Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 18
CHAPTER XVIII.
BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE—1870.
The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 had its origin in the traditional ill-feeling between French and Germans, a feeling that has long existed, but has been particularly bitter since the Napoleonic wars at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. In March, 1867, a dispute arose between France and Prussia relative to the possession of Luxembourg. The emperor of France proposed purchasing the province from the king of Holland; Prussia earnestly opposed the purchase, since Luxembourg had formed part of the dissolved Germanic Confederation. The air was filled with rumors of war, and the affair was only quieted by a conference at London of the representatives of the great powers, by whom it was decreed that the fortress of Luxembourg should be demolished and the perfect neutrality of the province guaranteed.
For three years from this time there was no disturbance of the peace, but both France and Prussia made preparations for war. On the 4th of July, 1870, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern consented to become a candidate for the then vacant throne of Spain, and as soon as the fact was known there was great excitement in France in consequence. Threatening speeches were made in the French Chambers by the Duc de Grammont, Minister of Foreign Affairs, but after some negotiation and the intervention of England, Prince Leopold on July 12th voluntarily retired from the candidacy, and declined the crown that had been offered him. On the 13th France demanded from Prussia a guaranty that no such offer should be accepted in future; Prussia was naturally irritated by the demand, and refused it, whereupon the French minister, Count Benedetti, retired from Prussia, and almost immediately thereafter the Prussian minister left Paris.
The emperor declared war on the 15th of July, with the hearty concurrence of the great majority of the French Chambers. After his surrender the emperor told Count Bismarck that he did not desire war, but had been forced into it by public opinion. He was evidently greatly deceived as to the strength and condition of his army, and equally deceived as to the forces that Prussia could bring into the field. Though vastly more numerous on paper, the French had hardly more than 300,000 men ready for the field, while the Germans had treble that number. Including their reserves and landwehr, or militia, the Germans had, on the first of August, 1870, a grand effective of 944,000 men, while on the peace footing, a month earlier, they had but 360,000. To the total on the war footing given above must be added the forces of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden, which gave a grand total for the German strength of 1,124,000 men. Napoleon had counted on the neutrality of the southern states of the North German Confederation, if not on their active hostility to Prussia, and is said to have been greatly disconcerted when, on the 19th July, the parliament met at Berlin and resolved to support Prussia in the war.
Impartial observers predicted at the beginning of the contest that the result would be disastrous to France. Commenting upon the war the Quarterly Review says: "The causes of the early ruin of the French army were: (1) The enormous superiority of the Germans in regard to numbers; (2) the absolute unity of their command and concert of operation; (3) their superior mechanism in equipment and supplies; (4) the superior intelligence, steadiness, and discipline of the soldiers; (5) superior education of the officers, and the dash and intelligence of the cavalry." The French and Germans were equally brave, but the French generals seemed to act often upon impulse, while every move of the Germans was the result of a carefully elaborated plan. From the beginning to the end Von Moltke seems to have left nothing to chance, and whatever his instructions to his subordinates they were faithfully carried out.
Both armies were massed on their frontiers; that of the Germans being assembled much more rapidly than the army of the Rhine, which constituted the French force to advance upon Berlin. It is doubtful if the latter exceeded 270,000 effectives, though it had a nominal strength of 310,000, while the Germans had an active force of 447,000, divided into three armies, commanded respectively by General Von Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince of Prussia. The armies confronted each other at the end of July, when the chief command of the French was taken by the emperor, and that of the Germans by King William of Prussia. On the 2d of August active hostilities began with an encounter at Saarbruck, the offensive being taken by the French, and the conflict resulting in their favor. On the same day the German armies began their advance, and on the 4th the battle of Weissenburg resulted in their favor, as the French were driven from the field after five hours of fighting, during which General Douay, the French commander, was killed. On the 6th was fought the battle of Woerth, in which the French made a stubborn resistance, but were compelled to retire. Weissenburg and Woerth were fought with the Crown Prince's army; meantime the armies of Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles had effected a junction, occupied Saarbruck and Forbach, and on the 6th had defeated the French at Spicheren, occupying the heights and driving General Frossard both from his first line of battle and from the position he afterwards tried to take near St. Avold.
