A manual of moral theology for English-speaking countries/Book 5

by Thomas Slater

BOOK V

ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

FAITH, hope, and charity are called theological virtues because they relate immediately to God, having God for their material and formal object. They thus hold the first place among the Christian virtues; they are of the greatest importance, are most meritorious; and sins against them are the most grievous. In moral theology the acts belonging to these virtues and the sins opposed to them are treated of; the treatment of the virtues is reserved to dogmatic theology.

PART I

ON FAITH

CHAPTER I

THE NECESSITY OF FAITH

I. FAITH is here understood in the sense in which it is used by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews ^[1] and elsewhere in Holy Scripture. It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a proposition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is vouched for by someone who knows and whom we can trust. The word has this sense among others in English. We say: " I should not like to pin my faith to such a proposition on that writer's authority." Here there is question of human faith resting on human authority. God can manifest the truth to us, and we believe that he has done so. " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath. spoken to us by his Son." Whatever God makes known to us mediately or immediately we are justified in believing on his authority. He can neither deceive us nor be himself deceived; and we are bound to believe all that we know God to have spoken or revealed, otherwise we implicitly accuse God of lying or of ignorance. An act of divine faith, then, is an act by which we believe whatever God has revealed on the authority of God himself. God has taken care that we should know for certain what he has revealed in times past for man's benefit and guidance by founding the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is the pillar and the ground of truth, whose chief function it is to bear witness to God's revelation, and to teach it to all men even to the consummation of the world. God's Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, ever abides with the Church, to enable her faithfully and infallibly to perform her task. Faith, then, considered as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes to our belief on the authority of God himself. An act of faith is an act of this virtue.

2. God has destined us for a supernatural end of eternal happiness, consisting essentially of the beatific vision of himself, as we know from revelation; he wishes that we should, as rational and free beings, work consciously for the attainment of that end. We cannot do this without believing in God and without believing that he is a rewarder of those who do well and a punisher of those who do ill; faith, then, is the necessary foundation of the Christian life. " Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him."

Faith is, then, necessary for salvation, not merely because it is of precept like the Commandments, but because it is a necessary means to attain the supernatural end to which we are destined by God. Without taking the necessary means the end cannot be attained. Those, then, who have come to the use of reason, so that they can know God and know what he has revealed, are bound to make an act of faith; otherwise they cannot be saved. The habit of faith is infused into the soul together with sanctifying grace at the reception of baptism, and this habitual faith is sufficient for such as have not the use of reason, like children or those who have always been insane.

3. Our act of faith must implicitly extend to everything that God has revealed; we cannot accept some articles on his authority and reject others which are vouched for by the same authority. But it is not sufficient to make an act of implicit faith comprising all that God has revealed. We are bound to know and believe certain revealed truths explicitly. Some of these truths must be believed explicitly as a necessary means to salvation; explicit belief in others is only of precept, and the want of it, if inculpable, will not be a bar to salvation. Explicit belief in the existence of God, the rewarder of them that seek him, is necessary for salvation, and probably also belief in the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation. Explicit belief in these mysteries is certainly of precept. ^[2] A Christian is bound also to know and believe the substance of what is contained in the Creed, the sacraments which are of obligation, the precepts of God and of the Church, and the Lord's Prayer. It is sufficient to have implicit faith in other truths of revelation.

4. It is not sufficient to have believed the necessary articles of the faith once in a lifetime. Our acts of faith must be frequently renewed; we must lead lives of faith, according to the divine precept. ^[3] This divine precept is sometimes of obligation per se, as when the truths of revelation first become known to a man and he becomes conscious of his obligation; sometimes it is of obligation per accident, as after a sin against the faith has been committed, or when a duty has to be fulfilled which requires an act of faith. However, for such as have once made their act of faith, it will be sufficient in order to fulfil the divine precept if the act of faith is renewed implicitly, as is done whenever we pray, assist at Mass, or receive any of the sacraments. It is well, however, especially in these days of unbelief, to renew frequently explicit acts of faith according to the wish and practice of the Church. They are acts of very great merit with God.

CHAPTER II

THE EXTERNAL PROFESSION OF THE FAITH

I. WE do not fulfil our duty as Christians and Catholics if we keep our religious faith concealed within our own breasts. Our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourselves sometimes requires that we should make open profession of the faith which we hold. When our public profession of the faith would render great honour to God, or prevent great dishonour being shown him, or prevent the true religion from being publicly despised and contemned, we must, even at the risk of great temporal loss, boldly come forward and proclaim our religious belief. We must be ready to do the same if our example would gain others to God or prevent them from falling away from him; for charity towards our neighbour sometimes requires that we should sacrifice our temporal interests for the spiritual good of others. Again, if we never made open profession of our faith, there would be grave danger of its becoming weak and altogether dying away; so we must sometimes perform external acts of our religion in order to keep the faith alive within us. The necessity of doing this is shown by the gradual falling away from their religion of Catholics who have no priests, and no churches wherein to practise their religious duties (Can. 1325, sec. i).

2. The positive law of the Church requires that a solemn profession of faith be made by those who are about to be baptized, or received into the Church, or at least in their name if they are unable to make it for themselves. The occasions and persons who are bound by canon law to make profession of faith are laid down in Canons 1406-1408.

