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Early English adventurers in the East (1917)/Chapter 12

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3183553Early English adventurers in the East (1917) — Chapter XII.—English and Dutch Rivalry in the EastArnold Wright

CHAPTER XII

English and Dutch Rivalry in the East

The fight for the spice trade—The Dutch predominance in the Eastern Archipelago—Dutch hostility to the English—Jourdain's expedition to the Moluccas—Jan Pietereoon Coen, the great Dutch administrator—His interview with Jourdain—Jourdain driven from the Moluccas—Deplorable condition of the English at Bantam—The English occupy Poolo Ai—Further English expedition to the Moluccas—Its withdrawal—Dutch re-occupy Poolo Ai

THERE are many strange features about the establishment of British power in Asia, but none quite so remarkable as the circumstances which fixed the centre of English authority in India in the earliest period. The East India Company, when it embarked on its enterprise, as has been narrated, concentrated its attention on the spice trade. If it thought of India at all it was only as a possible secondary field which might be developed in some future period. It was very much in this spirit of vague adventure that the Company's agents first went to Surat and they were established there far more by the fortuitous association of Sir Henry Middleton with the Indian traders in the Red Sea, than by any arrangements definitely made with that end. Roe's Embassy, no doubt, was in the nature of a carefully planned endeavour to obtain a permanent foothold on the Continent of India. But when we turn to look at the circumstances which attended and followed it we cannot fail to be struck once more with "the stream of tendency" which, apart from direct initiative, induced, we might almost say compelled, the English to regard India as their first and greatest charge.

Prominently amongst these influences was the long struggle for ascendancy in the Eastern Seas which the English and Dutch waged in these early years of the seventeenth century. That contest, as the narrative will show, continued over a long period, more than two centuries, in fact—but the main issue of whether English or Dutch influence should predominate in the Eastern Archipelago was settled in the very earliest years by the overwhelming strength which the Dutch were able to concentrate in the disputed region. The English might have asserted themselves with effect even against these great odds if they had not taken upon themselves their Indian responsibilities. But it was more to them to widen their splendid opportunities in India than to stake their all on a dubious contest to secure possession of markets which could not be held without vast expenditure. So each dropped gradually into its appointed place in Asia, the English securing a position of commercial influence and ultimately of political supremacy on the Indian Continent, and the Dutch obtaining a like predominancy in the Eastern Archipelago. Neither was able ultimately to challenge seriously its opponent on its own special ground. By that very fact the destiny of each was more securely fixed, for it is obvious that if there had been less definitely marked spheres of influence the final result must have been very different by the action and counteraction of rivalries and conflicting interests.

The prize for which English and Dutch contended in the Eastern Seas was a fascinating one. From the remotest ages the Spice Islands had figured in the world's history as a region of surpassing natural wealth. They had contributed to the dead Empires of Africa and of Asia the peculiar products which were necessary adjuncts of their civilization. They had ministered to the luxuries of Rome in her palmiest days, and later, as Raffles has aptly pointed out, through their influence on the commerce of the Italian States, had "communicated the first electric spark which awoke to life the energies and the literature of Europe." Portugal, too, had derived not a little of the wealth, which brought her for a period to the front rank of European nations, from these beautiful islets, while the Dutch, even in the short period of their connexion with the region, had drawn immense sums from the highly profitable trade which they had established in their staple products. These circumstances sufficiently account for the dogged resolution with which the exclusive policy was pursued from the very first moment that the English competition in the region became serious.

Of the two races, as the reader knows, the English were the first to exploit the Spice Islands. Sir Francis Drake visited them on the occasion of his famous voyage round the world in 1579, and established relations which, if they had been followed up, would have changed the whole situation. But nothing further was done for many years, and meanwhile the Dutch had made the best use of their opportunities. Instead of sending out a few ships at irregular intervals, they directed to the Eastern Seas a constant succession of well-equipped fleets which penetrated to every part of the Archipelago to the great enhancement of Dutch influence.

