History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 14

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XIV.

SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.

1811-1812.

Doctor Cos Joins Rayon — The Revolutionary Press — Perplexity of Venegas — Bishop Campillo's Failure as a Mediator — Second Campaign of Morelos — Calleja Takes Zitácuaro — Destruction of the City — Reverses of Porlier — Arrival of Spanish Troops — Triumphal Entry of Calleja into Mexico — Jealousy of Venegas — Calleja Marches against Cuautla — Description of the City — Llano at Izúcar — Calleja Repulsed — Cuautla Invested — Sufferings of the Besieged — Morelos Evacuates the City — Calleja Returns to the Capital.

When Morelos returned to Chilapa, after the suppression of the conspiracy formed by Tabares and David, he found himself in a most favorable position to make at leisure and without interruption his preparations for another campaign. By the dispersion of the royalist troops sent against him, he held possession of the country about him. Protected from attack on the north by the river Mescala, and the deep pestiferous valley through which it ran, he was equally secure from molestation in the direction of Oajaca. The recent defeats of troops from that province had left it in alarm for its own safety, without either the inclination or means again to assume the offensive. During the next three months, therefore, Morelos devoted himself with untiring activity to the more thorough organization of his forces, and especially to the establishment of systematic order and harmony between castes, the correction of the abuses practised upon Spaniards,^[1] and to the collection, proper management, and legitimate application of public rents and church tithes within the territory under his control.^[2] In order to facilitate matters, early in October he formed a new province, which he named Tecpan, out of the southern portion of the territory which at that time comprised the intendencia of Mexico, and erected Tecpan as the capital, with the title of the city of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, while at the same time, as a punishment for the pertinacious opposition of the inhabitants of Acapulco, that port was degraded from its rank and title of Ciudad de los Reyes to that of la Congregacion de los Fieles, the lowest grade of municipal communities in the Indies.^[3]

The preëminence displayed by Morelos in ability to direct the revolutionary movement, continually exposed his life to other dangers than those of open war. Dark and secret plans were formed for his destruction by poison or capture. In September 1811 he received a letter from one Padre Alva,^[4] warning him of a plot to poison him, and informing him that two men were already on their way from Mexico with that object. As Alva had minutely described them, they were arrested on their arrival at Chilapa, and sent to Zacatula. About a year later a similar design was meditated, of which Calleja seems to have been aware;^[5] and still later Rayon apprised him of the presence of a traitor among his most confidential associates, whose intention was to deliver him to the viceroy.^[6] Morelos received these unpleasant communications with extreme indifference.

The rapid extension of the rebellion, despite his utmost efforts to arrest its progress, kept Venegas in embarrassment; and to add to his perplexity, the popularity of the cause was daily gaining ground in the capital and other large cities in possession of the Spaniards. Fostered by the circulation of periodicals and publications—the distributors of which the government in vain endeavored to discover—the principles of independence were being more widely disseminated and better understood. Prominent among the authors of these sheets was Doctor Cos, whom the imprudent action of the viceroy had driven to the ranks of the insurgents. Cos, as the reader will remember, on his departure from Aguascalientes had been detained in confinement at Querétaro. Having addressed a representation to the viceroy giving an account of the occurrences at Aguascalientes, and informing him of the instructions which he had received from Calleja to proceed to Mexico, Cos was released by order of Venegas and presented himself at the vice regal palace. The viceroy expressed himself satisfied with his explanations; but after a delay of many days, during which no notice was taken of him, Cos was peremptorily ordered to return immediately to his parish. Such a journey could not be undertaken by him at that time without imminent risk; two days after his departure he was captured by Correa's band and conducted to Zitácuaro, where, disgusted with the treatment he had received and the want of confidence in him shown by the viceroy, he offered his services to the junta. Rayon willingly received him, and henceforth Cos devoted heart and soul to the cause. Conscious of the power exercised by the press as an engine of defence against misrepresentation, and for the diffusion of enlightened ideas on the subject of independence, with infinite labor he fashioned out of wood with his own hands sufficient type to enable him to print five pages of matter, and for some months issued from Zitácuaro a weekly publication which he styled the Ilustrador Americano.^[7] The effect produced by this sheet was soon felt by the steady emigration from the cities of young men of energy and ability, who joined the ranks of the revolutionists and aided the cause with sword or pen.

The perplexity of Veriegas increased daily; and so forlorn did his position appear to him that at times he even meditated opening communications with the rebel leaders to induce them to lay down their arms by offers of personal favors, and by concessions which would win back the multitude to their allegiance with out prejudice to the essential principle of Spanish domination. But such a step would be deeply humiliating to the dignity of the government, and doubly so in the event of failure. Sorely pressed though he was, he hesitated to adopt a plan so uncertain. It was therefore a relief to his mind when Manuel Ignacio Gonzalez del Campillo, bishop of Puebla,^[8] offered to open negotiations in his own name with Rayon and Morelos, and submitted a plan of proceeding. He would address a manifesto to the two leaders, and appeal to them to aid in putting a stop to the war. Commissioners were to be sent to them with instructions of both a public and private nature. By the first they would be authorized to offer full pardon to Rayon and Morelos if they would stop proceedings and recognize the Spanish government. By the second, promises were to be privately given to the insurgent leaders, on the word of the bishop and with his guarantee, of their reception into favor. If these offers were accepted, it was to be understood that the insurgent forces, their fortified places, arms, and all resources of war, should be placed at the disposal of the government.^[9]

Venegas gladly accepted the bishop's proposal; whether his mediation were successful or not, it would solve the question which perplexed him without compromising the viceregal dignity. The commissioners^[10] were received by the revolutionary chiefs with becoming deference. But the design failed. Neither the bishop's manifesto nor private arguments and promises had any weight with either Rayon or Morelos, who refused to enter into any negotiations except on the basis of the establishment in Mexico of a national government. Indeed, even their influence would have been unavailing to stay the current of independent principles now so deeply ingrafted in the minds of their followers, and an attempt to do so would have endangered their own lives.^[11] The commissioners, therefore, returned with the tidings of their failure, and the two governments continued their preparations for future hostilities.

Second Campaign of Morelos.

About the middle of November Morelos again took the field and entered upon his second campaign. Proceeding to Tlapa, he entered that town without opposition, the royalist garrison having retreated to Oajaca on his approach. Here he was joined by Padre Tapia, and Victoriano Maldonado, an Indian of great resolution and intelligence. From Tlapa he inarched to Chautla de la Sal, where Mateo Musitú, a rich Spaniard, had organized and armed at his own expense a considerable force, fortifying himself in a strong building which had formerly been the convent of the Augustinians. Morelos, however, despite the vigorous defence made, carried the place by storm, and captured Musitú and 200 of his men. Although Musitú offered fifty thousand dollars for his life, he was treated with the severity dealt to belligerents, and shot with other Spaniards who were taken prisoners with him.^[12]

At Chautla, Morelos divided his force into three divisions, one of which he placed under the command of Miguel Bravo, with instructions to march against Oajaca; with the second Galeana was sent to attack Tasco; at the head of the remaining division Morelos advanced to Izúcar, which he entered on the 10th of December without opposition, and was there joined by Mariano Matamoros, the acting cura of Jantetelco, who afterward figured as a prominent revolutionary chief. On the 17th, however, he was attacked by a force of over 500 men under the command of Miguel de Soto y Maceda, a lieutenant of the navy, sent against him by Llano who, in recognition of his services in the plains of Apam, had meantime been made colonel, and afterward appointed military commander of the province of Puebla.^[13]

The assault was sustained with great vigor for five hours, but the royalists could make no impression upon the plaza, the entrances to which were closed by barricades. Soto, mortally wounded, at last gave orders to retreat, delegating the command to Captain Mariano Ortiz. The retreat was equally disastrous. Ortiz was killed at the head of his men while endeavoring to repulse the pursuing revolutionists, and the remnant of the division, amounting to less than two hundred men, entered Puebla on the 19th, the rest being killed, captured, or dispersed.^[14]

Puebla now lay almost at the mercy of Morelos, dependent as it was for its defence only upon the disspirited remnant of Soto's force. But he chose rather to sweep clean the territory as he advanced, and leave no hostile force in his rear. He therefore proceeded to Cuautla, and entered it without resistance on the 25th of December, the comandante Garcilaso having fled at his approach. From Cuautla Morelos continued his triumphal march to Tasco in order to unite with Galeana, who had been equally successful in his expedition against that town, which he took after a vigorous defence maintained by the comandante Mariano García Rios. Rios, after sustaining himself for two days, capitulated on the condition that the lives of himself and his troops should be spared, but Morelos, on his arrival on the 31st, pronounced the capitulation null, on the ground that Rios had continued firing after it had been concluded, and he, with fifteen other prisoners, Spaniards and creoles, was shot on the 4th of January following.^[15] Thus terminated the second campaign of Morelos, by which he became master of the territory extending from Chilapa to the mountain range which separates the valley of Mexico from the tierra caliente of the south.

