History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 33

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XXXIII.

DETHRONEMENT AND DEATH OF ITURBIDE.

1822-1824.

Inauguration of the Order of Guadalupe — Padre Mier — Short-lived Harmony — Arrest of Deputies — Iturbide Attempts to Reorganize Congress — His Preposterous Claims — He Dissolves the Assembly — A Junta Instituyente Established — Appropriation of Spaniards' Money — Affairs at Vera Cruz — Santa Anna in Disgrace — Iturbide Visits Jalapa — Santa Anna Revolts — Republicanism Proclaimed — Progress of the Insurrection — Reverses — Influence of the Masonic Order — Change of Tactics — Plan of Casa Mata — Iturbide's Conciliatory Action — Congress Reinstalled — The Emperor Abdicates — His Departure from Mexico — His Return and Death.

When the ceremony was over, and the bishop of Puebla had delivered a sermon fulsomely flattering to the new monarch, and directly contradictory to his previous pastorals in eulogy of Fernando, Iturbide was conducted to the palace,^[1] where largess was scattered to the assembled crowds. Festivities in celebration of the great event were kept up for three days. But pomp and solemnities, rich banquets and merry-making, could not clothe with majesty the soldier. The high-born looked upon their emperor as an upstart, and the others regarded him in no wise as a royal personage. By all, the high-sounding titles of his family and court were pronounced with a supercilious smile.

The display at the coronation was supplemented on the 13th of August by the pompous inauguration of the order of Guadalupe. This order had been created some months before by the junta provisional^[2] as a means of rewarding the meritorious, not only in the military, but in all other careers, and shortly before the coronation the statutes were approved by congress and the appointments made.^[3] But the ceremony only supplied Iturbide's opponents with an additional subject for ridicule.

The harmony between the congress and the emperor was of short duration. Iturbide's impatience of restraint and claims to prerogatives soon made it evident that no balance of power could be maintained. The right of appointing the members of the supreme court of justice became a matter of dispute between the executive and legislative powers, and in it one of Iturbide's bitterest enemies took part.

Padre Servando Mier had returned from exile, and taken his seat in congress on the 15th of July as deputy for the province of Monterey. This extraordinary personage, whose travels, persecution, and sufferings, no less than his political writings, had gained for him notoriety, had escaped from Habana after his expulsion thither on the collapse of Mina's expedition, and had sought an asylum in the United States. As soon as he heard that independence had been proclaimed in Mexico, he once more turned his face to the land of his birth. But his usual misfortune still attended him, and on his arrival at Vera Cruz he was detained as a prisoner by Dávila, and confined in the fortress of Ulúa. Having been elected a deputy to congress, the assembly made strenuous efforts to obtain his release, but it was not until after Iturbide had been proclaimed emperor that Dávila liberated him. If, as was suspected, the Spanish governor's motive in releasing him was to let loose a dragon of mischief to confound the empire, he succeeded. An uncompromising republican, he had hardly set foot on shore when he began to inveigh against monarchy; and on presenting himself before Iturbide, he manifested his contempt for royalty by omitting all titles of majesty in addressing him.^[4] Witticism, irony, and ridicule were likewise brought into play. The coronation was a farce; the inauguration of the order of Guadalupe was a performance of mummers, and its members were nicknamed accordingly;^[5] he burlesqued the government, satirized the emperor, and published a forcible essay in recommendation of a republican form of government.

Matters soon reached a climax. The republicans and masonic order were hard at work; the political organs El Sol advocating monarchy with a European prince on the throne and El Hombre Libre—sustaining republicanism were suppressed. Nevertheless, seditious sheets were scattered broadcast. French works promulgating the social principles of Rousseau were published in Spanish. Preached against by the clergy, and burned in the plazas, they were printed again. Early in August the germ of a republican conspiracy was discovered in Michoacan and nipped. Not discouraged, the faction planned a bolder move, which was to effect a revolution near the capital, declare that the congress had been deprived of its freedom of action in the election of Iturbide, remove the assembly to Tezcuco, and proclaim a republican government. In this conspiracy many military officers and not a few of the members of congress were implicated. The government, however, was informed of the plot by Captain Luciano Velazquez, engaged in the suppression of highwaymen on the Puebla road. Iturbide thereupon took the high-handed course of arresting, on the 26th and 27th of August, fifteen of the deputies,^[6] among whom was Padre Mier, who once more found himself inside of prison walls. Other arrests were also made, and his passport was sent to Santa Maria, the minister of the republic of Colombia, who had been a prominent promoter of the design.^[7] The indignation of the congress was great; its rights had been infringed, and it demanded the liberation of the imprisoned members, while asserting its right to try them. The government refused, and the irritation thereby engendered was great. Friends of the emperor even took part with the accused; Gomez Farias, the proposer of Iturbide's elevation to the throne, moved that congress should address a manifesto to the nation and dissolve itself.

It was finally resolved that for the present the national assembly would remain silent, and await the course of events. Meanwhile the prisoners were rigorously prosecuted. But the evidence was of little legal weight; an attempt at conspiracy was proved, but it was difficult to fasten it upon individuals.^[8] Nevertheless, the accused were detained in custody. Their republican proclivities were too well known to allow their release. A few, however, were liberated at the end of the year, more as an act of grace at Christmas than as an admission of their innocence.^[9] The only demonstration of revolt occurred in Nuevo Santander, headed by Brigadier Felipe de la Garza, who sent in a representation to Iturbide signed by the ayuntamiento of Soto la Marina, the electors, military and other officers, protesting against the encroachment on the sovereignty of the nation, and demanding the release of the deputies.^[10] But the movement was a mere flash, no other provinces responding. Brigadier Fernandez, comandante of San Luis Potosí, was despatched against the disaffected district, and Garza having implored pardon, the affair ended.^[11]

After the imprisonment of the deputies the congress became more openly defiant, and united in selfdefence hitherto opposing parties. The question of right to appoint the supreme tribunal of justice was claimed with continued firmness. A proposal made by the government for the establishment of military courts in the city of Mexico and the provincial capitals, in order to expedite the administration of justice, was resolutely rejected, and the undisguised antagonism of the two powers made it evident that they could not long exist side by side. Iturbide, therefore, determined to reform the congress. On September 25th the deputy Lorenzo de Zavala, after classifying the proceedings of the assembly as illegal, on the ground that it had not been divided into two chambers in conformity with the provisions of the convocating act, and demonstrating that the provinces were not equally represented with regard to population, moved that the number of deputies should be reduced and measures adopted for the formation of the second chamber.^[12] The sensation thereby created was great, especially as the proposal had come from a deputy; and the motion met with corresponding disapprobation. But the government now took the matter in hand. On the 17th of October Iturbide held a junta, attended by the council of state, the generals resident in the capital, and over forty deputies either favorable to his views or indifferent. The discussions were lengthy, and resulted in a commission being sent on the following day to the congress, proposing on the part of the government that the number of deputies should be reduced to seventy. Of course the proposal was rejected; but the congress, by way of adjustment of differences, proposed that the Spanish constitution should be provisionally observed, by which concession the emperor would be entitled to the veto and the right to elect the members of the supreme tribunal of justice. This only opened the way to further demands. Iturbide thereupon made the preposterous claim that his power of veto should extend to any article of the constitution which was being framed, and that he should be authorized to raise and organize a police force. At the same time he insisted upon the reduction of the number of deputies. Even the strongest conservatives were disgusted. Congress hesitated no longer, but rejected the emperor's demands one and all, and Iturbide cut short contention by dissolving the assembly on the 31st with an armed force.^[13] To preserve at least a shadow of the legislative power, Iturbide established a junta, which he styled 'instituyente' composed of forty-five members selected from the deputies of the dissolved congress. The installation took place on the 2d of November,^[14] Castañiza, the bishop of Durango, being elected president. In such an assembly, the tool of course of the emperor, was vested the legislative power until the meeting of a new congress, for-the convocation of which regulations were to be formed by it without delay. But the business most urgent was to find some means of raising money. Nor did the junta nacional instituyente waste time, but on the 5th passed a decree ordering a forced loan of $2,800,000.^[15] As the collection, besides being attended with trouble, would be a slow process, and as there was then lying at Perote and Jalapa nearly $1,300,000^[16] belonging for the most part to Spaniards who had left the country or were on the point of departure—money awaiting safe conduct to Vera Cruz for shipment to Spain—Iturbide seized it and applied it to government purposes,^[17] a proceeding which brought down upon him much censure, and alienated the good-will of many. While these events were occupying the capital, affairs of no less moment were going on in Vera Cruz. Santa Anna's arbitrary proceedings were exciting comment. There was insubordination in his ranks, and defalcations in the regimental chest.^[18] Luaces, the captain general of the provinces of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and Oajaca, had retired on account of failing health,^[19] and the brigadier José Antonio Echávarri was appointed to succeed him. It appears that Santa Anna had informed the government that he was devising a scheme to obtain possession of Fort Ulúa, and Echávarri was ordered to march from Jalapa to Vera Cruz, where he arrived on the 25th of October. Dávila had been relieved^[20] by Brigadier Francisco Lemaur, and Santa Anna conceived the plan of gaining possession-of the fort by surprising it under cover of a feigned surrender of Vera Cruz to the new commander.^[21] He therefore made overtures to Lemaur, and it was arranged between them that the Spaniards should take possession of the fortifications on the night of the 26th of October. Echávarri, informed on his arrival by Santa Anna of the scheme now ripe for execution, gave his consent to it. Leaving the final dispositions to the management of Santa Anna, and accompanied only by Pedro Velez, Colonel Gregorio Arana, and a guard of about a dozen men, he went at midnight, according to arrangements, to the intrenchments of Concepcion, there to receive the decoyed Spaniards, while Santa Anna awaited another detachment at the bulwark of Santiago.

From some cause, however, the force which ought to have been provided by Santa Anna had not arrived, and Echávarri found only the ordinary picket on the fortifications. But the Spaniards had already landed, and were entering the outer works. Echávarri's position was thus a very perilous one. The Spaniards pressed forward and a contest ensued. Velez was wounded by a pistol-shot, and three soldiers were bayoneted. Nothing saved Echávarri from death or capture but the careless procedure of the Spaniards, who had only sent forward a small portion of their force; observing which, Echávarri bravely charged and drove back the assailants. This had the effect of causing their comrades who were coming up to retire and take up a position behind the outer stockade. Meantime Santa Anna's aid, Castrillon, who had conducted the negotiations, and had come in the Spanish launch, provided for his own safety. Abandoning his dupes, he ran down the beach to the pier and reported to Lieutenant Eleuterio Mendez, in command of the cavalry picket of twenty-five dragoons stationed there, that Echávarri was either killed or taken prisoner, whereupon that officer went in all haste to the assistance of his superior. The Spaniards were then driven from their position and took to their boats. At the Santiago fortification the action, there more hotly contested, terminated with a similar result.^[22] Though a victory was thus gained by the Mexicans, Santa Anna's project of surprising Ulúa failed. But the affair was pregnant with disaster to Iturbide. as we shall presently see. In a confidential despatch to the emperor, Echávarri expressed his suspicion that Santa Anna, enraged at not having been promoted to the captain-generalcy, had treacherously planned his death or capture, by purposely neglecting to order up the troops which ought to have been stationed in the works of Concepcion.^[23] So grave a charge, in view of previous complaints, required serious attention, and Iturbide decided to remove Santa Anna from his position as comandante general of Vera Cruz. Caution, however, was necessary, and to avoid possible mischief, the emperor deemed it prudent to manage the matter in person. With the ostensible object of taking measures for the reduction of Fort Ulúa, he therefore made a visit to Jalapa, leaving Mexico on the 10th of November. The journey was made in great state, and at Puebla he was received with demonstrations of joy. At Jalapa, however, the Spanish element predominated, and his late seizure of private funds had not gained him affection. His reception was so cold, and the want of hospitality to his suite so obvious, as to bring out the remark that at Jalapa Spain began.^[24]

When Santa Anna met the emperor at Jalapa according to instructions, he was informed that his services were required in the capital, and that he would have to accompany him on his return thither. In answer to the pleas of private business and want of money, Iturbide handed him five hundred pesos, and allowed him a few days to arrange his affairs and hand over his command to Brigadier Mariano Diez de Bonilla, who had been appointed to succeed him. So well had the emperor dissembled, that up to this time Santa Anna apparently had no suspicion that Iturbide intended to call him to account. The announcement to Santa Anna of his removal from the command in Vera Cruz was made in terms of highest compliment;^[25] and when Iturbide departed for the capital on the 1st of December, he embraced him and said: "I await you in Mexico, Santa Anna, to make your fortune for you."^[26] It was, perhaps, a little overdone by Iturbide, and Santa Anna was as clever a dissembler as he. Further than this, he was secretly warned that his ruin was meditated.^[27] Therefore, with every appearance of undisturbed confidence, with every mark of subservient respect,^[28] he attended Iturbide for a short distance on his journey, but returned with hatred in his heart to Jalapa, and in a few hours was on his way to Vera Cruz. He arrived at the port on the following day, and putting himself at the head of the 8th infantry regiment, of which he was colonel, proclaimed in the name of the nation a republican government, declaring that the three guaranties of the plan of Iguala would be inviolably observed.^[29] The movement was received in Vera Cruz enthusiastically; Alvarado and other neighboring towns joined in the revolt, and the knell of the empire had sounded.