The result of the movements of the Germans and the victories above mentioned was to drive Frossard in the direction of Metz, where Bazaine's corps was joined by L'Admirault's from Thionville, and by divisions under Bourbaki and Canrobert. There was now no obstacle to the junction of the three Prussian armies, and by the 11th they formed an unbroken line, with head-quarters in Saarbruck. On the 14th the first army was in the neighborhood of Metz, and frustrated the attempt of the French to retreat to the line of the Marne. The defeat of the French at Courcelles on the 14th, and at Vionville, or Mars-la-Tour, on the 16th, completed the cutting off of Bazaine's command from junction with other French forces, though it cost heavily to the Germans in loss of men. Bazaine now massed his troops at a position between Gravelotte and St. Privat le Montagne, and made ready for a battle that should be decisive. Winning it he would break through the German lines and retreat to the Marne, while by losing it he would be shut up in Metz, or at all events separated from the rest of the French army.
At the break of day on the 17th, the movement of the French army into its new position began. Late at night on the 16th one division of the 3d corps had reached the battle-field of Vionville, and this division was ordered into position between the Bois des Ognons and Malmaison, in order to cover the retreat of the left wing, which was the most exposed. There was great difficulty in moving the enormous train, as there was but a single way open for it, the road from Gravelotte to Metz. The French officers saw that the road was so blocked, and the wagons so closely crowded and in such a state of confusion, that a panic would have followed the appearance of even a few squadrons of German cavalry.
On the morning of the 17th Prince Frederick Charles, who had spent the night after the battle of the 16th at Porze, rode along the lines to make a personal inspection of the ground held by his forces. The enemy's skirmishing line was clearly visible in front of Rezonville. It stretched out for a long distance, and there was evidently a strong force behind it, to judge by the frequent trumpet calls that were wafted by the morning breeze. About six o'clock in the morning, King William arrived with his staff and occupied the new head-quarters which had been selected.
On the 15th of August the right wing was advancing, the 12th infantry division being near Arracourt, the 2d division corps on the Nancy road, and the 1st Bavarian corps not far from Einville. In the centre of the Prussian line was the 5th corps, supported by the Wurtemburg division. It advanced to Dombasle on the Meurthe, and took a strong position on the left bank of that stream. On the extreme left the 11th corps rested on the Moselle at Bayon. The 11th infantry division was at Henning supporting the left wing, the 2d cavalry division was farther advanced, being nearly five miles more to the front. The 4th cavalry division was at Nancy, and examining carefully the country towards Toul, but without encountering any considerable bodies of the French. They met a few bands of franc-tireurs, which were easily scattered. By great efforts on the part of the officers superintending the transportation department, all the trains of the different divisions were brought up closer to the rear and put in readiness for any further movement.
There was very little movement of the Third Army on the 16th, as it was necessary to wait for developments in and around Metz before ordering the army of the Crown Prince to push any farther forward. The 4th cavalry division was brought forward from Nancy on the 16th in order to have it in proper position in case the army should be advanced towards St. Dizier. The right wing of the army, the 2d Bavarian corps, remained in the vicinity of Nancy. On the 17th the head-quarters of the Third Army were changed to Nancy, and the 1st Bavarian corps moved forward to St. Nicholas, which is on the left bank of the Meurthe. The nearest objective point of the Third Army was the fortress of Toul. The 6th corps had been somewhat scattered, and on the 16th and 17th the various divisions were brought together, so that they reached Bayon on the 18th. The Prussian army was arranged—previous to the decisive battle of Gravelotte, so that one portion of it could attack Metz, while another could continue the advance on Paris.
The Second Army arrived at the Moselle on the 16th. The 4th corps and the Prussian Guards moved in the direction of Toul, the former going to Siazeray, and the other to Bernecourt. It was by no means certain whether the French army would retreat to Verdun, or give battle at Metz, or in its neighborhood. The latter alternative was forced by the attack made by the 3d and 9th corps, and consequently it was advisable for the Germans to concentrate as much as possible before the opening of the final battle.
