Early English adventurers in the East (1917)/Chapter 13
CHAPTER XIII
Faithful unto Death
New expedition to the Moluccas under Nathaniel Courthope—Occupation of Poolo Roon by the English—Dutch expedition to evict the English—Courthope's defiance—The Dutch capture the English ship Swan—Courthope prepares for a Dutch attack—The English ship Defence captured by the Dutch—The Dutch Governor General Reaal seeks an accommodation with Courthope—Courthope declines his terms—Dutch proclamation against the English—Unsuccessful attempt to relieve Courthope—Courthope's indomitable spirit—Sir Thomas Dale conducts an expedition against the Dutch—Action off Batavia—The Dutch retire to the Moluccas—English occupation of Jakatra (Batavia)—Dale returns to India—His death—Dutch attack on English ships at Patani—Jourdain is treacherously slain—Isolation of Courthope — His gallant fight against odds and his heroic end
JOURDAIN, though naturally mortified at the failure of his plans, was not disposed to give up the attempt to break the Dutch monopoly, more especially as he was imbued with the belief that the Hollanders would not use force if they were put to the extreme test. Once more he prepared to send an expedition to the Eastward. Besides the Defence, of 300 tons, he had available for the purpose a new ship, the Swan, of 400 tons. What was more to the purpose, he had at hand in Nathaniel Courthope just the right kind of man to take the command in such an enterprise.
Courthope is a name little known in English history, yet it is entitled to a high place amongst the list of humble heroes who in various parts of the world and in differing situations have at one time or another "kept the flag flying." Until he was entrusted with the command of this expedition he does not appear to have occupied any very responsible position, but Jourdain doubtless knew his worth and selected him especially for those strong qualities which he displayed so conspicuously in this adventure, the details of which we have now to relate.
The instructions given to Courthope directed him, after a call at Macassar, to proceed to Poolo Roon, an island near Poolo Ai, where he was to make inquiry as to the relations between the Dutch and the natives, and if possible to induce the latter to ratify under their hands and seals a formal surrender of all or part of such island as was at their disposal. A similar course was to be adopted in the cases of Lonthor and Rosengyn, but he was to take no action in regard to Poolo Ai beyond notifying the Dutch of the English claim to the island. He was further instructed to land ordnance on Poolo Roon, if the natives should request him to do so. Finally, he was specially cautioned as to his behaviour towards the islanders who were described as "peevish, perverse, diffident and perfidious, apt to take disgust on small occasions, and being moved are more cumbersome than wasps."
On arrival off Poolo Roon early in 1617 Courthope proceeded at once to make his commission effective. The native authorities cordially responded to his request to agree to a transfer of the island. They did this in the approved fashion "with earth and a young nutmeg tree and with writings drawn and confirmed under the hand of the principal gentry and seal or chop of the country." Thereafter the English flag was hoisted and saluted and six guns were landed and mounted in two batteries near the shore in preparation for all eventualities. The Dutch were not slow to take up the gauntlet which Courthope had so defiantly thrown down. A few days after the ceremony described, Cornelis Dedel, the Dutch Commander at Neira, appeared off Poolo Roon with three ships fully manned, prepared to evict the intruders. He anchored two of his vessels near the Swan and Defence and the third was placed between the ships and the shore to prevent assistance being rendered from that quarter. But Dedel had reckoned without the shore batteries, and when he discovered these and found also that the natives were fully prepared to back the English he reluctantly withdrew to await reinforcements from Amboina.
The next move on the Dutch side was to send a pinnace to take soundings off a small island called Nailaka which lies close to the northern shore of Poolo Roon. This position, if in Dutch hands, would have enabled them to dominate the anchorage at Poolo Roon, and accordingly by Courthope's orders shots were fired at the pinnace to drive her away. No damage was done or was intended, but the firing was a direct act of hostility which the Dutch were quick to utilize as a justification for their own acts of violence which followed.
Courthope's position, which was never strong, was weakened at this critical moment by dissensions which appeared in the ships' companies and notably amongst the landsmen who did not relish the prospect before them of spending an indefinite time on this remote island. Davis, the master of the Swan, sided with the disaffected faction, and announced his intention to take his ship to Lonthor to fill his water casks. When Courthope found that his colleague was not to be dissuaded from his headstrong course by his earnest representations as to the danger which he would incur in separating from him at such a time of crisis, he instructed him to proceed to Rosengyn and establish there a factory which the natives had expressed their willingness to permit. Davis carried out this order, entering into an agreement with the island authorities similar to that concluded by Courthope at Poolo Roon. He then directed his course to Ceram to a point where he knew he could obtain water. After a few days spent at this spot in watering and victualling operations he started on the return voyage to Poolo Roon. But he had not proceeded far before he encountered the Dutch ship Morgenstine with Dedel in command.