Meantime the junta of Zitácuaro was experiencing that opposition to its authority already foreshadowed. Tomás Ortiz, a nephew of Hidalgo, and who had been appointed by him comandante of that district, made himself particularly obnoxious, both on account of his want of deference and his rapacity, which drew angry complaints from Morelos. In order to sustain the authority of the new government, the junta therefore caused Ortiz to be arrested, as well as several of its own commissioners who had displayed a similar disposition, and to whom Rayon himself applied the epithet of voracious.^[16] Ortiz and two other delinquents were condemned to death; but in consideration of their services, execution of the sentence was suspended. When Calleja, however, approached Zitácuaro the junta, apprehensive that they might cause future trouble in case the royalists should prove successful, gave orders for their execution, and they were shot on the 31st of December.^[17] Nor did Rayon meet with that subserviency to his wishes which he had expected from his colleagues, who soon began to regard his ambitious views of self-aggrandizement with jealousy. In his correspondence with Morelos he speaks of the disgust which he had experienced at their differences, of the puerile disposition which they displayed, and of their weakness of character.^[18] Thus enmity sprung up between them; and though an apparent reconciliation occurred in the face of a danger common to all, mutual confidence was never restored.

On the 1st of January, 1812, Calleja appeared before Zitácuaro, the doomed city. He had left Guanajuato on the 11th of November, and the slowness of his movements marks at once the repugnance with which he undertook the enterprise and his care to secure a successful issue.^[19] Proceeding to Acámbaro, he there conferred with Trujillo, who met him for that purpose, and was joined by Castillo y Bustamante, García Conde, Meneso and other chiefs with their divisions, according to previous instructions. From Acámbaro he leisurely continued his march,^[20] and arrived at Ixtlahuaca toward the middle of December, in order to open communication with Toluca and combine his operations with these of Porlier.^[21] Here he received some reënforcements, and his army now amounted to 4,900 combatants,^[22] with twenty-three pieces of artillery of different calibre.

On the 22d of December Calleja marched from San Felipe del Obraje, where he had concentrated his troops, and on the following day entered the rugged defile of San Mateo. The difficulties which he encountered in his approach to the city were so great that he was eight days in accomplishing twelve leagues, sometimes advancing not more than half a league in twenty-four hours. In many places entirely new roads had to be opened at the cost of immense labor, and the sufferings of the soldiers were excessive as they toiled under pitiless storms of rain, snow, and pelting hail which alternately descended upon them from the sunless sky. Had the royalists been assailed in this pass, it is probable that they would never have reached Zitácuaro, but the insurgent leaders too confidently relied upon their strong position, and their fortifications, which had been elaborately completed under the direction of Ramon Rayon, brother of Ignacio. Having surmounted all obstacles, Calleja, on the 1st of January, 1812, encamped before the town on a rising ground just beyond reach of the enemy's batteries. Having personally reconnoitred the enemy's lines of defences,^[23] he made his dispositions for attack on the following day. His plan was to assail the insurgents' fortifications in the rear, while he threatened them with attack in front. With this object, he placed a division of his forces under the command of García Conde, who was directed to move round to the left toward the road leading from Los Laureles, while Calleja with the main body made a detour along the heights toward the right. A strong reserve force was placed in charge of the conde de Casa Rul. At ten o'clock in the morning the royalist commanders had taken up their respective positions, and having placed their artillery on commanding eminences, opened fire. For a short half-hour the revolutionists replied vigorously; but their fire then slackened before the superior gunnery of the royalists, and disorder was observed in their lines. Calleja had already made his dispositions for the assault, three attacking columns having been placed respectively under the commands of Castillo, Colonel José María Jalon, and Oroz and Meneso, the latter leaders being instructed to cover the right of the other columns, and occupying the Tuxpan road, connect with García's division on that of Los Laureles, thus closing retreat in those directions.^[24] These columns were now ordered to advance, while García Conde, having crossed the moat by means of a portable bridge provided for the purpose, was at the same time forcing his way into the town. The simultaneous attack was successful at all points. In deed, the defence appears to have been lamentably weak in comparison with the great preparations made, and by two o'clock in the afternoon the insurgents had fled from Zitácuaro as best they could, plunging into the ditches and escaping by the barrancas and mountain gullies.^[25] The junta fled to Sultepec, where it established a new seat of government.

The loss sustained in killed and wounded was inconsiderable in proportion to the importance of the fall of Zitácuaro.^[26] Forty-three cannon fell into the possession of the victors, besides a great quantity of other arms and an immense store of ammunition.^[27] The casualties of the victors were insignificant. Exemplary punishment must necessarily be inflicted upon a city which had twice witnessed the disgrace of the royalist arms. Most of the belligerents had escaped and the prisoners were few. Of these, eighteen were shot on the following day;^[28] too small an offering to appease the royalist gods; so the destruction of the city was determined upon, and on the 5th Calleja published a proclamation, declaring that the Indians of Zitácuaro and its district were deprived of their property, all their immunities and privileges forfeited, and that every building would be razed to the ground or destroyed by fire. Six days were given for the unfortunate inhabitants to leave the town.^[29] The conde de Casa Rul was charged with the execution of the sentence, which was rigorously carried out, after the place had been well sacked by the royalist troops, the churches and convents only being spared.^[30] On the 13th Calleja departed from Maravatío by the Tuxpan road, while in his rear ascended the flames and smoke from the burning town, which had been dignified by the revolutionists with the high title of Villa Imperial.^[31]

Porlier in the mean time sustained a reverse in his operations. According to the first plan formed by Calleja, he was to have occupied the San Mateo road leading to Zitácuaro; but having received orders from Venegas to move from Toluca against Tenango, he directed his march thither, and occupied the place during the 29th and 30th of December, meeting with little opposition except that offered by its mountainous position. Porlier then proceeded to Tenancingo, which the revolutionists abandoned on his approach, concentrating themselves in the barranca of Tecualoya. On the 3d of January he drove the enemy from their position and took possession of the pueblo. But the troops of Morelos were approaching in force, and about the middle of January the barranca was again occupied, Galeana having arrived with the advance division. On the 17th Porlier attacked the insurgents, who had taken up the same position from which they had previously been driven. Though, the royalists gained some advantage at first, and advanced to the pueblo which had been occupied by the enemy, they finally sustained a repulse with considerable loss, and retreated to Tenancingo. Here Porlier was assailed by the combined forces of Morelos, who conducted the operations in person.^[32] The attack began on the 22d, and the firing continued all through the night and the following day. Portions of the town were set on fire, and the royalists, having lost several of their principal officers, were driven to their last position in the plaza with no hope of maintaining it. On the night of the 23d Porlier abandoned the place, effecting his retreat with great difficulty and with the loss of eleven cannon to Tenango, whence he returned to Toluca, with the remnant of his force in miserable plight and thoroughly dispirited.^[33] Morelos having remained three days in Tenancingo, returned by way of Cuernavaca to Cuautla, where he arrival on the 9th of February.

 

The continued successes of Morelos had so alarmed Venegas, that he reiterated orders which he had previously given to Calleja, enjoining him to march southward against that leader. So peremptory were his last instructions that Calleja had no alternative but to comply; and on the 23d of January he left Maravatío and proceeded to Ixtlahuaca, having, however, previously requested permission to resign his command. Venegas refused his consent, and Calleja again on the 26th pressed him in urgent terms to accept his resignation. The viceroy at this date felt himself less dependent than heretofore on the victorious general. On the 14th and 16th of the month two Spanish battalions had arrived at Vera Cruz,^[34] and others were following. So Venegas, who would soon have over 3,000 peninsular troops at his disposal,^[35] proceeded to appoint as Calleja's successor Santiago Irisarri, a Spanish commodore. Irisarri was unknown in the army of New Spain; and the dissatisfaction at the appointment was expressed by a representation addressed to Venegas by the principal officers, stating their unwillingness to serve under any other commander than Calleja. The viceroy was now in a dilemma; but he deemed it prudent to retract under such pressure, and by despatch of the 31st conjured Calleja not to retire.^[36] To avoid further difficulties of the kind, Calleja was instructed to march with his army to the capital, and the 5th of February was appointed as the day for his entrance.

