History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 15

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XV.

WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.

1812.

Financial Distress and Arbitrary Measures — Insurgents Sack Huamantla and Capture Trains — The Suprema Junta's Movements and Acts — Doctor Cos' Plans of Peace and War — Viceregal Course — Independent Press — Bad Guerrillas — Rosains and his Troubles — Campaigns in Puebla, Michoacan, and Bajío de Guanajuato — Operations of Garcia Conde, Negrete, and Iturbide against Albino García — Capture and End of This Leader — Torres' Execution — Ill Success of Liceaga and Cos in Guanajuato — Raids in San Luis Potosí.

During the siege of Cuautla the viceregal government had to resort to extraordinary measures to carry on the war. Public loans, voluntary and forced, were long since an old story; yet one more attempt was made to borrow two million dollars from the church and the wealthy men and merchants of Mexico, Puebla, and Vera Cruz, but without success. Then it was ordered that all persons should surrender their plate and jewelry, a promise in return being given that their value should be paid in one year with interest. As it was customary at that time to invest largely in valuables of the kind, many were stripped of their all, and a considerable sum was raised, but the people never received any pay. Another infliction was a tax of ten per cent on rents of urban property. In order to provide the army with horses, and prevent their falling into the hands of the insurgents, this quixotic viceroy ordered bought all in the country, except those of the troops, guards, dependents of the acordada, and mail carriers, and such as might be found useless for military service.^[1] This brilliant scheme failed, for when Venegas came to pay for the beasts, like Simple Simon, he had not the money. All this tended to the further disgust of the people, and to the advancement of the revolutionary cause. Nor were the continued offers of pardon emanating from the Spanish córtes sufficient to hold forever the good will of the Spanish Americans.^[2]

There were several secret clubs in the capital at this time, one claiming special attention, called Los Guadalupes,^[3] whose members, like others before mentioned, labored to spread discontent in regard to the viceregal government.

One of the richest towns of that period, now within the state of Tlascala, was Huamantla, situated on the line of trade between Vera Cruz and Mexico. The place was garrisoned by forty infantry of the line, 200 royalist auxiliaries, also infantry, most of them armed with lances, there being but few muskets among them, and sixty cavalrymen. Of artillery there were only three small guns. The commandant, Antonio García del Casal, having been apprised that a large force of insurgents meditated an attack upon the town, opened ditches and erected barricades. The insurgents, 2,000 strong, assailed the place on the 18th of March, 1812, and though repulsed at first, carried it next day, after nearly all the regulars and a number of officers had been slain. Captain Casal and the rest of the garrison were made prisoners. The victors abandoned the town on the 20th, after having sacked it.^[4] Death without quarter frequently awaited the prisoners in this war, as we have seen; but thanks to the influence of some priests, their lives in this instance were spared, and they were set at liberty a few days later. The same force of insurgents afterward made several assaults against Nopalucan, but were repulsed by the garrison under Captain Antonio Conti, finally losing three guns, a number of mules, and a quantity of supplies.

Shortly afterward, at Nopalucan, a train of imported merchandise valued at two million dollars fell into the hands of the independents,^[5] under Osorno, Arroyo, Bocardo, Ramirez, and others. It was a rich prize, from which, however, the captors derived but little benefit, as it was quickly dissipated.^[6]

When the revolutionary junta suprema, after its flight from Zitácuaro, had gathered its dispersed forces and established itself at Sultepec, matters on the whole for a time looked well for the independent cause. Calleja had suffered a signal repulse at Cuautla; near Izúcar were the forces which had placed Llano in so compromised a position; Atlixco was threatened, the provinces were overrun by revolutionary troops, and Calleja was at a standstill. About this time an idea became prevalent that the struggle would soon be terminated by a compromise favorable to independence, and it was even hinted at by an article in the government organ, which announced with satisfaction an arrangement entered into by Francisco Xavier Elio, viceroy of the provinces of Rio de la Plata, with the revolutionary junta in Buenos Aires.^[7] This was the first time that the possibility of a compromise was broached; for hitherto, to speak of affairs in the other Spanish American possessions, was but to tell of royalist victories.^[8] Some thought the viceroy leaned that way, but that was not so. No one knew better than he that in the present war there was no possibility of compromise. There must be either freedom or bondage. But the junta at Sultepec, under the impression that the time had come for making some such proposal, approved two plans or projects devised by Doctor Cos, which he respectively named Plan of peace and Plan of war. These, accompanied with a manifesto entitled "de la nacion americana á los europeos habitantes de este continente," were sent in the name of the junta to the viceroy, together with a letter dated March 16th. At the same time copies of the documents were distributed to the corporations and chief authorities in the country.^[9]

The corporations and authorities placed Cos' productions, unread by many of them, in the hands of the viceroy. The latter, though pretending to look on the manifesto with contempt, in reality gave it the greatest importance by decreeing on the 8th of April that the document should be burned in the public plaza by the common executioner, thus awakening in the people a desire to know its contents.^[10] Another edict required that all copies should be gathered in; and the reading of the documents, except by special government sanction, was strictly forbidden.^[11]

The sovereign junta continued the policy of giving publicity to its views by means of the printing-press.^[12] The viceroy did what he could to counteract this influence by edicts and ecclesiastical injunctions. The circulation and reading of such productions were forbidden, and every copy called in. Priests at the confessional and from the pulpit were directed to enjoin upon the faithful obedience to these commands.^[13]

During the siege of Cuautla a number of persons occupying good social standing hastened to join the revolution. Among them was a distinguished lawyer, Juan Nepornuceno Rosains, who had been deterred for a year past from such action by the bad character of some of the insurgent leaders.^[14]

On the 3d of April Rosains raised the revolutionary standard, but with the resolve that all his acts should bear the stamp of order and true patriotism. He soon placed himself in contact with others holding like views, and within a fortnight there was thus gathered a force 800 strong, enlisted about San Andres and Nopalucan, and between Quichula and Tepeyahualco.