3. It is gravely sinful to deny the faith, or to do or say anything which is equivalent to a denial of it, or which shows that we are ashamed of it. " For he that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty, and that of his Father, and of the holy angels." ^[4] However, the obligation of professing the faith is affirmative, and so always binds but not for always. In other words, we may never deny the faith, but we are only bound to profess it openly when the divine, or natural, or positive law require it. A man might travel for months among heathen or heretics without making his faith known to anyone. As a rule, it is better openly to profess one's religion, so that all may know that we are Catholics; but under certain circumstances it might be lawful to conceal one's conversion to the faith for a time.

A Catholic who on being asked denies that he is one does not necessarily deny the faith. Such an answer might merely be a fitting reply to an impertinent question. It will, however, be a denial of the faith when the circumstances require that an open profession of it should be made. A Catholic who flies from persecution, or disguises himself, or eats meat on days of abstinence in order to avoid detection, does not thereby deny the faith. It is better never to enter non- Catholic places of worship, or be present at non- Catholic religious functions, and this is of obligation whenever such acts would be interpreted as countenancing a false religion, or as showing a spirit of indifferentism, or whenever there would be scandal or danger of perversion, or whenever lawful authority forbids them. Otherwise, merely to enter an heretical place of worship, or to be present at a non- Catholic religious function, such as a burial or a marriage, without taking part in the ceremony, is not sinful, [and may be permitted for a good cause (Can. 1258).

4. All communication with non- Catholics in their religious rites and ceremonies is as a rule forbidden to Catholics. To take part in such rites and ceremonies is to take part in a form of religious worship which is not approved by God and by the Church; it is a virtual adhesion to a false form of worship, or it shows approbation of it. A Catholic, then, may not act as a sponsor in a non- Catholic baptism, or take an active part in a non- Catholic marriage or funeral. On certain rare occasions, as when in danger of death and a Catholic priest cannot be had, a Catholic may accept the ministrations of a schismatic or heretical priest, as was done by some Catholic Japanese officers who were captured by the Russians and shot in the Russo-Japanese War.

Inasmuch as heretics and schismatics are excommunicated, the Church forbids prayers, suffrages, or Masses to be publicly offered for them (Can. 2262).

5. Experience shows that very little good and much harm may come from disputes and controversies about religion. Ordinarily such disputes leave the parties concerned more obstinate than ever in their convictions. Grave scandal, too, and great dishonour to God result from the public and contemptuous denials of sacred truths and the ridicule thrown on them in the heat of controversy. The mind of the Church is that, as far as possible, and except for the necessary defence of the faith, such disputes should be avoided whether they be public or private (Can. 1325, sec. 3).

CHAPTER III

SINS AGAINST FAITH

THE chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy, and apostasy.

I. All who have sufficient knowledge of the Gospel are bound to embrace and believe it: " He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned." ^[5] A grave sin, then, is committed by one who rejects the faith when it has been sufficiently made known to him with adequate grounds for believing, and this grave sin is called infidelity. This positive infidelity is distinguished from privative and negative infidelity. One who has the opportunity of knowing the faith, and recognizes the obligation of making inquiries about it, but neglects to do so, commits the sin of privative infidelity. This is also a grave sin if the degree of negligence be grave. One who has no opportunity of learning the faith, or who does not advert to the obligation of making inquiries, is in negative infidelity. This is not sinful, but St Thomas ^[6] teaches that it is the penalty of sin, inasmuch as if a man were faithful to the light that he has in natural reason, God would take care that he should have an opportunity of knowing the faith even if it were necessary to send him a special messenger, or an angel from heaven, to make the Gospel known to him. If, then, the Gospel is not preached to every man, not God but men are to be blamed for it.

2. Heresy is the rejection by one who has embraced the faith of some portion of revealed truth which is proposed by the Church for our belief. If the rejection is voluntary and accompanied with full knowledge that what is rejected is proposed by the Church as an article of faith, the heresy is formal. Otherwise it will only be material.

It is not heresy, though sinful, to reject what is known to have been revealed by God in a private revelation; private revelations are not proposed by the Church for our belief. Nor is it heresy, but disobedience, to reject what is proposed by the infallible authority of the Church for our acceptance, but which forms no part of divine revelation. One who denied that a canonized saint is in heaven would not be a heretic, but he would be disobedient to the Church, who assures us with divine authority that he is in heaven, and bids us honour him as a saint. Formal heresy is committed not only by knowingly and wilfully rejecting a revealed truth which is proposed for our belief by the Church, but by wilfully doubting about such a revealed truth. For such a one positively doubts whether a portion of God's revelation is true, and thereby injures him as much as if he asserted that it was untrue. Similarly one who would not submit to the Church's decision, even if she defined some doctrine to be of faith, is a formal heretic. Negative doubt, by which assent to a revealed truth is withheld or suspended, and voluntary ignorance of the true Church or of other necessary truths of faith, are sinful, but they do not constitute formal heresy. Great numbers of baptized Christians who were born of schismatical and heretical parents, and who do not know the true Church, are material, not formal heretics. When they begin to doubt about their position, and advert to the obligation they are under of making inquiries, they sin against the faith, more or less grievously according to their negligence, if they remain as they are. They do not become formal heretics until the truth fully dawns upon them, or they are so disposed that they would not submit to the Church even if they knew that she alone is the true Church of Christ.