Quite early in their Eastern career they came into violent collision with the Portuguese who, with their historic stronghold at Malacca, were able to impose a formidable barrier to the progress of the adventurers. The Hollanders accepted the challenge with a spirit which doubtless took a keener edge from the memory of wrongs perpetrated in the Low Countries by the predecessors of the then ruler of Portugal and Spain. In one great fight ofi Malacca in 1606 the Dutch lost no fewer than 600 men killed. There were other actions less deadly, but whose cumulative effect must have been to place a great drain upon the Company's resources. With such stubborn determination was the war carried on that in 1607 it was stated in a communication from the English Ambassador in Spain to the Government in England that the losses incurred in the East Indies by the allied nations at the hands of the Dutch were of such a character as to have inflicted "in those places a wound almost incurable," In point of fact, within ten years of their first appearance in the Eastern Seas the Dutch had firmly established their power almost throughout the region in which the spice trade was actively prosecuted.

It would have argued an exceptionally generous temperament on the part of the Dutch, in view of the enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure they had made to secure a paramount position, if they had regarded the efforts of the English to engage in the spice trade in the Archipelago otherwise than with distrust and dislike. Rightly or wrongly they considered themselves the sole inheritors by virtue of their conquests of the Portuguese and Spanish monopoly, and they were the more disposed to adopt this view as they had from the very outset concluded with the native chiefs of the various islands, and notably with the King of Ternate, one of the Moluccas group, who stood in the relation of suzerain to many of the minor princes, agreements or treaties under which the local authorities bound themselves to supply their spices only to the Dutch and to them under rigid conditions which practically made serfs of the islanders. But if the Dutch attitude was a natural one still more so was that of the English when they resolutely declined to accept the theory of exclusive rights which their trade rivals sought to establish. They took the line that the seas were open to all, that free trade was an inalienable right of every nation, and that if the Hollanders had done the principal part in breaking the Portuguese monopoly, they would never have achieved the amount of success they did if the way had not been prepared for them by England's defeat of the Great Armada in 1588.

In a controversy of this character, in which there was an element of right on each side, and in which there was a substantial financial interest involved the issue was certain to be fiercely contested. But probably neither party at the outset dreamed that so bitter and prolonged a quarrel would develop from it as that it gave rise to. The English, at all events, seem to have had little conception of the difficulties which the Dutch were to interpose to their trading until they were actually confronted with them.

The earliest purely trading visit paid to the Moluccas was that made by Sir Henry Middleton in 1604. On this occasion excellent relations were established with the natives and, no doubt, if the voyage had been followed up immediately a lodgment might have been effected which the Dutch could not have challenged. But nothing further of consequence was done until 1609 when Keeling took a ship to the Moluccas and was warned off by the Dutch in such circumstances as to leave him no alternative but to comply with the mandate. David Middleton in 1610 had a like experience when he attempted to trade with Banda, one of the principal islands of the group.

At last the English Company's eyes were opened to the full significance of the claims made by the Dutch. In their indignation they appealed to the Government through the Lord Treasurer for redress of their "notorious injuries." The response came somewhat later in the appointment of Joint Commissioners by England and Holland to consider the points in dispute. The conference, which was held in London in 1613, sat for two months without result and was then dissolved on the understanding that the matters should be reconsidered later.

Meanwhile, another effort was being made to penetrate the monopolistic wall which the Dutch had raised in the Moluccas. Jourdain, whose acquaintance the reader has made in a previous chapter, early in 1613 proceeded from Bantam to the Moluccas in the Darling. The natives who had had a taste of the cruel mercies of the Dutch, everywhere he touched received him with enthusiasm, but he had not been long in the islands before he received from Steven Coteels, the Dutch Resident at Amboina, a warning not to trade with the natives in spices, on the ground that to do so would be to infringe Dutch rights. Later on this was endorsed in peremptory terms in a letter sent by Coteel's superior, the Governor of Amboina.