 

Great preparations had been made in the capital for the return of the emperor, where it was thought that he was all this time triumphing over the Spaniards. Moreover, an imperial prince had been born,^[30] and the celebration of the auspicious event awaited the arrival of the august parent.^[31] But Iturbide was in no humor for baby bell-ringings and baptisms. At Puebla he had received intelligence of Santa Anna's revolt, and though he pretended to make light of it, was none the less conscious of its serious significance. He hurried his departure from the town,^[32] and unexpectedly entered the capital by night, December 13th.^[33] Measures were at once taken to suppress the revolt. Santa Anna was declared a traitor, and deprived of his military rank; pardon was offered to those of his followers who returned to their allegiance within a specified time; the governor of the archiepiscopal mitre was asked to fulminate excommunication against all who declared for republicanism;^[34] the press was brought into action, and every epithet that could attach odium to Santa Anna made use of; and brigadiers Cortazar and Lobato were despatched from the capital against the insurgents, while other troops were moved from Puebla, and the imperial grenadiers stationed at Jalapa were advanced to Plan del Rio.

Meantime Santa Anna had published in Vera Cruz a plan of the revolution,^[35] and joined by Guadalupe Victoria, who now sallied from his place of concealment, was organizing an army which he styled El Ejército Libertador. The revolution spread rapidly, and at first success attended the movement. Cortazar and Lobato were compelled temporarily to retire before insurgent bands near Cordoba, and Santa Anna surprised and captured the whole force of grenadiers at Plan del Rio, incorporating the soldiers in his ranks. Elated with this success, he marched against Jalapa, his force consisting of the 8th infantry regiment and a body of cavalry, and two guns. At dawn of December 21st he attacked the town, but sustained a crushing defeat. The grenadiers lately incorporated into the regiment went over to the enemy; the whole of his infantry was either killed or captured, and he fled from the place at full speed, attended only by eight dragoons.^[36] Never was disaster more complete. Santa Anna, on arriving at Puente del Rey, where Victoria was stationed, gave way to despair. Deeming all lost, he proposed to embark with him for the United States on board a vessel he had provided for such an emergency. But the stout old leader was of better metal. "Go and put Vera Cruz in a state of defence" he said; "you can set sail when they show you my head." ^[37]

The impulse given at Vera Cruz acted like leaven on the prevailing discontent. Guerrero and Bravo secretly left the city on January 5th, proceeded to Chilapa, and there commenced to revolutionize the south, adopting the plan of Vera Cruz, a copy of which had been sent to them by Santa Anna.^[38] Armijo was immediately despatched against them, and an engagement took place on the height of Almolonga, near Chilapa, where Guerrero and Bravo had posted themselves. The action was disastrous to the revolutionists. Guerrero was shot through the lungs, and his men believing him killed abandoned the field in disorder, despite Bravo's efforts to arrest them. He himself was borne away by the stream of fugitives. Had he been able to rally his men, the day might have been won, a similar panic having pervaded the imperial ranks on the fall of Brigadier Epitacio Sanchez, who was struck through the head by a bullet as he led them to the charge. As it was, Armijo entered Chilapa the same day; Bravo retired with a remnant of his force to Putla; Guerrero was supposed to be dead, and the revolt in this portion of the empire was considered as ended. And the revolution everywhere seemed to be at its last gasp. A movement of the negroes in Costa Chica had been suppressed; Alvarado and other towns on the gulf coast which had proclaimed for republicanism had submitted to Cortazar and Lobato; Victoria was held in check at Puente del Rey; and Santa Anna was confined in Vera Cruz, which was now invested by Cortazar, Lobato, and Echávarri, who, after having escorted Iturbide as far as Perote, took up a position at the Casa Mata.^[39]

In Echávarri the emperor placed the utmost reliance. Although a Spaniard, he had been treated with marked favor. He had been rapidly promoted from the rank of captain of a provincial corps in an obscure and remote district to that of captain-general of the provinces of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and Oajaca; had been made a knight of the order of Guadalupe, and had been admitted into the closest confidence. But influence was brought to bear upon Echávarri which Iturbide had not considered, and the action of the former bore a striking resemblance to the procedure of the latter when placed in a similar position of trust by Apodaca. While the emperor was daily expecting to hear that the final blow at rebellion had been struck by the capture of Vera Cruz, the masons, who were determined to overthrow him, were secretly intriguing with his generals. The political principles of this order had lately been greatly modified by the influence of members who had been deputies to the Spanish córtes, and who on their return to Mexico had placed themselves at its head. While in Spain, these members, conspicuous among whom were Michelena and Ramos Arizpe, had strenuously opposed the offer of the crown to a Spanish prince. Indeed, the establishment of a Bourbon on the throne was no longer regarded as practicable.

Iturbide, on the other hand, had disgusted most of the monarchists who had lent their aid on his assumption of the crown, and the order, monarchical in its principles at first, was ready to receive with favor the idea of a central republic with the reins of government under its own control. Under all circumstances, the existing condition of affairs could not last. The republican party was hourly gaining strength; the monarchists, not to be left behind in the race for power, preferred to change their tactics. By the Spaniards the author of the plan of Iguala was hated; and for all parties no form of government could be much worse than the present absolutism. Iturbide's downfall was, therefore, darkly foreshadowed, while he alone seemed blind to the fact. Though he must have been aware that the masonic lodges were largely composed of military officers who had sworn to uphold the plan of Iguala which he was trampling underfoot it seems never to have entered his mind that from that quarter would come a fatal blow. Yet it was so. The influence in the lodges over the military members was preponderating. Cortazar and Lobato belonged to the society; Moran, the comandante general of Puebla, and Negrete in Mexico were in accord with its leading members; and Echávarri had been lately admitted into it. Hence his inactivity before Vera Cruz,^[40] and hence the proclamation of the famous plan of Casa Mata^[41] on the 1st of February.

On that day a junta of the military chiefs was held and the act signed by them unanimously, as well as by representatives of the ranks. By it the army pledged itself to reëstablish and support the national representative assembly,^[42] while it disclaimed all intention of making any attempt against the person of the emperor. But the designers of it were well aware of the ultimate result to which it would lead. The aspect of the revolution, it is true, was changed, but its intrinsic character was the same, and its object the same. The republican leaders could feel very confident that in the new congress their own party would dominate, and its action, unlike that of the extinguished assembly, would now be supported by the army. Santa Anna, whose position otherwise was really critical, readily waived his demand for a republican government, and on February 2d the ayuntamiento and military forces of Vera Cruz accepted the plan, renouncing the idea of reëstablishing the dissolved congress. The revolution in its new robe was rapidly triumphant. On the 14th the plan was proclaimed at Puebla by the provincial deputation, supported by the ayuntamiento and the marqués de Vivanco. At San Luis Potosí and Guadalajara the imperial commanders were forced to give way to the popular feelings in order to avoid an uprising. Armijo proclaimed the plan at Cuernavaca, Barragan in Querétaro, and Otero in Guanajuato. Bravo had recovered from his disaster, entered the city of Oajaca on the 9th, and there installed a governing junta;^[43] and by the beginning of March^[44] all that was left to Iturbide of his empire was within sight from his palace windows.

When the news of Echávarri's defection became known in the capital, consternation reigned. In the ranks of the Iturbidists, the emperor alone bore a bold front. At an extraordinary session of the junta instituyente, on February 9th, he said that if it was intended to coerce him by means of the army, he would prove that the arm which had achieved the country's independence was not yet broken; still he took no energetic step. On the contrary, a commission, one of the members being Negrete, was despatched to treat with the leaders of the movement, who were advancing rapidly toward the capital. At Jalapa, Echávarri formed a military junta, in which even the rank and file of the different corps were represented. This assembly was to meet whenever occasion required, Echávarri being appointed president and Calderon vice-president. A permanent executive council, composed of five members,^[45] was also established.

On the 17th the commission sent by the government arrived at Jalapa, but in the conferences which followed no adjustment was arrived at; and the commissioners, with the exception of Negrete, who remained in Puebla and soon after espoused the popular cause, returned to report their failure. The army of liberators then advanced to Puebla, where Echávarri resigned the command in order to counteract the proclamations and manifestoes of Iturbide, who attributed the revolution to Spanish intrigue, and asserted that Echávarri was in communication with commissioners of that government residing in Fort Ulúa. But Echávarri's fidelity was never doubted, and his resignation was strenuously opposed. He firmly maintained his point, however, and the marqués de Vivanco was appointed in his stead. Whether it was that Iturbide was really anxious to avoid bloodshed, as some writers are inclined to believe, or that he recognized that a struggle would be hopeless, he made no effort to appeal to arms.^[46] The fact is, that it was now too late. Desertion of the troops in the capital was unprecedented. It was, not confined to the clandestine departure of individuals, or even squads of soldiery. Whole corps formed in line, and openly marched away with colors flying and bands of music. His proclamations and exhortations to fidelity had no effect.^[47] On the night of the 23d the troops remaining of the 9th and 11th infantry regiments sallied from their barracks, released the prisoners confined in the Inquisition—among whom was Padre Mier—proclaimed one of the liberated captives, Colonel Eulogio Villa Urrutia, their chief, and raising the cry of liberty and republicanism, marched to Toluca.^[48] Next day the 4th cavalry regiment deserted in like manner, and in the evening the mounted grenadiers of the imperial guard followed.

Iturbide had stationed himself with some troops at Iztapaluca on the Puebla road in order to prevent communication between the capital and the insurgent army, and in the hope of effecting a peaceable reconciliation. But a conciliatory line of action in no way tended to avert the catastrophe. He consented to the immediate convocation of a new congress;^[49] a dividing line between the troops was agreed upon; and a stipulation made that both sides should await the inauguration of the national assembly without further action and abide by its decision. But these arrangements were little conducive to Iturbide's advantage, nor even carefully adhered to, emissaries being despatched all over the country advocating the new movement. Moreover, the revolutionists were in no haste; their cause was making rapid headway, and a little delay was actual gain to them, while to Iturbide they foresaw that it would be fatal. The falling emperor also fully recognized this; he saw the mistake he had made in not having taken measures to assemble congress at the earliest possible date, when it might still have been largely composed of adherents of his own; and several times he expressed his desire for a personal interview with the chiefs, in the hope of settling matters. But they would hold no conference with him.^[50] To await the slow work of assembling a congress would be certain defeat, for its composition would be mainly of members hostile to him. Two courses remained: either to reinstall the dissolved congress, or lay aside his imperial title, and, adopting the plan of Casa Mata, place himself at the head of the revolution, as invited to do.^[51] The latter plan would have been the safer, but his pride revolted against taking the step,^[52] and he adopted the former, in which he was supported by the wishes of the provincial deputation of Mexico, the suggestions of his commissioners, and the advice of the council of state.^[53] Accordingly, on the 4th of March the emperor issued a decree ordering the members of the dissolved congress to reassemble, and on the 7th it again opened its sessions, although the deputies present numbered only fifty-eight, some being released from prison the evening before.^[54] When he addressed the assembly, explaining his motives and expressing his desire to concur with the general wish, he was listened to with coldness and lack of sympathy.