3. Heresy is punished by the Church as a crime which attacks the foundations and the very raison d'etre of her existence. In order to incur the penalties inflicted on heresy, the sin must be both formal and external, for the Church in her external forum does not take cognizance of sins of thought. The external act must be such as of its own nature, or from custom, or from the special circumstances, is held sufficient to manifest an heretical mind. The reception of the sacrament in an Anglican church, or being married in a non- Catholic place of worship by a non- Catholic minister, are considered acts of heresy and punished as such by excommunication.

A special form for the reception of converts into the Church, based on various Roman decrees, has been approved by the English Bishops.

4. Apostasy from the faith is the grave sin committed by one who throws the faith overboard entirely. The apostate not only rejects special dogmas like the heretic, but wholly abandons the Catholic faith, and becomes a free-thinker, atheist, materialist, Mohammedan, Buddhist, etc.

PART II

ON HOPE

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF HOPE

I. AN act of hope is an act of the will by which we desire the possession of God and of heaven, and firmly trust that we shall obtain them together with the necessary means through the goodness of God and God's fidelity to his promises. The material object, then, of hope is God, heaven, and the supernatural helps necessary to attain thereto. The formal object is God's infinite goodness towards us, his omnipotence, and his faithfulness to his promises. God is infinitely good and wishes us to be happy with him for ever; he has promised that we shall be happy with him if only we persevere to the end. He will enable us to do this by his all-powerful grace.

2. Hope is necessary for salvation for all who have come to the use of reason. The sinner must hope in order to ask for pardon and to be able to rise from his sin. The just man must hope, otherwise he will not pray, and without prayer it is impossible to persevere in the grace of God. Hope is also matter of precept, which obliges sometimes per se, at other times per accident, in much the same way as the precept of faith. Explicit acts of hope, however, are not necessary in order to fulfil this precept; what was said above about the acts of faith is applicable to acts of hope. Implicit acts contained in prayer, the reception of the sacraments, and other works of piety are sufficient to fulfil the obligation. Nobody, then, who is complying with the ordinary obligations of a Christian life need be anxious whether he is fulfilling the precept of eliciting acts of the theological virtues; but it is well, as a matter of counsel, to renew them frequently and explicitly.

3. The chief sins against hope are despair, presumption, and aversion for God and heavenly things.

Despair is a voluntary diffidence about obtaining heaven and the means necessary thereto. If it arises from mistrust of the goodness, power, and fidelity of God, it is gravely injurious to him, and is always mortally sinful. In an improper sense, despair. sometimes springs from an overpowering idea of one's own weakness and fickleness, and then it is frequently only venially sinful; it is not directly against hope, but rather a failure to make use of the motives to encouragement which hope furnishes.

Presumption here signifies a sin against hope by excess, and is an inordinate confidence in the attainment of heaven without using the necessary means. It is of itself a grave sin, but admits of parvity of matter, as when through such inordinate confidence one commits venial sin.

Aversion for God and heaven is distinguished from hatred of God, which is directly against charity, in that it does not wish evil to God, but prefers earth and earthly joys to God and heaven. It is, as is obvious, a mortal sin.

PART III

ON CHARITY

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF CHARITY

I. CHARITY, as treated of here, is an act of the will by which we love God for his own sake above all things, and our neighbour for the sake of God. The love of charity, then, is different from the love of concupiscence, by which we love God as our reward exceeding great, and desire to possess him in whom our supreme and perfect happiness is placed. This love of concupiscence is good and belongs to the virtue of hope, but it is imperfect. By charity we rise above the consideration of our own reward and happiness; we see in God the infinite Good, the Source and Origin of all good, and we rejoice in his infinite Perfection. We wish him all honour and glory and every good, and desire, as far as we can, to obtain it for him, because he is infinitely worthy of our wholehearted devotion. So that the formal object of charity, the reason why we love God, is his own infinite goodness and worth; for this reason we love him and our neighbour, for such is his will. He has made us all in his image and likeness; all rational creatures form the great family of God, our common Father; all are capable by grace of eternal happiness with him in heaven.

2. The most intimate union with God by charity is the end for which we were created, and it is our duty to prepare ourselves for this high destiny by exercising ourselves in charity while on earth. It is the highest and the noblest of virtues, the queen of all the virtues, the seal and bond of human perfection. That we might cultivate charity all the more assiduously God has commanded it in express terms: " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."^[7] We are bound, then, to love God above all other things, to cling to him, come what may, never to allow ourselves to be separated from him by sin, for: " He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me."^[8] If we do this, we need have no scruples about our charity; even though we seem to have a tenderer feeling for husband, child, or friend than for God, we may call to mind that charity belongs essentially to the will; if our will is firmly fixed on God, so that we are prepared to suffer the loss of anything rather than of God, we substantially fulfil the greatest of the precepts, on which the law and the prophets hang.

All rational beings that are capable of friendship with God, and of becoming his children by grace, are to be loved for the sake of God in charity. This love of charity towards our fellow- men does not exclude love for them as friends or relatives. Love of others for any honest motive is good and praiseworthy, and may by being supernaturalized become supernaturally meritorious with God. By the precept of charity towards our neighbour we are bound to wish well to all, to pray for all, never to allow ourselves any thought, word, or deed which is incompatible with mutual love, and we are bound to help others in their necessities as far as we can.