Jourdain, who was of the true bull-dog type of commander which the Company's service seemed to breed, forwarded a defiant message in reply, asserting that the trade of the islands was free to all men, stating that he knew of no contracts with the natives, and declaring that even if such existed they did not concern him. Acting on this independent view he commenced to trade at Hitoe, but had not proceeded far before he discovered that the islanders were in such deadly fear of the Hollanders that he could do little business. Jourdain now turned his attention to Ceram, an adjoining island of the group, which appeared to offer better prospects, as the Dutch influence there was not so powerful as at Amboina. At Luhu, one of the principal ports of the island, the English Commander saw the native chief and preferred to him a request for a site for a factory. The chief replied that the application must be made to the King of Temate, but he allowed it to be understood that the English would be welcomed if they could be sure that they would not suffer for their display of friendliness at the hands of the Dutch.

In consequence of this declaration Jourdain decided to seek an interview with the Dutch Governor in order to satisfy himself as to the precise attitude that was assumed. At the Dutch headquarters he found in the supreme official position Jan Pietersoon Coen, thereafter to become famous in Dutch history as the greatest of Grovemor Generals of Netherlands India. Coen was a man of stern, unyielding disposition, ambitious, and, according to his lights, intensely patriotic. He was largely the inspirer of the Dutch monopolistic policy and he pursued it throughout his career with a determination and a skill which largely contributed to the measure of success which ultimately attended it.

The meeting between two such men on an occasion in which clashing interests were so sharply opposed was bound to be of a stormy character. It was all that, if we may accept the account of the interview which Jourdain sets forth in his diary. From this it is to be gathered that Coen met the Englishman's hot protests against the exclusion of his ship from the trade of the islands by a torrent of objurgation. "In cholleric manner he (Coen) upbraided him for lingering in the countries that were under their protection as itt were in despite of them, affirming that whosoever bought any cloves in these countries without their consent so much stole from them and, therefore, they would prevent it if by any means they might." Jourdain retorted in kind, reaffirming in the strongest language that the trade of the islands was as free to the English as it was to the Dutch and that they would not be driven from the region by Dutch threatenings. The conference closed with a display of angry feeling which boded ill for the future relations of the two races.

At a later period in the day Jourdain attended a gathering of the leading natives, who having been told the upshot of the interview, protested in vehement terms their desire for commercial relations with the English. As Coen had denied that the islanders were willing to trade with any outsiders, the Dutch officials were summoned to hear from their own lips the truth. The Hollanders attended with reluctance and listened in silence to the declarations of the chiefs in favour of free trade. But the next day a letter, which was virtually an ultimatum, was sent to the English Commander directing him to depart. The missive was returned by Jourdain on the ground that he could not understand Dutch. A day or two later another communication was forthcoming, written in Portuguese and directing the English Commander in even more peremptory terms to depart the country or take the consequences. By this time all trade with the natives had ceased and it had become clear that the earlier relations could not be restored without a greater force than that at Jourdain's disposal. Recognizing the hopelessness of his position the English Commander, when he had taken in supplies at an adjoining port, departed for Bantam.

After calling at Macassar on his way and establishing a small factory there, under the charge of George Cokayne, Jourdain reached the Javan port towards the end of 1613. A terrible disappointment awaited him here. He had expected to find a flourishing English factory with resources which would have enabled him to renew the struggle with the Dutch, but when he entered the port there were no signs of English life. On the Dutch factory the ensign was hoisted and struck twice in curious fashion, as if to give warning to the incoming ship. Jourdain, accepting the signal in this light, called his men to action and cast loose his ordnance to be ready for any emergency. After a period of suspense a boat came off from the shore and four Englishmen, "all of them like ghosts or men fraighted" clambered with difficulty on board. They brought with them lamentable tidings of the condition of the factory.

"I could not number any man of note, but was dead of the the number of 140 persons," wrote Jourdain, "and the rest which were remaining as well on land as aboard the Traders Increase were all sick, these four persons being the strongest of them, who were scarce able to keep on their legges."