Insurrection becoming thus rank throughout Puebla, the viceroy gave command of the province to Brigadier Santiago Irisarri, already mentioned, and sent him the first battalion of the Americano infantry regiment,^[15] Major Gomendio, which with a small body of cavalry and the royalist auxiliaries, were all the troops at his command to defend that section. Every loyal town hereabout was in turn assailed,^[16] including Atlixco, which was attacked on the 23d of April by a strong force from Izúcar, and saved from capture only by the arrival of troops under Colonel Ordoñez. At the end of April the viceregal authority, whose forces were all engaged in front of Cuautla, was recognized only in the city of Puebla, and a few towns, including the ever faithful Tlascala, and even this city was seriously threatened. Communication was so much interrupted that for several months Mexico knew not what occurred in Jalapa and Vera Cruz. Nevertheless, Rosains and his party had no faith in their ability to withstand an attack from the royalists at Puebla; and upon news of danger reaching them, the priest José Rafael Tarelo, who had prevailed on Rosains to join the revolution, wrote to Bishop Campillo that he and his companions would accept the royal amnesty if they were not required to perform humiliating acts. The bishop returned a letter of acceptance, and Tarelo with another priest, Amador, began their preparations, when, the affair reaching Rosains, he had the latter arrested and summoned a meeting, before which he laid the bishop's letter and signified his intention, now more confirmed than ever, of fighting for the national independence. On the same day came Rafael Argüelles, a lawyer from Orizaba, commissioned by a meeting called a few days before by the curate Montezuma, at Zongolica, to arrange coöperation with Rosains and Osorno. Tarelo's negotiations with Bishop Campillo caused much trouble, and almost brought about the destruction of himself, Rosains, Argüelles, and others.^[17]

During the same period revolution raged in the provinces of its birth, left scantily garrisoned when Calleja abandoned Guanajuato. The chief towns were fortified, but had no available troops for distant expeditions. Calleja, after taking Zitácuaro, sent a division of the central army against the parties over running the Bajío or plains of Guanajuato.^[18] Colonel Diego García Conde, the chief commander, displayed great activity. He fortified his headquarters at Maravatío, a central point between Valladolid, Guanajuato, and Querétaro, and organized royalist companies.^[19] His chief aims were to destroy Albino García, and to secure communication with Mexico and the safe passage of trains. Villalba went against Cañas and Ramon Rayon, and destroyed the artillery and foundry at Santa María Tismadé. Oroz and Iturbide were sent with a force as far as Indaparapeo to relieve Valladolid, and García Conde, after visiting Celaya, hastened to Acámbaro to be at convenient distance from Valladolid. Albino García kept the garrisons of small towns constantly alarmed, and forced other insurgent leaders to obey him.^[20] At this time he formed a combination with Muñiz and Father Navarrete to assail Valladolid, on the 3d of February, which had a most disastrous result.^[21] Trujillo defeated them in detail, captured their artillery, and destroyed their foundry at Tacambaro. This, however, did not improve matters for the royal cause in Michoacan. Muñiz soon managed to make more cannon; and though the insurgent guerrilla parties were not formidable, they so multiplied that Valladolid was for eight months with out news from Mexico.^[22] Albino García seemed to derive greater resolution and power of resource from every reverse. He soon gathered his dispersed forces, and returned to his headquarters in the valley of Santiago. He was joined there by the parties under

Bajío Of Guanajuato.

Escandon, the Gonzales, Tomás Baltierra Salmeron, Cleto Camacho, the negro Valero, and others. García Conde resolved to attack them in the valley, and succeeded in penetrating as far as the plaza of Santiago on the 13th of February, but was compelled to retreat in haste. He made a second attempt with all his forces on the 15th, with no better result, and then withdrew to Celaya.^[23] It would be useless attempting to follow the repeated movements and counter-movements of the belligerents, as they reached no result other than to keep the country in a state of disturbance and suffering.

In March and April Guanajuato was reduced to the last extremity for the want of specie.^[24] By request of the civil authority García Conde, now a brigadier, escorted the bullion on hand to Querétaro. On the 8th of April he started on his return with specie and merchandise, about 1,000 mule loads, for Guanajuato and interior towns; but encountering insurgents, he lost one load of specie and a large quantity of merchandise. He succeeded in taking to Guanajuato on the 17th only the specie of the royal treasury. The specie of private individuals and the merchandise that escaped capture he was forced to leave in Irapuato. However, Colonel José Castro started from this place soon after with the effects, and leaving in Silao those for Guadalajara and Zacatecas, marched on with the rest to Guanajuato, which he reached safely on the 21st.^[25] García Conde now re ceived orders from the viceroy to convey to Mexico all the silver bullion in Guanajuato, together with that left at Querétaro, and a large flock of sheep; mutton being very scarce in the capital. To the people dwelling in the towns of the Bajío this news was anything but pleasing, and petitions poured upon him not to leave them at the mercy of the insurgent marauders. On the other hand, Cruz, deeming his own province in danger, also requested García Conde not to start with the trains till Albino García was put out of the way. The latter having overcome the insurgent chiefs, Escandon, Rubi, Gonzalez, and others who had been acting too independently of him, had increased his own force and become more dangerous. Under the circumstances, García Conde delayed his departure and decided to combine a plan of operations with the comandante general of Nueva Galicia.^[26] The troops of this province since the opening of the year had been engaged in keeping at bay insurgent parties on the confines of Michoacan and Guanajuato; and if any of them set foot in Nueva Galicia territory they were forthwith destroyed. In these repeated encounters a number of notable guerrilla chiefs had perished, some of them killed in action, and some captured and shot.^[27]