3. As charity is the queen of all the virtues, it binds of itself under pain of grave sin, but when the matter is light the sin will be only venial. Sins, then, against charity are grievous of themselves, as we shall see while treating of them separately.

We are bound sometimes to elicit acts of charity, but, as we have already seen, it is very difficult to determine exactly how frequently. Nor is it necessary to attempt the task, for implicit acts such as are contained in a devout recital of the Our Father, sorrow because God is continually being offended, by sin, pious meditation on the Passion of Christ, suffice for the fulfilment of the obligation. We must not suppose that it is difficult to love God with the love of charity, for God has commanded it, and his infinite love towards us and the desire he has of being loved by us in return prompt him to give us abundant grace to enable us to comply with his precept. By becoming bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh in Jesus Christ, God has made it especially easy for us to love him, inasmuch as it is easy for us to understand and to appreciate the infinite tenderness and loveliness of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It is of such great merit that an act of perfect charity at once blots out all sin and reconciles the sinner with God.

CHAPTER II

WELL-ORDERED CHARITY

i. THE law of charity is not fulfilled by a general and equal esteem for all mankind. Such a vague and general regard for others would probably he inoperative, and charity is above all things active. Charity, then, to be genuine must be well ordered and discriminating. It must look at the claims which others have on our charity; it must appreciate things at their true value, otherwise in wishing to confer a favour it will do harm to the object of love; it must assist others wisely according to their necessity, otherwise it will foster hypocrisy and produce professional and able-bodied beggars. In other words, as theologians teach, the order of charity has reference to the persons who claim our love, to the advantages which we desire to procure for them, and to the necessity in which they are placed.

2. God, the fountain and reason of charity, the infinite source of all good, has the first and highest claim on our love. " He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me." ^[9] Next to God we must love ourselves with that genuine charity which makes one's own salvation the first great duty of every man " For what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul?" ^[10] We are never justified, then, in committing the slightest sin for the love of anyone or anything whatsoever.

Neither must we without good cause expose ourselves to the proximate occasions of sin. If duty demands it and if proper precautions be taken, we may confidently trust in the protection of God, and expose ourselves to risk for the sake of our neighbour. We may, too, forego a small spiritual advantage which is not matter of precept for the sake of our neighbour. Moreover, we are sometimes called upon to sacrifice our own good of a lower order for the higher good of our neighbour. In this connection we may distinguish a triple order of goods, those which pertain to the salvation of the soul; the intrinsic and natural goods of soul and body, consisting in life, health, knowledge, liberty, etc.; and extrinsic goods consisting in reputation, wealth, etc. Theologians also distinguish three degrees of necessity in which one in need of charity, spiritual or temporal, may be placed. If he is in danger of damnation or of loss of life, or of other good of almost equal importance, and can do nothing to help himself, he is said to be in extreme necessity. If he is in similar danger but can do something to help himself, though not without grave difficulty, he is in grave necessity. Ordinary sinners and beggars who can help themselves without grave difficulty are in common necessity.

3. Every man, as far as he can, is bound to help his neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity even at the cost of his own life: " In this we have known the charity of God, because he hath laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." ^[11] However, we do not lie under so serious an obligation unless the spiritual necessity of our neighbour is certain, the prospect of our being able to render effective help is equally certain, and no help is forthcoming from elsewhere. Neither should we be bound to risk our lives in order to help another in extreme spiritual need if greater harm would follow from our making the attempt. So that it is not often that ordinary people are bound to expose their lives to fulfil this obligation of charity; the obligation more frequently presses on Bishops and priests who have the cure of souls, and who are bound to execute their charge in justice as well as in charity. These are bound to expose their lives for their flock not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.

Except in the case of extreme spiritual necessity, we are not bound by the precept of charity to risk life or limb or expose ourselves to any serious inconvenience. The reason is because we are not bound to use extraordinary means and suffer serious inconvenience in order to preserve our own lives, and we cannot as a rule be bound to do more for our neighbour than we are bound to do for ourselves, especially as in grave or common necessity he can help himself. We might be obliged to do more for one whose welfare was of public importance. However, when our neighbour is in grave or even in common necessity, we must be prepared to undergo some inconvenience and trouble in order to help him. More precise rules on the subject will be given below.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether one is allowed to sacrifice his own life in order to save the life of another whose welfare is not of public importance. Many deny that it is lawful, for we should love ourselves in the first place when there is question of equal good; charity begins at home. Others, however, more probably teach that it may lawfully be done, and that it is an act of heroic virtue; so that in yielding a plank to another in a shipwreck and permitting himself to be drowned, a man does not prefer the life of another to his own, but he sacrifices his life for the sake of virtue.

4. The more important spiritual goods of the soul should be the first objects of our solicitude, then the intrinsic goods of the soul and body, finally the extrinsic goods of reputation and wealth.

With the love of complacency which inclines us to show reverence, honour, and respect to others, we should give the preference to those who are more worthy of it on account of their closer union with God. The love of benevolence, on the other hand, leads us to prefer those who are nearer to us in sharing with them the goods which are specially due to them on account of their union with us. Although no absolute and universal rule can be laid down to guide us as to whom the preference should be given when we cannot help all, yet there is general agreement among theologians that the claims of our neighbour rank somewhat in the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, domestics, those who live in the same place, country, and finally all others.

