Intelligence and Security Committee China report/Case Study: Academia
PART TWO:
CASE STUDIES
CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN UK ACADEMIA103 - Influence and interference
103 - Economic advantage
109
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE115 - Who: Taking responsibility for tackling influence and interference
115 - How: Taking action on influence and interference
116 - What: Understanding the threat from theft and subversion
116 - How: Taking action on economic advantage
117
As we have noted in Part One, the UK is a target for China in its efforts to build global support for its core interests, to mute international criticism and to gain economically. To achieve these aims, China seeks 'political influence' in the UK and 'economic advantage' over the UK. During this Inquiry, we have examined the influence and advantage China seeks through three areas: Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy. We explore the threat and response to these three key areas in the subsequent Case Studies, starting with Chinese interference in UK Academia.
- The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve both political influence and economic advantage by both:
- controlling the narrative of debate about China within UK universities by exerting influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students; and
- obtaining Intellectual Property (IP) by directing or stealing UK academic research in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise.
- These strands can often overlap, and the UK Intelligence Community assess that it is not always clear which is the driver: "it is difficult to know if interference is the priority or whether it is a by-product of trying to acquire sensitive material and expertise".[1]
- What is clear from our Inquiry is that the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.
- The External Expert witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK are a significant problem, and they provided us with numerous examples.
- By contrast, historically, the Intelligence Community considered that, while China had "***" to interfere in UK Academia, there was not a broad evidence base for this[2]—although it is not clear whether this was because the evidence was not there or the Intelligence Community were not looking for it. In June 2019, we were told by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) that examining the threat from interference to Academia was a "work in progress" and that there was not a "comprehensive understanding of the picture".[3] However, towards the latter stages of our Inquiry it was recognised that evidence of malign Chinese interference in UK Academia appeared to be growing.
- Pressure is primarily exerted on institutions, academics and students to prevent engagement with topics that harm the positive narrative presented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is particularly acute when it involves the so-called 'Five Poisons' (Taiwanese independence, Tibetan independence, Xinjiang separatists, the Chinese democracy movement and the Falun Gong).
UK universities: Funding from overseas student fees
UK universities are reliant on income from students in order to operate. A decade ago, university funding comprised 72% public funding, with student fees providing 23%, but this has since been reversed, with student fees now making up 73% of funding.[4] (There are other sources of income available to UK universities such as residences, catering, investments and endowments—but fees are the most significant revenue stream.[5]) In recent years, the number of 'home' students (who have their fees capped) has remained static whilst the number of overseas students has increased. Figures from February 2021 show that, in 2018/19, international (non-European Union) students accounted for 14% of UK university students, and their fees accounted for 14.4% of the total income of all UK universities.[6]
- The fees paid by international students account for a large—and increasing—share of university income. The profit universities are able to make from teaching international students helps to fund loss-making activities, such as research.[7] Chinese students make up the largest overseas contingent of students in UK universities. Although estimates vary, it is believed that, in 2019, there were more than 120,000 Chinese students—more in the UK than in the rest of Europe combined. China sends five times as many students to the UK as any other country does. To put it in perspective, reporting in 2020 showed that there were only 27,000 students from India, the next largest source of international students in the UK.[8]
- In financial terms, it was estimated that, in 2017/18, Chinese students were responsible for generating almost £600m,[9] which makes up a very significant proportion of universities' income. HMG evidence provided in September 2020 noted that the Department for Education (DfE) was working on "geographically diversifying" the recruitment of foreign students[10]—presumably to counteract the current over-reliance on income from Chinese students.
- While the numbers are clearly significant, the question is whether, and if so how, China is actively using this 'buying power' as leverage. An article in The Times in 2019 reported that the intelligence Agencies were "concerned that a reliance on Chinese money and students, particularly postgraduates paying up to £50,000 a year in fees, makes some universities particularly vulnerable [to influence and interference by the Chinese government]".[11] During this Inquiry, we were told that "China likely seeks to exert influence over UK universities by threatening to withdraw scholarships or funding for Chinese nationals in the UK".[12] ***.[13]
- Indeed, in some cases, China does not even have to issue a threat. Professor Steve Tsang (Director of the China Institute at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS))—who is known for being willing to challenge the CCP's narrative—told the Committee that institutions were actively avoiding taking action themselves for fear of upsetting the Chinese: he had been asked by *** the University of Nottingham not to accept any media requests during the visit of President Xi Jinping to the UK in 2015, for fear of causing offence to the Chinese.[14]
- In terms of exerting control and influence, China does not just rely on the leverage that its student fees buy it; it also provides direct investment to academic institutions so that it can guarantee input into academic programmes, direct research (discussed later in this Case Study) and ensure that UK students are taught an interpretation of China that reflects the CCP's interests. The latter is primarily conducted through the Confucius Institutes in the UK.