The first difficulties which presented themselves were as to the faculties and legitimacy of the congress. The number of deputies, although increased by a few others, still fell short of that prescribed by the law, and as most of the provinces had declared for the plan of Casa Mata, which called for a new congress, it was doubtful whether the old one would be recognized. Its position was still further complicated by the tumultuous state into which the capital was thrown, and which threatened to interfere with the freedom of its deliberations. Iturbide had withdrawn from Iztapaluca, and had returned to the capital with the purpose of retiring to Tacubaya. On his departure on the 10th the dregs of the populace became dangerously demonstrative in his favor, loudly cheering and drawing his carriage through the streets, while menacing the congress. This caused the members much alarm for their safety, and on their representation to the ministers, General Andrade, in whom they had little confidence, was removed from the military command, and Brigadier Gomez Pedraza appointed in his place.

All now depended on the decision of the revolutionary junta at Puebla, which, having assembled on the 14th, resolved that it could not recognize the congress until assured that its liberty was not interfered with; at the same time it was decided to advance against Mexico. On the following day the army began its march, but commissioners from the congress who had been sent to treat with the leaders being met a short distance from the town, a second meeting was held, at which, after a long discussion, the following resolution was adopted: The ejército libertador and the junta will recognize as legitimate the old congress, which had been illegally dissolved, when the competent number of deputies is complete, and will obey it as soon as it enjoys absolute freedom in regard to its labors. When this decision was known to Iturbide, he gave up the struggle. The coldness of his reception when congress was reinstalled; the rejection of a proposal made by him that his own and the revolutionary forces should respectively retire to positions fifty leagues distant from the capital, and that a regency should be appointed to which he would delegate the executive power; and the threatening movement from Puebla all were too palpably significant of the intention to overthrow him. But he could still make a show of having at heart the welfare of his country, and he determined to retire for its good. On the night of March 19th congress was assembled in extraordinary session, and Iturbide's abdication, written by his own hand, was read to the chamber by Navarrete, the minister of justice. Since the congress, he said, had been recognized by the junta at Puebla and by the troops that had declared for the plan of Casa Mata, he laid down the crown which at first he had accepted with the greatest unwillingness, and then only to prove his self-sacrifice and devotion to his country. He would have taken this step sooner had there been a recognized national representation. In order that his presence might not be the pretext for further trouble, he would cheerfully expatriate himself, and make his abode in some foreign land, whither he would be ready to depart in ten or fifteen days. He only requested that the nation would pay the private debts which he had incurred in view of his not having availed himself of the income assigned him out of consideration for the necessities of the troops and public officials. On the following day a more amplified form of abdication was presented to the congress.^[55]

But the congress was in a dilemma. It could pass no decision on the matter until a competent number of deputies was united. At the same time the revolutionary forces were occupying positions in the immediate vicinity of the capital. It therefore proposed that the leaders should consent to a conference with Iturbide. They had, however, no stomach for such an interview; it would be far from agreeable for them to meet face to face the sovereign whom they had first created and then deserted. Moreover, they still feared the magic influence of his presence over many of them. They consequently not only persistently refused to listen to such a proposal, but demanded that the emperor should betake himself either to Tulancingo, Jalapa, Córdoba, or Orizaba they would give him the choice and there abide pending the decision of the congress. This slight roused Iturbide's indignation, and caused no little apprehension in the capital that hostilities would finally break out. Indeed, there was imminent danger of such action between the imperial troops at Tacubaya and those of Bravo, who had arrived from Oajaca, and had stationed himself at Tlalpam. In the general alarm the congress invited Vivanco to occupy the capital, and Gomez Pedraza on the 26th obtained an agreement from the chiefs by which they bound themselves to recognize Iturbide in such character as should be given him by the congress. Other terms of the convention were to the effect that Iturbide should retire to Tulancingo, which he did three days afterterward escorted by Bravo,^[56] and that Pedraza should surrender the command of the capital to the chief appointed to occupy it. The ejército libertador entered the city the same day.

By the occupation of the capital by the revolutionary forces the difficulties which had impeded congressional action were removed. The deputies who had escaped from prison in the previous month arrived with the army; those members who had hitherto feared to attend the session now took their seats, and on the 29th, 103 members being present, congress could declare itself a legitimate national assembly. During the following week it was occupied in the formation of a new government. The functions of the existing executive were declared to have ceased, and a provisional government, composed of three members, was created, Bravo, Victoria, and Negrete being elected. During the absence of the two former José Mariano Michelena and José Miguel Dominguez were appointed to act as their substitutes.

On April 7th congress gave its attention to the question of Iturbide's abdication. The opinion of the commission which had been appointed to report on the matter was that Iturbide's elevation having been effected by violence and compulsion was null, and that his abdication should not be accepted, as that would imply his right to the crown; that he should be conveyed to Italy, and a yearly income of $25,000 be assigned to him. The discussion was conducted with considerable heat. By many these decisions were considered too lenient, and they would have brought the fallen emperor to trial. Padre Mier, supported by other deputies, regarded the allowance proposed as excessive, and insinuated that Iturbide would take away with him large sums of money. Nevertheless the opinion was approved by a large majority in all its points, and on the 8th the congress passed a decree to that effect.^[57] As a final blow to monarchy in Mexico, by a separate decree of the same date the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba were pronounced null, in so far as the offers of the crown and the form of government prescribed in them were concerned, and the right of the nation to establish its government was declared free from all compromise.^[58]

Iturbide had left Tacubaya, March 30th, for Tulancingo. A portion of his own troops accompanied him, and their faithfulness was unfortunately displayed by frequent affrays with the soldiers of the escort under Bravo. The result of this was that Bravo received instructions from the government to disarm Iturbide's men and dismiss them from service.^[59] Henceforth Iturbide was treated with severity. The demonstrations which had occurred at Tulancingo were attributed to intrigue, and during the rest of his journey he was regarded as a political prisoner by Bravo, who was ordered to hasten his departure from the country. Nor was Iturbide's life altogether safe. Spies of the masons followed him unremittingly, and, to their shame be it said, plotted his assassination. Bravo was, however, timely informed of the design, and his precautions prevented its accomplishment.^[60] On the 20th of April the dethroned emperor left Tulancingo, and was conveyed to Vera Cruz, which he reached May 9th, without having had many of the ordinary comforts of life during the journey. On his arrival at the coast he was not allowed to enter the town, but had to camp at the mouth of the Antigua, under guard, till the ship Rawlins^[61] bore him from the shores of Mexico on the morning of the 11th.

Iturbide was accompanied by his wife and eight children, his chaplain José Antonio Lopez, Fray Ignacio Treviño, José Ramon Malo, and his secretary, Francisco Álvarez. The voyage to Italy, though prosperous, was long and tedious, the vessel not being allowed to touch at any intermediate port.^[62] On arriving at Leghorn on August 2d, the Rawlins was quarantined for a month, and it was not till September 2d that the exiled family were domiciled in their new home.^[63] Here Iturbide wrote his Manifiesto á la Nacion Mexicana.^[64] His residence in Italy, however, was of short duration. Influenced by news from Mexico, or, as he asserts, discovering that its independence was threatened by an alliance of the Latin powers of Europe for the recovery of the Americas, he resolved to leave a country where his freedom of action would be restricted, and on the 30th of November embarked with his two eldest sons for London. Forced by stress of weather to return, he decided to make the journey overland to Ostend. Avoiding France, he travelled through Switzerland, Germany, Prussia, and Holland, suffering somewhat from the cold, and embarked at Ostend December 31st, arriving in London the following day.^[65] In April he was joined by his wife and children. The hand of fate now beckoned him to his doom. On February 13th he had addressed a note to the new constituent congress of Mexico, which had been installed at the beginning of November 1823, assigning as the reason of his departure from Italy the intrigues of Spain against Mexico, and offering his services for the good of his country, while declaring that his only object was its welfare.^[66] But the government was thoroughly informed about him; his movements had been closely watched. Secret agents of the government had reported them; spies of the masonic order had followed his track, and his intentions were well known. On the 28th of April congress passed a decree declaring him an outlaw and an enemy of the state, if, under any pretext, he should place foot on Mexican soil, and caused copies of it to be circulated.

Without waiting for an answer to his note, and unaware of the above decree, on May 11th he sailed from Southampton on board the brig Spring^[67] accompanied by his wife and two younger sons, padres Lopez and Treviño, Malo, and Beneski, a Pole, who had served under Iturbide in Mexico and now followed him as his aide-de-camp. On the 14th of July the vessel came to anchor off the bar at Soto la Marina.

The Mexican liberator's days were now numbered and few in count. Beneski was sent ashore to gain information about the later occurrences in Mexico, and presented himself to Garza, who was still comandante at Soto la Marina. Provided with a letter from Padre Treviño, he represented himself as having come with a companion as the agent of commercial houses in London, to propose to the government a plan for the establishment of an English colony, and having received permission to land, and a written answer to Trevino's communication, he returned on board.^[68] Beneski's report of his reception by Garza was so favorable that on the following day Iturbide landed with the intention of visiting him in person. He was accompanied only by Beneski, and arrived a little before sunset at the rancho de los Arroyos, about six leagues from the sea, where they put up for the night. But Iturbide had been recognized as he went ashore, and the officer in command of the detachment at the point of Pescaderia sent soldiers in pursuit of the strangers, who were disturbed in their sleep and placed under arrest after midnight. In the afternoon of the following day Garza, who had been informed of the occurrence, arrived with his escort. His meeting with Iturbide was most cordial, and he manifested his joy at seeing him. In friendly converse they journeyed together, and Iturbide now learned for the first time that he had been proscribed by the congress.^[69] But he doubted not Garza's professions and promises to aid him. From Soto la Marina, where they arrived at ten o'clock at night, he wrote to Padre Lopez, instructing him to follow him there with his wife and companions. On the following morning, however, Garza's aide-de-camp appeared and told him to prepare for death, as both of them were to be shot at three o'clock that afternoon. Iturbide received the information with composure. "Tell General Garza," he said, "that I am ready to die, and only request three days to prepare to leave this world as a Christian." He also requested that Beneski's life might be spared.

Nevertheless, Garza was unwilling to shoulder all the responsibility of a political murder. To put a man to death by virtue of a decree the existence of which he knew not of till he had made himself liable to the penalty would be an inhuman act, and the general would have washed his hands of the matter if he could have done so. I believe, too, that he really wished to save Iturbide's life.^[70] Be his feelings what they might, he determined to refer the case to the state congress of Tamaulipas, and that afternoon started with his prisoners for Padilla, where it was holding its sessions. Still more incomprehensible is his action on the journey. On the morning of the 18th, he resigned the command of the whole escort, consisting of 130 cavalrymen, to Iturbide, stating in the presence of all that he did so because he was convinced of his good intentions, and that until the congress had passed its decision he would not regard him as a criminal. He then took leave of Iturbide, stating that he was going to return to Soto la Marina.^[71] The doomed man, now light of heart, hastened by forced marches to Padilla, which place he reached at sunrise on the 19th. In no way did he attempt to abuse the confidence reposed in him. Halting his forces outside the town, he awaited the permission of the congress to enter. This was, however, denied him, and Garza, who had followed his steps, now rejoined him and placed him again under arrest.