The reception given to the victorious general, and the army of the centre, was an imposing one. His triumphal entry presented a spectacle never before witnessed in the capital on so grand a scale.^[37] As the van approached the gates of the city, a salvo of artillery announced the arrival to the immense multitudes which thronged the streets, eager to gaze with hate or admiration upon the soldiers of whose victories they had heard so much. The city was gay with decorations;^[38] salutes were fired, and the te deum chanted with unusual sublimity in the cathedral.^[39] But this display was attended with an accident to the hero of the occasion, which in the eyes of some was foreboding of disaster to him. When near the gate of Mercaderes the horse of the mariscal de campo, Júdas Tadeo Tornos, who was riding by the side of Calleja, became restive, and rearing struck the general on the head, bringing him to the ground. Calleja was carried into a house near by, and only recovered some hours later sufficiently to be conveyed in a carriage to the palace to present himself to the viceroy, having been unable to attend the joyful ceremony at the cathedral.^[40]

Although the viceroy and Calleja maintained an outward appearance of friendship, their sentiments toward each other were none of the kindest. The jealousy with which Venegas had for some time regarded his general was increased by the flattering reception now given him. The applause with which his deeds were rehearsed in prose and verse, and the enthusiasm with which his appearance at the theatre and in public was greeted, plainly indicated how high in royalist favor Calleja stood, and Venegas henceforth could only regard him in the light of a rival. The feelings, also, so lately displayed in the army in no way tended to lessen his uneasiness; nor did the conferring of rewards and promotions which he could no longer withold^[41] improve matters. Medals were distributed to the officers and troops;^[42] and Calleja having been previously promoted by the viceroy to the rank of major-general, a corresponding advance in grade was extended to all officers in the army.^[43] As this promotion was not confined to the army of the centre, but was extended to the officers of other divisions, and even to those of the marine who had arrived from Habana, and whose services had been very inferior, it did not meet with general satisfaction. The loyal Americans felt aggrieved; a party spirit was developed in the army, and it was said that the Mexican-born officers were even beginning to show signs of indecision in regard to their political faith, influenced by the revolutionary papers which had been issued from Zitácuaro. During the few days that Calleja remained in the capital the misunderstanding between him and Venegas increased; and had the stay of the army been prolonged, it is doubtful whether they could have kept up even a semblance of friendly intercourse. But the proximity of Morelos afforded the viceroy a pretext for hastening the departure of the troops; and on the 8th he issued orders for the army to march, at the same time explaining why he was compelled to act with such promptness. The position of the royalists as described by Venegas^[44] was, indeed, serious. The capital was surrounded by bands of revolutionists; commerce with the interior was destroyed; communication with Vera Cruz and Oajaca was closed; transportation of quicksilver and gunpowder to the mines was no longer possible; and all intercourse with the port of Acapulco was cut off, causing additional commercial distress and a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000 pesos in duties payable on goods brought by the vessel from Manila. Scarcity of provisions and other commodities was severely felt in the capital, and the viceroy feared that even the roads to Texcoco and Toluca, the only ones left open, would shortly be closed. It was therefore indispensable that a decisive blow should be struck at Morelos, whom he regarded as the present head and front of the revolution.^[45] The plan of operations which he gave to Calleja was based on the latest information. It arranged for simultaneous attacks on Izúcar and Cuautla, conducted respectively by Llano and Calleja.

The necessary instructions having been sent to Llano at Puebla, on the 10th of February Calleja's advance left for Chalco, whither troops of Morelos had already arrived, and on the 12th the main body moved forward. Pursuing the line of march indicated in his instructions,^[46] Calleja encamped on the 17th at Pasulco, two leagues from Cuautla. Here Morelos, duly informed of the movements of the royalists, had determined to make his stand, and accordingly had united the divisions of his forces distributed in the neighboring towns. He made every endeavor to render his position as impregnable as possible. Without attempting to erect exterior fortifications, he confined his attention to a limited line of defences within the city.

Cuautla de Amilpas,^[47] distant about twenty-two leagues from the city of Mexico, is situated on a rising ground in a level plain. Its position, though not so strong as that of Zitácuaro, is suitable for defence, being commanded by no adjacent heights. At this date the town was an open one, surrounded by plantations of fruit trees and plantain patches growing close up to the houses. Its extent from north to south was about half a league, the main street running in a straight line in that direction, and connecting the plazas of the convents of San Diego and Santo Domingo. At the northern extremity is the chapel of the Calvario; on the east rise the hills of Zacatepec, between which and the town flows a rapid river in a channel 200 varas wide at the top, but contracting to twelve or fifteen varas in its bed. The portion of the town fortified by Morelos included the plazas and convents of San Diego and Santo Domingo, and was surrounded by trenches and ramparts, with embrasures and merlons.^[48] The outside doors and lower windows of the houses on the line of defence were walled up, and communication between the interiors opened by breaking through the partition walls. Deep trenches were cut across the streets, and batteries placed in suitable positions.^[49] The accompanying plan will enable the reader to recognize the relative positions of the opposing forces.

Cuautla And Vicinity.

Positions of besiegers:
1 Headquarters and camp of Calleja on the estate of Buena vista.
2 Batteries and intrenchments.
3 Positions occupied by Llano's troops.
4 Redoubts.
5 Battery of Juchitengo.
6 Redoubt of the Calvario.
Positions of besieged:
7 Plaza of San Diego.
8 Plaza of Santo Domingo.
9 Premises of hacienda of Buenavista.
10 Redoubt at spring of Juchitengo.
11 Plantations and redoubt of the Platanar.
12 Highway to Mexico.

Morelos' force at this time amounted to 3,300 men, of whom 1,000 were infantry and the remainder cavalry,^[50] and 100 Indians collected from the neighboring villages. During the progress of the siege, however, his forces were increased to the number of 5,550 by the arrival of different commanders.^[51] On the 18th of February Calleja moved forward his forces and encamped on the rising ground of Cuautlixco, after reconnoitring the defences of the revolutionists. During the day Morelos imprudently exposed himself to danger of being killed or captured, having gone out with only a small escort. He was attacked by a troop of cavalry, and was brought off with difficulty by Galeana, who sallied out to his rescue.^[52] At dawn on the following day Calleja advanced his troops in four columns to the assault, directed principally against the intrenchments of the plaza of San Diego. The defence of this important point was intrusted to Hermenegildo Galeana, and that of Santo Domingo to Leonardo Bravo; while to Victor Bravo and the cura Matamoros was assigned the defence of the Buenavista buildings.

Galeana, at the post of danger, well sustained his reputation for cool judgment and personal bravery. The front column of the royalists was allowed to approach near to the parapet; but then so deadly a fire was opened upon it that it retreated in confusion; and Galeana, perceiving an officer endeavoring to rally his men, sallied out alone, engaged with him in single combat, and killed him. The act perhaps was rash, but it raised the spirits of his men to enthusiasm.

Two lateral columns, by creeping from house to house along the street, now fought their way close up to the intrenchments, causing some disturbance among the defenders, whose confidence their leader, however, soon restored. The enemy was repulsed, and though again and again they returned to the charge, their efforts to storm the defences were vain. For six hours the combat continued. Many of the royalist officers were struck down; the conde de Casa Rul was mortally wounded, and the greater part of the ammunition was spent. The attempts against the plaza of Santo Domingo and the Buenavista buildings, though these points were poorly fortified, proved equally unsuccessful.^[53] Troops accustomed to victory, and who rushed up to the trenches in full confidence, quailed at last; and though Calleja, in the final charge, led them in person,^[54] his presence did not mend matters. Convinced of the impossibility of taking Cuautla by assault with his present force, for the first time in his victorious career he withdrew crestfallen.^[55] That night he held a council of war, the result of which was that he determined to reduce the place by siege; and a despatch was sent on the following day to Venegas, informing him of the position of affairs. Cuautla, he says, must be destroyed, and its defenders buried in its ruins, so that in future no insurgent will find escape from death except by laying down his arms.^[56] To effect this he shows the viceroy the necessity of an increased force, of large supplies of provisions and munitions of war, and above all of mortars and siege artillery of heavy calibre. In pursuance of his design, Calleja took up a position on the western side of the town at about a league distant, and began his preparations for a regular siege.