A fierce attack was at once delivered by the Hollanders whose superiority in men and armament was so marked that the result of the conflict was never seriously in doubt. In a short space of time many of the small crew were either killed or wounded by the well sustained fire maintained by the Dutch soldiers who crowded the deck of the Morgenstine. The vessel then fell an easy prize to the Dutch. It was taken in triumph to Neira, the Hollanders " much glorying in this victory, showing the Bandanese their exploit in the great disgrace of the English . . . saying that the King of England might not compare with their great King of Holland, and that one Holland ship would take ten of the English ships and that St. George is now turned child."
When Courthope heard of the capture of the Swan he sent the purser of the Defence under a flag of truce to demand her restitution. As he had probably anticipated, the reply of the Dutch was a contemptuous refusal. Before his envoy returned he had worked out for himself a complete plan of defence based on the idea that he would have to rely upon his own resources probably for a considerable period. He dismantled the Defence and had her guns and stores removed to Nailaka, which he converted into a fortified camp sufficiently strong to resist almost any attack that the Dutch were likely to make upon it. The empty ship, he contemplated, should be moored near the shore so that she could not be readily attacked, or if attacked might be destroyed to save her from capture.
The scheme was probably as sound a one as could have been devised in the peculiar circumstances in which Courthope was placed, but there were traitors in camp and one night the Defence was cut adrift and taken by the mutineers into Neira, where she was surrendered to the Dutch. Courthope's only satisfaction was that a number of loyal men put off in a boat at some peril to themselves and succeeded in rejoining him.
This additional blow was a heavy one, but Courthope, though now completely isolated, declined to give up the fight. His spirit of determination, indeed, seems to have taken a sterner form as his position became more difficult.
Laurence Reaal, the Governor-General, had himself at this time taken over the direction of affairs in the Eastern Islands, and being desirous of making if possible an amicable arrangement sent an invitation to Courthope for a conference. The English commander attended and entered into a long debate on the position of affairs which had been created by recent events. Reaal offered to return the captured ships and men, to pay compensation for all articles taken from them and to assist the English to depart in safety with the valuable cargo of spices they had obtained at Poolo Roon in exchange for their goods.
Courthope's answer was a flat refusal. "I could not," he said, "unless I should turn traitor unto my King and country in giving up that right which I am able to hold and also betray the country people who had surrendered up their land to our King's Majesty." It was the kind of answer that might have been looked for from one of Courthope's character, but it irritated Reaal who had set his heart on getting this troublesome Englishman out of the way without yielding any material point. He "threw his hat on the ground and pulled his beard for anger." As a concession Courthope afterwards offered to depart in the Defence provided Reaal would agree to allow the questions in dispute to be settled in Europe and would pledge himself in the meantime to make no attack on the Bandanese. But Reaal would not listen to any suggestion which allowed of English interference with the internal affairs of the islands.
Nothing now remained but for the representatives of the two nations to fight out the quarrel to the bitter end. They proceeded to do so with the dour determination which might have been looked for from two such antagonists. The advantage, as the narrative makes clear, was markedly in favour of the Dutch. They had a number of strongly fortified positions, a considerable fleet of well manned ships, and hundreds of trained soldiers which with their undisputed command of the sea could be brought to bear upon any point to which they desired to direct their operations. The surrender of large masses of the ese at this juncture by freeing their hands for the attack on their rivals gave them an additional advantage of no unimportant kind.
It is impossible that Courthope could have been ignorant of the enormous risks he was taking in declining the accommodation offered by the Dutch. His excellent secret service, supplied by the islanders whose prows enabled them to keep up communications with the inhabitants of the other islands of the group in spite of the Dutch, kept him informed of every move on the enemy's side. He had, besides, more direct sources of information in the deserters who from time to time came over to him from one or other of the Dutch ports. Knowing all he might without any reflection upon his courage have walked the golden bridge which Reaal essayed to build for him. But his heart was in this struggle which he felt he was waging for the honour of his country, and he resolutely put behind him the suggestion that he should abandon his post on any terms which would make difficult the future revival of English rights to a share in the trade. He confidently calculated that when his need was known to his superiors adequate assistance would be sent him to enable him to make good the foothold which he had secured in the islands with so much trouble and cost. In this he was not altogether wrong, as the sequel will show, but neither he nor his principals had taken adequate measure of the strength of the Dutch position and of the tenacity of their resolve to keep their monopoly intact.