The congress of Tamaulipas had been immediately informed by Garza of Iturbide's arrest when he landed, and on the 18th had passed the sentence of death upon him after a long discussion. It now again assembled in extraordinary session, and Garza pleaded in person in his behalf, laying stress upon the fact that Iturbide had landed in ignorance of the decree which proscribed him. But his efforts were vain. The assembly confirmed its previous sentence, and with unseemly haste instructed Garza to carry it forthwith into execution.^[72] Shortly after two o'clock Iturbide was informed that he had to die, and that the hour of six in the evening was appointed for his execution. His serenity of mind was undisturbed; he only repeated his former request that three days might be allowed him for religious preparation.^[73]

But even this short respite was denied him, and at the set of sun he was led forth. With unfaltering step he walked to the place of execution, and in a voice without a tremor he addressed a few parting words to the troops. "Mexicans," he said, "in this last moment of my life I recommend to you the love of your country, and the observance of our holy religion. I die for having come to aid you; and depart happy because I die among you. I die with honor, not as a traitor. That stain will not attach to my children and their descendants. Preserve order, and be obedient to your commanders. From the bottom of my heart, I forgive all my enemies." When the officer approached to bandage his eyes he objected, saying that it was not necessary, but being told that the form must be observed, he bound his handkerchief over them with his own hand. Then he knelt, and the platoon fired, killing him instantly. On the following morning his remains were buried in the old roofless church of Padilla, where they remained till 1838, when they were removed, by decree of congress, and interred with solemn obsequies in the cathedral of Mexico on the 24th of October.^[74] At the time of his death Iturbide was nearly forty-one years of age. His career is before the reader, and his character may be drawn from it. Ambitious and designing, he possessed a winning influence most remarkable. Plausible and persuasive, he could cloak his aspirations with false patriotism, and while harboring designs the most selfish, put on a semblance of candor that carried conviction of honesty and purity of purpose. Thus it was that when independence had been achieved he came to be lauded by a large party as the savior of the nation, properly to be chosen its rebuilder. But his ability as a statesman was of no high order. He was wholly unable to cement the disintegrated elements of the community, which might have been reconstructed by a greater mind; and when by force of impudence and scheming, based on a brilliant military record, he had raised himself to the throne, he lacked the skill to hold his place. Selfish ambition outran his craftiness, and blinded his judgment. He failed to see that the same military leaders whom he had elevated with injustice to others would be the first to make their peace with the indignant nation when he alienated it by trampling under foot its sovereign rights; his blind confidence in the army was the secondary cause of his fall. Nevertheless, his execution was an unjust proceeding, and it can be excused only by the belief that civil war might ever be stirred so long as he remained alive. He still possessed numerous adherents, and to believe in his pretensions of patriotism would have been weakness.

With regard to the achievement of independence, more credit has been given to Iturbide than he deserves. Fighting first for monarchy, he would have so continued to the end had not personal interests influenced him. He was a great man only in a superficial way, though brilliant. He knew not the meaning of pure patriotism. His name is not to be mentioned beside those of Hidalgo, Morelos, and Bravo. Independence as finally achieved was the work not of an individual. Iturbide would have failed at the outset had not circumstances combined to aid him. When he proclaimed the plan of Iguala, he would inevitably have been crushed had Liñian obeyed the viceroy's orders. But he was left unmolested. Military chiefs in every part of the country then took up the work, and in all the principal provincial capitals independence was consummated without his presence. Apodaca's inactivity made the rest easy, and finally O'Donojú's liberalism opened to him the gates of Mexico. But it must be admitted that spasms of political sagacity were displayed by Iturbide, and that he acted with consummate skill and sound judgment on occasions. He knew well the public mind, and seized upon the right moment to arouse its feelings. Thus it was that his elevation was rapid and almost bloodless.

 

With a brief summary, I close this volume on the Mexican revolution. It was the transition period from political and intellectual despotism into the elemental conditions of a free nation. The evils afflicting the colonial existence were what might be expected from relations between a jealous and exacting mother country and a rich dependency, aggravated, by opposing interests and geographic position, such as exclusive control of desirable offices, due to partiality and suspicion of loyalty; oppressive restrictions of trade and industries, due to selfishness and greed; and irritating class distinctions, due partly to the comparatively inferior rank of emigrants to that at least of the men sent to govern them. But these abuses and wrongs had here attained a far greater extent under Spanish pride and narrow-mindedness than in the English colonies, owing to the admixture of settlers with the aborigines, and the growth of a new race, which under the oppressive subordination of centuries had come to be regarded as hostile and inferior, the great mass of the people being for that matter looked upon as conquered, in reality or by sympathy.

And so the seed of discontent grew till ripe for a revolution that awaited only an impulse beyond innate love for liberty. The impulse can be traced more immediately to the example set by the northern United States, which, fostered greatly by the works of French writers during the century, reacted upon Europe, notably in France itself, where the movement failed through its excesses. Spain also felt the reaction, and gave her colonies practical lessons in dispelling the glamour of royalty, showing how to depose rulers, and in its struggle with France placing New Spain in a position to discover her own strength in manifold resources. The Gallic invasion accordingly precipitated the revolution.

Its aim was lofty, for Hidalgo already declared for independence, as revealed in the war-cry, Death to the Spaniards! and as understood from the long-mooted point that New Spain was not only a colony, but a conquered country. And herein lay a powerful means for bringing the masses to his aid. To Morelos it was given, although too late, to impart a definite form to Hidalgo's idea. In the constitution of 1814 he declared for a republic of the extreme type, with three powers, and a triple executive duly subordinated to a sovereign congress. While liberation and equality were elements alluring enough, they did not suffice with all, and others were needed at least to sustain the fickle ardor of these fiery children of the south. Visions of a glorious past had to be conjured up before the trampled Indians, and bitterness had to be roused into hatred and thirst for vengeance, the whole made practical by hopes of spoils, which were licensed on the plausible ground that Spanish riches had been wrung from the aboriginal owners of the soil. These baser allurements, dictated by necessity, reacted on the cause, however; but as nations are composed of high and low, good and bad, so their common aim, be, it never so lofty, must even partake of the different ingredients.

The people of New Spain were more pliable and long-suffering than their northern neighbors, but lacked their self-control and adhesion to principle, and fell more readily into extremes, allowing mind and heart to be obscured by passion. Hence a war stamped by relentless and bloody retaliation on both sides, due alternately to passion and weakness. The royalists were at first impelled by a sense of self-preservation, which acted on the belief early instilled that strong measures were required to impress rebels; subsequently they were roused by the bandit-like raids of the guerrillas. Policy should have urged them to imitate oftener the magnanimous example set by men like Bravo and Mina. We have long ceased to wonder at the absence of any considerable mollifying influence of religion where men's passions are aroused.

This calls up a peculiar feature of the struggle in the prominent part played by the church. Both sides professed to be its champion, using it now as a cloak, anon as enginery, and stirring to move into vindictive activity a contest rife with hate and fanaticism. Although the upper clergy were essentially for the royalists, yet they finally turned the scale by which the revolutionists triumphed. If the price paid for the alliance was in later times to prove costly, it must also be remembered that the common fanaticism, however bloody, served as a bond which prevented an additional and probably more horrible war of races.

Several of the foremost leaders, too, were priests. Men who longed to give vent on the battle-field to feelings pent beneath the robe, to liberate suppressed ambition and patriotic instincts, found every encouragement to assume the lead, through their influence as guides and rulers over devoted flocks which respected them for their character and acquirements, and felt impressed by their directing minds. Their training unfortunately had not fitted them for the field, but this failing was found as well in most of the other leaders, whose only claim to the distinction lay in a positive character or social precedence. It was a priest who started the revolution, a quiet good-hearted provincial cura; a man lacking military skill and definite plans, but self-sacrificing and resolute, who could choose soldiers like Allende for aids; a man standing between the medieval past and the material future, for he was both a philosophizing dreamer and a dabbler in science and improvements one whom we would expect to conceive lofty ideas and enterprises. Again, it was a priest, in Morelos, who, imbued with military genius and noble unselfishness, with the confidence won by a self-made condition, and with a practical mind, gave shape to the conception, organizing the revolution, giving it a real army, a representative congress, and finally a constitution with avowed independence a fit man to carry out a great project, aided by chieftains like Matamoros and Galeana, and using legislators like Ignacio Rayon. The next grade of leaders exhibits a wide range of representative characters. Villagran and Rosains are conspicuous for reckless and unscrupulous pursuit of selfish purposes; Osorno figures as a successful cavalry leader and raider; Teran is a precocious, immature hero, Mina a dashing soldier; Bravo shines for his magnanimity, and Victoria for his tenacious loyalty to the cause; while Guerrero stands forward as an able successor to Morelos, one whose stanch purpose and self-denying patriotism sustain a flickering revolution. Iturbide is typical rather of the following period as soldier and schemer, brilliant yet selfish, who fox-like watches the opportunity to seize the bone of contention. As a rule, they are a self-willed class, rising frequently to heroic spheres, but unsustained, and falling repeatedly into moral and military errors. The royalist officers appear in comparison as professionals against amateurs, who with methodic precision, studied tactics, and strict discipline carry out the plans of the viceroy, in whom is absorbed the credit for their achievements.

This applies even more to the rank and file on both sides, which are merged wholly in the leaders. The active royalist troops are entirely or mainly trained soldiers, often veterans of long standing with a large proportion fresh from peninsular battle-fields; while their opponents, as a rule, are undisciplined and uncontrolled recruits, who seek to supply the lack of skill and means with devotion and daring, or with numbers. Yet both parties are essentially brethren, the one enrolled for a noble purpose, the other enlisted by interests or compulsion to fratricidal war. The revolutionists are mainly composed of mestizos, the new-sprung race, ambitious and intelligent; of restless though uneven energy; with keen sense of its rights and wrongs, and with aspirations roused by mingled Spanish pride and aboriginal claims. The long-suffering Indian looks upon the issue with less eagerness. The assumption that the gain will be mainly absorbed by others counteracts greatly every inducement, even the traditions of a gilded past and the hopes of a roseate future, and draws him often back to a passive indifference, combined with a secret desire to behold the extermination of two objectionable rival races. The creoles waver frequently between a sense of injustice suffered and a class prejudice, which on one side binds them to the domineering Spaniards; between a longing for control and a timid fear for imperilled wealth. Their objection to fighting in a motley crowd renders them comparatively passive, except under compulsion, such as serving under royalist authorities as rural guard. Many prefer to manifest their revolutionary sympathies in contributions and intrigues.

Hidalgo sets out with a mere rabble, imposing in number, but easily vanquished. Morelos seeks to remedy the defeat by discipline and the organization of an army; and the result is a success which gains for the revolution control of all the vast south, and assists to dispute the royalist sway in the central provinces, reducing the enemy to narrow straits. The latter are roused, and to the rescue comes Calleja, not alone a great soldier, but one who knows the country and the people. He avails himself of their mistakes and jealousies, and defeats them in detail. Errors like Hidalgo's vacillation, Morelos' long-drawn siege of Acapulco and indecision before Valladolid, and Mina's delay in the north cost dear; yet the achievements of the great men are mainly checked or ruined by discord, by the selfish aspiration or insubordinate action of a host of independent chieftains. Royalists also suffer from Venegas' lack of ability, from growing carelessness or lack of energy on the part of Calleja and Apodaca, and from the prevalence of greedy speculation which sacrifices the whole of Spanish interests to individual ends. This saves the revolution more than once from threatened suppression, and many a time it might be revived with hearty coöperation, as when Mina comes; but some leaders are suspicious, others jealous, the rest afraid or indifferent. Since its strength is broken with the fall of Morelos, the movement resolves itself into a guerrilla warfare, which sinks only too often into mere raids under men intent on personal control, and enrichment from tolls, levies, and spoils. Their followers become contaminated and demoralized, less willing than ever to submit to discipline and plans. They prefer desultory skirmishes to harassing operations, surprises to battles; insist on using horses where infantry alone can win, and ignore the lessons taught by experience. Against such a spirit the efforts of a few loyal men cannot prevail. They must humor their adherents to exist at all; great achievements are out of the question.

