thought of the several objects and intended to kill each and all, there will be as many sins as there are distinct objects. A priest who, when starting for a fortnight's holiday, intends to omit his breviary during the whole time, commits one big sin; but if he executes his design, he commits a new sin every day that he neglects his duty, for the Office of each day forms one total object, and the precept of saying the divine Office is virtually multiple, and falls on each and every day.
5. If the means used to commit a sin are themselves evil and of the same species as the sin, and if they can be regarded as parts of one total object, as, for example, immodest talk and touches with a view to fornication, such means need not be distinctly confessed, as we saw above. If, however, the evil means are of a different species from the sinful end, as, for example, lying in order to commit a theft, the evil means are a separate sin, and must be distinctly confessed. If the means used to commit a sin are not in themselves sinful, they need not be confessed, unless the end was not attained, and in that case it will be sufficient to express in general terms in confession the use of means to give effect to a sinful purpose, by saying, for example, " I tried to commit theft," if the intending thief merely entered a house, but failed to effect his design.
PART II
ON CERTAIN KINDS OF SINS
CHAPTER I
ON SINS OF THOUGHT
I. THERE are as many kinds of bad thoughts as there are different kinds of sin, but for the purpose of this chapter they are commonly reduced by theologians to two kinds: bad desires and morose pleasure in evil imaginations. Desire, therefore, is here understood in a wide sense and comprises a longing, a wish, purpose, or intention of doing something wrong. Morose pleasure is voluntary joy, delight, and satisfaction in an evil imagination, and what is said about it is also applicable to voluntary sadness and sorrow on account of something good, which should cause the opposite sentiments.
Desires are efficacious when there is the intention of taking the necessary means to obtain what is desired; they are inefficacious or conditional when this is not the case.
2. An efficacious desire of doing what is wrong is a sin of the same kind as the external action would be; it contracts the malice of the object and of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is plain. The external action in the concrete with all its circumstances is the object to which the will tends in forming an efficacious desire; and as an act is specified by its object, the evil desire belongs to the same species of sin to which the external act would belong when performed in the circumstances contemplated.
The same must be said of inefficacious or conditional desires, unless the condition takes away all the malice of the act, as it frequently may do. There is no harm, for example, in saying, " I should like to eat meat on a Friday, unless the Church forbade it "; and the same is true generally whenever the condition, "if it were lawful," is annexed to a merely positive prohibition. If this condition is annexed to a- desire against the natural law, as " I should like to steal if it were lawful," or " I should like to commit fornication if it were not forbidden," the condition does not remove all the malice of the vicious will, for the very tendency of the will toward such objects is against right reason. Such conditional desires, then, are sinful, unless they indicate a mere propensity towards such sins without any voluntary affection of the will. In any case, however, they are dangerous, and should not be indulged or expressed.
3. Morose pleasure in the imagination of what is evil is what ordinary Catholics mean by a bad thought in the restricted sense. It is sinful when voluntary, for it is an approbation, a satisfaction in what is wrong; it is an act of the will which is specified by a bad object, and so it derives its special character and malice from the object. To take pleasure, then, in the thought of revenge, is a different sin from taking pleasure in the thought of adultery.
There is a difference, however, between the source of the malice of evil desires and of morose pleasures. We have seen that evil desires contract all the malice of the object and of its circumstances. Morose pleasure, too, contracts the malice of its object and of any circumstance which is a motive of the pleasure, but not of other circumstances which may belong to the object in the concrete. For the will in morose pleasure tends to the object not as it exists in the concrete with all its circumstances, but as it is represented in the imagination, and precisely in so far as the object thus represented allures the appetite. Morose pleasure, then, takes its malice from the object, but not from all the circumstances of the object.
Taking pleasure in an evil imagination must be distinguished from taking pleasure in the thought of sin. It is not sinful to take pleasure in thinking about pride, for example, and trying to penetrate its malice. Knowledge naturally gives pleasure and in itself is not sinful. But it is dangerous to think about some sins, about sins of lust or revenge, for example, and on account of the danger it is wrong to think about sins of the flesh without good reason. Thinking about such sins with good and sufficient reason is not sinful, for the danger of sin is not sin, and it may be neglected for sufficient cause; if there is not sufficient reason and the danger of consent is small, it will be a venial sin; if the danger of consent be proximate and the matter grave, the sin will be mortal.
4. Morose pleasure in certain definite sins of one's past life has for its object the sins as they were actually committed with all their circumstances, and so it will be infected with all the malice of the circumstances. Morose pleasure in past sins is thus similar in its malice to evil desires, and on this account obtains the special name of " joy " in theology. A penitent who has been guilty of this sin should say what sins they were whose remembrance gave him pleasure.
5. Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in the thought of what is allowed to married people, for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensual appetite and this causes temptation and sin.
