Dictionary of National Biography, 1927 supplement/White, George Stuart
WHITE, Sir GEORGE STUART (1835–1912), field-marshal, was born at Whitehall, co. Antrim, 6 July 1835, the eldest son of James Robert White, of Whitehall, by his wife, Frances, daughter of George Stuart. Entering the army from Sandhurst in 1853 he served in the Indian Mutiny with the 27th Foot (Inniskilling Fusiliers) and subsequently transferred to the 92nd (Gordon) Highlanders. It was with this regiment, after twenty-six years of service, that he, as a major, obtained his first chance of winning distinction. In the Afghan War of 1879–1880, during the advance of Major-General (afterwards Earl) Roberts [q.v.] from Charasia to Kabul, White, in command of some 200 of the 92nd Highlanders, managed by skilful leading and great courage to outflank the Afghans in the Saug-i-nawishta gorge (6 October 1879), and so was largely instrumental in clearing the way for the remainder of the force. Roberts said of this exploit: ‘From an inspection of the ground, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that much of the success which attended the operations on this side was due to White's military instincts, and, at one moment, to his extreme personal gallantry.’ Thenceforward White's advancement was as rapid and remarkable as it had hitherto been slow and ordinary. At the end of the Afghan War he received the V.C. for his feat at Charasia and was made a C.B. and brevet lieutenant-colonel. In 1880 he was military secretary to the viceroy of India. After a short spell of duty at home in command of the 92nd, he went again on active service to Egypt as assistant quartermaster-general (1884–1885). In the latter year war broke out in Burma, and White was given the command of a brigade for operations in that country. Mandalay was speedily taken by the force under Major-General (Sir) Harry Prendergast [q.v.], but, as was usually the case in Burmese wars, there followed a long and tedious conflict with bands of dacoits, a conflict aggravated in this instance by the action of the frontier tribes, who thought their opportunity had come for avenging themselves on their Burmese neighbours. In quelling this guerrilla warfare and in the pacification of Upper Burma White played a leading part and established his reputation both as a general and as an administrator. At the conclusion of the War in 1887 the government of India reported that ‘the success of these operations, which have involved great hardship and labour on the troops, and the satisfactory progress made towards the pacification of the country, must be ascribed in a very large measure to the skill, judgment, and ability of Sir George White.’ For his services he had been made K.C.B. in 1886, and he was promoted major-general in 1889.
In the latter year White was transferred from Burma to command at Quetta, where for the first time he was brought in a responsible position into contact with the problems of the North-Western Frontier of India. The controversy between those who desired to make the Indus the administrative frontier and those who desired to extend it to the borders of Afghanistan was at its height; but the ‘forward’ school, with the powerful support of the commander-in-chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, and of the viceroy, the Marquess of Lansdowne, was in the ascendant, and White, who was an enthusiastic supporter of Roberts's views, at once became an instrument of that policy. In the autumn of 1889 he was entrusted with the command of the Zhob Valley expedition. The operations, directed against a tribe which had long made their almost inaccessible mountain home a base for raids into British territory, were admirably planned and skilfully executed. White, having scaled the heights of the Maramazh, surrounded the principal village of the tribe, which surrendered at discretion. In the following years, in conjunction with Sir Robert Groves Sandeman [q.v.], he was occupied with the pacification of Baluchistan, to this day the one lasting achievement of the ‘forward’ policy. In this work he displayed considerable political and diplomatic gifts and was successful in the not always easy task of working harmoniously with his civilian coadjutors.