Orders were issued by Prince Frederick Charles during the evening of the 16th for the concentration of the Second Army on the battle-field of that day. The 12th corps was ordered to move immediately from Pont-a-Mousson to Mars-la-Tour, and the Saxon corps was brought to a point not far from Mars-la-Tour. The longest march of the Second Army was performed by the Guards, who had a distance of nineteen miles to travel from Bernecourt, which they accomplished in ten hours. Nearly all the French troops had been concentrated on the left bank of the Moselle, and consequently there was no great danger of a sortie from Metz towards the east or south. The German commanders decided that a single corps was sufficient to observe the city itself, and consequently withdrew all but the 1st corps. The 7th and 8th corps were sent over the Moselle and placed behind the 9th corps, where they formed the extreme right of the German army. The 8th corps and the 1st cavalry division, which were at the west of the St. Arnould wood, the 7th corps, occupying the valley between the Bois des Vaux and the Bois des Ognons, were ordered to remain in their positions. A few scouting parties of the French encountered the pickets of the 7th corps. Some sharp firing ensued but no serious damage was done, and the Germans had strict orders not to bring on a battle. General von Steinmetz made a reconnoissance on the Bois des Ognons, south of Gravelotte, and found that the French were in strong force in the vicinity of Gravelotte. Their number was estimated at fully three army corps, and from the commanding position where General von Steinmetz made his observation, it was easily perceived that the villages and farm-houses of St. Hubert and Point de Jour were occupied and surrounded by infantry and artillery. There were also many mitrailleuses, which fired vigorously on every Prussian skirmishing party that came within reach.
The positions allotted to the French forces on the 17th were not changed. Marshal Bazaine simply ordered the commanders to fortify themselves as much as possible. The slope of the left bank of the Moselle from the water's edge to the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville is quite steep, and covered with a thin forest. There are two narrow valleys, or gorges, that cross this slope, both of them with very steep sides; one of them is about three hundred paces from the crest of the slope, while the other, farther to the west, is a deep ravine, running first in a southerly direction and afterwards towards the east. The French army was posted on the range of hills between these two valleys. The main road between Metz and Gravelotte passes through the southern part of this slope, with a great many windings, and in places cut deeply into the earth. The slope is, for the most part, regular, and not at all steep; consequently the ground was favorable for the erection of batteries in tiers, one above the other. The French had taken advantage of this position, and thrown up a liberal number of batteries. Behind the crest of the ridge there were many positions, covered by bits or stretches of forest, and also intersected with small ravines and valleys, all of which furnished excellent cover for a defending force. The assailing party would thus be obliged to make his attack over sloping ground, which offered no cover, while the defenders were comparatively well sheltered.
The slopes of the valley through which the Meuse passes were covered with wood, but not sufficiently to interfere with the view from the French position, or detract from the effect of their fire.
Canrobert's corps, the 6th, formed the right wing of the French position. The line it occupied was known as that of Amanvillers. The 4th corps, commanded by De L'Admirault, continued the line from that of the 6th corps to Montigny-la-Grange, and had an advanced post at Champenois. The centre was formed by the 3d corps, while the 2d corps, Frossard's, had a strong position on the left. The Imperial Guards were in the rear of the left wing at Bau St. Martin, and formed the main reserve. Along the line of heights from St. Quentin to Plappeville, already described, 120 pieces of artillery were ready for action; but the forts of St. Quentin and Des Carrières were not mounted with guns. The position gave a fine view over the whole region. Marshal Bazaine established his head-quarters there on the morning of the 18th, and remained there throughout the battle.
The French front was about seven miles long, and the position was an admirable one for a defending army. The left wing was especially strong, as it occupied a steep height, which was almost inaccessible, while the right wing was not so well protected, as it had no fortification to rest upon. It is generally believed that Marshal Bazaine was still confident of escaping with his army from Metz. He was ready for an attack, and hoped that the superiority of his position, the destructive fire of his artillery, small-arms, and machine guns would be able to repel the enemy, and bring him victory. As soon as this was accomplished the time would be propitious for making his retreat. The entire arrangement of the French for the battle of the 18th was purely a defensive one, and in no manner did they intend to make it offensive. The strictest orders were issued to the corps commanders not to advance, but to retain their positions as long as possible, no matter how great might be their loss.