Among the most noted royalist commanders, both for activity and severity, was Pedro Celestino Negrete. Haughty and inflexible, he never spoke of the insurgents without applying to them some blackening epithet,^[28] and not one that was captured by him escaped death. On the other hand, he did not spare his officers and men from hard work, though he looked after their interests with the utmost care, and they had accustomed themselves to look up to him as a father as well as an invincible commander. His tenacious persecution of rebels had put an end to many obscure leaders, till at last there remained in the province only one insurgent chief who had acquired any considerable distinction. This was José Antonio Torres, generally called El viejo Torres, who had rendered good service to the cause in Nueva Galicia. His fate was a sad one. With his later operations against Valladolid the reader is already acquainted. From his stronghold in Michoacan he was wont to invade the region of Rio Grande, and in February 1812 he attacked Negrete near Tlasasalca. Torres was repulsed and, assailed in turn, was utterly routed. From the time of this reverse he was actively pursued from place to place, and on the 4th of April was surprised and captured at Palo Alto, near Tupátaro, by Lopez Merino, one of Negrete's subordinates. It was no small matter this capture of so noble a patriot, and the royalists made the most of it after their fashion. He was taken to Guadalajara and his arrival made a public spectacle. Wishing to heap every indignity upon him, his foes were about to fasten him by the neck to a wooden prop that his face might be well seen, but the old man told them to have no fear, he would carry his head high enough. He was tried by the oidor Velasco, and sentenced on the 12th of May to be hanged and quartered. The execution was carried into effect on the 23d. In the presence of the assembled crowd the head was severed from the body and raised upon a pole. One quarter of the body was sent to Zacoalco, the scene of his victory over Villaseñor; another was placed at the Mexicalcingo gate, by which he had made his triumphal entry into Guadalajara, and the remaining two at the gates of El Carmen and San Pedro.^[29] Negrete's division could now be employed in the pursuit of Albino García. Orders were brought him from Cruz by Iturbide to march at once. It was arranged that on the 15th of May at ten o'clock in the morning he should attack Albino García, covering the roads leading from Parangues and Yurira to the valley of Santiago; and that García Conde should at the same hour come upon the enemy's camp from the Celaya side, thus cutting off escape. In order not to awaken suspicion, García Conde tarried in Silao,^[30] where on the 1st of May he received information from Captain Esquivel, commanding at Irapuato, that he was surrounded by numerous parties of Albino García's. Conde at once despatched Villalba with one battalion, 100 dragoons, and two cannon. The rebel chief, who had been all day assailing the town with 4,000 cavalry and seven pieces of artillery, on learning of their approach retired to the hacienda de las Animas, a league distant, whence two of his lieutenants kept up a skirmish with Villalba's force.^[31] Meantime Albino García marched against Celaya, and was repulsed.^[32]

García Conde departed with the conducta of silver bullion from Guanajuato to escort it to Mexico, and conveyed it as far as Irapuato. From this place, where he incorporated into his force Villalba's command, without divulging his destination, he started at two o'clock in the morning of May 15th, so as to reach the valley of Santiago by ten, and occupy the points agreed upon with Negrete. But Albino Garcia, if unlettered, was a shrewd military man. He well understood the royalists' movements, and easily disconcerted them. Not finding Negrete where he expected to meet him, and hearing a brisk firing from the direction of Parangues, García Conde inferred that Albino García had attacked Negrete, which was true. On García Conde's approach, the enemy retired, and, pursued by the cavalry, lost some men.^[33] The brigadier again started on the 4th of June with the conducta for Mexico; but hearing at Salamanca that the guerrilla chiefs were reorganizing in the valley of Santiago, he thought that as they believed him occupied with the conducta, it would be a good opportunity to take them unawares and even capture Albino García. The same evening he despatched his most efficient officer, Agustin Iturbide, with about 160 mounted men with orders to reach Santiago at moonrise. Iturbide was there at two in the morning of the 5th, surprised the guard at the entrance of the town, and pretending to be Pedro García, who had been called by Albino to join him, obtained the pass and countersign, and took possession of the place without arousing the sleeping revolutionists. At length they were purposely awakened by orders loudly issued for the grenadiers of la Corona to occupy a certain position, the battalion of Mixto another, and so on, several organizations being named, to each of which a few of Iturbide's men belonged. The insurgents believed the whole division of García Conde was upon them; they attempted, however, to defend the barracks which were taken by force. Some soldiers took possession of the roof of the house occupied by Albino García. This chief, his brother Francisco, known as El brigadier Don Pachito, his secretary, José María Rubio—who on presenting himself said he had been held in the insurgent quarters by force, which plea saved his life — and a man named Pineda, a deserter from the royal service, were taken alive, together with some 100 or 150 more. About 150 guerrillas were killed; while Iturbide's only casualty, by his report, was the death of one grenadier. As Iturbide had to traverse on his return a region teeming with insurgents, and his force was too small to guard so many prisoners, he ordered them to be shot, excepting only the two Garcías, Rubio, and Pineda, whom he conveyed to Celaya. Three days later, after certain empty judicial proceedings, the Garcías and Pineda were publicly executed.^[34]