While Calleja was undergoing the mortification which attended his first defeat, a similar reverse was sustained by Llano in his attempt against Izúcar. That commander, in obedience to instructions, had marched from Puebla by way of Cholula and Atlixco, arriving about the 22d of February in front of Izúcar, distant sixteen leagues. His force consisted of about 2,000 men, 540 of whom were cavalry,^[57] with eight pieces of artillery. On the 23d, having taken possession of the hill of the Calvario, he opened fire with his artillery upon the town, and under cover of it advanced two attacking columns composed respectively of the battalions of Lovera and Asturias, under Colonel Antonio de Andrade. The revolutionists who had fortified themselves in the plaza, and were commanded by Padre Sanchez, seconded by Vicente Guerrero and Sandoval, repulsed all attempts to storm their position, and Llano ordered Andrade to retire. The assault was again tried on the following day with no better result. The "invincible conquerors of the victors at Austerlitz"^[58] were beaten by rustics fighting for their rights.^[59] Llano was now in an unenviable position, from which he was, however, unexpectedly relieved. Venegas had received Calleja's report with undisguised displeasure, but recognized the fact that Cuautla must be taken. He therefore despatched immediately all the munitions of war which could be spared from the capital, and ordered Llano to raise the siege of Izúcar and join Calleja. Accordingly on the 26th Llano retired from the scene of his failure and marched to Cuautla, harassed incessantly in his rear by the insurgents.^[60]

Every preparation was now made for a determined siege. Llano took up a position opposite to that of Calleja; redoubts were thrown up, batteries erected, and the place invested as closely as possible. Morelos also improved his line of fortifications. The premises of the hacienda de Buenavista were strengthened, and a redoubt was erected in the platanar on the east side to defend the approach to the river. The revolutionary leader, encouraged by his late success, not only felt confident of maintaining his position but anticipated victory, with the capital itself as the objective point.

The bombardment began on the 10th of March, and for four days the iron shower fell upon the city. But the bursting shells and hurtling shot as they tore through parapet or house wall could not break the spirit of the defenders. Even the townspeople soon lost alarm as their children at play began collecting and making piles of the cannon-balls strewed about the streets.^[61] Breaches in the defences made by day were repaired by night, and each morning the royalist general must begin anew. As the water supply was cut off, wells were sunk. Every privation was borne with such a cheerful fortitude that Calleja soon saw that there was here no thought of surrender. And he dreaded to risk another assault. The unyielding attitude of the besieged made him fear for the result; and again he urged the viceroy to send him quickly more and heavier cannon, for there was work here which would tax his utmost endeavor.^[62]

But it was all of no use. The place was not to be captured by cannonade; and recognizing this, or at least that to effect a breach with artillery of so light a calibre was not possible, Calleja reduced the siege to a mere blockade, and week after week passed by. The supply from the wells proved insufficient, and the besieged made daily sallies and fought for water at the springs and conduits outside the city. To stop even the supply thus dearly obtained, the watercourse of the Juchitengo spring was turned into another channel, and sixty varas of the old ditch filled in. But Galeana in broad day took possession of it, threw up a strong square redoubt around the spring, and connected it by intrenchments with the defences of the city. An attempt made the same night to take this fortification failed, and henceforth the besieged were in no want of water.^[63]

Outside the line of circumvallation, too, the besiegers were continually harassed. Miguel Bravo and the cura Tapia hovered around with troops of cavalry; fierce skirmishes were fought, and convoys of provi sions and ammunition intercepted or brought in with great difficulty. But hunger, a foe more terrible than musket or sword, began to press the beleaguered revolutionists. Morelos had not had time to provision the city for a lengthened siege, nor had he expected that Calleja would adopt so slow a method of warfare. There was no help for it, however, and so day by day the situation of his people became more distressing as the scarcity of food increased. But, as I have said, they bore their sufferings with heroic fortitude, and with every manifestation of unyielding purpose. The soldiers on their return from battle, whatever might be the result of their sally, were greeted with loud cheers; those who fell were buried to the sound of pealing church bells rung in celebration of their glorious death; enthusiastic joy marked any success, however slight; and death was proclaimed against him who dared to speak of surrender. Even Calleja could not suppress his wonder and admiration at such highsouled fortitude. "These people are heroes," he writes the viceroy, "and they would merit a distinguished place in history—if their cause were just"! Morelos he declared to be a second Mahomet.^[64]

Nor was the situation of the royalists by any means an enviable one. The troops, reared in the temperate and cool regions of the table-land, suffered under the fervid sky of the tierra caliente. They broke down under their heavy fatigues by night and day; sickness came upon them, and toward the end of April 800 men were in hospital. The rainy season too was fast approaching ought already to have come; then fever would strike them down by files, and the enemy, inured to the deadly climate, would fall upon them and complete their ruin. It was a question between time and nature which would win. Nature was this time on the side of oppression, to her shame be it said. The rains were unusually late this year. Day after day the fiery sun rose and set, and still no cloud appeared to the wistful eyes of the famished crowds in the beleaguered city. Their sufferings were awful.^[65] When all else was wellnigh consumed, old, time-worn, weather-beaten hides, stripped from doors to which they had been nailed for years, were macerated and eaten; foul grubs and crawling insects were devoured;^[66] and pest, the companion of famine, followed in her footsteps. The church of San Diego was converted into a hospital; from twenty to thirty died daily; gaunt, spectral forms moved wearily along the streets, and the children no longer, as heretofore, marshalled their bands in mimic warfare.^[67] But still they yielded not, and still Calleja dared not risk a second assault.^[68]

And all this time the junta at Sultepec remained inactive, the leaders in Michoacan with their numerous forces came not to the aid of these brave, long enduring patriots. Morelos vainly endeavored to break through the besiegers' lines and introduce provisions. On the open plain the enemy was superior.^[69] On the 27th of April a desperate effort was made, but failed.^[70] After this an unusual stillness and inactivity was observed by the besiegers to prevail in the city. The last hostile sally had been made. No hope was left except to evacuate the town. Calleja's bloody intentions were too well known, and capitulation would be certain death. And still, reduced as they were to the direst extremity, Calleja dared not attack them; and had he not been made aware of their dreadful condition by the numerous fugitives who daily left the city, he would probably have raised the siege. But they were his; he would have their blood, as he thought, if only the rains would hold off a little longer. So with redoubled vigilance he waited for his prey. On the 1st of May he sent to Morelos copies of the general pardon lately published by the viceroy.^[71] As far as appearances went, this offer of mercy was received with joy by the besieged troops, and hostilities ceased on both sides.^[72] It was but a ruse, however; Morelos had made his preparations to evacuate the town. His influence over his followers was unbounded, and whithersoever he went, or to whatever fate, they were ready to accompany him and die for him. That night the troops were silently marshalled in the plaza of San Diego, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d the march began, the lights being left burning on the ramparts.

Galeana led the van, consisting of over 1,000 infantry armed with muskets; then followed 250 cavalry, and a large number of troops whose weapons were slings and lances; after these followed a mixed crowd of both sexes and all ages. The rear was brought up by another body of infantry, with the baggage and two small pieces of artillery in its centre.^[73] Morelos commanded in the centre with the Bravos, and Captain Anzures in the rear.

Calleja lay stretched in sickness on his bed, and heartily wished himself away from the infernal place, as he called it.^[74] He little imagined what the enemy were doing. With all his vigilance he was deceived; nor did he know till more than two hours afterward that he was being outwitted, so skilfully had Morelos made his arrangements. Directing its course to the river, so silently did the column move, that unperceived it approached the earth-works running north ward from the Calvario redoubt, drove back the guard, and demolishing a part of the intrenchments advanced to the river, which was crossed by means of hurdles provided for the purpose.

But now the enemy was upon them. Llano's forces assailed them on the flank; their rear was attacked as the royalist troops rapidly came up. For a time the revolutionists sustained themselves under cover of the stone walls that surrounded the country haciendas, and for an hour a fierce contest raged. Out flanked at last, the order was given to disperse and fly,^[75] but not before more than 800 had fallen. Morelos, after having two of his ribs crushed by falling with his horse into a ditch,^[76] fled by way of Zacatepec to Ocuituco hotly pursued. Here, while changing horses, the enemy overtook him. To save their leader's life, those around him fought until they died, almost to a man,^[77] and he escaped wellnigh alone. Pursuing his flight to Izúcar he there met Victor Bravo, and thence proceeded to Chautla. Here, in safety at last, he remained for a month, and unbroken in spirit, hastened to repair his fortune, collecting his scattered troops and preparing for a new campaign.^[78]

Meantime the slaughter of the unarmed crowd was horrible. Men, women, and children, old and young, were indiscriminately butchered by the royalists,^[79] and for seven leagues the bodies of the slain lay strewn upon the road.^[80] This cowardly vengeance of Calleja's was among the most dastardly doings in the war. Villanous as it was, and vengeance-satisfying, it was but poor comfort after all to the leader so long sure of his prey. This priest had worsted him and baffled him, had finally eluded his grasp not a very happy reflection for so proud a soldier. Calleja's sickness was a serious bilious attack, and we may be sure that his temper was not improved thereby. Of the dreadful punishment which he inflicted upon the heroic inhabitants of that wretched city I shall give no further details. Let a veil be drawn over the frightful scenes of cruelty. "I have heard officers, who were present at the siege, speak of them," says Ward, "after a lapse of ten years, with horror."^[81]