- There are 29 Confucius Institutes in the UK, with more than 160,000 registered students (not all of whom will be Chinese). They carry out entirely legitimate activities, such as fostering cultural ties and providing language teaching. However, they have also been accused of stifling academic debate about sensitive issues, such as Tibet. Confucius Institutes are run, and part-funded, by the Hanban, an educational organisation that is ultimately controlled by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department—an association that means that comparisons with the British Council or the Institut Français are misleading at best. The Hanban's charter stipulates that Confucius Institutes must obey Chinese law.
- Confucius Institutes often occupy premises on university campuses free of charge, and some also provide funding to the university with which they are associated, meaning that the line between the institutions can become blurred. For example, it has previously been reported that the Nottingham University School of Contemporary Chinese Studies received money from the university's Confucius Institute to fund core academic activities—thereby giving it influence over who came to speak at the university on Chinese issues.
- The Intelligence Community assess that Confucius Institutes are utilised by the Chinese government in order to dissuade universities from engaging in debates that the CCP considers to be unsuitable topics. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Chair told us in October 2020 that the operations of Confucius Institutes were primarily concerning for their role in intimidation:
The Confucius Institutes, I would say, are more of an instrument for pursuing that and at one level, if one takes it as a purely cultural issue, one could equate it with the British Council, but of course nothing in China is that simple and they are undoubtedly following a government line.[15]
- China not only seeks influence at an institutional level but will also target individual academics who focus on China, seeking to ensure that they act in the CCP's best interests either through professional inducements or, if that doesn't work, by intimidation.
- China appears prepared to use levers, such as research funding and travel opportunities, to cultivate relationships with academics, and to encourage them to change their research direction or course content in line with CCP objectives. We heard from the External Experts that this can be very direct—Professor Steve Tsang told us that, within six months of him taking up a new appointment at SOAS, a political counsellor from the Chinese embassy approached him, offering him anything he wanted in an attempt to curry favour: "It is as blatant as that."[16]
- If positive incentives do not work, the Chinese government is willing to apply pressure in other ways. The JIC Chair told us that they were aware of:
examples of intimidation, in different ways, sometimes with the Vice Chancellor getting a phone call, sometimes at student body level, to try to discourage universities from allowing speakers on issues like Tibet or Xinjiang.[17]
Lord Patten told the Foreign Affairs Committee that, when, in the early days of his tenure as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, the Dalai Lama was invited to speak by the university's Buddhist Society, "within 48 hours I had the then-Chinese ambassador on the phone saying, 'This is a disgraceful insult to the People's Republic of China', and so on".[18] He refused to intervene. On a different occasion, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford was asked by the Chinese embassy to prevent Lord Patten from visiting Hong Kong; she also refused.[19]
- Chinese visas are also used as leverage. Professor Tsang stated: "Research for academics entering China is weaponised. You say something that they don't like, they deny you a visa."[20] As visas are essential to the academic research of many UK-based China scholars, this makes them a powerful lever that can be used to deter criticism of the CCP and its policies. In October 2020, the Chief of SIS told the Committee:
If you are an academic and you are specialising in China, and your entire academic life is focused on China, the threat of not allowing you to travel to the country of your academic [focus] is a very powerful threat.[21]
- China also seeks to monitor and control Chinese students' behaviour—primarily via the network of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs). There are reportedly more than 90 CSSAs in the UK, all based at universities, and they are actively supported—and at least partly financed—by the Chinese embassy.[22] The CSSAS ostensibly exist to look after the interests of Chinese students in the UK, organising cultural activities for Chinese and non-Chinese students, and providing practical advice to Chinese students on living and studying in the host country. However, CSSAS are—along with Confucius Institutes—assessed to be used by the Chinese state to monitor Chinese students overseas and to exert influence over their behaviour.[23] Professor Steve Tsang told the Committee:
The student bodies are infiltrated … We know that … there are meetings that happen through the middle of the night and the following morning some Chinese students can get rung up by somebody at the cultural or education section of the embassy to ask them: why did you say that? Why did you do that?[24]
- This would appear to be resulting in a culture of fear and suspicion among Chinese students in the UK. According to Professor Tsang, "we are seeing that … in the class where there is only one Chinese student, that Chinese student usually engages in discussions and debates much more openly than in a class that has quite a few Chinese, [where] they don't know who [if anyone] is going to report on them".[25] The protests in Hong Kong, and subsequent demonstrations in support of the protesters by some ethnic Chinese students in the UK, have brought to the fore the pressure exerted on Chinese students in the UK by the Chinese embassy and CSSAS.