CHAPTER III

LOVE OF ENEMIES

I. NOT even enemies and those who injure us are excluded from the law of charity; in spite of their ill will and malice they remain our neighbours, and our Lord expressly bade us love them: " I say to you: Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you." ^[12] We are bound by this precept to put out of our hearts all ill feeling and desire of revenge against those who dislike and wrong us, and furthermore we are bound to show them those common marks of Christian charity which are due to all and may be refused to none. What those common marks of Christian charity are depends much on the usages of time and place, and of the society to which the parties belong. Those marks which are common to members of the same family are not due to outsiders; those which are mutually shown to neighbours of the same social standing are not due to utter strangers or to persons in a lower social position. Among the common signs of charity which may be refused to none are reckoned the following: general prayer for all which we offer up when we say the Our Father, answering a question or returning a salute, selling in open market to all comers, refraining from excluding individuals from general invitations or general benefactions.

It is not of precept but of counsel to show one's enemies unusual signs of forgiveness and charity. Such signs are to pray expressly for an enemy in particular, to visit him, to console him in affliction, to treat familiarly with him.

2. In certain circumstances, however, we are bound to show even these unusual signs of charity to our enemy, as when they cannot be refused without scandal to others who will think that they are refused through hatred, or when they are required to prevent our enemy from falling into serious sin as, for example, by conceiving a deeper hatred for us. If a former friend asks our pardon for an injury which he has done us, and if the friendship was not a freely accepted union between us, but was more or less required by our mutual relations, we must be ready to show him again unusual signs of charity. If the friendship depended merely on our mutual liking, there will be no obligation to show unusual marks of charity after receiving an offence; what was freely given may be freely withheld, always supposing that there is no ill will. We may for a time even refuse the common and ordinary signs of charity toward another for a good reason. A superior, for example, may do so in order to correct an inferior who has offended him. An equal may do so for a time immediately after receiving an offence while the injury is still rankling in his heart; to require not only repression of ill feeling, but the immediate exhibition of marks of charity for the offender, would be to lay too heavy a burden on poor human nature. It may also be lawful to refuse the ordinary signs of charity for a time toward one who has offended us in lighter matters as a suitable punishment, and as a means of preventing a repetition of such offences in future.

3. When one who has offended us apologizes and asks for pardon we are bound to forgive him and also at the proper time to show him the ordinary signs of charity. If, however, he has injured us, we have a right to compensation for the injustice, and charity does not compel us to forego our right. We may then require satisfaction for the injury and even bring an action in a court of law to recover it against the wrongdoer, without, of course, indulging any ill will.

4. With a view to reconciliation between enemies, it is the duty of him who gave the offence to apologize and to ask for pardon, unless a position of superiority makes this inadvisable. As a rule, it will not be necessary to make a formal request for pardon; satisfaction can usually be given to the offended party in a less formal way, and in a way that is less embarrassing to both parties. If both were in the wrong, the one who was most so, or the inferior, should be the first to seek reconciliation.

5. We sometimes find it difficult to associate with certain people; they try our temper; we can scarcely talk or think of them with patience. This is sinful, of course, if it is voluntary, and if it arises from ill will towards the person in question. It sometimes, however, comes not from ill will towards the person, but from incompatibility of characters and dispositions. We dislike in him some quality or mannerism, or something which we cannot precisely define. It is what theologians call the hatred of abomination, not of enmity, and it may be without fault, as when it leads us to fly his company not in order to wound his feelings, but to escape a trial of temper and probable unpleasantness.

To refuse the ordinary signs of charity so as not to speak to another, or to refuse to have anything to do with him out of ill feeling, and to foster this for a considerable time, is of itself a grave sin. But in estimating the gravity of such a sin in practice, the cause and the strength of the ill feeling should be considered. If the refusal to have anything to do with another come from serious ill will, it will be a grievous sin; otherwise it may be only venial, or if there be no ill will and a just cause, no sin at all.

CHAPTER IV

ON ALMSGIVING

I. ALMSGIVING is here taken in a wide sense for any of the corporal works of mercy by which our neighbour's necessity is relieved. Inasmuch as the law of charity binds us to help all who are in need as far as we can, almsgiving is obligatory by the law of nature. The obligation is frequently inculcated in Holy Scripture: " Defraud not the poor of alms," we read in Ecclesiasticus. ^[13] Our Lord in severe terms enjoined on his followers the exercise of the works of mercy. ^[14]

2. In order to measure as precisely as possible the gravity of the obligation of almsgiving, we must consider the necessity in which our neighbour is placed and our ability to help him. We are only bound to help those who are in real need; we should be fostering idleness and hypocrisy, and squandering on unworthy objects what is sorely needed by others, if we distributed our alms to the unneedy.

Theologians commonly distinguish three degrees of necessity, as we saw in a former chapter. Extreme necessity is the condition of one who from want is in danger of death or some equally serious evil, and who can do nothing to help himself. If in similar circumstances he can, though with difficulty, do something to help himself, he is said to be in grave necessity. Beggars and the indigent poor generally are in common necessity. These distinctions cannot be applied with mathematical accuracy; they are necessarily somewhat loose and vague, but they represent real differences which, broadly speaking, are capable of being appreciated without much difficulty.

With regard to the ability of him who is called upon to relieve the needy, theologians distinguish between what is necessary to support the lives of a man and his family, what is necessary to support one's position, and what remains over and above and is superfluous.