The scene of action shifts with the turn of fortune, centring along mountain ranges with ready access to fertile valleys and rich trade routes. Indeed, the revolution is confined mainly to the central provinces and the busy highways, rather than to remote districts with their less turbulent and ambitious settlers, who in the north cluster round presidios for shelter against the wild Indians.

Finally, at the lowest ebb in the war, a liberal and anti-clerical sentiment, under the mask of freemasonry, makes a step against absolutism in Spain, and wrings concessions from a faithless king. In Mexico the effect is startling. While the revolutionists fail to appreciate the boon gained, it rouses the only elements hostile to them, a powerful church threatened in its privileges, and an army rendered discontented by precept and grievances, and now seduced by promises and clerical influence. To gain their end, they join issue with the former; Guerrero disinterestedly yields his own plans, and hopes for the prospect of immediate partial relief, and when the capricious soldiers begin to desert Iturbide, he remains true and assists to save the tottering movement. The waiting revolutionists, strengthened by a period of repose, fall into line. They recognize the brilliant qualities of Iturbide, as a soldier round whom to unite the discordant elements.

 

The new and now leading faction naturally objected to a republic, and many deemed a moderate monarchy a safer stepping-stone from a three-century despotism to independence. At any rate, this was the only promising plan for the moment, one held forth already by Rayon, the masses being propitiated with freedom and presumed equality, while the conservative Spaniards, the aspiring creoles, and a church jealous of its privileges were each appeased. Soon the last link of bondage to Europe was cast aside, in substituting a native ruler for a foreign prince, the idea of an empire flattering a court-loving capital, and to some extent the dreaming Indians. Unfortunately for himself, Iturbide was a soldier rather than a diplomate and legislator, and sought to rule the people as he had his regiments. Disregarding tact, he blundered into despotism. None had forgotten his past career, his cruel warfare against the revolution, and his greed as a governor, the Spaniards also disliking him as an ambitious creole. The newly risen party availed themselves of royalist errors and weakness to step in and secure the fruit of a ten years' struggle; but the old leaders who had yielded before the rush of their success stood resolved on their course. They would use that party in their turn, snatch back the prize, and carry out the great project momentarily interrupted.

The diversity of races with different feelings and interests, fostered by geographic distribution and separate guerrilla wars, inclined the people naturally to a republic, one of federal form, for which the despotism of Iturbide gave fresh zest. This diversity stamped also the political attitude, seldom bold and strong in policy, but procrastinating yet impetuous, suspicious and vacillating, and with a tendency to cover ulterior designs by plausible projects and methods in consonance with the secretive aboriginal trait and the Spanish regard for form. Hidalgo and Rayon used the mask of Fernando to propitiate a large class; Mina did the same with the constitution of 1812; and so the dissimulation varied in relations with different sections and leaders. Morelos made a frank avowal of purpose, but it came inopportunely. Iturbide took a middle course, although still disguised; but his was rather a coup-d'état.

 

Those who like Alaman give undue prominence to the revolution of 1821 overlook that it was based essentially on the feelings and hopes of the people, wrought to a culminating point by their long efforts. The moment was ripe—independence was inevitable, as Iturbide admitted—and so made by his predecessors in the field. Without that preparatory work, the movement of 1821 could not have been successfully attempted. It would have collapsed at once, as shown by Iturbide's critical position when the reaction set in with sweeping desertion, and as proved by the rapid and almost bloodless triumph achieved, owing to the active and passive coöperation of the people, the guerrillas, the rural guards, the militia. Nay, more: the army which gave the second and decisive impulse to the tottering movement at Iguala was that of Guanajuato and Michoacan under Bustamante and other creoles, composed to a great extent of pardoned insurgents, who had not failed to spread their ideas, and to a greater extent of native militia wholly in sympathy with the former, and awaiting only an opportunity and a leader. The opportunity was offered in the military errors and neglect of the viceregal government. While Iturbide may justly claim to have presented a plan and leader round whom to rally the different elements all lying prepared, his party is to be regarded properly as only one of the ingredients in the leavening mass, which infuses the necessary stimulant for perfecting it. And if we look at the ultimate results we behold the movement of 1821 a mere brief episode, fading into an impracticable scheme, setting a bad example, and giving the main impulse to the bitter party spirit that for decades involves the country in all the horrors of fratricidal war. The movement of 1810, on the other hand, reasserts itself almost at once overwhelmingly, and is practically carried out under the old leaders, who regain prominence and retain it for their party, with brief exceptional intervals.

 

And so Mexico becomes again her own mistress, after a probationary course of three centuries under stringent colonial régime. Born of oppression, baptized in blood and rapine, often the tool of selfishness and other base passions, the revolution achieves in almost bloodless coup-d'état one aim—political independence. The struggle is fraught with bitter lessons drawn from lack of more general self-sacrifice to the common good, involving greater discipline, restraint, and above all harmony; for it is discord, with neglect of sustained action, that forms the bane. In the United States a similar war was maintained for seven years by a far smaller population, with less means, against greater odds, and this in more regular campaign, not in desultory guerrilla warfare. This proportionately greater achievement was due simply to unity, subordination, and persevering adherence to the cause, with application of lessons taught by experience, for the Mexicans fought with equal bravery and eagerness. And similar devotion to principle won liberation for the Dutch and independence for the Swiss; the former from Spanish tyranny, the latter from the Austrian yoke. The movement in Switzerland bears certain resemblance to the Mexican, in causes drawn from semi-conquest and accumulating under oppressive rule, and in method, which resolves itself greatly into guerrilla operations round mountain fastnesses, with active participation of religious elements. The United States issued from the war deeply exhausted and in debt, while Mexico had recovered herself before the final blow was struck; but in the former country the one struggle ended all, while here much remained to be achieved, in political, social, and intellectual emancipation. Mexicans had yet to learn that strict adherence to principle, with self-control, guided by an educated and unchained mind, and bound by harmony, can alone bring true liberty.

 

The most important work on the war of independence is that of Lúcas Alaman, entitled Historla de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su Independencia en el ano 1808 hasta la época presente. Méjico, 1849-1852, large 8vo, 5 vols. The history of the revolution is preceded by a lengthy review of the policy and institutions under Spanish rule, and the causes of the war, and is followed by Iturbide's campaign, rule, and downfall. Then the establishment of the republic is more briefly described, the first decade of its existence occupying only 100 pages. The last 100 pages are devoted to a general review of the political, industrial, and social outcome of the revolution, a consideration of the aspect of the republic, and suggestions for needed reforms in various branches of government. At the end of each volume is a valuable appendix containing corrective, supplementary, and statistical information, and supplying copies of a large number of most important official and other documents. A copious index of contents is also given, while plans of routes, towns, and forts, and portraits and autographs of noted men, add to the value of the text. Alaman had watched the progress of the revolution, had personally known Hidalgo and other later leaders, and was therefore able to judge of the value of the histories presented. The blind hero-worship of the Mexican accounts, and the bitter tirades of the Spanish versions, had equally disgusted him. His aim was to write an impartial history, but perceiving how strongly partisanship prevailed, particularly among Mexicans, he dreaded the denunciation which he feared his statements would draw upon him, and proposed to defer the publication of his version till after his death; finding, however, that public sentiments were changing somewhat, he yielded to the solicitations of friends, and ventured to begin issuing the work in 1849. His main authority for the period from 1814 to 1820, when he was travelling in Europe, is Dr Arechederreta's minute diary of events with comments. He moreover claims to have made the general archives his chief source, and to have kept before him all extant books, newspapers, and manuscripts obtainable. The very careful and not scanty notes bear him out herein, and his exactness and conscientiousness are shown by the notes in the appendices, wherein he is constantly correcting statements not in accord with later researches or with reliable information from friends, critics, and even opponents. Alaman's long public career, after 1821, when he figured as deputy to the córtes, has afforded him ample opportunity to gather material and knowledge for his work, and has developed the ability so evident in its pages. The work does not appear to have met with the wide reception abroad, at least that it deserves, nor with the severe attacks that might have been expected from its independent tone. Alaman claims above all to have been impartial and exact, and declares in his 4th volume that his invitation to critics has not brought forward any refutations of facts stated, beyond the trifling corrections added in the appendices. He also claims that he does not intrude his observations on current events—preface, i. p. v—in order to leave the reader's judgment free; but this rule he fails to observe. Often he who fancies himself the most free from prejudice is the most prejudiced. Alaman has a contempt for the Indian and mixed races by whom and for whom the rebellion was chiefly carried out, and he consequently shows his objection also to many of those among the 'pure Spaniards' of Spain or America—whom he otherwise upholds as of his own prouder race—who aided the rebellion. He even goes so far as to misconstrue the motives of Hidalgo and other leaders, even when facts presented by himself tend to purify them. He takes every opportunity, while accrediting the royalists with every virtue, to exhibit the rebels as inhuman robbers, and to deprive the early insurgent leaders of any credit in the revolution. All the merit of it he gives to Iturbide, to the regular army, and to Spaniards born in Spain. For the latter he strains his points of argument into divers contradictions of himself. Yet he does not favor Spain or subjection to Spain; nor does he altogether exempt royalists or pure Spaniards from blame. In short, he struggles to appear impartial, despite his failings. Though Alaman's meaning is occasionally obscure, this is of rare occurrence, and his style is clear and unaffected, free from flowery fancies, poetical ecstasy, and sentimental gush. It is well adapted to his subject, and his descriptions of events are often graphic, as for instance the capture of Guanajuato by Hidalgo. Occasionally he indulges in strokes of fine-pointed satire. He owns to the use of Americanisms, but claims that Mexico has a right to introduce now words, iv. p. viii. The promised bibliography of his authorities is not given. Indeed, Alaman appears to have tired of his labors—to judge partly from the disproportion in the narrative—and hurried the work, by contracting it toward the end. The title-page, which calls it a history 'to our present day,' is therefore wrong. It is a pity that he found no time or inclination to continue the history of Mexico from 1830, during a period in which he played so conspicuous a part.

Lúcas Ignacio Alaman was born in the city of Guanajuato, October 18, 1792. On his mother's side he was lineally descended from Pedro de Busto, who in 1475 proclaimed Queen Isabel in Ocaña, and from Francisco Matías de Busto y Moya, first marquis of San Clemente and viscount of Duarte. His father, Juan Vicente Alaman, was a native of Ochagavia, in the valley of Salazar in Navarre, and married Maria Ignacia Escalada, the widow of Gabriel de Arechederreta. Alaman's mother by her first marriage had a son, Juan Bautista, who became knight of the order of Cárlos III., and canon of Mexico; it is the manuscript diary of this half-brother, kept at Mexico from 1811 to 1820, that constitutes Alaman's main authority in his history of the events during that period. He received his early education in the school of Belen at Guanajuato, and afterward studied mathematics and other branches in the college of La Purísima Concepcion, one of his instructors being the unfortunate Rafael Dávila, who was shot by order of Calleja in November 1810. The study of mining next occupied his attention, to which he devoted himself with an assiduity characteristic of all that he did. In 1808 he was in the city of Mexico, when Iturrigaray was deposed, and in 1810 witnessed the terrible events which occurred in Guanajuato. In December of the same year he removed with his mother to Mexico, his father having died three years before. Here he continued his studies, including in the course foreign languages, physical sciences, mineralogy, chemistry, and botany, until 1814. when he left for Spain. He remained abroad until 1820, travelling over nearly the whole of Europe, and completing his education with unwearied application. Italy, Switzerland, France, England and Scotland, Germany, Prussia and Saxony, Holland and Hanover were all visited. At Paris he pursued his study of natural science under Biot, of botany with Decandolle, and chemistry under Thenard; and at Freyberg, where he resided for some time, he increased his knowledge of mining. On his return to his native country he was elected deputy to the Spanish córtes for the province of Guanajuato, and embarked with the deputies who hastily left Mexico on the eve of Iturbide's revolution. From this time his career was a public one, and pertains to the history of his country. Alaman died June 2, 1853, after an illness of only a few days. On May 26th he was attacked with inflammation of the lungs, which assumed a fatal form on the 29th. He left a wife, Dona Narcisa García Castrillo, whom he married in 1823, and six children, five of whom were sons. Alaman was of somewhat diminutive stature, and possessed little physical strength. His determination, however, moral energy, and ceaseless perseverance rendered him capable of undergoing great exertion, and supplied him with an exhaustless fund of endurance. His forehead was broad and smooth, his eyes keen and piercing, and his complexion so fair that it would betoken him to belong to a northern race. He was highly gifted, speaking English, French, and Italian fluently, besides possessing considerable knowledge of the German language. He was a member of numerous scientific institutions and literary societies in Europe and the United States. His talent was of high order, and he cultivated it with exemplary industry. Though holding high office under the republic, he not infrequently displays in his history monarchical tendencies. Tornel states that during his travels in Europe Alaman became imbued with the idea that a monarchical form of government was the most perfect. Breve Reseña Hist., 25-6. Alaman, on the contrary, assures us that his experience ill Europe had made a republican of him, Hist. Méj., v. 807; he was, however, opposed to democratic tendencies. Zavala speaks of him as cunning, reserved, avaricious, and ever ready to avoid danger: a man who made few or no friends. Rev. Mex., i. 342-3. Consult Alaman, Apuntes Biog., pp. 56; Id., Notic. Biog., pp. 59; Arroniz, Biog. Mex., 21-30; Montes de Oca, Orac. Fúneb.; Robinson's Mex. Rev., 268-70, 281; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, ii. 8; Id., Hist. Iturbide, 150.