- Examples of such behaviour have been reported throughout the Western world over the past decade, but awareness of the issue has increased in recent years. The perception that the Chinese government is interfering with academic freedom across the world—including through surveillance of its own students overseas via Confucius Institutes, CSSAS and other means—is such that, in 2019, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Human Rights Watch issued a Code of Conduct to help universities protect themselves against Chinese academic interference, the Code called for the rejection of Confucius Institutes and restrictions on CSSAS.[26]
Pressures on Chinese students in the UK
- In November 2019, a Chinese student was photographed in Edinburgh with a sign supporting Hong Kong citizens' demands for free elections. The following day, he was secretly photographed at Edinburgh Airport while escorting his mother to her flight. Both pictures were circulated on Weibo, the Chinese social media site, by someone who believed he was returning to Chengdu, his hometown. The post—entitled 'Brothers from Chengdu, beat him to death'—contained the flight number and a call for him to be arrested by police or assaulted by citizens. It was shared 10,000 times.[27]
- In November 2019, it was reported that the Glasgow CSSA— which acknowledges that "the Chinese embassy is one of the sponsors of our events"—had promoted 'flash mobs' to confront Hong Kong demonstrations. One Hong Kong student who had attended protests in Edinburgh said that "there is Chinese embassy involvement in these demonstrations … They surrounded us in a circle, waving Chinese flags, singing the national anthem and being threatening and hostile." A spokesman for the Chinese consulate in Edinburgh told The Times: "It is totally justifiable and understandable for Chinese students to express their indignation and opposition to words and actions that attempt to split the nation and smear China's image."[28]
- A Hong Kong student at the University of Sheffield reported that he and his friends were surrounded by mainland Chinese students when they were handing out pro-democracy leaflets: "A glass was thrown at one of my friends and one of our flags was broken … We were terrified. In Sheffield there are nearly 4,000 Chinese students and only a few hundred Hong Kong students … It's the fear of what they might do that scares us. We are sure we will be on watch lists when we go home."[29] On another occasion, a film screening by Hong Kong students at Aston University, in Birmingham, was interrupted by mainland Chinese students who attempted to video those attending.[30]
- In addition to mainstream Academia, China will also seek to influence think tanks and NGOs in the UK—again with the aim of influencing research agendas, making policy recommendations and influencing the narrative on China.[31] MI5 observed that:
think tanks that people are inserting themselves into, or think tanks which are essentially just ***, that is a methodology that we've seen since time immemorial and we certainly see it nowadays, and ***. So there are bits of the think tank activity that go on that we don't judge are causing deep damage … there are other cases where we think there is more concerning activity taking place ***.[32]
- Engagement with think tanks in order to promote a particular view of the world is not unusual behaviour and would not generally reach the threshold for 'interference'. However, Chinese tactics extend to intimidation and coercion. For example, we were told that staff from at least one European think tank focusing on China are frequently followed by Chinese officials, and others have experienced difficulties obtaining Chinese visas.[33] Charles Parton, Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told the Committee about one employee who "knows if she wishes to return to China, temporarily or when she retires, she cannot say things that go against the Party, and she has told me, 'I have to clear things with my protector back in Beijing' … that is the way the Party forces [ethnic Chinese academics] to act".[34]
PP. The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve political influence in the UK and economic advantage over the UK. China exerts influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students in order to control the narrative of debate about China—including through the use of Confucius Institutes in the UK—and it directs or steals UK academic research to obtain Intellectual Property in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise. However, the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.