For his services in Baluchistan White was made G.C.I.E. in 1893; and when, in that year, Roberts's long term of command in India came to a close, he was chosen over the heads of a number of seniors to be his successor. His period of supreme command in India saw the greatest development of the ‘forward’ policy. Encouraged by his success in Baluchistan, he supported the policy of opening up communications beyond the Indus and subjugating the unruly tribesmen of the Himalaya. This policy brought about a succession of frontier campaigns. During this period the gradual approach of Russia to the northern frontier of Afghanistan and the menace of a Russian attack upon India were the principal military preoccupations, and the chief argument of the advocates of the ‘forward’ policy was the necessity, in view of this menace, of obtaining better control of the tribes of the North-Western Frontier, and thereby more influence in Afghanistan. White's command began with a small expedition in 1894 against the Abor tribe on the North-Eastern Frontier. This was followed in 1895 by the more considerable Chitral campaign, due to the revolt of Umra Khan, who besieged in Chitral fort the commissioner, (Sir) George Scott Robertson [q.v.], and a small garrison. The expedition of relief which was successfully carried through had more than local importance in view of Russian approaches to the Pamirs. The Chitral campaign was followed in 1897 by a succession of outbreaks along the frontier, which were the cause of expeditions into the Tochi Valley of Baluchistan, the Swat Valley, and against the Mohmands; and before these were terminated the most warlike and important tribes of the frontier, the Afridis and the Orakzais, rose and burned the British forts in the Khyber Pass. There followed the Tirah campaign, the most considerable military enterprise of which India had been the scene since the days of the Mutiny. While the responsibility for the policy of these expeditions rested with the viceroy, the Earl of Elgin, who had followed the tradition established by Lord Lansdowne, White was responsible for their planning and organization. All of them were successful in obtaining the objects immediately aimed at, but the permanent gains were small. It has been said, with reason, that a less ambitious enterprise than the Tirah campaign, more swiftly executed, would have had better results. White probably hoped that by operations on a considerable scale the problem would be solved once and for all. In that he was not successful. His term as commander-in-chief was in other respects remarkable for the training which he inaugurated (particularly of the British troops) in the intricacies of mountain warfare, and for the advancement of the musketry instruction of the Indian army. For his services as commander-in-chief he was made G.C.B., and at the end of 1897 he was appointed quartermaster-general at the War Office.
In September 1899, on the outbreak of the Boer War, White was sent in command to Natal with the task of saving that province from invasion. There he was confronted with a far more serious problem than any created by the tribes of the Indian frontier, a problem more serious indeed than had confronted any British general then alive. His predecessor in command in Natal, Sir William Penn Symons [q.v.], had taken up a forward position on the frontier at Dundee; and though White desired to concentrate his whole force in the neighbourhood of Ladysmith, which was the strategically wise course, he allowed himself to be overruled by the dashing and adventurous Symons, and the campaign in Natal began with the British forces divided. At that time no one believed that the Boers would show the tactical skill and cohesion which they in fact displayed, and the advantage which their mobility conferred upon them was much underrated. There were, therefore, arguments on behalf of the plan adopted, mistaken though it proved to be. After a successful engagement with the Boers at Talana (20 October), in which Symons lost his life, the Dundee column made good its retreat to Ladysmith. The next day the Boers were again repulsed by Major-General French at Elandslaagte, but by that time the horns of the invasion had extended far into Natal. An unfortunate night enterprise at Nicholson's Nek, which ended in a complete failure, ruined White's plan for engaging the enemy at Lombard's Kop (30 October), and the whole of his forces were shut up in Ladysmith (2 November). It would have been possible for White to retreat across the river Tugela, but it would have been a hazardous undertaking, entailing the abandonment of a large quantity of ammunition and stores, while the moral effect would have been even more considerable than was that of the investment. White maintained that by attracting the Boers to Ladysmith he preserved the rest of Natal from invasion. In this he was shown by the result to have been right. The balance of military argument is in favour of White's decision in a very difficult and critical situation. It has been said that White's defence was lacking in enterprise and that his choice of the lines of defence was not the best. Mistakes—common in war—there may have been, yet there is no question but that he kept the enemy at bay; for only once, in the rough and tumble fights of Waggon Hill and Caesar's Camp (6 January), did they make any attempt to close, while his indomitable courage inspired a defence which more than once had cause for despair. After a siege of 118 days, Ladysmith was relieved (28 February) by the advance of the Natal field force, Lord Roberts's invasion of the Free State having drawn away a number of besiegers. It is with the defence of Ladysmith that White's name will always be associated, and he deserves to be honourably remembered for his reply to the suggestion of Sir Redvers Buller [q.v.], after the latter's defeat at Colenso (15 December), that he should make terms: ‘The loss of 10,000 men would be a heavy blow to England; we must not think of it.’ Broken in health as a result of the siege, he came home to be appointed governor of Gibraltar, where on the occasion of a visit by King Edward he received the baton of field-marshal. In 1905 he was awarded the order of merit, and was made governor of Chelsea Hospital, where he died 24 June 1912.
White married in 1874 Amy, the only daughter of the Venerable Joseph Baly, archdeacon of Calcutta, and had one son and four daughters.
[Earl Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 2 vols., 1897; Howard Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879–1880, 1881; A. Durand, The Making of a Frontier, 1889; L. James, The Indian Frontier War, 1898; Sir J. F. Maurice, and M. H. Grant, (Official) History of the War in South Africa, 3 vols., 1906–1910.]