Reaal, on his return to the Dutch headquarters at Jakatra, the modern Batavia, in a proclamation issued in November, 1617, fulminated in strong language against the attempts that were being made to subvert the Dutch monopoly. Courthope was not named in this; nor was there any specific mention of the English Company. The reference was in general terms to "French, Scotch, and other foreigners" and "even men of our own nation" who sought to make the Dutch Company's charter illusory by their illicit trading. Dutch commanders were everywhere directed "to attack with arms vehemently" all who were found trading in the islands and to capture and confiscate their ships.
The day following the issue of the proclamation a communication was sent to the English factory at Jakatra demanding the evacuation of Poolo Roon, and warning the English against sending ships to the Moluccas. "If you refuse," said Reaal, "we shall have to help ourselves with all means time and opportunity will give us, believing ourselves to be guiltless before God and the world."
An indignant protest was lodged by Ball, the English chief, against this virtual declaration of war. They were not, he said, to be deterred by any such action from what was just and honest. "Neither is the custom of ill strife in us as in yourselves who, contrary to the bonds of amity betwixt his Majesty of England and States of the United Provinces have most unjustly and in hostile manner robbed our employers of their ships and goods, and murdered and imprisoned their people." As for the demand for the evacuation of Poolo Roon that island belonged to the Crown of England and would in all reason be "defended and made good against all unjust demands and actionc whatsoever." The writer charged Reaal by the bonds of amity between the two nations and on the faith of a Christian to persist not in his course to the effusion of blood. "Hitherto," he concluded, "I have shed no blood, and if blood must be shed it shall not be my fault, it being lawful in defence of myself to do my best."
The next important move in the conflict was in the early months of 1618 when the English dispatched three ships to the Moluccas to relieve Courthope and further develop the trade with the islands. They apparently thought that the number would be sufficient to ensure their safety, but the Dutch had concentrated their forces with the special object of deallng with the English flotilla and did not hesitate to oppose it as soon as a favourable opportunity offered.
As the Solomon, one of the three ships, was off Banda she encountered four large Dutch vessels which, without any ado, proceeded to attack her. The English ship was so deeply laden that she could not use her lower tier of ordnance. She was further embarrassed by a lack of ammunition. Nevertheless she fought on from two o'clock in the afternoon until nine at night. By this time the contesting ships were quite close to each other—"almost board and board"—and it was possible for the combatants to enter into conversation with each other.
Cassarian, the English commander, opened a parley with the result that he on the demand of the Dutch commander struck his colours and went on board the enemy's flagship. As he did not return his crew assumed that he had been detained a prisoner. Their first care was to disarm the party of Bandanese on board, whose assistance they had had in the fight and whose exasperation at the turn events had taken might they feared take the form of a general running amok. The precaution, as events proved, was not an unnecessary one. When the Hollanders came to take possession of the ship two of the Bandanese who had managed to secrete their terrible krises fell upon the invaders and cut a number of them to pieces before they themselves were killed. The English portion of the crew took no part in this incident on either side, but their neutrality did not save them from the resentment of the Dutch who treated them with persistent cruelty during their subsequent confinement.
Courthope was intensely mortified at the surrender of the ship. He declared in a letter describing the fight that rather than have yielded as Cassarian had done he "would have sunken right down in the sea first." He spoke no more than the truth; his whole being was animated with the feeling that to yield would be a disgrace not to be borne. Yet nothing hardly could have been more desperate than his position at this juncture. His small force had been weakened considerably by sickness and his supplies were so reduced that the garrison were compelled to exist largely on bread made from the fruit of the sago tree. On the other hand the Dutch had eight ships and two galleys fully armed ready to make a descent upon the island at the first favourable opportunity. For their advent Courthope, to use his own words, looked "daily and hourly," and he could not disguise from himself that the issue must go against him, the odds being what they were; though he consoled himself with the grim reflection that "if they win it, by God's help I make no doubt but they shall pay full dearly for it with much effusion of blood."