Alaman 's history was preceded by his Disertaciones sobre la Historia de la Rep. Mex., desde la conquista hasta la independencia. Mex. 1844, 1849. 3 vols. These dissertations were really introductory to the history, and originated in a resolution of the Ateneo society, of which Alaman was a member, that its associates should give public lectures. They were published in the periodical of the Ateneo, and as this record seemed too ephemeral to Alaman, he revised and enlarged them for this special issue. The 1st volume narrates pretty thoroughly the events of the conquest of Mexico and later occurrences down to 1535; vol. ii. is devoted to the biography of Cortés, his family and descendants, and to a history of the development of the city of Mexico, with an account of the religious progress of the country. The 3d volume is wholly given to Spanish history, and contains an appendix of 100 pages, supplying a list of the viceroys, with the principal events connected with their administrations. Considerable research into rare documents and archives was made in obtaining the material for this work, as is proved in the appendices. Alaman excuses the lengthy history of Spain on the ground that no true and impartial version existed—iii. 385—and he considered his account worthy of Spaniards' attention, and also thought it needful for the proper understanding of Mexican history. In the preface to vol. iii. he outlines his Historia de Méjico, and reports its progress to date.

José Maria Luis Mora, Méjico y sus Revoluciones, Paris, 1836, 3 vols., i., iii., iv., the 2d not having been published. This author was born in Chamacuero in Guanajuato, October 1794, studied theology, and was ordained a presbyter in 1819. Somewhat later he established himself in Paris, where, in 1847, he was appointed minister plenipotentiary for Mexico in London. He died suddenly in Paris in July of the following year, at the age of fifty-four. Mora began to collect material for his work in 1828, and commenced to write it in 1830. His first volume treats of modern Mexico, that is, its character as a nation and country at the time when he wrote; vol. iii. takes up the conquest and the colonial period down to 1810; and vol. iv. the war of independence from its beginning under Hidalgo to 1812 inclusive. His history adds little, as far as information goes, to that supplied by previous writers. It is naturally tinted with his own ideas, which without being profound display intelligence. His groupings are good, his speculations are practical, and a broad human nature seems to speak throughout his work. He never quotes, but in his preface states the authorities upon which he mainly relied for his information. His remarks on them exhibit his desire to be impartial. He supplies several interesting documents, and his biographical matter, without being abundant, is clear and concise. This author's account of Hidalgo's epoch seems hurried and incomplete, while his relation of the Morelos period, as far as it extends, is full. His estimate of Hidalgo is one of disapproval rather than appreciation. Morelos he admires. He has a radical dislike of both the church and military as state powers. His sympathies are with the insurrection, the more so, probably, since his brother fought and died in its cause. His literary style is simple and good, though somewhat commonplace. Mora was the author of various other works, conspicuous among which is his Obras Sueltas, Paris, 1837, 2 vols. Volume i. contains a political review of events in Mexico from 1820 to 1837 and a collection of Bishop Queipo's writings on the subject of the sequestration of church property for the benefit of the treasury; also a dissertation on finance and the public debt, foreign and internal. The political review treats of the different factions and administrations, philosophically discussed, reforms in the army and church systems being advocated, especially the suppression of ecclesiastical civil jurisdiction. Vol. ii. is a collection of his articles published in the Semanario Politico y Literario, and the Observador de la República Mejicana, probably written between 1826 and 1830. These articles are mostly of a political character, and treat of secret societies, liberty of the press, education, expulsion of the Spaniards from Mexico, reforms in the constitution, the suppression of military tribunals, the prerogative of mercy in remission of capital punishment, laws respecting citizenship, and other questions—in all of which discussions the author displays his strong liberal views.

The authorities from which the history of Iturbide's revolution, reign, and death has been derived are very numerous, as will be recognized by the following list. Perhaps the most important one is the Historia del emperador D. Agustin de Iturbide. . . . Mexico, 1846, by Cárlos Bustamante. This work, though strongly tinctured with the usual farrago noticeable in Bustamante's writings, is very valuable for the great number of documents it contains, and from the fact that the author, being a member of the congress, was a participator in many of the leading events. His versions, however, must be received with caution. Bustamante is not an unprejudiced writer, and not unfrequently makes out his case and colors it to suit his own views. I can not accept his assertion that Beneski reported to Iturbide before he landed that he had been proscribed, and that the latter 'rushed with his eyes open into the abyss of destruction.' With regard to the execution of the ex-emperor, the author remarks: 'The government, no less than the congress, has been accused of cruelty and injustice, and Garza of both as well as of ingratitude.' p. 261. Bustamante holds all parties blameless. The safety of the people, he argues, is the supreme law, and with Iturbide present the public peace could not have been preserved. Garza, he maintains, could not have acted otherwise without sacrificing himself, and the only fault he finds with him is for having temporarily placed Iturbide in command of the escort.

Cárlos Navarro y Rodriguez, Iturbide. Madrid, 1869, pp. 237. This author, a Spaniard and constituent deputy of the Spanish córtes, supplies us with the history of Iturbide's career and events in Mexico that resulted from the time of his defection till his death. Navarro draws largely upon Alaman for his historical material, but his views are taken from a Spanish standpoint. Every act of Iturbide was wrong, and every misfortune which happened to the country or to individuals who took part in the events is attributed mainly to the separation from Spain, which country he describes as a good mother, who would have been a powerful support against the encroachment of the United States. Next to this grievous error was the mistake committed by not establishing a monarchy with a European prince on the throne and European support. Navarro writes well, and utters many bitter truths, but he is an inveterate monarchist and far from impartial.

José Joaquin Pesado, El libertador de México D. Agustin de Iturbide. Mexico, 1872, pp. 79. This work is a historical sketch of Iturbide's life, the greater portion of it being devoted to the period commencing with the declaration of the plan of Iguala, and terminating with the liberator's death. The author considers that the charges of excesses committed by Iturbide while in command at Guanajuato were exaggerated, and regards the action of the government in removing him from his command as an indication of the little confidence placed by royalists in Mexican officers serving in the government ranks. Pesado inclines to believe that Iturbide while in retirement reflected on the question of independence and meditated its achievement. He does not, however, attempt to screen his ambition and failings. Contrary to the supposition of Malo, he believes that Beneski carefully concealed from Garza the fact that Iturbide had arrived on the coast, and while giving the comandante full credit for his final efforts to save Iturbide, condemns his execution as repugnant to the principles of justice and reason.

José Ramon Pacheco, Descripcion de la solemnidad fúnebre con que se honraron las cenizas del Heroe de Iguala, Don Agustin de Iturbide. Mexico, 1849, pp. 66. A description of the obsequies celebrated in honor of Iturbide on the occasion of removing his remains from Padilla to the cathedral of Mexico in 1838. This account was written by order of the government, and President Herrera afterward caused it to be published. Pacheco denounces the execution of Iturbide as, an act of party vengeance and by no means expressive of the will of the nation. He repudiates the idea that Iturbide had any personal object in returning to Mexico, maintaining that his only motive was to aid in the salvation of the nation's independence which the author believes was really threatened by the projects of the Holy Alliance. Pacheco finds no excuse for Garza's proceedings in the matter, charging him with ingratitude and treachery. To the account of the exhumation

 

 