3. Except in the case of extreme necessity, which in ordinary circumstances is rare, there is no obligation to give alms out of what is necessary either for the support of life or position. Charity, as we have seen, begins at home, and it rather forbids us to prefer the needs of outsiders to our own and to the needs of our family. We are, as a general rule, only bound to give alms out of our superfluity, " That which remaineth give alms." ^[15] Some theologians maintain that this precept imposes an obligation of giving all one's superfluous wealth to the poor; but others hold that this is only of counsel, that the precept is a general one directed to all the rich, and that it will be fulfilled if each gives something of his superfluity so that the necessities of the poor may be relieved by the common contributions of all. How much must be given according to this opinion depends upon circumstances, and is better left to the judgement of a prudent man after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

4. When our neighbour is in extreme or almost extreme necessity we are under a grave obligation of helping him even out of what is necessary to support our position in life, provided that it can be done without impoverishing ourselves or being compelled to give up our reasonable and justly acquired style of living. We are not obliged to pay large sums of money to ransom a captive from the hands of bandits, or to send a sick pauper to the Riviera for the winter; we should not be obliged to take such extraordinary means even to preserve our own life.

5. We are also under a grave obligation, according to the common teaching of divines, of helping the poor who are in grave necessity out of our superfluity. It is difficult to reconcile the words of Holy Scripture with any more lenient doctrine on this point. ^[16] However, we should be slow to decide that in any particular case a rich man has sinned mortally by refusing to help one in grave necessity. For although there be a grave obligation occasionally to help the poor in serious want, it cannot be concluded that a grave obligation binds any one particular person to assist all such; that would be an impossible burden. Furthermore, in practice it is frequently difficult to decide when a man is in grave necessity, and whether he will not be more conveniently helped by someone else. Besides, there are not wanting theologians who teach a more lenient doctrine as to the gravity of the obligation of assisting those who are in grave need.

A rich man cannot be excused from sin who makes it a practice never to give anything in alms on the plea that the poor can go to the workhouse, and that he pays his poor rates. For cases of grave and sometimes of extreme necessity arise where it is practically impossible to seek relief in the work- house; and wherever there is a case of true necessity there is an obligation to help as far as one can.

6. The rich are also under an obligation of sometimes helping those who are in common necessity, for the texts of Holy Scripture seem to refer to cases of ordinary need such as are commonly met with, and if no one ever helped the poor, their lot would soon become desperate. A man, therefore, who makes it a rule never to give alms to ordinary beggars certainly commits sin; he is not obliged to help all who apply, but out of his superfluity he must help some. It is a disputed point among theologians whether this obligation binds under pain of mortal or venial sin only. The severer view is the more common, but the milder is defended by many approved authors, on the ground that the necessity of the common beggar is tolerable, and is not so irksome as to impose on others a grave obligation of helping him.

CHAPTER V

ON FRATERNAL CORRECTION

i. BY fraternal correction is meant a brotherly admonition given out of charity to a sinner to induce him to amend his ways. If such brotherly admonition is likely to do good and have its effect in procuring the amendment of the delinquent, charity requires that it should be given; for if charity obliges us to assist our neighbour when he is in temporal need, much more does it oblige us to do what we can for one who is in spiritual necessity. Our Lord, too, insisted on the fulfilment of this duty: " But if thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee thou shalt gain thy brother." ^[17] This obligation is of itself grave, as it belongs to the grave precept of charity, and like charity it binds all men. However, as we shall see, there are several conditions to be fulfilled in order that this precept may oblige in the concrete, and in practice private persons are rarely compelled under grave sin to exercise fraternal correction. Bishops, parish priests, and others who have the cure of souls, as well as parents, are more frequently obliged under pain of mortal sin to admonish those committed to their charge. 2. Theologians enumerate the following conditions as requisite in order that there may arise an obligation of giving fraternal correction:

(a) It must be certain that a grave sin has been committed and that the delinquent has not corrected and will not of himself correct his fault. There is no general obligation to correct the venial sins of another according to a very probable opinion; in religious communities, or in other circumstances where uncorrected venial sin might lead to serious relaxation of discipline or other harm, superiors are sometimes bound under grave sin to correct venial faults, or even faults against the rule which are not necessarily sinful. The grave sin must be certain without the necessity of making inquiries, which would be unwarrantable in a private person.

(b) If there is someone else who can and will give the necessary admonition, the obligation will not rest upon me.

(c) There must be a reasonable expectation that the admonition will do good; there is no obligation to do what is useless. Neither should it be given if it is doubtful whether it will do good or harm.

(d) As charity does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience to one's self, there will be no obligation to correct another if this cannot be done without serious inconvenience. This rule applies to such as are bound only out of charity to correct others fraternally; Bishops and priests are bound to do so also in justice, which obliges more strictly than does charity.

3. Our Lord not only inculcated the duty of fraternal correction, ^[18] but he taught that in the first instance it was to be done in private, then in the presence of witnesses, and finally the delinquent was to be denounced to the public authorities in order that public morality might be safeguarded and the sinner more effectually corrected. This order should, of course, be followed per se, for charity and justice demand that our neighbour's secret fault should not be made known to others except in special cases and for good cause. However, cases are not infrequent in which it is lawful to denounce a delinquent immediately to the superior without first attempting to correct him fraternally. Such cases are the following:

(a) If the sin be public, the sinner's reputation is not injured unjustly by at once informing the superior, which accordingly may be done.