When news reached Courthope as it did later that the English prisoners were being cruelly illtreated by their captors he indited a letter of strong denunciation of the inhumanity of the Hollanders to one of the captives. "What extremity the Dutch useth unto you," he wrote, "they shall have their measure full and abounding either in gentleness or rigour; and whereas they have heretofore protested fire and sword, fire and sword they shall have repaid unto their bosoms."
Fierce as was the spirit of the indomitable Courthope he had a singularly happy gift of attaching to himself the affection of his followers. When some of the men revolted against the coarse sago bread which now constituted almost their sole rations, "his mild carriage and earnest protestations" won them back to their allegiance. It was always so when the burden seemed almost too great for the ordinary seaman to bear. A reminder of their duty coupled with a personal plea for patience made them invariably his devoted followers once more. His influence over the natives was also remarkable. They rallied to him as they had rallied to no Englishman before, and they fought under him with a resolution which caused the Dutch to entertain a wholesome fear of invading the island. When at length some weeks after the capture of the Solomon they did essay an attack with a force of 700 men, they were defeated with an ease which suggested that the disciplinary influence of the gallant Englishman had gone very deep.
Months went by without any material change in the situation, Courthope hoping against hope all the while, holding his tight little island with undiminished determination. At length early in 1619 his heart was gladdened with the news that Sir Thomas Dale with a considerable English fleet had won a victory over the Dutch and was coming to his relief. It now seemed that the fruits of his long and stubborn stand for the rights of his country were to be reaped and throughout the island there went up a shout of anticipatory triumph. But, alas! the sanguine hopes aroused were destined never to be realized for reasons which must now be related.
Sir Thomas Dale, one of the most experienced commanders of the Company at the time, was sent in 1619 from India to Bantam charged with the special duty of protecting English shipping and English interests from the attacks of the Dutch. In his early days Dale had served as a military commander in the service of the States General. But he is best known as one of the first governors of the infant Colony of Virginia. It was he who brought over to England the celebrated Princess Pocohontas whose romantic story so stirred the sentimental hearts of a past generation. He was a bluff, choleric type of man, ready of tongue and in official matters exacting and punctilious. He was rather feared than loved by those under him. As far as the particular service upon which he was engaged was concerned, he was at a distinct disadvantage owing to the fact that his experience in positions of authority had been gained in the West and not in the East.
On receiving at Bantam the intelligence of the latest moves of the Dutch, Dale's hot blood boiled over with indignation. He swore with all the freedom which he allowed himself that he would have vengeance of these ruffianly Hollanders, and especially of that arch enemy of the English, Jan Pietersoon Coen, who had distinguished himself by his cruel treatment of the English prisoners in his hands.
As a preliminary to larger operations Dale seized a Dutch vessel called the Zwarte Leeuw (Black Lion) and put her crew ashore with the intimation that if he caught them again he would hang every man of them from the yard-arm. The Dutch authorities at Jakatra as soon as they heard of the capture sent a vigorous letter of protest. When it was handed to Dale he "only scolded, stamped on the ground, swore, cursed (and asked) why the letter was written in Dutch and not in French, Spanish or any other language if we (the Dutch) didn't like to write English."
He finally told the messenger that he would take the reply to Coen himself, "swearing and cursing that he would take all he could get."
The Dutch retaliated for the capture of the Zwarte Leeuw by burning the English factory at Jakatra. Dale wanted to cap this by destroying the Dutch factory at Bantam, but the native authorities interposed and safeguarded it from attack by occupying it with a strong guard.
Dale fumed and fretted over the restraint, but he eventually reconciled himself to the situation in view of the prospect that lay before him of exacting a full measure of retaliation at Jakatra. Collecting all available forces, towards the end of December he descended like an avenging torrent on the Dutch headquarters. His arrival was awaited with extreme anxiety by the Dutch. In the days which had elapsed since they first received news of his expedition there had been frequent and earnest consultations as to the plan of defence. The Dutch weakness was that they were to a certain extent between two fires, as the moment the English attacked on one side it was practically certain that the Javanese would attack on the other. With many misgivings the council ultimately decided to withdraw most of the men from the shore to the ships and to contest the issue solely on the sea. In this way it was calculated that the conditions of the fight would be more equalized, though the Dutch ships were only seven to the enemy's eleven and several of them were in a very poor condition.