QQ. In seeking political influence, there are obvious and repeated examples of Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK. Universities are reliant on student fees, and the vast number of Chinese students in the UK—it is striking that there are more than five times the number than for any other country—provides China with significant leverage, which it is not afraid to exert. Yet the Government had shown very little interest in warnings from Academia: at the time of drafting, there was no point of contact in the Government for those in the sector to seek advice on these issues.
Economic advantage- In addition to influence and interference, Academia also provides China with a means of securing economic advantage over the UK. This can be overt—directing academic research for its own ends domestically, whether in an economic sense or militarily. It can also be covert—using collaborative projects to steal information and IP. In both respects, Academia is an easy option' since the information may be less protected than it might be in the private sector or in the Ministry of Defence, for example. Academic institutions often conduct research on behalf of UK Industry, and we were told that they can be more vulnerable than their Industry counterparts due to a combination of greater need for funding ***.[35]
(i) Using academia to steal Intellectual Property- China's theft of IP has often been cited as one of the reasons for its significant growth in technological expertise and market share. In July 2019, the Chief Executive Officer of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) told us:
In our role trying to defend the UK from cyber-attacks, China's ambitions to steal IP is one of the principal things that we worry about. When we analyse how that whole attack ecosystem works … it's about China … using whatever means they can to attack a range of western organisations for their valuable Intellectual Property and then find use [of that IP] to China.[36]
- As such, it is clear that China's pursuit of key emerging technologies poses an increasing threat to UK Itellectual Property, including via UK universities and research institutions. The vast number of Chinese students—particularly post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK that are involved in cutting-edge research must therefore raise concerns in this respect given the access and opportunities it affords them.
- The United States (US) has already recognised this threat and has very publicly taken action to counter it. In 2020, then-President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation[37] imposing additional entry requirements on post-graduate Chinese students with a demonstrable link to the CCP for study in the US. The Presidential Proclamation notes:
The PRC [People's Republic of China] authorities use some Chinese students, mostly post-graduate students and post-doctorate researchers, to operate as non-traditional collectors of intellectual property. Thus, students or researchers from the PRC studying or researching beyond the undergraduate level who are or have been associated with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are at high risk of being exploited or co-opted by the PRC authorities and provide particular cause for concern.[38]
The Presidential Proclamation led to the US Department of State revoking many existing visas for Chinese students and denying other visas to prospective Chinese students. At the time of writing, the Proclamation remains in force under the Biden Administration—meaning the new Administration also recognises the enduring threat posed by Chinese students.
- With US Academia becoming an increasingly hard target for Chinese students, it is likely that more Chinese students will seek to study at UK academic institutions—meaning that UK IP and information is increasingly vulnerable. This concern is supported by public research. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the People's Liberation Army has sent approximately 500 military scientists to UK academic institutions in the period 2007-2017.[39] The author of the document suggested that the UK is a primary destination for Chinese military scientists studying abroad.[40] In some cases, these students obscure their military affiliations, including through the use of misleading historical names for their institutions or even the use of non-existent institutions.[41] A document published by the leading Chinese defence university, the National University of Defence Technology, advises students that military and political courses can be excluded from their academic records when applying to foreign institutions.[42] Once established in academic institutions, these students are in a position to identify and exfiltrate valuable Information Data and IP back to China.
- In addition to using students to steal information and IP, China also utilises so-called 'Talent Programmes'. Originally, these programmes were established to attract Chinese research scientists back to China; however, they now recruit Western scientists as well. For instance, the 'Thousand Talents' Programme is made up of a number of schemes that are aimed both at Chinese scientists working abroad, and at foreign scientists, offering very significant remuneration and research budgets to work and/or teach in China.
- These programmes are established by the Chinese state and aim to transfer Information Data and IP from the participants to Chinese research entities or government agencies. This is not necessarily illegal and is done overtly—however, it is noteworthy that, in the US, researchers are obliged to disclose funding from foreign governments when applying for government grants. In 2018, Texas Tech University warned its staff that recipients of 'Thousand Talents' grants could, in future, be barred from working on research funded by the US Department of Defense or by federal research grants. The US Congress was told by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in December 2018 that such programmes "encourage theft of intellectual property from US institutions".[43] No such action appears to have been taken in the UK to prevent IP and information being transferred out of the UK, either through 'Talent Programmes' or more generally.