Having destroyed the fortifications of Cuautla—the siege of which cost the government 564,426 pesos, exclusive of munitions of war and other expenses—Calleja, with his military reputation by no means improved, and his troops in miserable plight, returned to the capital, which he entered on the 16th of May, there to meet the ridicule of the inhabitants who well knew that he had been outwitted, despite his glowing accounts.^[82]

 

 

1. On the 13th of October he published a decree to this effect: 'Que aun siendo culpados algunos ricos Europeos ó criollos, no se heche mano de sus bienes sino con orden Expresa del Superior de la Expedicion.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 402, 450.
2. At the beginning of his career Morelos appointed commissioners to attend to these matters. See Id., ii. 227-8; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 41. These commissioners were instructed 'á reconocer las existencias de los estancos, alcabalos, como tambien las de bulas y nuevo indulto de carne, tomando cuenta de ellos á las personas que los manejan.' Ib. On the 15th of Sept. he established postal communication with other independent centres, and between the revolutionary armies, by the organization of a service of mounted couriers. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 376.
3. Alaman supplies a copy of this enactment. Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 44-6. The territory thus constituted a province by Morelos was afterward made, with an addition, the province of Guerrero.
4. Con destino de Capellan de Coro ó otra ingerencia en la Colegiata de Guadalupe.' Declaracion de Morelos, 38-9.
5. Such is Alaman's opinion: 'En la declaracion muy especial que por órden del virey Calleja se le tomó en su causa, sobre otro conato posterior de envenenamiento, que da idea que Calleja tenia noticia previa del hecho.' Hist. Mej., ii. 425.
6. Rayon described the man as stout and big-bellied. Morelos' reply was 'no hay aquí otro barrigon que yo, la que en mi enfermedad queda desbastada.' Id., ii. 425-6.
7. Mora says: 'El Ilustrador Americano, se leia por todos partes con avidez y con aprecio, en las grandes ciudades sometidas á los Españoles, especialmente en Mejico, circulaba de mano en mano, y aunque el gobierno vireinal sabia el hecho, no podia dar con las personas que lo leian y tenian.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 197. See Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 406. Somewhat later Cos obtained a quantity of type by the assistance of José Rebelo, an official in the printing office of Arizpe, in which the government printing was done. Rebelo purchased the type without suspicion, and it was conveyed at great risk through the gates of the capital packed in gourds, which to appearance contained fruit. Having joined the insurgents forthwith, Rebelo served for some years with great zeal for the cause. He was eventually captured by the royalists while conveying some revolutionary sheets from Zacatlan to Apazingan, and shot. Id., i. 407-9.
8. Campillo, though a creole, had been appointed bishop of Puebla on account of eminent services rendered the church. Previous to his election he had frequently been engaged in disputes with the Spaniards and the government. Disagreements were then laid aside, and when the revolution broke out Campillo used his utmost efforts to promote the cause of Spain. His line of conduct was, however, marked by freedom from the rancor displayed by his brother prelates, and the coarse vituperation which too often disfigured their exhortations was never resorted to by him. He moreover frequently interposed his influence with the viceroy to save the lives of unfortunate insurgent captives. He was, therefore, regarded with less aversion by the revolutionists than his ecclesiastical colleagues. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 198-200.
9. The bishop's manifest and his correspondence with the viceroy and the insurgent leaders, together wich the report of the cura Antonio Palafox one of the commissioners—of the failure of the plan, was published by him in August 1812. Campillo, Manif., 11 3, pp. 103. Negrete claims to be the first historian who published a copy of these interesting documents, Bustamante having only produced the bishop's correspondence with Morelos. Mex. Sig, XIX., v. 103-76. This last author is of opinion that Campillo did not initiate the mediation, but that it was secretly arranged by Venegas. Cuad. Hist., ii. 162-3. Consult Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 197-201.
10. The cura Antonio Palafox to Rayon, and the presbítero José María Llave to Morelos. The latter, however, was prevented reaching his destination 'porque se lo impidieron unas calenturas,' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 103, or, as Mora says, 'no quiso encargarse de este negocio.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 201. A substitute was therefore sent in his stead.
11. The commissioner Palafox, in his report to the bishop describing the public feeling in that part of the country which he visited, says: 'Ni se piensa, ni se habla, ni se obra, sino de la insurreccion: . . .todos, pero mas los indios, estan resueltos à morir, y con hechos prácticos han probado quo lo están tambien à matar aun à los supremos gefes que han puesto el dia que se vuelvan como ellos dicen "revelados." Campillo, Manif., 112-13. Rayon's reply to Campillo is dated Zitácuaro, October 10, 1811, that of Morelos, Tlapa, Nov. 24, 1811. The latter chief, irritated perhaps by the upbraiding tone and somewhat acrimonious style of the bishop's letter, forwarded to him a sarcastic note which he had appended to two letters received by him from the curas of Tixtla and Chilapa relative to the protection of their flocks from abuses by insurgents! The following is a translation of the document: 'Tlapa, Nov. 24, 1811. I certify in due form that those curas of the people who have declared in favor of the gachupines can kill and perform their religious functions without being liable to the charge of irregularity and to excommunication, and that only the cura Morelos and the other American curas will be considered irregular, excommunicated, etc. Let the original be remitted to the bishop of Puebla for his information. Morelos.' Id., 97-8.
12. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 429-30; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 382. Morelos while here attached to his service José" Manuel de Herrera, cura of Huamuxtitlan, who was found secreted in the church and brought before him overwhelmed with terror. Morelos appeased his fears, and he was afterward admitted into his closest confidence, and made a chaplain of his army. Cavo says: 'Este es el famoso Ministro de relaciones de Iturbide, que tanto daño hizo á la nacion.' Ib.
13. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 1056, 1214.
14. Soto died the same day and was buried on the 20th, in the cathedral at Puebla. His attack on Izúcar was regarded as rash by the government. See the report of the alférez de navio, Pedro Micheo, who brought off the defeated troops, in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 1209-14; also, Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 382-3; Alaman, Hist. Mex., ii. 431-4. From a fragment of a communication of the viceroy, dated december 20, 1811, it appears that on the 18th the royalists collected at Atlixco to the number of 150 only, Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 436. About 70 prisoners were taken, nearly all of whom were set at liberty. Id., vi. 22.
15. Morelos, Declar., 23. Rios had made himself an especial object of hate by his cruelty. Bustamante describes him as 'hombre pequeñito de unas entrañas diabólicas.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 28.
16. Oficio de Rayon a Morelos, Enero 18 de 1812; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 444.
17. Oficio de Liceaga á Morelos, Enero 13 de 1812.
18. It was through Rayon's influence that Liceaga and Verdusco had been elected members of the junta. Mora says of them: 'Eran personas oscuras y desconocidas en la mayor parte de las divisiones insurjentes. . .y se acusa Rayon de haber intentado apoderarse de la autoridad suprema a la sombra de personas insignificantes y nombres desconocidos.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 190-1.
19. After his departure from Guanajuato he received Venegas' instructions of October 31st, couched in such peremptory terms as to cause him much annoyance. He replied to the viceroy that 'no necesitaba usar de términos tan estrechantes, pues bastaban las anteriormente recibidas para obedecer.' Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 133.
20. Calleja was 10 days passing from Acámbaro to Maravatío, expecting to receive instructions from the viceroy, which failed to arrive. Gaz de Mex., 1812, iii. 136.
21. Calleja, considering that the previous failures to take Zitácuaro were caused by the attacks being directed through the difficult cañon of San Mateo, had intended to make his approach by that of Tuxpan, while Porlier secured the San Mateo road against the retreat of the insurgents. He was, however, compelled to alter his plan and march through the San Mateo cañon, while Porlier directed his attention against Tenango. Ib.
22. Consisting of 2,761 infantry and 2,134 cavalry. His original force had, however, been reduced by 1,543 men from sickness and desertion. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 451-2.
23. It is narrated by Diaz Calvillo, that while Calleja was making his observations the figuration of a very perfect palm tree appeared in the sky, and that he exclaimed to José María Echagaray, who commanded the cavalry escort which accompanied him: 'Vea V. la palma; nuestra es la victoria.' Sermon, 154. Calvillo, moreover, gives a wood-cut of the miraculous appearance, which has so little resemblance to a palm that it has been thus criticised in a marginal note: 'En verdad qe parece á la Palma, como un burro á una chinchi (sic).' Ib.
    hist. mex., vol. iv. 23
24. A deep barranca intervened between the position which Calleja took up and the town. He caused three mountain paths leading to this to be well opened for the advance of his attacking columns under cover of his artillery. Castillo moved along the one to Calleja's left; Jalon advanced on the central one; and Oroz and Meneso, whose forces were composed of cavalry, on the one extending to Calleja's right. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 138-9.
25. 'Á las dos de la tarde ya no habia en el recinto un solo enemigo vivo.' Id., iii. 140. The account of the capture of Zitácuaro has been derived from Calleja's report to the viceroy in Id., iii. 17-18, 135-42; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 132-51; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 413-19; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 270-82; Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Amer., i. 310-13; Diaz Calvillo, Sermon, 152-59.
26. Though Calleja in his report wishes to give the idea that great numbers fell, he only vaguely states that many hundreds of the rebels perished. A Spaniard, however, writing from Zitácuaro on the 5th of January, says: 'Apenas moririan 200 y en el pueblo no pasarian de 20, porque estaba y aun permanece solo.' Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 419. Negrete says: 'La pérdida de los independientes. . . fué corta: no pasó de cincuenta hombres, siendo mucho mayor la de los realistas.' Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 389. Calleja estimated the number of the defenders at 35,000, of whom 12,000 were cavalry, 'número sin duda muy exajerado,' as Alaman remarks. Hist. Mej., ii. 455.
27. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 155.
28. Seventy were set at liberty, 'miserables seducidos que tambien se hicieron prisioneros.' Id., iii. 140.
29. The capital of the department was transferred to Maravatío. The lands and all except movable property were to be sold and the proceeds placed in the royal treasury. Id., iii. 156-8.
30. Ward says: 'I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is lovely, but the place is still in ruins.' Mex. in 1827, i. 180. Diaz Calvillo defends Calleja from the charge of having allowed the churches and religious houses to be pillaged. An inventory was taken of all ecclesiastical effects, and they were sent to the bishop at Valladolid. Calvillo also reproduces an order of Calleja of the 13th of January, prohibiting his soldiers from sacking any other towns, or haciendas and ranches. Sermon, 173-4. Besides Zitácuaro, Calleja reduced to ashes twelve pueblos in the vicinity. Bustamante supplies a list of most of their names. Cuad. Hist., i. 323.
31. Calleja in his report speaks of it as 'la llamada Imperial Zitáquaro.' Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 140.
32. His forces numbered about 3,200 men, commanded by Galeana, Nicolás Bravo, and Matamoros. Morelos, Declar., 23.
33. The account of Porlier's operations has been mainly derived from his despatches in Gaz. de Mex. y 1811, ii. 1231; Id., 1812, iii. 18-19, 61-70, 159-61. Consult also Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 460-7; Torrente, Rev. Hist. Amer., i. 314-16; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 166; and Cuad. Hist., ii. 10-32, in which last narration the author gives a very incorrect version. Alaman remarks that had Calleja obeyed the orders of the viceroy to march against Morelos as he approached the valley of Toluca, Porlier would not have sustained this reverse. But Calleja was bent upon returning to the Bajío of Guanajuato and opposed the movement. Ut sup., 467, 470-2