The capture of Albino García was a great triumph for the royalists, none of whom had ever gained much advantage over him. It must be confessed that like the other side he was something of a scourge, the Bajío region having suffered greatly at his hands. García Conde could now proceed with his conducta. One of the Villagrans, however, attacked him in the sierra of Capulalpan, but was routed by Iturbide with heavy loss.^[35] The same division on its return escorted from Mexico a large train of European and other merchandise and passengers to Querétaro.^[36]

Meantime Liceaga had been sent by the suprema junta to assume the government of the northern provinces, and, accompanied by Doctor Cos, had entered the Bajío of Guanajuato. On the 24th of July the insurgents, who had again collected in the valley of Santiago, were defeated by Iturbide, sent in advance from Querétaro. Liceaga and Cos saved themselves by flight, and García Conde now proceeded with the convoy, but was attacked near Salamanca on the 7th of August, and lost 400 mule loads. Iturbide actively pursued the insurgents, and in September defeated them on several occasions, Liceaga and Cos narrowly escaping capture.^[37] Cos, having been appointed his second in command by Liceaga, retired to Dolores, which place he made the centre of his future operations, while the latter remained in the vicinity of Yuriria. The lake, on the southern side of which this town is situated, has two islets or cays, the larger being about 1,000 varas in circumference, and the other somewhat smaller. They were 180 varas apart, and Liceaga joined them by a causeway three varas wide, protecting the cays as well as the bridge with a stone wall six feet in height, a moat, and a stockade made of prickly plants. In the larger cay there were 71 merlons, and 64 in the other.^[38] To this fortress, which Liceaga deemed impregnable, he gave his own name, and it is called in the official reports Isla Liceaga. He established factories there for making cannon and ammunition, and a mint. García Conde deemed it unnecessary, and even imprudent, to undertake the capture of the place by main force, inasmuch as, holding possession of the shores of the lake, it must sooner or later surrender. But Iturbide resolved to attack it; and to this end he first cleared the surrounding country of insurgents. He allowed the enemy no rest from the 9th of September till he pitched his camp in Santiaguillo opposite the fortress.^[39] His position was within cannon-shot, but was protected by a small rise of ground. Liceaga, who never bore the palm for bravery, on seeing the approach of danger, left the island, the command of which, together with 200 men, was intrusted to Father José Maríano Ramirez.^[40] Iturbide, having made eight rafts and brought two canoes from a long distance, attacked during the night of October 31st at four different points, placing Captain Vicente Endérica in command. A powder magazine that caught fire disheartened the garrison, and the place was taken without resistance. Father Ramirez, José María Santa Cruz, the town major, Tomas Moreno, commandant of the artillery, Nelson, an English engineer under whose direction the fortifications were built, and Felipe Amador, who had received one of the minor orders of priesthood, were captured, conveyed to Irapuato with others, and shot. The royalist loss was small. Of the defenders none escaped; such as did not fall into the victors' hands perished in the lake.^[41] The small number of arms found indicates clearly that the fortress, when assailed, was almost abandoned, and the garrison had been mostly removed.^[42]

Doctor Cos at Dolores engaged himself in organizing and bringing together the armed parties of that region. With him was Rafael Rayon, one of the president's brothers, and Matías Ortiz, who from this time began with his brothers to acquire distinction, and were generally known as Los Pachones. With the force he had organized, Cos marched on the 27th of November against Guanajuato; but his movement was attended with no result, and he had to return to Dolores. He did not remain there permanently, however, as that town was on the line of transit for produce and other merchandise to and from the inland provinces; and when trains approached he usually abandoned the place for the purpose of attacking them. It often happened that reinforcements had to be sent from Querétaro to save the trains from capture.^[43]

On the opposite side of the sierra of Guanajuato, separating on the north the Bajío from the plains of Dolores and the province of San Luis Potosí, the operation of escorting live-stock from the latter place to Querétaro, and transporting merchandise from Mexico, furnished opportunities for repeated hostile encounters. One of the hottest of these took place on the 3d of February, at the Santuario de Atotonilco near San Miguel el Grande, on which occasion Ildefonso de la Torre, the royalist commander, who had advanced to that place to receive 500 silver bars from Zacatecas, saw a refulgent palm in the sky.^[44] Another train was convoyed by the royalist priest

Diego Bear with 250 men, who coming upon a small party of insurgents near Dolores on the 22d of March, killed a number and dispersed the rest. On that same side of the sierra the independents with three guns assaulted the hacienda of Villela on the 7th of April, but were repulsed with the loss of the guns. Colonel Nuñez and Major Molleda perished in the action, and Colonel Gutierrez was taken prisoner and subsequently shot by order of Colonel Tovar, comandante at San Luis Potosí. Father Zimarripa was also captured; he had once before been taken in Aculco and pardoned; now he was retained in irons pending orders from the viceroy.^[45] About this time, owing to the defeat of the royalist Bengóa on the 16th of February, three leagues from Rio Verde, this place was at the mercy of the insurgents, who, according to the official reports, plundered it, and also the rancho Jabalí. Tovar despatched Captain Sanz with a force on the 23d of February, who recovered the town and the artillery the insurgents had possessed themselves of, but could not overtake the assailants. The latter were, however, defeated and dispersed by Arredondo, who pursued the governor of Sierra Gorda—as Colonel Felipe Landaverde was called, being represented to have been an honorable man—so hotly that to escape he threw himself down a precipice, abandoning his arms and horse.^[46]