Case study: Chinese Talent Programmes
China operates a number of Party- and state-sponsored Talent Programmes to recruit researchers (both Chinese and non-Chinese nationals), who are then incentivised to steal foreign technologies needed to advance China's national, military and economic goals.[44] Participants in Chinese Talent Programmes have been known to go on to register patents in China on behalf of the Chinese government[45]—yet these have been based on research funded by foreign governments. China benefits from this Intellectual Property and associated royalties, at the cost of others.
In one specific case ***.[46] Chinese Talent Programme participants have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of offences, including economic espionage and theft of trade secrets, export-control law violations, and grant and tax fraud.
(ii) Using UK research to support Chinese interests- While the potential theft of IP may have received the most headlines, China's overt use of UK Academia provides it with just as much of an opportunity to gain an economic advantage over the UK. China directs, funds and collaborates on research—in particular that which might benefit the Chinese military.
- The risks of this can most clearly be seen in respect of dual-use technologies—defined as "goods, software, technology, documents and diagrams which can be used for both civil and military applications".[47] One of the problems with this is that the potential military use of dual-use technologies is not always apparent at the beginning of the research project and therefore the initial research is often unclassified. In this way, research on technological innovations - which might later be seen to have a clear military use, and perhaps offer a decisive military advantage - can be readily available via academic engagement.[48]
- On the issue of diversion of UK-China joint research for military use, we were told that basic research is often open to collaboration, and individual academics and research groups ***. Universities themselves may intend to commercialise IP, but increasingly need Chinese financial support. Moreover, transfer of tangible or intangible goods to China only requires an export licence if they are in the Control List, or where there are specific concerns about military or Weapons of Mass Destruction end use. Emerging technologies without established military use are often not covered. ***.[49]
- It appears highly likely therefore that collaboration on joint UK-China research projects is being exploited for military use ***. HMG noted that research related to engineering or physical sciences was most likely to have a defence use (and therefore was at greatest risk). ***.[50]
Case study: University of Manchester's National Graphene Institute
Shortly after President Xi Jinping visited the University of Manchester in 2015, the university's National Graphene Institute was involved in a five-year collaborative research project with the Aero Engine Corporation of China's Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM). In a press release, the university stated that this partnership would "accelerate the application of graphene in the aviation industry and other sectors".[51] However, concerns have been raised that this collaboration could be used to develop China's military capabilities. A 2021 Civitas report into Chinese military exploitation of scientific research at UK universities highlighted this collaboration between BIAM and the University of Manchester. The report noted that BIAM was working in parallel to develop graphene for a range of uses, and that Chinese reports suggested that China's Z-10 attack helicopter had been equipped with graphene armour that may have been developed at BIAM.[52]
The University of Manchester has also acknowledged the potential dual-use of research jointly with other Chinese universities—for instance, collaboration between researchers at the University of Manchester and at Central South University China led to the creation of a new kind of ceramic coating that could "revolutionise hypersonic travel for air, space and defence purposes".[53]
***.[54]
It appears that any collaboration between a UK research institution and a Chinese institution will very probably be used to benefit China's military. By way of example, the case of Huang Xianjun was publicised by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.[55] After completing his PhD at the University of Manchester, working with the discoverers of graphene, Huang is now a researcher at China's National University of Defence Technology, working on key defence projects for the People's Liberation Army. ***.[56]
- There is a question as to whether academic institutions are sufficiently alive to this threat—particularly given that academic institutions will often accept the transfer of Information Data and IP as a condition of funding.[57] The JIC Chair told the Committee in October 2020 that the Intelligence Community have significant concerns about research partnerships where universities may "unwisely not recognise who they are actually dealing with and the sensitivity of information which may be being transferred as a result".[58]
- Some universities clearly are aware of the threat posed by collaboration: the University of Cambridge has expressed concern that its science and technology research projects are being exposed to espionage via the university's collaborative projects with, and investment from, Huawei.[59] They are particularly concerned about exposing 'high-risk' projects that require additional layers of vetting—for example, research collaboration with Rolls-Royce on aerospace technology.