6. It is not sinful to take pleasure in a good result which followed from some evil, as, for example, in the good results of a war or of a revolution. We may lawfully rejoice in the death of someone who was causing great harm to public morality, or to the public good in general, not precisely because he is dead, but for the reason that the cause of public harm is removed. We prefer the public good to the good of the individual, especially if he is doing harm. In this connection mention may be made of certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the following is a specimen: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice that he killed his father in a drunken fit on account of the great wealth to which he has thereby succeeded." It is obvious that such joy is morally wrong, for the act of parricide was at any rate materially wrong even when committed while drunk, and joy on account of what was, and is, wrong is unlawful; nor does succession to the father's wealth, a good of a lower order than human life, especially a father's life, furnish a just cause for such unfilial rejoicing.
7. As it is unlawful to take pleasure in evil, so it is sinful to entertain voluntary sadness on account of good. To be sorry, therefore, for what is good and matter of precept is a mortal or a venial sin according as the precept binds under mortal or venial sin; and so a reprobate sins grievously who laments the years that he spent in leading a virtuous life. Even though the good be not matter of precept, as, for example, the vows of religion, it is irrational and at least venially sinful to be sorry for having taken them; it will be grievously sinful if it leads to the danger of transgressing them.
On the questioning of penitents concerning bad thoughts, see Genicot, i, n. 175.
CHAPTER II
THE CAPITAL VICES
THEOLOGIANS divide the chief vices to which human nature is subject into seven heads or capital sins, as they are called. The name implies that they are the source and origin of many more, inasmuch as the inordinate love of any temporal good is apt to give rise to many inordinate ways of pursuing it. The seven capital sins are: Pride, Covetousness, Lust, Anger, Envy, Sloth, Gluttony.
1
On Pride
1. Pride is the inordinate love of our own pre-eminence. There is a tendency deeply seated in human nature, which arises from the self-love which is innate in every man, and which leads him to prefer himself to others, to wish to lord it over them, and to bear with impatience the yoke of subjection to authority. Truth requires that we should look upon any qualities and gifts that we possess as coming to us from the bounty and goodness of God, and as giving us no right to exalt ourselves above others who have received similar or even greater benefits from the generosity of our common Father. Pride, on the contrary, would willingly close its eyes to this salutary and humbling truth; it looks upon whatever it possesses as its own, as the fruit of its own labour and merit; it is prone to magnify its gifts, and to consider them to be greater than they really are, while on the other hand it is blind to the good qualities of others. This leads to the growth of a spirit of independence which is impatient of subjection to any authority, human or divine, and to a depreciation and contempt of others. The proud man has no need to ask God for anything; he thanks him that he is not as the rest of men; he is self-sufficient and independent of all the world. This is the pinnacle of pride, the inordinate love of one's own pre-eminence.
Consummate pride, which refuses to be subject to God and to lawful authority, and which looks down upon other men with profound contempt, is a mortal sin. If it does not go to these lengths, but merely magnifies self without grave insubordination and contempt of others, it is a venial sin.
Pride is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbour, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected and subdued.
2. To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: " Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart." [5]
Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.
(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one's capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.
(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one's due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one's fellow-men. " If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work." [6] Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its. end are grievously sinful.
(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches. [7] But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.
(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one's own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.
(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.
2
On Covetousness
1. Covetousness or avarice is the inordinate love of wealth. It is not sinful to value and seek after money in moderation, but the love of money becomes inordinate when it causes a man to be too close and niggardly in spending it, too eager and absorbed in acquiring it, and ready to do what is wrong in order to come at it.
It is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it leads to the transgression of a precept which binds under grievous sin. Although it is of itself only a venial sin, yet it is very dangerous because of man's proneness to it, and because the vice is apt to grow fast by what it feeds upon, until it becomes mortally sinful. Holy Scripture frequently condemns it and warns us against it. [8]
2. Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.
3
On Lust
Lust is an inordinate appetite for the pleasure which has its seat in the organs of generation. A wise and provident Creator has taken care that those actions which are most necessary for the individual or for society should be accompanied by great pleasure in order that they may be exercised more certainly and more readily. If there were no pleasure connected with eating and drinking, few men would trouble themselves about those necessary actions. The great pleasure felt in the act of procreation induces men to do what is necessary for the preservation of the race which otherwise would excite only shame and disgust. This, however, can only be done lawfully in wedlock. It is lawful then, according to the rules of married life, for husband and wife to indulge in venereal pleasure; outside marriage it is inordinate and sinful.
Any act of wrongful indulgence in venereal pleasure by those who are not married is grievously sinful if directly sought for or to which deliberate consent is given. But the fuller treatment of this subject must be left till we come to the Sixth and Ninth Commandments.
4
On Anger
I. Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.
Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: " To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord," [9] Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.
2. To be angry in moderation for a just cause is not sinful: " Be angry, and sin not." [10] Sin may even be committed through defect of anger, as when a parent or superior is never moved to anger against the faults of children or subjects, but permits them to go unpunished to their loss and the public inconvenience.