 

 

1. The owners of the last class were required to have a written license. And any one found riding a horse, unprovided with the license, fifteen days after the publication of the edict at the head town of his district was to be shot. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 174-7.
2. This became evident in the reception given to the amnesty law of Nov. 8, 1811, published in Mexico in the Diario of April 3, 1812. In fact, decrees purporting to be for the general good were looked on, not as springing from a desire to benefit the colony, but as so many rights forced from the Spanish rulers. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 136-41.
3. Established for securing independence, when and by whom has not been ascertained; but it existed prior to 1808; it was said that Viceroy Iturrigaray had relations with them; and that in the differences between Venegas and Calleja they made proposals to the latter which were not looked upon with displeasure. The labors of these clubs were very important. They were in constant correspondence with the independent chiefs. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 14.
4. 'Han clestrozado el pueblo. . .llevándose una cuerda de prisoneros.' Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 206, 337-42. Mendíbil, Resumen Hist., 95, states that Casal escaped; the insurgent chief celebrated the victory, never thinking of affording aid to Morelos at Cuautla. Huamantla became a very important place for the Americans, a mart for the free sale of tobacco being established there. The profits that might have been obtained, sufficient to meet the war expenses, were, however, squandered by the chiefs of guerrilla parties.
5. It happened thus: The brigadier Juan José de Olazabal, a recent arrival, started for Perote on the 18th of April with 325 men, of whom 25 were cavalry, escorting a large train of merchandise belonging to the merchants, two pieces of siege artillery, and ammunition to be used against Cuautla. When near Nopalucan he sent forward for assistance, the place being beset by insurgents, who after a fight retired, and Olazabal entered the town. The mules of the merchandise teams, being then taken out of the town to water, were cut off by the enemey. All his despatches to Puebla had been intercepted; and the brigadier, leaving the merchandise in the town, returned to Perote with the artillery and ammunition, arriving there on the 30th of April. Meantime the independents captured Nopalucan and made a prize of the merchandise. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 505-7; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 570-3; Negrete. Mex. Sly. XIX. , v. 183-5. Bustamante says that Olazabal spent his time in Nopalucan reflecting on the audacity of the 'citoyones de gamuza y rueda de cuerda,' as he called the men that wore buckskin and used the lasso. That author gives him the worst of characters, accusing him of ingratitude and scandalous theft. Cuad. Hist., i. 415-7.
6. No account was ever rendered of it. Among the spoils were some beautiful diamond rings, a pectoral for the bishop of Puebla, and a necklace of fine stones which was sent as a present to Morelos. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 417-8.
7. The arrangement was signed October 20, 1811, at Montevideo, with the view of establishing peace in those provinces. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 223-4; Negrete, Mex. Sig., XIX., v. 43.
8. The fiscal of the tribunal de minería, at the meeting of that body in March, endeavored to prove that the only efficacious means to revive the mining industry was peace, such as had been made in Buenos Aires. Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., in Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 555-6.
9. Doctor Cos' ideas produced so strong an impression on Venegas that it was said he would allow no one to see the letter. It may be found entire in Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 88-90. Both plans were based on the principle entertained by the ayuntamiento of Mexico in 1808, adopted by Hidalgo and followed by Rayon and the junta, of using the name of Fernando VII. only to aid in achieving independence. On that ground Cos founded his plan of peace; in the preamble he maintained that the sovereignty resided in the body of the nation; that Spain and America were integral parts of the monarchy, subject to the king, which parts possessed equal rights and were independent of one another; that in the absence of the monarch, America, having kept herself loyal to him, had a better right to convoke córtes, and to call thereto the few Spanish patriots who had not stained themselves with treason, than Spain to summon deputies from America; that the inhabitants of Spain had no right to assume the supreme power in the colonies, and authorities sent by them were illegally constituted, and that Americans, as a natural consequence, had the right to conspire against them; such action, instead of being treasonable, was on the contrary meritorious; and the king, if present, would certainly commend them. To reduce his principles to practice, Cos proposed in the plan of peace the creation of a national congress, independent of Spain, representing Fernando VII. and affirming his right. The European officials and the armed force were to resign their offices and powers into the hands of the congress, and remain as private citizens, with their lives and estates guaranteed; the employés retaining their honors and fueros, and a portion of their pay if they continued residing in the country. Past grievances should be forgotten, and the Mexican congress would then, as a token of fraternity, afford some pecuniary assistance to the Spaniards fighting in Spain against the foreign usuper and his allies. If that plan were not accepted, then the alternative of war should be recognized, and under it hostilities carried on according to the laws of nations, prisoners being treated as belligerents, and not as traitors, for both would be fighting for their national rights under the common banner of Fernando VII.

   The doctor made a résumé of charges for violence, atrocities, and grievances, real or supposed, said to have been committed by the royalists, and concluded by trying to prove that it was in the interests of the Europeans, whom he called 'brethren, friends, and fellow-citizens,' to accept the plan of peace, and thus contribute to the general welfare. His plans acquired great celebrity. The difficulty with them was that the principles supposed to be therein established were the very gist of the trouble, about which there could be no compromise; for one party wanted an independent government, though under the name of Fernando, which the other party well understood the meaning of. As to the war plan, the insurgent junta was pledging more than it could fulfil, its authority not being recognized by all the chiefs at war with the viceregal government. El Ilustrador Am., nos 2-6, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iv. 189-90, 193-5, 207-8, 222-4, 230; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 15-32; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 548-63; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 133; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 389-406; Meníbil, Res. Hist., app. ii. 375-83; iii. 384-5; iv. 385; Ward, Mex., i. 183-5; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 202-14. The pretended allegiance to Fernando was a deception, a mere matter of policy, and so considered by Cos and the junta. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 556-61. This was an undeniable fact, recognized by Bustamante as such, and fully confirmed in a confidential letter of the junta to Morelos, dated Sept. 4, 1811, which contains these words: 'Habrá sin duda reflexado V. E. que hemos apellidado en nuestra junta el nombre de Fernando VII. que hasta ahora no se habia tornado para nada ... nos surte el mejor efecto ... Nuestros planes en efecto, son de independencia, ... no nos ha de dañar el nombre de Fernando.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 405-6; Gaz. de Mex., 1812. iii. 489-90; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., app. 5, 385-6.