The German armies well understood that the battle must be an offensive one, and fought under great disadvantages of position. A concentration had been made in such a manner as to afford the greatest possible celerity in supporting any parts of the line that might be in danger. Briefly summarized, the positions were as follows:
At Mars-la-Tour, the Prussian Guards and 12th corps, with cavalry between them.
Between Trouville and Vionville, the 3d and 10th corps, with 5th and 6th cavalry divisions.
South of Rezonville, the 9th and 8th corps, with first cavalry division.
Between Bois des Ognons and Bois des Vaux, the 7th corps, forming the right wing.
At Ars-sur-Moselle, the 26th infantry brigade.
The two contingencies for which the Germans were prepared were, first, that the French might try to retire on the 18th by the northern road; and, secondly, that they might accept a battle close to the walls of Metz, and with their rear in the direction of the German frontier. King William issued a general order on the afternoon of the 17th as follows:
"The second army will get under arms to-morrow morning, August 18, at 5 o'clock, and advance with the object of cutting off the enemy's line of retreat to Verdun, and attack him wherever he may be encountered, marching in echelons."
The king personally assumed the command of the whole forces. The 12th and 9th corps moved at the appointed time, and their advance was at the Gravelotte-Conflans road. At 8.30 a.m. they had halted to wait further orders. Patrols were sent out, but they did not encounter any French. While the men were preparing for breakfast, a little after ten o'clock, orders to advance were received. The 8th, 7th, and 3d corps remained in position where they were. It was now pretty certain, as no French had been encountered, that they were not seeking to retreat from Metz to the west by way of Conflans, but had decided on the second alternative, a battle in the neighborhood of Metz. The French right wing was supposed to be at Amanvillers. It was necessary, in order to reach that position, for the three leading corps of the Second Army of the Germans to wheel to the right: a little more reconnoitring showed that the battle was to be on the broad plateau embraced between Amanvillers, Leipsic, and Moscou.
As the Germans advanced, they found that the French right extended considerably beyond Amanvillers, and hence the Guards came first into contact with the enemy. Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance to Verneville to be continued, and fire was opened on the French about noon. This may practically be said to have been the beginning of the great battle. Verneville is in the open ground between the Bois de la Casse and the Bois des Perivaux, only the latter of these woods having been occupied by the French. The Bois de la Casse was immediately occupied by the Germans, and they opened an artillery fire against the French, though they were a good 
deal troubled by a flank fire from machine guns and small-arms. The fight at this point was maintained for at least two hours by the 11th corps, when it was relieved by the artillery of the Prussian Guards Corps which came in on the north.
While this was going on, the French attacked the 25th division with a furious artillery fire to the westward of Bois de la Casse. They were strongly posted at St. Privat and Amanvillers, and it was very evident that here some very hard fighting would be required to drive them out.
About noon, the Prussian Guards renewed the advance from Doncourt and Caulre-Ferme. The extension of the French right beyond Amanvillers made it necessary for the entire corps of the Guards to make a larger sweep than had been originally contemplated, in order to attack the French right wing in flank and double it up. Accordingly, Prince Frederick Charles, who had reached Verneville about one o'clock, ordered the Guards to march on Habonville, in order to make the movement which has been designated. The 12th corps had by this time brought its advance to Battilly. Constant reconnoissances showed that the French right extended beyond St. Privat, and that Marie aux Chenes was also strongly held. Prince August of Wurtemburg received orders to engage the enemy in his front with artillery, only keeping back his infantry until the 12th corps had been brought up. The 10th corps was at that time advancing to Battilly, and the 3d corps towards Verneville.