On the morning of December 30, the English fleet hove in sight off Jakatra. Coen, who had by this time become Governor-General, assuming the command of the Dutch ships, went out to meet the enemy, not omitting, however, beforehand to dispatch a small craft to Amboina with instructions for a concentration of the entire Dutch forces in the Moluccas with a view to further eventualities. When the two fleets had approached within about a gunshot of each other, Dale sent off a herald to proclaim the reason for his warlike operations and to demand the surrender of the Dutch commander. Needless to say, the answer was a defiant negative. The rest of the day was spent in manoeuvring to secure a Dutch ship which in ignorance of the state of affairs had arrived outside the harbour.
The next morning the action commenced in earnest. From eleven in the morning until three in the afternoon the contest continued without intermission, "a cruelle bloodye fight" in which 3,000 great shot were exchanged between the fleets and many men were killed and wounded on each side. Night closed in with the two fleets anchored close to each other without any decisive result having been reached. On the Dutch side a council of war was held to decide a future course of action. The outlook for them was gloomy. Ammunition on all the ships was running short, there were many casualties, and several of the vessels were so damaged as to be scarcely seaworthy. To renew the fight in such circumstances would be perilous in the extreme: yet surrender was not to be thought of. "It was a puzzling dilemma," as the official Dutch record says, and the members of the council came to the conclusion that it would be better to sleep over it.
When the morning dawned the council was resumed, but the discussions had not continued very long before they were abruptly closed by the news of the appearance of a reinforcement of three ships to Dale's fleet. This addition to the enemy's strength it was felt decided affirmatively the question of the fleet's withdrawal from an unequal contest. Without loss of time the order was passed through the fleet for a return to Jakatra with a view of seeking there the protection of the guns of the fortifications. Anchor was weighed accordingly and the Dutch ships set a course for Jakatra closely followed by the English ships. Before the destination was reached a further council of war was held, as grave doubts were entertained by some as to the wisdom of the plan of taking refuge in harbour. On second thoughts it was determined to leave Jakatra to its fate and to steer a course for the Moluccas where with the resources available a stand might be made with a reasonable prospect of success. Eventually this course was successfully followed.
Dale maintained a curiously supine attitude in the face of this daring retreat of the Dutch. With his strengthened fleet his plain duty was to pursue and overwhelm the enemy, but instead he practically did nothing. His plea in his account of the fight is that he could not imagine that Coen would abandon the position ashore to its fate, but, even so, it is not clear why he did not keep in touch with the Dutch fleet. By allowing it to escape he not only rendered his own sacrifices nugatory, but he sealed the fate of the English cause in the Eastern seas. Never again in the history of the Company was such an opportunity to offer of breaking down the Dutch monopoly.
Probably the best excuse that can be offered for Dale is that he attached more importance to the capture of the Dutch headquarters than he did to the destruction of their fleet. It may have seemed to him a choice of alternatives in which the balance strongly inclined in favour of the one which would deal the heaviest blow to Dutch prestige. Whether that were his view or not he succeeded in effecting the capture of the Dutch fort at Jakatra without difficulty. Under the terms of the capitulation the fortress and garrison and munitions of war were surrendered to the English, while the merchandise and other movable property fell to the lot of the King of Jakatra. Somewhat earlier the Dutch commander had made a secret agreement with the latter by the terms of which the English were excluded from the locality. As an outcome of this probably the native authorities in the weeks following the capitulation adopted an unfriendly attitude. They not only sent prows into the Straits of Sunda to warn approaching Dutch vessels of their peril, but the Pangeran of Bantam, with a force of 2,000 men, appeared upon the scene and compelled the release of the prisoners.
In the face of the discouraging attitude of the native authorities. Dale felt that it was useless for him to continue the occupation. After taking council with his commanders he decided to withdraw his ships to the Coromandel Court there to refit for a further campaign if such should be deemed desirable. His decision was, perhaps, a sound one on the whole in view of the steady deterioration of his fleet and the danger that he would incur by remaining at Jakatra, a target for native attack by land and Dutch attack by sea. It was too late now, at all events, to retrieve the original blunder of proceeding eastward in pursuit of Coen. That worthy had had time to combine his scattered forces and replenish his ammunition stores, and was not to be attacked with impunity by any force that the English could now bring to bear.