10. He said that he could find no better means of showing the horror and abomination inspired by those proposals. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 90-2; Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 373-4.
11. Beristain, archdeacon of Mexico and influential with the viceroy, and Friar Diego Miguel Bringas y Eucinas, guardian of Santa Cruz de Querétaro, undertook to defend the despotic order, and to impugn Cos' plan. Bustamante believed it beneficent. Of Bringas' character he speaks in high terms of praise, giving him credit for honesty of purpose in his effort, though based on wrong impressions. Cuadro Hist., i. 401. Beristain gave his arguments in the journal El Filopatro. and in a pamphlet of 65 numbers, ending 15th October, 1812, dedicated to the tribunal of the inquisition. Bringas confutes the charges made against the royalists, and specifies the acts of atrocity by the insurgents which he saw or heard of. If he did not vindicate the royalists, he made it appear that the insurgents had excelled them in cruelty. Bringas, Impugn. del pap. sedic., 176 and 143 pp. issued from the press of María Fernandez de Jáurequi, in Mex., 1812.
12. Owing to the acquisition of the type as already narrated at this time, the Ilustrador Americano and the Semanario Patriótico had freer course, and exercised no small influence. Rivera, Gob. Mex., ii. 39.
13. The edicts were dated June 1st and 3d respectively. The ecclesiastical chapter said that the newspapers of the independents were 'una máquina infernal inventada por el padre de la discordia para desterrar del pais la paz.' Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 599-601.
14. Such men had justly won the name of 'devorantes' given them by Morelos. Máximo Machorro, Arroyo, and Antonio Bocardo were of the number. Machorro was like a wild beast, having plenty of physical courage, and indulging it in the way of murder and robbery without limit. Morelos tried to bring him under discipline, but failed. Bocardo was a little less brutal, a little more amenable to reason. Bustamante., Cuad. Hist., ii. 132. This author uses similar language respecting other leaders whom he personally knew, and with whom he had to associate even at the peril of his life, men who were no better than bandits. His lamantations are touching. But on the other hand, he was inclined to judge more favorably of other leaders that he was not acquainted with, such as Albino García, the Villagrans, Osorno, and others, whom Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 563-6, stamps with the same stripe. Such men gave Morelos and other respectable chiefs much trouble, and were the bane of the revolution.
15. Arrived at Vera Cruz, from Spain, January 29, 1812. The second battalion remained at Habana. A little later the Castilla regiment came out. The fourth expedition arrived August 25, 1812, consisting of the Zamora infantry regiment, Colonel Rafael Bracho, a company of flying artillery, and the rest of the men to complete the Castilla and Lovera regiments. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 469-70; iii. 237; Guerra, Rev. Mej., ii. 447; Mendíbil, Res. Hist., 94; Bustamante, Camp, de Calleja, 158-9; Niles' Reg., ii. 71; Zamacois, Hist. Mex., viii. 86-8, 236; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 349-50.
16. At the foot of Popocatapetl was posted an insurgent party led by a monster called Vicente Gomez, nicknamed El Capador, recognizing no authority. As late as 1850, there was in Mexico, begging his daily food, an old soldier of the Asturias battalion, whom Gomez had mutilated. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 568.
17. The report got out that Rosains and his friends intended to apply for amnesty. A rough, unbridled rabble, led by Machorro and the Franciscan friar Ibargüen, fell upon Rosains and Argüelles, severely maletreated them and confined Tarelo, who, however, escaped. Ibargüen was of Arroyo's stamp, and even worse if possible. No arguments availed with such men, and Rosains and Argüelles were on the point of being sacrificed, but after much trouble succeeded in escaping and fled toward San Andre's Chalchicomula. Tarelo, who had joined the revolution for the sake of plunder and had taken a large share of the two million conducta captured at Nopalucan, sent men in pursuit. Rosains was taken and in shackles conveyed to Tepeaca, where he was saved only by the prayers of the people. But he was confined in a dungeon, and was in peril of his life till he escaped. Rosains, Rel., in Alaman, Hist. Mex., ii. 575-6; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 186-7.
18. It consisted of one battalion of the Corona, lieut-col. Villalba, another made up from several regiments under Captain Agustin de Iturbide, the Puebla cavalry regiment, and two squadrons of frontier troops, with some pieces of artillery.
19. His report of Feb. 17th, from Salamanca. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 218-22, 225-8.
20. As he acted with entire freedom from control, the junta, when at Zitácuaro, sent a certain Cajigas with troops and artillery to bring him under subjection; but he, caring no more for the junta than for the government at Mexico, fell upon Cajigas, taking his cannon and other arms, and sent him back to the junta. Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 430. The junta on the 18th of March, 1812, declared Albino García an outlaw, 'por su crueldad, y embriaguez, lascivia, latrocinios, escándalos y despotismo conciliándose el odio y detestacion general.' Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 198-200.
21. The plan was for García to attack on the north; Navarrete on the west; Muñiz on the south; and Piedra with 400 men from his hacienda El Canario was to render aid. Trujillo and his subordinate, Captain Antonio Linares, made short work of the matter. The latter, with 100 foot, 200 cavalry, and 3 pieces, charged upon García, who had about 4,000 or 5,000 men, mostly mounted, and six pieces, on the heights of Tarimbaro, and after some fighting dispersed them and captured their artillery. Linares returned to Valladolid with the cannon and upward of 600 horses and mules, most of them saddled, and other spoils. Muñiz, not knowing what had befallen García, appeared before the city, and occupied the heights of Santa María with 10 pieces. Trujillo and Linares together made a dash against him and signally defeated him, capturing all his artillery. Linares went in pursuit as far as Tacambaro, burned the town after removing nine cannon, and thereby destroyed the factory of arms that Muñiz had there. Navarrete, receiving timely advice, kept away and returned to his old position. Thus Trujillo in three days broke up, with out losing a man, a combination of 8,000 or 10,000, taking besides about 25 pieces of artillery, and large quantities of supplies. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 589-95; Mora, Revol Mex., iv. 426-8.