In the presence of such a lamentable condition of weakness Jourdain had to dismiss all thoughts of further action Eastward and concentrate his attention on the question of saving the situation at Bantam. The whole of 1614 shipped away without any means offering of taking up the Dutch challenge. Mainly through the Agent at Macassar came to hand many urgent messages from the Bandanese, imploring English help against their Dutch oppressors. Since Jourdain's visit a state of almost open warfare had existed on the islands in which the Dutch, under Coen, had acted with ruthless severity. Eager as the Company's agents were to intervene, it was not until the opening weeks of 1615 that they were in a position to send ships. At that juncture they dispatched, with George Ball and Cokayne, the Maccasar agent, in command, the ship Concord and a small pinnace called the Speedwell, to the Bandas and Ceram.

Ignoring the protests of the Dutch, the Englishmen occupied Poolo Ai, a small island off Banda, and entered into close relations with the natives on the adjacent and larger islands. They were received with an enthusiasm which spoke eloquently of the islanders' hopes of relief from the oppressive yoke which had been imposed upon them. In touching language the natives gave vent to their feelings as to the Dutch. Visiting the town of Lonthor, the Englishmen were received by two of the principal men, one of whom, pointing to the Dutch castle burst out:—"It makes old men to weep and wish that the child that is unborn shall be born dead: as God hath given them a country to them and theirs, so He hath sent the Hollanders as a plage unto them, making wars upon them and by unjust proceedings seeking to take their country from them."

The Dutch appear to have been equally communicative to the Englishmen and quite as outspoken. Cokayne was told by the Dutch "General" that the English were "rogues and rascals," and the Honourable Company was "most vilely railed at" by the same functionary.

In the Straits of Amboina, whither the Concord proceeded, a welcome reinforcement was met in the vessel Thomassin which had been sent on from Bantam. Encouraged by the appearance of English strength, the natives were everywhere extremely friendly, and both at Luhu and Cambello sites for factories were offered. But the Dutch were speedily upon the scene in such force that after an exchange of shots with them the English were compelled to withdraw and return to Bantam.

On their departure the Dutch turned on the unfortunate natives intent on wreaking revenge on them for the encouragement they had given to their hated rivals. Their first efforts were marked by a disaster which might have had grave consequences for them if the English had been at hand to give the natives efficient backing. On landing a large body of men on Banda the force was attacked by natives and had to retire with a loss of upwards of three hundred men—a very substantial proportion of the total garrison in the Moluccas at the period. Encouraged by this success the natives sent an envoy to the English authorities at Bantam to implore their support in the further stages of the contest. Jourdain, who was in charge, in response to the appeal re-equipped the Thomassin, the Concord and the Speedwell, and with the ships Clove and Defence, which had just arrived from England, despatched them to Banda in the early days of 1616.

The little squadron arrived at Poolo Ai on March 2, and found that the Dutch were concentrating a large force at Neira, a port opposite Lonthor, in Banda, intent on wiping out the reverse of the previous year. The moment seemed at last to have come when conclusions would be tried between the Dutch and the English. On March a fleet of nine Dutch ships appeared off Poolo Ai with the declared determination of either driving the English ships away or sinking them.

At a council of war held on the English Admiral's ship it was decided to "stand the coming of the Hollanders." Two days later, when the Dutch ships had approached much nearer a second council was held at which the resolution was formed to "cut hawsers, let slip their cables and go out to meet the Hollanders." The Dutch, on their side, were not idle. Four of their ships "worked to the windward and seized the weathergage," while the remainder spread to leeward to block the progress of the ships in that direction. The manoeuvre brought home to the English Commander the risks which he would rim in forcing an action. While the Dutch ships were all well found and well manned, his own vessels were small and had only weak crews. On resurveying the situation he came to the conclusion that he ought not to incur the great responsibility of fighting with the odds so heavily against him. He therefore concluded an arrangement with the Dutch by which he withdrew his vessels, leaving the unfortunate natives once more to the tender mercies of their taskmasters. An attempt was made by the so-called rebels on Poolo Ai to secure immunity by hoisting the English flag, but the Dutch landed on the island, tore down the flag and afterwards built a strong fort, which they christened Fort Revenge, to strengthen their hold upon the island.