General von Steinmetz waited until the sound of the cannonade from Verneville indicated that the 9th corps was engaged. He then commanded the 8th corps to advance into line of battle by way of Rezonville and Gravelotte. This occurred about mid-day, and before one o'clock the position east and south of Gravelotte had been occupied by the Germans, and they opened fire on the French with fifty guns. The machine guns and chassepots at St. Hubart and at Point de Jour opened an effective fire upon them, but it was not sufficient to drive them out or to diminish the rapidity, vigor, and precision of their artillery practice.
A little before two o'clock, orders were given to advance the infantry in order to drive the French out of the southern part of the Bois des Perivaux. The 15th infantry division of the 8th corps made a rush for the wood, where they encountered four battalions of French infantry. They occupied the southern part of the wood, but farther along they were stoutly resisted by the French and made very little progress. As soon as the cannonade began. General von Zastrow advanced on Gravelotte and the Bois dcs Ognons. They opened a vigorous fire, which relieved in great measure the 8th corps. By two o'clock, the artillery of the Guards and of the 9th corps on the German left and of the 7th and 8th corps on the right were in full play. Nearly 250 cannon were being fired with rapidity and precision, but only one division, the 16th, had been able to take the offensive. The two infantry divisions of the 9th corps were quite inactive, as it was necessary for them to wait until the left wing of the Second Army had completed its deployment.
The artillery combat was vigorously maintained for several hours, and as vigorously opposed. By four o'clock some fifteen or twenty guns had been dismounted or in some way became useless, and most of the batteries had exhausted their ammunition. Several times the French endeavored to compel the artillery to retire, but each attempt to do so was successfully resisted. A little after four o'clock, the artillery fighting on the left wing became more advantageous for the Germans. The French fire at St. Privat and also at Amanvillers and Montigny had been pretty nearly silenced by the fire of no less than fourteen full batteries of the Germans. Some of the German divisions suffered severely by the steady fire of shell and canister which were poured in by the French batteries; in spite of this they held to their position and showed no signs whatever of retreating.
There was a severe fight at St. Marie aux Chenes between three battalions of French and the 5th and 6th Saxon regiments together with the first division of the Guards. The Germans attacked under very great disadvantages. The ground in the vicinity of St. Marie is quite open, and the men had no cover whatever against the French fire. The bullets from the chassepots and machine guns poured like hail across this ground as soon as the Germans began their advance. Their only way was to make a rush of perhaps one hundred or two hundred paces, then throw themselves flat on the ground and begin firing; and as soon as they had taken breath, rise and repeat the movement. Rush after rush was made in this way. Many of the Germans were killed and wounded, but the advance continued. When the Germans were within one hundred yards of the village, the French evacuated it, not caring to wait for the last rush.
At five o'clock in the afternoon, the French army was holding all its principal positions from one end of the line to the other, and had only lost a few unimportant points. The 6th corps on the right wing held its ground at St. Privat and Roncourt. The 4th corps was also unmoved in its position at Amanvillers and Montigny-la-Grange; but the 3d corps had been compelled to evacuate the Bois des Vaux in front of its left wing, although it was still in its strong position on the Moscou Heights. In front of the 2d corps, every attack of the Germans had been repulsed. The Imperial Guard was still held in reserve and was impatient to be brought forward. Marshal Bazaine was confident that the day would end in a victory for the French, in view of the circumstance that the Germans had lost much more heavily than his own army and had gained no position of consequence.
But he was not aware that up to that time the Germans had only brought about half their disposable forces into action, and that a large body of German troops was ready to advance on both wings, especially on the left. Excepting the artillery, only one infantry brigade of the 12th corps and the Prussian Guards had been in action at St. Marie, while the two reserve corps of the left wing were ready to be brought forward. The 7th and 8th corps on the left wing and the 16th infantry division and the 2d corps with parts of other divisions and brigades were ready to be brought into action whenever desired. In brief, it may be said that three corps had been in action, while there were five corps, including the Prussian Guards, which were practically fresh for the fight.