22. Arechederreta saw a letter from the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, to a friend of his in Mexico, which so stated. The official reports of Trujillo and Linares, dated Feb. 8th, of the actions opposite Valladolid, did not reach Mexico till the latter part of May or beginning of June, and they were the triplicates.
23. He had to abandon the place on hearing that Pedro García had taken and sacked the villa de Leon, and slain its comandante, Manuel Gutierrez de la Concha. Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 428.
24. Silver bullion was selling at very low prices, and work in the mines suffered accordingly. A deputation of the ayuntamiento went with a letter from the intendente to García Conde, then at Silao, requesting him to escort to Querétaro the bullion belonging to private persons the royal treasury officials would not send the silver of the crown without orders from the viceroy and bring back the coin and goods detained there. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 176-81.
25. García Conde's official report to the viceroy from Silao, April 24th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 741-4; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 181-2; Bustamante, Cuad Hist., ii. 299-301.
26. He despatched Captain Iturbide with 60 Silao royalists to confer with Cruz and Negrete. With this small escort Iturbide traversed the region infested by insurgent parties, fulfilled his commission in a satisfactory manner, and in six days was back again at García Conde's headquarters. The time occupied by him was hardly more than the postman employed in time of peace. These facts and future operations appear in his report of May 18th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 733-9.
27. Such was the fate of Colonel Vargas, Francisco Piña, El Seguidillo, Maldonado, Tomás Rodriguez, and others.
28. Monsters, infamous rebels, wretches, cowardly assassins, vile canaille, and such like, were words constantly occurring in his official reports; and yet that man lived to serve the republic, and so did García Conde.
29. At each place were posted these words: 'José Antonio Torres, traidor al rey y á la Patria, cabecilla rebelde é invasor de esta Capital.' The remains were incinerated forty days after. His house in San Pedro Piedra Gorda was razed to the ground and sown with salt. Thus we see what it was to be a patriot in those days. It must be confessed that in the city of Mexico more decency was shown. The execution took place the 23d of May, all the garrison being out under arms to see it. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 639-40; Castillo, Negrete, Mex., v. 57-63, 78; Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., i. 145; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 185-90; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 185-6; Mora, Mex. y sus Rev., iv. 439-43. At the time of his capture Torres had 400 men with him, all of whom perished, many of them being burned alive, Merino having ordered some barns in which they had sought refuge to be set on fire. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iv. 147-8.
30. Official reports of May 11th and 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 733-9, 769-71.
31. Villalba, being told by Esquivel that the people of the San Jacinto rancho were friendly to the insurrection, ordered Lieut. Gutierrez to put them all to the sword, an order which he afterward modified by sparing the women and children; but as all the men but one had fled, on him alone must fall the vengeance of the realm. Alaman, Hist. Mex., iii. 188.
32. The vecinos of Celaya, Irapuato, and other towns, instead of making so strenuous a resistance, would have joined the revolution if the junta soberana had been able to keep in check the guerrilla chiefs. The comandante at Irapuato, José" Ma Esquivel, was decidedly in favor of independence. In after years he was several times a member of the legislature, and once vice-governor of Guanajuato, and died as one of the justices of her supreme court. Id., iii. 189-90.
33. Among the slain was one of the most efficient officers of the guerrilla band. Conde and Negrete marched into the valley in three sections, one of which was under Iturbide, with the view of pursuing Albino if he returned. They failed to find him, however, only priests, women, and children being left in the town. Conde wanted to form other combinations with Negrete, but the latter had to return to his former positions to protect the Nueva Galicia frontier from possible invasion by Albino García. It was, however, agreed that Negrete should march by the Pénjamo road, Conde taking that of Yuriria, so as to place the enemy between two fires; but the latter eluded the hot pursuit of Conde and Iturbide, though owing to the fact of his being afflicted with gout, Albino had to journey in a carriage or on a bed. When the pursuers came near he would quickly mount a horse and escape by some side road, after hiding his artillery. Once his artillery carriages were captured and destroyed. At the end of this unsuccessful pursuit the royalists were completely exhausted. Conde gave up the chase, and returning to the valley of Santiago, took the sacred vessels and paraments and the priests of that town and of Yuriria to Irapuato. Conde, in his report of May 31st, speaks of Albino's force being all dispersed, and states that the chief had only 100 men with him; but, of course, that is a part of guerrilla warfare. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 749-55; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 191-3; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 431-2. Albino García's bands consisted of large masses of mounted men, mostly mestizos and mulattoes, some armed with spears, others with muskets and swords, ready for attack and still readier for running away. Their chief was the most active and dreaded guerrilla that the war produced. When he intended to assault a town or hacienda, a large number of Indian slingers assembled in the neighboring villages and fields, and with a few badly made and worse served pieces of artillery, rendered aid. The attack was made by surrounding the town with cavalry, which was, of course, useless against a fortified place. The most abusive epithets were hurled at the besieged, and a brisk fire of artillery and musketry sustained for hours, discharging perhaps 600 or 700 cannon-shots, which did little or no harm, the royalists returning the fire from behind their intrenchments. Finally, after having some men killed and wounded, the foiled assailants would retire either because their ammunition had given out, or some royalist force was approaching to relieve the town. In the retreat the guerrillas would sack every hacienda on their way, and then disperse, to meet again at some other place agreed upon. The good fortune of towns that thus escaped being plundered and destroyed was attributed to a miracle, and the te deum was chanted. If any prisoners had been taken on either side they were forthwith shot. In a field of battle the insurgents generally placed their artillery on some height, the infantry behind it, and the large masses of cavalry at the wings. The cavalry would charge upon the royalists, who easily drove them away with a few discharges of grape; they would then flee in all directions, throw their ill-disciplined and poorly armed infantry into confusion, and the artillery would fall into the royalists' hands after the first discharge. Albino García complained that his men were always more disposed to plunder than to fight. But this kind of warfare was excessively fatiguing for the royalist troops, constantly deprived of rest and food, marching and countermarching without being able to catch or strike the foe.
34. García Conde's conduct toward his prisoner, according to his own report was dastardly, even for that day and place. He pretended to pay him honors as captain-general by bringing his troops out on parade, ringing bells, and firing salvoes of artillery. Albino and his brother being placed in the plaza opposite the brigadier's residence, the latter used insulting words to the chief prisoner, and then made a ribald speech to the crowd who had come to see the fallen hero. Notified of his death-sentence, Albino García wrote his parents, who were royalists and had formerly rendered service to García Conde himself on his expeditions, asking their pardon and blessing, and ordering the restoration of all property he had seized to the owners. His head was elevated in Celaya at the crossing of San Juan de Dios street, where he made his greatest effort to capture the city. The crippled hand, which made him known as El Manco, was taken to Guanajuato, and the other to Irapuato. Years after, when the country became independent, the skull was buried. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 640-4; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 237-8; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 196-203; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 435-6; Mej. Bosquejo Ligerís, 14, 257-8; Mendíbil, Res. Hist., 132.
35. Conde's report of June 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 645-6.
36. 7,706 bales, 79 coaches with passengers, 632 mules, and 130 asses laden. Numbers of persons, including troops, passengers, and muleteers, 5,920. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 85-6.
37. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1014-17, 1095-1110.
38. Iturbide's detailed report in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 25-39. The town and lake have different names assigned to them by different writers; namely, Yurira, Yuriria, Yurirapándaro, Yuririapúndaro, and Yurirapúndaro.
39. In 19 actions during 40 days he killed many, some of whom were chiefs of renown, and took prisoners Colonel Francisco Ruiz, and lieutenant-colonel of artillery, Francisco Valle, known as the 'negro habanero,' both of whom it is hardly necessary to say were executed at once. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 241.
40. Bustamante, calling him a sub-deacon, says: 'En quien siempre admiré buenas disposiciones para puntear una guitarra y divertio un estrado de damas, y no tenia otras.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 240.
41. Iturbide, whose pedantry in his reports equalled his bravery and cruelty, broke out on this occasion into one of his peculiar bursts: 'Miserables, ellos habrán conocido su error en aquel lugar terrible en que no podrían remediarlo. Quizá su catástrofe triste servirá de escarmiento á los que están aun en tiempo de salvarse!' Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 27.
42. Bustamante has it that Liceaga had taken out the troops, leaving his prisoners, who found ways to plot with Iturbide to secure their freedom. The latter says: 'Fué preciso valerse de muchos ardides, cuyo relacion no contemplo interesante para este lugar, y el resultado lo hará inferir á los entendimientos claros, imparciales y sin preocupacion.' For all that, Iturbide ordered many military executions there, and sent hundreds hence of whom he made no mention. It was his chief delight in this world to consign to hell the excommunicated. Ramon Rayon occupied the island several months later, and exhumed the bones of about 600 persons, whom he caused to be interred with funeral honors in the parish church, which Iturbide looked upon as a crime, prosecuting the priest that officiated, and holding much correspondence with Rayon on the subject. Iturbide put himself up for a sage, and a loyal vassal of Fernando VII. Cuadro Hist., ii. 246-7. Thus far in this history we find him both fanatical and murderous.
43. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 295-8, cannot reconcile Cos' statement on his attack against Guanajuato, appearing in Diario de Operac., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 626, with the report of Intendente Marañon inserted in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 207-9; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 167-8. The same difficulty occurs in comparing the false accounts of insurgent and royalist commanders. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 238-9, says that the invading force was repulsed.
44. Torre's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 257-9. The palm phenomenon had become fashionable since Calleja pretended to have seen one at Zitácuaro. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 205.
45. Tovar's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 626-7, 669-75.
46. Tovar's report and annexes, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 615-18, 625-7; Arredondo's report in Id., 1812, 1111-15; Mora, Mex. Rev., iv. 445-8.