34. Namely, the third battalion of the regiment of Asturias, and the first of that of Lovera, Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii 114. These were the first troops sent from Spain. Alaman, Hist. Mex., ii. 469. On the 29th the frist battalion of the Americano Infantry regiment arrived from Cádiz. Gaz. de Mex. 1812, iii. 177.
35. 'Se recibieron noticias de que pronto estarían mas de tres mil hombres en Vera Cruz’ Bustamante, Camp. De Calleja, 158.
36. This despatch elicited a reply from Calleja, in which he enumerates his services and the sacrifices he made for his country. Venegas had enclosed a copy of the representation he had received from the officers of the army. It was therein asserted that the ill health of Calleja, which he made his plea for resigning, originated in disparaging remarks passed upon his conduct. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 473
37. His forces consisted of 2,150 infantry, 1,832 cavalry, accompanied by a train of 1,500 loads of provisions and over 400 of munitions of war. Bustamante. Camp. de Calleja, 167.
38. The day was that of San Felipe de Jesus, on which a festal procession was made from the cathedral to San Francisco.
39. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 133-4.
40. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 477. Bustamante states that the horse which Calleja rode was a stolen one, and recognized by its owner, Doña María Gertrudis Bustos, sister of the marquesa de Rayas. Cuad. Hist., i. 324.
41. Venegas had always been sparing in his acknowledgment of the services of Calleja's army, though pressed by him to reward the troops with medals and promotions. See his letters to the viceroy of Dec. 12, 1810, and Jan. 18, 1811, in Id., i. 118-19, 159-60. By despatch of May 30, 1811, the Spanish regency instructed Venegas to bestow upon the officers and troops such rewards as he might deem fitting. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 514. But nothing appears to have been done until this occasion.
42. The medal bore the name of Fernando VII., supported by a dog and a lion, symbolical of faithfulness and courage, and on the border the words 'Venció en Aculco, Guanajuato y Calderon.' Alaman says: 'Este escudo dió motivo a mil chistes graciosos, por parte de los afectos á la revolucion. ' Hist. Mej., ii. 480.
43. The names and grades of the officers promoted will be found in Gaz. Mex., 1812, iii. 143-53.
44. See copy of his instructions in Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 159-65.
45. The viceroy's words are: 'Principal coriféo de la insurreccion en la actualidad, y podemos decir que ha sido en ella el génio de mayor firmeza, recursos y astucias.' Id., 161-2.
46. The army passed through Chalco, Tenango, Ameca, Ozumba, and Atlatlauca. This route was selected as offering few obstacles to the passage of the artillery. Id., 163-4.
47. The modern name of the city is Morelos. The Mexican word 'quauh' means eagle, and 'tlan' place. Cuautla therefore signifies 'place of the eagle.' Molina, Vocabulario.
48. This description is taken from Calleja's report of April 28, 1812, to the viceroy. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 445-6.
49. Calleja states that the revolutionists had 30 pieces of artillery. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 169. Morelos, in his declaration, says that he had one mortar and 15 serviceable cannon. Declaracion, 24.
50. The cavalrymen also served on foot during the siege, their horses being pastured outside the town; 300 of them had arrived from Huétamo under Cano and Francisco Ayala. Morelos, Declar., 24. Ayala had joined Morelos at Chilapa under peculiar circumstances. He was a lieutenant of the acordada in the valle de las Amilpas, and resided at the hacienda de Mapaxtlan, near Cuautla. Being favorably disposed toward the revolution, he had declined to enroll himself in the troops levied by Garcilaso, the subdelegado of Cuautla, and had thereby incurred suspicion. Some time afterward an insurgent was killed in that neighborhood, and on his body was found a letter from Ignacio Ayala, who had been appointed intendente by Morelos of the new province of Tecpan. The comandante Moreno, believing that Francisco Ayala was the author, attacked his house, and opening fire upon it wounded Ayala's wife, who died a few days afterward. Ayala, believing his wife dead, and his house having been set on fire, effected his escape by great prowess, and offered his services to Morelos, who conferred on him the rank of colonel. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 35-7. Alaman verified this author's account by statements of reliable persons in Cuautla. Hist. Mej., ii. 428.
51. Miguel Bravo, who had been unsuccessful in his expedition against Oajaca, came with 400 men and three cannon; Anaya with 300 out of 700 sent by the junta at Sultepec, the rest having deserted; from Chautla the cura Tapia brought 300, instead of 1,000 expected by Morelos; and 250 arrived from Yautepec. Morelos, Declar., 24-5. Calleja reported that the place was defended by 12,500 armados de fusil. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 169.
52. José María Fernandez, afterward General Victoria, first signalized himself on this occasion. The skirmish was a severe one, and he saved Galeana's life at the expense of a severe wound, which he received in protecting him. Ward's Mex. in 1827, i. 190-1.
53. Calleja assaulted at four different points. In a letter to the viceroy dated April 18th, he says: 'El 19 de febrero asalté por cuatro diferentes puntos a Cuautla, que no estaba ni de mucho fortificada como en el dia.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 63.
54. En la última fué necesario que yo mismo condujese á los granaderos acobardados.' Id., ii. 64.
55. Besides the conde de Casa Rul, who died shortly after his removal from the field, Colonel Nepomuceno Oviedo, of the patriots of San Luis, fell with four captains and eleven other officers of his corps. The loss of the royalists was over 300 men. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 342-3. Ward says 500 royalists were left dead on the spot. Mex. in 1827, i. 192. Calleja reported four officers killed and 18 wounded, and of the ranks 15 killed and 95 wounded. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 409. The loss of the revolutionists was insignificant.
56. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 170.
57. It was composed of 631 of the infantry of Puebla, 400 posted at Atlixco, and the battalions lately arrived from Spain numbering 500. His cavalry, which only amounted to 240 dragoons, was increased by 300 horse detached from Calleja's army. Id., 163.
58. These troops on their arrival were called in the Mexican papers of the day 'los invencibles vencedores de los vencedores de Austerliz,' which words were printed in large type. Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 449.
59. Morelos after his capture of Izúcar left Sanchez there with 200 men. Guerrero at that time was a captain in the revolutionary army. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 434. Ward narrates that Guerrero during the bombardment had a miraculous escape. While asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a shell came through the roof and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, killing or wounding every one in the room except himself. Mex. in 1827, i. 193. Llano states that the insurgents mustered 1,500 men armed with muskets, besides a multitude of Indians. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 523-4.
60. He was compelled to abandon an 8-pounder, the gun-carriage having become unserviceable. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 531-4.
61. Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very plentiful, paid them so much a dozen for them. Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 194. 'Pagaba a peso cada bomba, granadas á cuatro reales, bala de fusil á medio la docena.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 51.
62. He wanted the heavy artillery from Perote. In April the brigadier, Juan José de Olazabal, lately arrived from Spain, was ordered to bring it up. He was intercepted at Nopalucan by the revolutionists and compelled to return to Perote, losing a rich convoy, and with difficulty saving the artillery. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 513. See Calleja's letter to Venegas of March 13th. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 58.
63. This occurred on the 3d of April. Id., ii. 61.
64. See his letter to the viceroy of April 24th. Id., ii. 59.
65. 'A cat sold for six dollars, a lizard for two, and rats or other vermin for one. An ox which was seen one day feeding between the Spanish camp and the town nearly brought on a general engagement.' Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 196-7.
66. The house doors in Cuautla were protected with strong hides nailed to them, instead of sheets of tin. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 519. 'La espantosa escasez que la reduxo al término de comer insectos, cueros y quantas inmundicias se les presentaba,' are Calleja's own words. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479.
67. For an account of the children organizing themselves into companies, and of their capture on one occasion of a royalist dragoon outside the walls, see Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 55-6.
68. He says to the viceroy: 'No convenia asaltar á un enemigo que lo deseaba.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 513-14.
69. In one of these attempts directed by night against the redoubt on the Calvario, Gil Riaño, a son of the intendente who fell at the alhóndiga of Guanajuato, was killed on the side of the royalists. Id., ii. 515.
70. Matamoros and Colonel Perdiz sallied with 100 men on the night of the 21st and forced the enemy's lines on the Santa Inés road, Perdiz, however, and many others being killed. Matamoros succeeded in joining Miguel Bravo, who was stationed at Tlayacac near the Zacatepec range with a strong force and a large convoy of provisions. The design was to introduce it by the barranca Hedionda and the town of Amelcingo, and on the 27th, signals having been exchanged with Matamoros during the preceding night, Morelos attacked with the greater portion of his forces the royalists at several points. Calleja had, however, intercepted a letter which informed him of the plans of the besieged. He accordingly made his preparations. A sanguinary contest took place, the assailants being repulsed. Bravo and Matamoros were driven back with the loss of the convoy and their artillery. Id., ii. 516-18; Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 447-52.
    hist. mex., vol. iv. 24
71. The Spanish córtes had decreed on the 9th of November, 1811, a second general indulto. This was published by the viceroy on the 1st of April following, and appeared in the Diario de Mex. of April 3, 1812.
72. Bustamante states that the indulto was brought by a royalist officer and was confined to Morelos, Galeana, and Bravo. The reply of Morelos was to the effect that he extended similar mercy to Calleja and his officers. Cuad. Hist., ii. 71.
73. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 522, supplies a copy of the original of Morelos' instructions as to the order of march, which differs somewhat from that given in the text and taken from Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479-80.
74. He wrote a letter to the viceroy that same morning at half-past four, in which he says: 'Conviene mucho que el ejército salga de este infernal pais,' and adds that his own health is such that if he does not attend to it at once all aid will be too late. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 438-9.
75. Ward says that this was done with such promptitude that the Spanish troops which were advancing from opposite directions fired upon each other before they discovered their mistake. Mex. in 1827, i. 199. Bustamante makes the same statement.
76. He was saved by José María Franco, who assisted him out. Mex. Refut. Artic. Fondo, 13.
77. 'Opusieron alguna resistencia á las nuestras con sacrificio de sus vidas que casi todos perdieron,' is Calleja's testimony to their self-sacrifice. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 480-1.
78. He states that at Chautla 800 of the troops of Bravo and Galeana were reunited; that during the siege of 72 days he only lost about 50 men by the enemy's fire and 150 by the pest; that with regard to the number who fell on the evacuation of the town he could only say that Captain Yañez told him that he had counted 147 dead on one half of the road from Ocuituco to Cuautla. Morelos, Declar., 25.
79. Estévan Montezuma, afterward a general of the republic, on his return from the pursuit, killed with his lance the wounded women whom he came across on his road! Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 524.
80. Calleja's words are 'Las siete leguas están tan sembradas de cadáveres enemigos que no se da un paso sin que se encuentren muchos.' Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 481.
81. Mex. in 1827, i. 199.
82. 'A comedy was acted a few nights afterward, in which a soldier was introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a turban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, 'Here is the turban of the Moor, whom I took prisoner!' 'And the Moor himself?' 'O, he unfortunately escaped!' The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the application readily made by the audience.'Id. 199-200.