1. He had hitherto occupied the house of Moncada as his temporary palace.
2. By decrees of Oct. 13, Dec. 7, 1821, and Feb. 20, 1822. The order received its name from the virgin of Guadalupe, regarded as the patroness of the nation. It was composed of 50 grand crosses, 100 knights, and as many supernumeraries or companions of the order as the grand master, who was the emperor, might consider it convenient to appoint. Alaman, Hint. Méj., v. 452-3.
3. A full list of the members of the order was published July 25, 1822. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 549-54. Among the grand crosses, besides the princes of the imperial family, appear the names of the bishops of Guadalajara, Puebla, and Oajaca; the archbishop of Guatemala and the bishop of Nicaragua; of the generals, Negrete, Bustamante, Quintanar, Luaces, Guerrero, Garcia Conde, Vivanco, and O'Donojú, 'considerado como vivo para perpetuar su buena memoria.' Bravo, Lobato, Borja, Sanchez, and Ramon Rayon were among the knights. To Ignacio Ramon, no degree was given.
4. 'En boca de Mier, la consagracion no era mas que la aplicacion del medicamento conocido con el nombre de "vinagre de los cuatro ladrones."' Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 644-5.
5. 'Huehuenches, apodo que quedó a los individuos de aquella Orden.' Huehuenches is derived from the Mexican word 'Yeueuetlacatl,' meaning 'old man,' and the diminutive 'tzin,' pronounced by the Spaniards 'che.' It therefore meant 'little old men.' Ib.
6. They were: Lombardo, Echenique, Fagoaga, Carrasco, Obregon, Mier, Anaya, Tarrazo, Echarte, Valle, Mayorga, Herrera, Zebadúa, Sanchez de Tagle, and Cárlos Bustamante. Mex. Col. Ley. Fund., 93. Valle, Mayorga, and Zebadúa were deputies from Guatemala.
7. The republic of Colombia had been recognized by decree of congress on April 29th. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 251-2. Santa María had arrived as minister plenipotentiary in March preceding. Ortega, Mem. Relac. Diplom. Mex., 3-13. His passport was sent him on the 18th of October.
8. According to the fiscal Francisco de Paula Álvarez, who was commissioned to draw up the proceedings, 'contre la plupart des individus arrêtées, on ne peut prouver aucun crime; mais il y a des apparences suffisantes pour justifier lour détention comme personnes suspectes.' Iturbide, Mémoires Autographcs, 109. This work was first published in London by J. Quin, and translated into French in 1824 by J. T. Parisot, the translator of the letters of Junius. It contains the manifesto addressed to the Mexicans by Iturbide when in exile at Leghorn, and a number of official documents, among which is the report of the fiscal Álvarez on the proceedings instituted against the accused.
9. Among those who still remained in custody was Padre Mier, who found means even in prison of continuing his attacks on Iturbide. Bustamante has preserved some satirical stanzas written at this time. Hist. Iturbide, 23-5, 32; for fuller particulars, consult Id., 5-23, 57-62; Cuad. Hist., vi. carta 4^a 41-93, vii. 6-9, 60-63; Farias, Minist. Respons.; Mex. El oficio que la comision del sob. Cong. presentó á S. M.; Mex. Col. Ley. Fund., 93.
10. See copy of the document and details in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., vi. carta 5 a, 95-100; and Cuevas, Porvenir Mex., 218.
11. Garza went to Mexico, and was kindly received by Iturbide, who even restored his command to him. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 655; Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 859-60.
12. Zavala, Proyecto de Reforma del Congreso, Mexico, 1822, pp. 8.
13. Brigadier Luis Cortazar was charged with the delivery of the imperial order for the dissolution. If it was not obeyed within ten minutes after being read, he was instructed to inform congress that force would be used; and if in ten minutes after this intimation congress still remained in session, Cortazar was to dissolve it 'militarmente.' Mex. Col. Ley. Fund, 93-4. Iturbide entered into an explanation of his reasons for taking this step, and the statement of charges against the congress which appeared in the preamble to the decree dissolving it was amplified and published by the government under the title: Indication del origen de los extravios del Congreso Mexicano, que han motivado su disolucion. The accusations were to the effect that the assembly was influenced by Spanish intrigues of the party opposed to independence; that it consequently neglected its work on important matters the formation of the constitution, the organization of the revenue department, and the proper establishment of the judicial tribunals and wasted its time in trifling or irrelevant discussions; that it moreover arrogated to itself prerogatives belonging to the sovereign. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 944-7, 953-6, 962-3, 985-8.
14. Disposic. Varias, ii. f. 76; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., vi. carta 5^a 116-25; Id., Hist. Iturbide, 23 et seq. A list of the names of the members, Iturbide's opening address, and the basis of the organization of the junta are supplied in Mex. Col Ley. Fund., 94-103.
15. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 950-1. Alaman states that this was the first decree of the junta. Hist. Méj., v. 668.
16. At Perote $740,200, and $557,000 at Jalapa, in all $1,297,200. Id., v. 669-70; Medina, Mem. Sec. Estado, 1823; Mex. Col. Ley. Fund., 100.
17. He tries to defend his action by asserting that the late congress had authorized him to lay hands on any existing funds, and that he had been privately informed by certain deputies that the congress had these particular funds in view. Iturbide, Manifesto, 56-8.
18. Iturbide says: 'Unidas las repetidas quejas que tenia contra Santa Anna del anterior capitan general, de la deputacion provincial, del consulado, de muchos vecinos en particular, como del teniente coronel del cuerpo que mandaba, y de varios oficiales. . .me ví en la necesidad de separarlo del mando.' Id., 49. See also Álvarez, Santa-Anna, hasta 1822, 7.
19. He died shortly after at Tehuacan. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 069.
20. He returned to Spain, and was rewarded for his loyalty by being appointed governor of the real alcázar de Sevilla, one of the best appointments in the kingdom, and which he retained till his death. Id., v. 671.
21. Santa Anna had been previously frustrated in an attempt to bribe the garrison of the fortress of Ulúa. His present plan was that Lemaur should send, on the night of Oct. 26th, detachments to take possession of the fortifications of Vera Cruz, which were to be surrendered without resistance. The Spaniards were then to be overpowered, and Mexican troops, dressed in the uniforms taken from them, were to proceed to Fort Ulúa in the launches on which the Spaniards had arrived, and under cover of the darkness and disguise gain possession of it. Bustamante, Cuad. Hint., vi. carta 5^a, 107-13.
22. Echávarri, in his report of Oct. 27th, states that the loss to the Spaniards was over 100 in killed, wounded, drowned, strayed, and prisoners. Among the latter were a captain and two subalterns. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 905-6.
23. Iturbide states that Santa Anna really did plot to accomplish Echávarri's death. Manifesto, 49. Bustamante, writing in August 1832, takes the same view, Cuad. Hist., vi. carta 5^a, 114; but in September 1833 says: 'En mi concepto no fué otro sino un deseo ó proyecto mal combinado para apoderarse de Ulúa.' Hist. Iturbide, 30, Alaman declines to pass an opinion in the matter, and confining himself to the narration of the facts, leaves it to the reader to form his own judgment. Hist. Méj., v. 674, 676.
24. Iturbide repetia—Desde aqui comienza España.' Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide, 34.
25. 'En los terminos mas honorificos que pudo inventar el sagaz y avisado emperador.' Santana, Manifiesto a sus conciudadanos, 8.
26. Id., 9.
27. Santa Anna says that he would have been deceived by Iturbide's manner 'si un confidente de Mexico no me avisara con oportunidad "que mi perdicion estaba decretada."' Id., 8.
28. Francisco de Paula Álvarez, Iturbide's secretary, in reply to a letter of Santa Anna addressed Dec. 6th to Iturbide, setting forth the reasons which urged him to revolt, says: 'Vd sabe que yo sé de la manera que habló siempre al Emperador, temblando y adulando, ofreciendose á servicios de un lacayo, indignos de un gefe.' Santa-Anna hasta 1822, 7. This communication was written at Puebla in Dec. 1822, and was printed and published at Guadalajara the same month. In 1844 it was again published just before Santa Anna's fall in that year. It is an intensely stinging diatribe, exposing in scathing language all the worst traits of Santa Anna's character, his conduct from boyhood, and his motives. In invective it can hardly be matched, and in future revolutions it was always made use of as a means of vilifying him.
29. Santana, Proclamas, 2 Dic^re 1822; Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 1011. On the 6th he addressed to Iturbide the letter mentioned in the previous note. After reminding him of the excess of his zeal in his service, which had become 'odious to his fellow-citizens, who thought him servile and a flatterer,' and professing unalterable affection, he says: 'I have felt myself under the necessity of separating myself from your command, because your absolute government is about to fill with incalculable evils our beloved country. . . The provinces, the towns, the people, cry aloud for their freedom; they say that you have broken your oaths of Iguala and Córdoba; have trampled upon the laws;. . . have unjustly persecuted members of congress, banishing some, imprisoning others, so as to reduce it to what is called a junta constituyente, composed of a few of your favorites. . . . They cry out, too, in consternation against the seizure of the convoy of money in Jalapa, convinced that under your government the sacred right of property will never be respected. Finally, they understand that there are neither means nor wealth sufficient in this America to support a throne with all the ostentation and dignity an emperor requires.' He then hopes that Iturbide will take measures to renounce the crown, and concludes with the ominous words: 'Do not expose your valuable life to the terrible catastrophe which your flatterers have prepared for you.' Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide, 51-3; Niles' Reg., xxiii. 344. Santa Anna states in his Manifiesto á sus Conciudadanos, 7, that he formed the design of liberating his country when the deputies were imprisoned. 'Yo juré en el silencio de la aciaga noche del 26 de Agosto, volver por el honor de la nacion esclavizada.' He was in Mexico at the time, and to carry out his project, sought with urgency the command of the province of Vera Cruz, which was conferred on him. Ib.
30. On Nov. 30th. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 1013-14, 1016-17; Buatamante, Hist. Iturbide, 38-43. For an account of the preparations made to receive Iturbide, see Zavala, Rev. Mex., i. 153.
31. The name given to the prince was Felipe Andrés María de Guadalupe. Ib. The safe deliverance of the empress was made the occasion for several military promotions. Alejo García Conde and Sotarriva were made lieutenant-generals; Armijo, Torres, Barragan, Lobato, and some others were raised to full brigadiers. Gac. Imp. Mex., ii. 1138.
32. The oath of allegiance was celebrated at Puebla, on the occasion of his return, and he did not wait for the completion of the customary festivities.
33. 'A noche á los nueve, inesperadamente, entró sin novedad á esta Capital S. M. I. de regreso de Xalapa.' Id., 1064.
34. This occasioned the circulation of a stinging invective in verse, attributed to Padre Mier. The first stanza is as follows:

    Diz que pretendia el tirano
    Que una escomunicacion saliera,
    En que ipso facto incurriera
    Todo hombre republicano.
    ¿Y por que crimen? Es llano,
    Porque de su magestad
    So opone con la libertad
    A la infausta tista monarquía:
    ¿Puede darse mas impía
    Herética pravedad?

    The remaining, to the number of five, are in similar strain. Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide, 54-6; Alaman Hist. Méj., v. 692.