(b) If the paternal admonition of the superior will in all likelihood be more sure and efficacious than the fraternal correction of a private person, the superior may be immediately informed as a father, whose duty it is to correct his children for their good, not as a judge, whose duty it is to safeguard public interests by punishing crimes.

(c) If harm threatens the community from the action of the delinquent, and it can only be effectually prevented by the intervention of the superior's authority.

(d) If the delinquent be one of a religious community whose members have voluntarily renounced their rights in this matter, and agreed that anyone who becomes aware of their faults may straightway inform the superior, such a one suffers no injury if the rule be acted on. However, even in this case there must be good reason for making the fault known to the superior, such as the sinner's correction, the good name of the community, the preservation of discipline. If the sin was committed in the past, and there is now no good reason for making it known to the superior, it would be sinful to make it known to him. Religious have a right to their reputation.

Sometimes members of communities, and boys or girls at school, who know that serious harm to morals is being done by a black sheep among the flock, are bound under penalty of grave sin to give information to superiors so that the suitable remedy may be applied. Such cases require careful treatment from the confessor, who is bound to instruct his penitents concerning their obligations, and to refuse them absolution if they are not prepared to fulfil those obligations which bind them under penalty of grave sin. On the other hand, the seal of confession must be safeguarded at any cost.

4. It is the better opinion that private persons are not regularly obliged to admonish another for committing a material sin through ignorance or inadvertence. Sometimes, however, harm would follow even if material sin were to go uncorrected and, inasmuch as charity requires that we should prevent harm when we can, in these cases admonition should be given. Those also who are placed in authority and have the duty of instructing their subjects, preventing scandal, and maintaining discipline, are bound to correct even the material sins of those under their charge.

CHAPTER VI

ON SCANDAL

I. SCANDAL in its theological sense is any word or action which has at least the appearance of evil and is the occasion of sin to another. This is the received definition of active scandal. Passive scandal is the sin which another is led to commit through active scandal. It is quite immaterial whether passive scandal be a sin of the same species as the scandal which caused it or not; a priest who gets drunk may cause scandal by inducing others to follow his example, or by causing others to speak ill of priests or of the Catholic Church.

Scandal is direct when it is foreseen and intended. If it is intended precisely in order that another may fall into sin, it is called diabolic; if it is intended on account of the advantage it will bring to him who gives it, it is simply direct scandal.

Indirect scandal is foreseen by him who gives it, but it is not intended.

Scandal of the weak is caused by the ignorance or frailty of him who suffers it; pharisaic scandal is caused by his malice, as was the case with the Pharisees taking scandal at the words and actions of our Lord and his Apostles.

2. Giving scandal is of itself gravely sinful, as it is against charity; and it is a special sin against the precept of fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall. ^[19] Although of itself scandal is a grave sin, it is frequently .only venial in the concrete. The gravity of the sin is not measured by the malice of the sin which causes scandal, but by the malice of the sin which he who gives scandal foresees will certainly or at least probably be caused in another. Thus a gravely sinful word or act may be a venial sin of scandal, and a venially sinful word or act may be a grave sin of scandal. It is plain, too, that not every sin committed in the sight of others is a sin of scandal, but then only when it is foreseen that at least probably it will cause others to commit sin.

3. There is a twofold malice in sins of direct scandal; such sins are against charity and also against that special virtue which he who suffers scandal violates. So that when A incites B to drink to excess, A sins against charity and against temperance, which not only prescribes moderation in one's own actions, but forbids one to be the cause of its violation by another.

The question whether indirect scandal in the same manner also contains a twofold malice is disputed among theologians. The negative opinion is probable, for although the virtue of temperance, for example, forbids me to induce another to sin against it, and I violate temperance if I do so, yet temperance does not require of me that I should prevent others from sinning against it; I may sin against charity if I do not try to prevent a sin of intemperance in another, but I do not sin against temperance. And so when indirect scandal is given, thereby causing another to drink to excess, there is a sin against charity; but the sin of scandal does not contain in addition the malice of a sin against temperance.

When A solicits B to commit sin with him and B consents, both sin against charity and also against the virtue which is specially violated; so that although solicitation causes A's sin to be greater, it does not constitute a specific difference, and need not be confessed.

4. If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the danger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain or omit the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in performing the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not bind to one's own serious inconvenience.

5. On the other hand, I am not justified in omitting an action which is prescribed by the natural or divine law on account of the scandal which the action would give, and so when God's honour or the salvation of my neighbour or my own requires that I should make public profession of the faith, I am bound to make it though my profession will make the enemies of the faith blaspheme.

Even a positive precept does not cease to bind on account of a general fear of scandal; whether it ceases to bind or not on account of scandal in a particular instance is a disputed point. Some theologians maintain that if a woman knows that her presence at Mass is a cause of grave sin to another and she cannot hear Mass elsewhere, she is obliged to abstain from hearing Mass at least for a Sunday or two, because the natural precept of avoiding scandal is more important than the positive precept of hearing Mass on Sundays. Others, on the contrary, hold that inasmuch as the scandal is taken and not given, the obligation of hearing Mass does not cease to bind in such a case. Practically, therefore, one is free to follow either opinion. This disputed question refers to scandal of the weak, for positive precepts do not cease to be obligatory on account of pharisaic scandal.