    The siege of Cuautla was a subject of public conversation in Cádiz. Wellington, at a banquet which was given to him in that city, asked the deputy for Mexico, Beye de Cisneros, what kind of a place Cuautla was. 'It is a place,' replied Cisneros, 'open on all sides, situated in a plain or valley.' 'That,' answered Wellington, 'is a proof both of the ignorance of the general attacking it, and of the wisdom and valor of the general who is defending it.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. Ind. viii.

    The material for the history of the revolution is abundant, and the details of some parts of it have been fairly well presented by Mexican authors, though seldom without more or less bias, for and against persons and parties. Prominent among writers on this episode is Anastasio Zerecero, Memorias para la Historia de las Revoluciones de Mexico. Mexico, 1869, 1 vol. 608 pages. It is confined mostly to affairs during the time of Hidalgo, a brief sketch of the conquest being given as introductory. As the city of Mexico was occupied by the French at the time of his writing, the author pursued his labors at San Luis Potosí, and whether so intended or not, the result was little more than a series of recollections, the author evidently intending to carry them through the war for independence. Only one volume, however, was published. Zerecero was a strong revolutionary partisan. Thus while excusing the cruelties committed by the rebels, he denounces in strongest terms those indulged in by the royalists. He quotes freely from Alaman, and sparingly from Bustamante and Mendívil. The style is for the most part clear, yet without many distinctive characteristics. The last 150 pages are devoted to the biographies of Indians prominent since the conquest, and credited to Antonio Carrion.

    Bustamante, Martirologio de Algunos de los Primeros Insurgentes por la libertad é independencia de la America Mexicana. Mexico, 1841, pp. 51. This short work gives a summary of the legal proceedings against those implicated in the plots of April and August 1811 to seize the viceroy. The particulars connected with the case of each ecclesiastic and layman are given, Bustamante having obtained them from the original documents of the junta de seguridad presided over by the oidor Miguel Bataller y Vasco. To these are added biographical notices of the subsequent fate of many of the conspirators. The names are given in alphabetical order, and among them appears that of Calleja. Bustamante deems it necessary to enter into an explanation of the reasons why he inserted the royalist general's name in a list of martyrs to the cause of independence and which he published to their honor. He, therefore, states that he did so in order that the indecent conduct of Calleja might be held up to view, who tried to pass over to the side of the insurgents when he found himself in disgrace with Venegas. Under such circumstances he ought to be regarded as one of the so-called insurgents. See also Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. passim; Id., ii. 3-428; Id., iv. 309; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 89-178, passim; Bustamante, Elogio, Morelos, passim.