35. A copy of it is supplied by Bustamante. Hist. Iturbide, 64-71.
36. 'La division de Santa Ana que se componia de ochocientos á novecientos hombres ha sido completam^te disipada y solo se asegura que emprendió su fuga con ocho Drag^es.' Dominguez, Parte Oficial Defensa Jal, MS., f. 5. This manuscript of the official report to Brigadier José Maria Calderon, comandante general of Jalapa, by Colonel Juan Dominguez, gives a detailed account of the occurrence.
37. Zavala states that Victoria himself narrated this circumstance to him. Rev. Mex., i. 157.
38. Padre Mier also effected his escape, but was recaptured through information given by a woman, and confined in a dungeon of the Inquisition. Alaman, Hist. Mej., v. 698.
39. A magazine where gunpowder was stored; hence its name. It was situated about half a league to the south of the town.
40. Iturbide says: 'El general Echávarri y el brigadier Cortazar. . . pudieron tomar la plaza de Veracruz sin resistencia;' and adds: 'Aunque la apatia de Echávarri habria sddo bastante motivo para desconfiar de su probidad, no lo fué para mi, porque tenia formado de ella el mejor concepto.' Manifesto, 512. Alaman, however, maintains that the capture of Vera Cruz was not so easy a matter as Iturbide supposed, and that Echávarri was not provided with men and means sufficient to accomplish it. Hist. Méj., v. 707-8.
41. So called from the place where it was signed.
42. The Plan de Casa Mata consisted of eleven articles, of which I give a synopsis. Art. 1. As the sovereignty resides in the nation, congress shall be installed as soon as possible. Art. 2. The plan for its convocation shall be based on the same principles which governed in the election of the first congress. Art. 3. The provinces can reëlect such deputies as had shown themselves worthy of public esteem by their liberal ideas, and substitute others in the place of those who had not corresponded to the confidence extended to them. Art. 4. The congress shall reside in whatever city or town it may deem most convenient. Art. 5. The army will sustain the national representation and all its fundamental decisions. Art. 6. Military officers and troops not ready to sacrifice themselves for their country's good can depart whithersoever they may wish. Art. 7. A commission shall place a copy of this act in the hands of the emperor. Art. 8. Another commission, provided with a similar copy, shall propose the plan to the governor and municipality of Vera Cruz for their acceptance or rejection. Art. 9. The same proposal shall be made to forces at Puente del Rey, Jalapa, Córdoba, and Orizaba. Art. 10. Pending the answer of the government, the provincial deputation of Vera Cruz, with its own assent, shall exercise the administrative functions. Art. 11. The army shall make no attempt against the person of the emperor, but shall not disband until by disposition of the sovereign congress, whose deliberations it shall support. Mex. Col. Ley. Fund., 113-4; Zavala, Rev. Mex., i. 164-5.
43. Bravo on his march toward Oajaca received intelligence of the plan of Casa Mata, but does not appear to have agreed with it. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 713-14.
44. Durango proclaimed on the 5th and 6th of March, the comandante Gaspar do Ochoa and the garrison swearing to support the plan, and the provincial deputation resolving to coöperate with the southern provinces. Pinart't Col., print i. no. 79, 80; Id., MS., i. no. 89. Chihuahua immediately followed the example, under the encouragement of the comandante Colonel Maynez. Ib.
45. The brigadiers Miñon and Gual, and the colonels Juan Codallos, Iberri, and Puyade. Alaman, Hist. Héj., v. 714-15.
46. When he first heard of Echávarri's defection he resolved to take the field in person, but changed his mind through the advice of the council of state. Ib. He recognized his mistake later, and says in his Manifiesto, 53: 'La falta que creo cometí en mi gobierno fué no tomar el mando de ejército, desde que debí conocer la defeccion de Echávarri, me alucinó la demasiada confianza.' But he did not suppose that at Vera Cruz the besiegers and besieged were working in accord.
47. See his proclamation of Feb. 11th, in Gac. Imp. Mex., 1823, i. 80.
48. Bustamante states that Mier lost one of his shoes in the confusion, and was conveyed away in a carriage. As the troops passed the emperor's residence near Tacubaya, they shouted, 'Viva la libertad y la república,' 'que causó mucha agitacion en la familia imperial.' Hist. Iturbide, 93-4.
49. The convocatoria had already been drawn up at the beginning of the preceding December, and was now to be put in circulation. Iturbide, Manifiesto, 55. A draft of a constitution had also been prepared, Mex. Proyecto Constitucion, 40, as also one for the provisional regulation of the government during the mean time. Mex. Proyecto Regl. Polit., p. 34.
50. He says that they were ashamed to meet him: 'El delito les retraia, y los confundia su ingratitud.' Iturbide, Manifesto, 60.
51. He was invited to do this by many of the principal leaders, among whom he mentions the names of Negrete, Vivanco, and Cortazar. He remarks that if ambition had been his aim, by accepting this proposal and retaining the command, time would have afforded him a thousand opportunities of exercising it to his own pleasure. Id., 65.
52. 'Pero los negocios me eran odiosos, pesado el cargo, y finalmente era contraponerme á la cabeza de aquel partido.' Such are the reasons he assigns for his refusal, disclaiming at the same time personal ambition. Ib.
53. Gac. Imp. Mex., 1823, i. 135 et seq.
54. Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide, 105.
55. Full particulars with copies of documents relative to events connected with Iturbide's resignation will be found in Id., 95-117. Bustamante had been released from prison, and had resumed his seat in congress.
56. Iturbide requested that Bravo should command his escort. Id., 120. Alaman remarks that this choice reflected the highest honor on Bravo: 'No hay en la vida de Bravo nada que le sea tan honroso, como esta eleccion que hizo Iturbide para confiar á su honor y probidad su propia persona y familia, cuando todos lo habian faltado.' Hist. Mej., v. 744.
57. It was as follows: 1. The coronation of D. Agustin de Iturbide being the work of violence and void of right, there is no occasion to discuss his abdication of the crown. 2. Consequently the hereditary succession and the titles emanating from the coronation are declared null; and all acts of the government from May 19th to March 29th are illegal, remaining subject to the revision of the existing government for approval or revocation. 3. The executive power shall take measures for the speedy departure of D. Agustin de Iturbide from the territory of the nation. 4. This shall take place at one of the ports of the Mexican Gulf, a neutral vessel being chartered at the state's expense to convey him and his family to such place as he may designate. 5. During his life $25,000 annually are assigned to D. Agustin de Iturbide, payable in this capital, on the condition that he establish his residence at some point in Italy. After his death his family shall enjoy a pension of $8,000, under the rules established for pensions of the montepío militar. Mex. Col. Ley. Fund., 115; Mex. Col. Ley. Ord. y Dec., ii. 91-2.
58. Zavala, Rev. Mex., i. 182.
59. By order of April 5th. On the 2d and 3d broils had occurred at Tulancingo, on the latter day a corporal of Iturbide's troops being killed and two soldiers wounded. This caused unpleasant passages between him and Bravo, who informed congress of the trouble. On the 9th, 102 of Iturbide's men were dismissed. Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide, 140-3.
60. One of Iturbide's companions who followed him throughout in his exile was José E. Malo, who in 1869 published a narrative of Iturbide's journey to the port, his voyage to Italy, and of all subsequent events to the day of his death. Its title is Apuntes Históricos sobre el Destierro, Vuelta al Territorio Mexicano y Muerte del Libertador D. Agustin de Iturbide. On pp. 11, 14-15, Malo makes mention of the attempts to assassinate Iturbide, and the measures taken by Vicente Villada, colonel of the escort, to prevent it. He also states pp. 17-18 that Iturbide narrowly escaped being poisoned on board by drinking of some bitters which had been supplied him by Padre Marchena, a Dominican and a mason, who according to Alaman Hist. Méj., v. 790 had been sent by the order to dog his steps. Marchena followed Iturbide to Leghorn in another vessel with the intention of taking his life. This gentle priest was afterward murdered in a cellar in Mexico by the brothers of a secret society which he had formed for the purpose of assassinating certain persons. A list of the intended victims was found on his person, one of whom was the prior of his own convent, a brother-in-law of Bravo. Malo, ut sup.
61. The Rawlins, Captain Quelch, was an armed English merchantman of 400 tons and carrying 12 guns. She was chartered by the government for the sum of $15,550. The vessel was convoyed for some distance by an English man-of-war. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 751, 754; Malo, Apunt. Hist., 156; Bustamante, Hist. Iturbde, 147; Gac. Imp. Mex., 1823, i, 241-2. Before embarking Iturbide had an interview with Victoria, to whom he presented a watch as a token of remembrance. His parting with Bravo was less cordial.
62. During the voyage Iturbide entered into an explanation to Malo relative to the expression in his report of the battle at Salvatierra—see pp. 515-10, this vol. wherein it is stated that 350 excommunicated wretches had gone to the infernal regions. His explanation was that, being prostrated with sickness he had signed the despatch, which was drawn up by his chaplain Padre Gallegos, without reading it. When it appeared in print he was powerless to contradict the heartless expression, as it was his own fault through not having revised the original. Malo, Apunt. Hist., 18-20.
63. Iturbide rented the Villa Guevara, belonging to the princess Pauline Bonaparte. Id., 23. Mariano Torrente, author of the Historia de la Revolution Hispano-Americana, who had lately been deprived by Fernando of his office as Spanish consul in that port, offered his services to Iturbide with every assurance of friendship. His intentions, however, are doubtful. In his history he has shown himself very unfavorable to Iturbide.
64. He was unable to publish it in Tuscany, and it was first printed in London by his friend Quin. This manifesto has been translated into English, French, and German, and supplemented by a number of documents, among which are several letters of Iturbide, and editors' notes, and has reappeared at different dates under various titles. I have already noticed the French edition in note 8 of this chapter. In 1827 it was published in Mexico by Pablo Villavicencio, under the title, Carrera Militar y Política de Don Agustin de Iturbide. This editor adds a political treatise of his own, Manifesto del Pajo del Rosario, pp. 16, largely taken up in discussing tho principles of the masonic lodges. In conclusion he says: 'Aborrecí á Iturbide mientras persiguio mortalmente á los primeros patriotas. . . lo amé mucho cuando en Iguala rompió el nudo gordiano:. . .le volví a aborrecer desde el momento de su proclamacion hasta su caida á la cual contribuí.' In the same year was published in Mexico Breve Diseño Critico de la Emancipacion y Libertad de la Nacion Mexicana, containing the manifesto, annotations on the notes, numerous documents, and General Garza's account of Iturbide's execution. And lastly, in 1871 the edition of 1827 was republished under the title, Manifesto del general D. Agustln de Iturbide, Libertador de Mexico, by the editors of La Voz de Mexico. The publishers state that some portions of the previous issue had been omitted by them, inasmuch as they displayed an angry feeling oppugnant to the present age. This does not refer to Iturbide's manifesto, of which nothing is left out. For the same reason the annotations contra-notas would also have been omitted had it not been that their annexation to the manifesto rendered it unadvisable. With regard to the manifesto itself, which has been frequently quoted in this and preceding chapters under one or other of the above titles, it is a review by Iturbide of the events connected with his rise and fall, and a vindication of his conduct. After giving a brief sketch of his life up to the time of his proclamation of the plan of Iguala, he then stands on the defense of his political intentions and action relative to his acceptance of the crown. He denounces the assertion that he aspired to such position, and insists that he was compelled to mount the throne in obedience to the wishes of the people, that throughout the short period of his reign he was actuated solely by patriotic motives. He describes the general condition of Mexico as he found it when placed at the head the exhausted condition of the treasury, the state of abandonment into which the judicial administration had fallen, and the difficulties under which the government labored. He then gives his attention to the discord between himself and congress, charging the latter with incompetence, and discusses the insurrection that terminated in the plan of Casa Mata and his own abdication. He moreover repudiates the charge that he had enriched himself from the public funds.
65. Malo states that they took passage on a small steamer, the first which plied the straits. Apunt. Hist., 27.
66. Copies of his note are supplied in Iturbide, Manifiesto, 128-30, and in the other editions mentioned in note 64 of this chapter. An English translation is given in Beneski's Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don Agustin de Iturbide, published in New York, 1825.
67. Commanded by Jacob Quelch, the same captain who had conveyed Iturbide to Leghorn. Malo, Apunt. Hist., 35. Before his departure he addressed a letter to the English minister, Canning, which is somewhat in contradiction to that sent to the congress. He therein states that he went with the object of consolidating a government which would render his country happy, and that be had received frequent invitations to return to Mexico. 'He sido llamado de diversos puntos repetidamente, y no puedo hacerme sordo por mas tiempo.' At the same time he asserts that he does not go to seek an empire. One of his first cares would be to promote friendly relations with Great Britain. Manifesto, 136-7.
68. Beneski in his narrative pp. 4-7 states that at the interview Garza expressed great regard for Iturbide, and assured him that if the ex-emperor should ever return to Mexico he might rely upon his assistance; that in 15 days he could place himself at the head of 2,000 cavalry, with ten pieces of ordnance, and that every confidence could be reposed in the troops. He further states that Garza gave him a letter for Iturbide whom he supposed to be in London imploring him 'to hasten from London to save Mexico, his country, from ruin and devastation.' The statement with regard to the letter is disproved by the evidence of Padre Treviño and Malo, Bustamante, Garza Vindicado, 74-5, and the latter only makes mention in his narrative of the one to Treviño. He conjectures, however, that Garza, suspecting who was on board, hoodwinked Beneski by protestations of adherence to Iturbide, and thus obtained the secret from him. Nevertheless, the note to Treviño expressed both the wishes and offers of Garza as told by Beneski, and Bustamante's vindication of Garza is virtually without point. Apunt. Hist., 37-8.
69. Garza had made no mention of this fact in his letter to Treviño; hence Malo infers that his intention was to entrap Iturbide. Apunt. Hist., 40. Garza states that he informed Iturbide while on their journey that death would be his fate. Iturbide, Manifesto, 176.
70. Indeed, Garza's proceedings are inexplicable as the sequel shows. I can only suppose that private instructions had been issued to the military authorities at the ports to use all means to secure Iturbide's person if he should appear, and execute him immediately. The government afterward reprimanded Garza for not having acted with more promptness in the matter. See the despatch of Teran, the minister of war, in Id., 185-6.
71. Garza excuses his conduct by stating to the government that his design was to put Iturbide's real intentions to the test; that he had perfect confidence in the troops and officers, to whom he had given secret orders. Id., 179-80.
72. See the records of the sessions supplied by Alaman. Hist. Méj., v. ap. doc. no. 24, and Garza's report in Iturbide, Manifiesto, 182.
73. He had previously written, on the 17th, a representation to the sovereign congress, appealing against his proscription. He now concluded it, and says: 'No pedi por la conservacion de la vida que ofrecí tantas veces á mi patria. . . mi súplica se redujo á que se me concediesen tres dias para disponer mi conciencia, que por disgracia no es tan libre en mi vida privada, como en la pública.' Id., 165-6.
74. For an account of these ceremonies, see Pacheco, Descrip. Iturb.; Bustamante, Gabinete Mex., i. 84-93; Arrillaga, Recop., 1838, 292, 395-9. Iturbide's family were detained under arrest at Soto la Marina till September, when they were banished the country and went to the United States. Mex. Col. Ley. Ord. y Dec., iii. 60. A pension, however, of $8,000 a year was granted his widow. Dublan and Lozano Ley. Mex., ii. 449. By decree of February 27, 1835, the sentence of banishment was revoked, and his widow and children were permitted to enter the republic. Id., iii. 25. In after years Iturbide's services in accomplishing independence were recognized. In 1853 the title of Liberator was bestowed upon him. Mex. Leg. Mej., Aug.-Dec., 1853, 356-57; and in 1855 the anniversary of his death was declared a public holiday. Mex. Col. Ley. Ord., Jan.-Aug., 1835, viii. 309-10.