For five hours the battle had been steadily raging on the right of the Guards without any gain on one side or the other. The day was ending, and if the Germans were to secure a victory prompt action was necessary. Unless the battle could be made decisive before the sun went down, it was possible that the French army during the night would concentrate and occupy a still stronger position on the next day than they were occupying on the morning of the 18th. Prince Augustus, of Würtemburg, determined to send the Guards to the attack without waiting for the arrival of the Saxon corps, which had been marching to join him. Consequently, three brigades of the Guards were sent to assault the French position at St. Privat.
This position at St. Privat was a very strong one, and any commander of troops would be justified in hesitating to attack it. Close behind the crest of the hill the ground slopes quite steeply in the direction of Metz, while on the west side the slope is gradual and regular for a distance of two thousand paces, and offering no cover of any kind to an advancing force. Furthermore, all the houses of St. Privat had been loopholed, so that the place formed a sort of fortress. The attacking army was obliged to advance over this wide open space, and fully half the distance they would be unable to use their rifles, but at the same time would be under fire of the French machine guns and artillery.
The assault was led by the 4th brigade. The skirmishers were thrown out on the front and the batteries followed closely. The French were ready for them, and as soon as they were within range, the artillery, machine guns, and small-arms opened upon them with full vigor, cutting wide swaths in their ranks and covering the ground with dead and wounded. But the advance was continued in spite of this furious fire; the commanders and their staff officers remained on horseback in order that they might better control the troops, but so many of them were killed that they soon dismounted. The slaughter became so great that the commander ordered a halt, fearing that the brigade would be annihilated before reaching the line of the enemy. Just then the Saxon corps was seen advancing at double quick to the north of St. Privat, and immediately the order to advance was renewed. The soldiers made a tremendous rush, each man endeavoring to get at close quarters with the enemy. The French defended every position, fighting desperately, but they were beaten at last. The Saxon and German columns had so closely timed their movements that they met in the streets of St. Privat. In a little while they had driven out the French and were in full possession of the place.
By this time it was nearly dark. The French took up fresh positions in the woods a little distance away, and also in the quarries at the edge of the woods. The Germans were unable to pursue, partly on account of their great loss and partly because of the darkness. The reverse of the French in the capture of St. Privat soon became known along the whole line of Marshal Bazaine's army. The effect was demoralizing, and the French soon began to retreat in disorder, abandoning their arms, tents, and equipage, and seeking safety inside the walls of Metz. But the darkness which prevented the advance of the Germans also made it impossible for Marshal Bazaine to send the Imperial Guard to drive back the assailants. The battle was over. As soon as night set in all advance of the Germans was suspended. They encamped on the field and cared for the wounded.
The loss of the Germans was very much greater than that of the French, as they had been throughout the day the attacking party. The German loss was given at 904 officers and 19,000 men, while that of the French was stated to be 809 officers and 11,000 men. On the German side 310 officers and 4,000 men were killed; among them were 22 field officers. One hundred and twelve of the slain officers belonged entirely to the corps of the Guards.
The fighting forces of the armies in the battle of Gravelotte were 211,000 Germans, of whom 146,000 were in the first line and 65,000 in the reserve. The French were estimated at 112,000 in strongly entrenched positions. The losses were, consequently, one eighth of the men in action for the French, and somewhat more than one seventh of the Germans.
The defeat of the French at Gravelotte caused Bazaine's army to retire within the fortifications of Metz, where it was besieged by a portion of the German forces, while the remainder, which comprised the greater part of the First and Second Armies, were free to pursue MacMahon, whose army was reorganizing at Chalons, reinforced by Failly's corps, a part of Felix Douay's, and a great body of reserves. Bazaine made several ineffectual attempts to break through the investing forces, and finally surrendered on the 27th of October, the surrender including 3 marshals, 66 generals, 6,000 officers, and 173,000 men. There were delivered up, as prizes of war, 400 pieces of artillery, 100 mitrailleuses, and 53 standards, besides the amount of small-arms appropriate to the strength of the capitulated army. The battle of Gravelotte carried momentous consequences in its result. It was the prelude to the fall of Sedan, and with Sedan fell the empire of Napoleon Third.