    Diaz Calvillo, Sermon que en el aniversario solemne de gracias á Maria Santísima de los Remedios.. . . Mexico, 1811; followed by Noticias para la Historia de Nuestra Señora de los Remedios. . . Mexico, 1812. The sermon which precedes the historical matter in this volume, was preached in the cathedral of Mexico on the 10th of October, 1811, by Juan Bautista Diaz Calvillo, at the anniversary celebration of the royalist victory at the monte de las Cruces! The author was prefect of the oratory of San Felipe Neri, and was apparently as credulous a believer in the marvellous and as unmitigated a denouncer of the revolution as can well be found among the ranks of the churchmen of that time. With regard to the sermon it is a fair specimen of the discourses delivered from the pulpit during the first years of the revolution. Abuse is plentifully heaped upon Hidalgo; the so-called victory of Las Cruces and Hidalgo's retreat are attributed to the miraculous intervention of the virgin, and, as a consequence, the events which led to his capture. In the Noticias para la Historia, which has been frequently quoted, an account of the image of the lady of los Remedies is given. Then follows a historical narration of events down to the escape of Morelos from Cuautla, supplemented with sub sequent occurrences during the same years. Castillo, resolutely blind to the true causes of the revolution, attributes its origin solely to French intrigues and Hidalgo's wicked readiness to listen to Napoleon's agents. In his persistency to hold up Hidalgo as the author of the rebellion, he unblushingly states—page 108—that his short interview with d'Alvimar was so satisfactory to the latter as to stimulate the activity of the French in their intrigues in other Spanish American countries. The historical portion of this volume of 269 pages is but an emphasized rescript of the versions of events given in the Gazeta de Mexico.

    I add by way of general reference:Alaman, Méj., ii. passim; Id., iii. 11-12, 58-60, 137-41, 170-86, 327, 335, app. 80-2, 85; Id., iv. 724, 727, app. 47-8; Hernan y Dav., i. 492-3, 874; Id., ii. 227-8, 415-16, 424-30, 467-70, 512-15; Id., iii. 223-315, 326, 328-95, 401-6, 424-530; Id., v. 245-7,865-7, 876-903, 906-8, 919; Id., vi. 18-25; 35, 38-9, 77-81, 274-5, 280-2, 288, 981-8, 1045-6; Gas. de Mex., 1784-5, i. 35; Id., 1810, i. 54, 802; Id., 1811, ii. passim; Id., 1812, iii. 6-490, passim; Id., 1790-1, iv. 361-2, 441-3; Id., 1792-3, v. 349; Id., 1794, vi. 709; Id., 1802-3, xi. 166; Id., 1808, xv. 140; Id., 1809, xvi. 793-4; Id., xxiii. 423-7; Id., xxiv. 1235-6; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 365-430, 448-91, 544-7; Córtes, Diar., 1811, iii. 354, 360; Id., iv. 192,397; Id., v. 175, 240-1, 269; Id., vii. 4, 17, 177, 199, 214; Id., 209, 220, 373; Id., 1812, xiv. 248; Id., 1820, xxiv. app. 40-53; Córtes, Col. Dec., i. 181-2; Id., ii. 26, 85-7; Córtes, Diar. Cong., ii. 405; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iii. 358; Id., iv. passim; Mosaico Mex., ii. 197, 270, 341, 461-2; Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 175, 225, 330, app. 483-9; Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 15-16, 23-8, 39-40, 48, 52-3, 58-60, 67-72, 177-81, 186-91, 216-21; Id., Ruina, N. Esp., 23, 59, 62-3, 77; Cavo, Tres Sig., iii. 382-3; Id., iv. 1-55; Cedulario, i. fol. 236; Chevalier, Le Mex., 348-65; Collado, Juan, Inform., 4-8; Negrete, Mex. Sig., xix. iv. passim, v. 104-76, and Hist. Mil., i. 312-18; Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 183-4, 188, 191, 199-200, 227-8. Other authorities consulted are: Conejares, Virtud Vengada; Cumplido Album Mex., ii. 97; Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Arner., i. 46-7, 73, 229-51, 310-37; Calderon, Life in Mex., ii. 179-89; Consejo de Regenero, Espan. é Ind. Amer. Esp., Cadiz, 1811, passim; Prov. Int. . Carta Minis. 24 de Jul. 1812, in Mayer MSS., no. 6; Prov. Int. Real Orden., 24, Jul. 1812, in Mayer MSS., no. 7; Rivera, Gob. de Mex., ii. 8, 33-46; Id., Hist. Jalapa, i. 305-8, 338-9, 394, 437; Revilla Gigedo, Bandas, no. 31, passim; Iturribarria, in Soc. Mex. Geog., vii. 291-2; Villaseñor, in Id., iii. 71; Zamora, iii. 188-9; Zamacois, Hist. Mex., v. 618, 657; Id., vii. passim; Id., viii. passim, ap. 737-8, 740-7, 749-50, 757-85; Id., 563, 820-1, 913-16; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 55-8, 61-4, 68-9; Id., Venerable Congreg. Neri, passim; Diputac. Amer. Represent., passim; Juzgados de Hac., MS., passim, in Doc. Ecles. Mex., MS., ii. no. 5; Colegio, etc., passim, in Id., v. no. 2; Chilpantzingo, in Id., ii. no. 3; Sumario Criminal contra Tres Relig., MS., 1811, in Disturbios de Frailes, ii. 341-48, no. 9; Disposic. Varias, vi. 61-71; Ximenez y Frias, El Fenix, passim; Mex., Cuad. de Formul., passim; Diez y Seis, passim; Vega, J. S. G., Exhortacion, passim; Acapulco, Provision, 6-31, in Virey de Mex. Instruc., MS., 2d ser. no. 2; Villaseñor, Theat. Amer., i. 178-90, 233-4, 237-40, 315-17; Id., ii. 30-4; Young, Hist. Mex., 89; Walton, Exposé, 281, app. 26-30; Rebelion, Origen de la, passim; Rev. Span. Amer., 178-209, 318-21; Revue Amer., ii. 552; Romero in Soc. Mex., viii. 547;Robinson, Mex., 44-56; Id., Mex. Rev., i. 47; Romero, in Soc. Mex., viii. 621; Zelaa é Hidalgo, Querétaro Agrad., passim; Pap. Var., ii. 36-68; Exhort. Patriot, dinting. Fernan. Sept., passim; Payne, Hist. Europ. Col., 305-6; Pedraza, Biog. Caudillos, 38-50; Perez, Dice. Geog. y Estad., i. 31-7, 114-15; Prov. Mich., 111-25, 143-202; Puerto Convite, passim; Sastre, Constitut., pt ii. passim; Quart. Review, vii. 257; Id., xxx. 175-7; Relacion Christ., passim; Bergosa y Jordan, Exhort., passim; Id., Carta Pastoral, passim; Ober, Mex., 417; Campillo, Edicto, passim; Id., Manifesto, passim; Olavarria y Ferrari, Junta, de Zitácuaro, ix. passim; Orizava, Ocurr., 3; Tournon, Proceso, passim; Puebla, Mario Fiedo, passim; Inquisicion, Apol., passim; Mex. Bosq. Rev., 10, 29, 34; Mex. Cabildo Metrop., 1-14, in Doc. Ecles. Mex., MS., ii. no. 4; Museo, Mex., i. 133; Id., ii. 163-76; Modern Travel. Mex. Guat., i. 109-15; La Ilustr. Mex., iv. 229, 273-5; Las Closes Product., Set^re. 15, 1878, in Pinart Coll.; Lezama, Exhort de Paz, passim; Mayer, Mex. Aztec, 256-7, 287-90; Martinez, Sinop. Hist. Rev., i. 58-66; Id., Parabien, passim; Manifesto contra las Instrucc., passim; Maillard, Hist. Tex., 17-19; Linati, Costumes, passim; Diar. Imper., June 8, 1866, 559; Gonzales, Col. N. Leon, 213-28, 238-48; Pasatiempo Militar, passim; Borricon, Exhort., passim; Alvarez, Estud., iii. 459-61; Aim. Calend. Man. y Guia, 1811, 45-102, 173-206; Apunt. Hist., passim, in Pan. Bol. Ofic., June 4, 1868; Pinart Col; Gaz. Mex., Arévalo Compend., 7-104, passim; Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 129-55, 161-70; Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 184-7, 387-9; Azanza, Instrucc., MS., 92-4, 171; Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 7-171, 221-6; Robles, Diar., in Doc. Hist. Mex., 1st ser. ii. 70; Domenech, Hist. Mex., ii. 16-21; Dill, Hist. Mex., 292-329; Descripcion de Amer., 119 et seq. ; Foote, Tex., i. 94-9; Conder, Mex. Guat., 109-10; Chynoweth, Max., 6-9; Mendíbil, Res. Hist., 51-5, 61-72, 79-98, 103-19, 141-60, ap. vii. 391-4; ix. 396-7; Narte, Clamores, passim; Niles' Register, 11. 238, 365; Niles, S. Amer. Mex., i. 142-54; Notidoso Gen., Aug. 28, 1815, 1-2; Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo, 3-15; Dice. Univ. Hist. Geog., i. 102; Id., ii. 666-8; Id., viii. 27; Id., ix. 44-5, 68, 602-3; Id., x. 77-80, 141, 474-5, 482-4, 522, 616, 636-7, 911-12, 1102, 1120-8, ap. i. 57, 300-1; Fronterizo, Dec. 5, 1880, 1.