Shipping all his merchandise and stores Dale started on his voyage with the rankling conviction that he had failed egregiously where he should have been triumphant. His disappointment was accentuated by dissensions which now broke out in an aggravated form amongst his officers. There was resentment in this quarter at his masterful ways and especially at the dictatorial tone he was in the habit of assuming towards every one however highly placed they might be or whatever the question at issue. It was always, says one of his colleagues, "'I will and require,' 'this must be done,' and 'this shall be done,' and yet in the end we must signe what he says "
Under the weight of his accumulating troubles Dale sickened and died soon after the fleet reached India. Thus the final tragic seal was set on a disastrous venture. It would be unfair, perhaps, to saddle Dale's memory too heavily with the responsibility for the failure. Something must be allowed for the inevitable weakness of a fleet operating many thousand miles from its base against one scarcely inferior in size which had open to it several strong bases. Still, the error of judgment committed in permitting the quiet withdrawal of the Dutch fleet to the Moluccas was too far reaching in its consequences to be lightly overlooked in any estimate of Dale's achievements.
Coen lost no time in re-establishing the Dutch position at Jakatra. Early in March, a few weeks after the retirement of the English, he appeared off the town with sixteen ships and having re-occupied the fort, caused it, on March 12, to be christened Batavia. From this day may be said to date the commencement not merely of the Dutch dominion in Java, but of their supremacy in the Malay Archipelago.
The famous Dutch Governor-General was not a man to do things by halves. When he had consolidated his position at Batavia he turned his thoughts to other parts where the opportunity offered of asserting Dutch power. Amongst the first to fall a victim to his policy of "Thorough' was poor Jourdain, the enterprising commander who did so much to promote the active English policy in the Moluccas. Jourdain in April, 1619, had taken charge at Madras of two ships, the Hound and the Sampson, which were dispatched by the authorities in India to re-establish an English factory at Patani on the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula. He piloted them to their destination in safety; but in July, some little time after their arrival, they were attacked while at anchor by three large Dutch ships, which entered the port for that purpose. A spirited fight was maintained by the Engllsh ships for a considerable period. At length when eleven of the men of the Sampson had been killed and thirty- five wounded and the Hound had also lost a number of men Jourdain caused a flag of truce to be raised with the object of parleying about peace.
As the negotiations were proceeding between Thomas Hackwell, the master, and the Dutch commander, Jourdain showed himself near the mainmast on the gratings, and the Dutch "espying him most treacherously and cruelly shot at him with a musket and shot him in the bodie neere the heart, of which wound hee dyed within halfe an hour after." It is difficult to say whether this episode was deliberate or was due to a misunderstanding. The Dutch afterwards strongly repudiated the former hypothesis and there is reason to think that the business was in the nature of an accident. Whether so or not its effect was greatly to exacerbate the feelings of Jourdain's countrymen in the East by whom he was highly respected. So deadly did the feud now become that according to a letter of the period had their fleets met at sea at this juncture "there had never been such a day among Christians."
And what, it may be asked, was the position of Courthope in this acute phase of the feud of the two nations? The answer is not difficult to guess. Brave soul as he was he fought his fight to a glorious finish. How it came about is easily told. When the disheartening news reached Poolo Roon that Dale's fleet had returned to India and that the little body of Englishmen on the island had been abandoned to their fate, Courthope did not, as he might very well have done with honour, surrender to the Dutch. He just went on the same as usual, living his hard life and keeping his weather eye open for the enemy who he knew would come sooner or later.
Eventually what could not be accomplished by force was effected by guile. A Dutch deserter—more probably spy—on learning of Courthope's departure for Lonthor on an expedition connected with some of his people, promptly sailed across to the Dutch headquarters with the information. A boat heavily armed and fully manned was secretly sent over by night to intercept the English commander on his return. The prow was encountered as anticipated at a point at which it was completely at the Hollanders' mercy. Betrayed and entrapped the intrepid Courthope stood up in his tiny craft like a lion at bay. He returned shot for shot until his "piece being choked" he could fire no more. Still he maintained an undaunted mien until a shot struck him full in the breast. Then without a moment's hesitation, as if he had fully thought out his course of action, he jumped into the water and was seen no more.
The history of the Empire has no finer example of courage and lofty self-sacrifice than the two years' struggle which this splendid seaman maintained almost unaided from without against the serried forces of Dutch power in the East. Of him it may be said, as of an illustrious contemporary:—
"He nothing common did, or mean,
Upon that memorable scene."
The road of duty and of patriotism he saw clearly before him and he followed it unerringly with a serene indifference to all personal considerations. There was in him much of the spirit which animated Gordon when he made his glorious last stand in the lonely isolation of the Mahdi's capital. To Courthope, in a humbler way, belongs the same crown of immortality which a grateful nation has bestowed upon the Hero of Khartoum.