3. The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and he swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.
Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.
5
On Envy
Envy is sadness on account of another's good, inasmuch as it is regarded as lessening one's own. It is directly opposed to charity, which inclines us to rejoice in the good of our neighbour, and is mortally sinful if the matter is serious. We must carefully distinguish envy from various other dispositions which bear some resemblance to it. Thus, if one is sorry because another has obtained something desirable, thereby making it impossible for himself to obtain it, it is not envy but emulation, which in itself is praiseworthy. Sadness because another has obtained a post of influence of which he is unworthy, is not envy nor sinful. In the same way, if one is sad because his enemy has obtained the means of doing him harm, there is no sin in such a disposition. Envy comes in where an equal, or one who is not much more than an equal, rises in position, power, or influence, and his rise is regarded with ill will because it seems to lower one's self.
The ambitious are usually also envious, inasmuch as they see others enjoying what they wish to have for themselves. The mean-spirited, too, are commonly envious, since they look upon trivialities as matters of great importance, and the promotion of others, especially of the young, as a lowering of themselves.
6
On Sloth
Spiritual sloth is a sluggishness of the soul in the exercise of virtue. If the reason for the sluggishness is the labour and difficulty which accompany the practice of virtue, sloth will be a mortal sin whenever on account of it a grave precept is violated; otherwise it will be a venial sin. If sloth makes the friendship of God tedious and irksome because of the trouble it takes to preserve it, it is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is directly against our obligation of loving God with our whole heart.
7
On Gluttony
1. Gluttony is the inordinate indulgence in food or drink. The use of food and drink should be regulated by temperance according to right reason. As a standard right reason will be guided by the necessities of bodily health and strength, interpreted in a wide sense, and the uses of the society in which one lives. Inordinateness will come in if through appetite we anticipate the proper time for taking refreshment, or demand too exquisite dishes, or indulge in excess, or devour our food voraciously, or require too great care in the preparation of food, paying a chef as much as all the other servants put together.
2. Gluttony is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal if it leads to violating precepts, such as those of fasting and abstinence, which bind under grave sin, or if it seriously injures health, or if it makes a man unfit to pursue his ordinary avocations, or if eating and drinking become the end for which a man lives, whose God is his belly, [11] or if it causes complete loss of reason through drunkenness.
3. Complete drunkenness which deprives a man of the use of reason, so that he cannot distinguish between what is right and wrong, is a mortal sin, for St Paul numbers it among those vices which exclude from the kingdom of God. [12] The malice of this sin does not consist merely in the depriving one's self of the use of reason, for it is allowed to do that for a good cause, but in the depriving one's self of the use of reason in such an unnatural way by the inordinate use of drink for a considerable time during which the recovery of the use of reason is out of one's power, and without any just cause. Theologians more commonly teach that if there were a sufficient cause, it would not be morally wrong to make a man drunk as a substitute for the use of chloroform, or in order to counteract the effect of poison.
To drink to excess but not so as to be perfectly drunk is only a venial sin per se, but it may become mortal on account of the serious harm done thereby to one's own health, or the spending in drink of money which is required for the support of one's family or the payment of one's creditors, or on account of grave scandal caused by such a sin, or on account of other sins to which it gives rise.
4. If a man could be prevented from committing a more serious sin, as murder, for example, in no other way except by making him drunk, many theologians teach that this would not be unlawful. For very probably I may induce another who is determined to commit some grave crime to be content with doing something which is less bad. Under such circumstances, to persuade another to do what is a less evil is a good action. [13]
5. Bad actions committed in drink are imputable to the agent if they were foreseen in some confused way, for they are voluntary in their cause. The same must be said of blasphemy, indecent language, and other sins of word which retain their objective malice even when said by a drunken man. Mere abuse of others, inasmuch as nobody cares what a drunken man says, would not be sinful. However, when sins in word are committed in drink, there is something wanting to them for their full and proper signification, and so, if blasphemy, for example, were punished by ecclesiastical censure or reservation, these would not be incurred for blasphemy uttered while drunk.
6. Morphia may be given to ease pain, and brandy to strengthen a sick person, even though they cause loss of reason. This follows from what has been said and from the principle of a double effect. It is not lawful to administer such medicines in order to deprive a dying man of the use of reason, so that he may die while unconscious. The time just before death is very precious; a sinner may then be reconciled with God and save his soul; one who is in the state of grace may very much increase his merit by a good use of that time. Euthanasia then, in this sense, is unlawful; it is virtually shortening a man's life.
7. The terrible evil of drink should be combated by all the means, spiritual and temporal, which are at the disposal of the Christian. The general means which may be used are especially the frequent reception of the sacraments, the avoiding of dangerous companions and the occasions of sin, the cultivation of modes of taking innocent recreation while not at work either at home or outside, the joining of Catholic temperance societies whose members encourage each other by mutual example, and the taking of the pledge if its nature and obligations be properly understood.