A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it; and so I may receive the sacraments even when they are not obligatory from a priest whom I know to be in a state of sin and unworthy to administer them.

6. If I suspect the honesty of a servant, I do nothing wrong if I leave a sum of money where I know he will see it with the object of finding out whether he will steal it. If he is an honest man, no harm will follow; if he is a thief, my action does not make him one; I do but furnish the opportunity for him to betray himself, and in my own defence I am justified in doing that. It is of course morally wrong to use agents provocateurs in order to detect criminals; they are the cause of another's sin, not merely the occasion.

7. If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one's self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.^[20]

CHAPTER VII

ON CO-OPERATION IN ANOTHER'S SIN

I. CLOSELY connected with scandal is the subject of co-operation or participation in the sin of another; indeed, they are often treated of together, but on account of the importance of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it.

Co-operation, then, may be formal or material. Formal co-operation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it is performed. Material co-operation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention with which it is done.

Co-operation is proximate or remote according as the action of the secondary agent is more closely connected with the action of the principal agent or less so.

One is said to co-operate positively when he does something which influences the action of the principal agent; one is said to co-operate negatively when he does not hinder a bad action which he is bound to prevent.

2. It is never lawful to co-operate formally with another's sin, for it is obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to co-operate materially with the sin of another when the action of the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or at least indifferent, and he has no evil intention, and furthermore there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, material co-operation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect which was laid down in the Book on Human Acts.^[21]

The cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very numerous, but the safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief difficulty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will justify one in co-operating materially in another's sin. No general rule can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is required when there is question of a graver sin, when the co-operation is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the sin would not be committed at all if the co-operation were denied. The following examples taken from approved authors are given as illustrating the application of the doctrine, and they may be used to show what may be done in similar cases.

(a) I may lawfully ask for the sacraments from a bad priest, though he commits sin in administering them, for he need not sin thereby unless he likes, and his malice should not deprive me of the benefit of the sacraments to which I have a right.

(b) A dealer may sell to all buyers things which are in themselves indifferent, though they can be put to a bad use, as firearms, unless he is certain that they are required for a bad purpose. Even in the latter case a correspondingly serious inconvenience or loss will excuse his selling, especially if his refusal will not hinder the sin on account of the buyer being easily able to procure what he wants elsewhere.

(c) Intoxicating drink may not be sold to one who has already had too much. Many authors, however, allow this to be done when it cannot be refused without provoking to violence and quarrelling. This excuse would rarely avail in England at present, because the law forbids such sale, the strong arm of the law thus being on the side of morality.

(d) It is not lawful to sell things of which the use is ordinarily sinful, except when their lawful use is guaranteed. And so booksellers are not allowed to sell infidel or immoral books except to such as require them for good reasons and with the requisite permission. The same doctrine applies to drugs and instruments used for immoral purposes, as well as to poisons. Publishers, too, sin by publishing books which are dangerous to faith or morals. Compositors and others employed in printing should not work for firms which are known to publish bad books; as they are usually ignorant of the nature of the work which they help to bring out, their ignorance, the remoteness of their co-operation, and the ease with which other workmen can be found to supply their place, will ordinarily excuse them from sin if an odd bad book or two are published by an otherwise respectable firm.

(e) Dancing may be a perfectly innocent amusement and it may be a dangerous occasion of sin. No general rule, therefore, can be given as to when dancing must be avoided. Much depends upon the company who join in the dance, upon the way of dancing, and upon the subjective disposition of the dancers. If there be nothing objectionable in any of these respects, there is no reason why a young man or a young woman should not be allowed to dance with due caution. If there be ground for objection, and especially if sin has already been frequently committed in similar circumstances, there is an obligation to abstain, unless the occasion of sin is necessary and can be made remote by taking proper precautions. If sin only follows occasionally, there will be no strict obligation to abstain from dancing, provided due precautions be taken in future.

(f) The question of theatre-going is settled on similar grounds. There are all sorts of theatres and all sorts of plays represented in them, and all sorts of actors and actresses. To go and listen to a bad and suggestive play arouses the passions, leads to sin, and encourages evil in many ways. It will, then, as a rule, be grievously sinful to go to the theatre to see such a play. The confessor will usually be able to judge best whether in any particular case it is lawful to go to the theatre by asking whether in the past it has frequently led to sin. If it has done so, it is a proximate occasion of sin, and must be avoided as far as possible. In other cases, unless the play or the theatre is known to be bad, there will be no strict obligation to refrain from going.

1. Heb. xi.
2. Props. 22, 64, condemned by Innocent XI.
3. Props. 16, 17, condemned by Innocent XI.
4. Luke ix 26.
5. Mark xvi i.
6. De Verit., q. 14, a. n, ad I.
7. Matt. xxii 37.
8. John xiv 21.
9. Matt. x 37
10. Matt. xvi 26.
11. i John iii 16.
12. Matt, v 44.
13. Ecclus. iv i.
14. Matt, xxv 41.
15. Luke xi 41.
16. Matt, xxv 41; i John iii 17.
17. Matt, xviii 15.
18. Matt. xviii 15.
19. Cf. Matt. xviii 7.
20. Theol. Mor., a, n. 57.
21. St Alphonsus, lib. a, tract. 3, n. 63.