- However, other universities seem to be turning a blind eye to the risk: for example, the University of Surrey received a £7.5m 'donation' to its 5G/6G Innovation Centre from Huawei which it described as a 'key partner' that the university would continue to do research with "unless there were clear and compelling reasons not to do so".[60]
RR. In its quest for economic advantage, China often acts in plain sight—directing, funding and collaborating on academic research for its own ends. In particular, it seeks to benefit the Chinese military through research on dual-use technologies, which is often unclassified in its early stages. There is a question as to whether academic institutions are alive to the threat posed by such collaboration, particularly given that they often accept transfer of Information Data and Intellectual Property as a condition of funding. While some have expressed concern, others seem to be turning a blind eye, happy simply to take the money.
SS. The UK Government must ensure that transparency around the source of foreign donations to Higher Education institutions is improved: a public register of donations must be created by the Department for Education and monitored by the State Threats Unit in the Home Office.
TT. Academia is also an 'easy option' when it comes to the theft of Intellectual Property, by taking advantage of collaborative projects to steal information which is less protected than it might be in the private sector or the Ministry of Defence, for example. The vast number of Chinese students—particularly post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK that are involved in cutting-edge research must therefore raise concerns, given the access and opportunities they are afforded.
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Who: Taking responsibility for tackling influence and interference- In 2019, the External Expert witnesses we spoke to told the Committee that the Government had shown very little interest in their warnings that China was actively attempting to influence and utilise Academia in the UK for its own purposes: Lord Patten noted that there was not even point of contact in the Government for advice on these issues.
- HMG appears now to recognise that Chinese engagement with the UK's academic sector—while yielding many benefits—is not without risk. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office noted in 2020:
in the UK we are aware of cases such as autocratic state actors putting pressure on universities and academics to avoid certain topics or self-censor their research or course content. There are also reports of pressure or influence exerted on overseas students. We are also aware of autocratic state actors targeting research collaboration.[61]
However, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the security aspects are being lost. In July 2019, the DNSA and Senior Responsible Owner for China told us that "the Department for Education and BEIS [the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy] are the ones who we have tasked to be the lead government departments to understand the threat from influence and interference in the academic sector".[62] However, in December 2020, 18 months later, the DNSA told the Committee:
we need DfE [the Department for Education] to be able to understand that agenda, to have a high level of awareness of the risks of the potential of intelligence and a covert capability to support them in that.[63]
- It appears therefore that the policy departments still do not have the understanding needed. This problem can be seen by the lack of engagement we have received during this Inquiry from DfE and the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). In April 2021, we contacted both departments to request information on issues on which they are the 'lead' departments. At the time of writing, we were still waiting to receive a response from DfE—despite having chased this request with the Secretary of State's office. No explanation has been provided for the department's failure to engage with this Inquiry. This is particularly concerning when DfE is supposed to play a pivotal role in countering nefarious Chinese activity in academic institutions.
- BEIS did respond to our requests—only to refuse them outright. The department refused to provide any information to the Committee, citing commercial sensitivities and the fact that it provides its information to the BEIS Select Committee[64] and to the Science and Technology Committee. We also note that its response was provided on an email system accredited only to 'Official-Sensitive', yet it referenced information in our more highly classified communication. We are worried that a department charged with security matters would make such a basic error. The BEIS Select Committee may wish to assure itself as to the security processes in place with the department to avoid such errors.
- We have previously addressed the lack of oversight resulting from the Fusion Doctrine.[65] The responses from DfE and BEIS in relation to our Inquiry into China—one of the key national security threats facing the UK—are clear examples of the unacceptable nature of the current system, both in terms of the failure of policy departments to be alert to security matters and to take responsibility for tackling them, and the lack of effective oversight if this Committee is not formally given a remit in this area.
How: Taking action on influence and interference- In terms of tackling Chinese influence over, and interference in, many of our academic institutions, while the dawning recognition that there is a problem is welcome, the Committee has still not seen any detail as to what action is planned to tackle it—which reinforces our concern that policy departments are not taking it sufficiently seriously.[66]
- In the evidence received, the only step that was pointed to was the championing of the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom in our academic institutions, which, as the (then) Universities Minister noted, "are a huge part of what makes our higher education system so well-respected around the world".[67] The UK Government says that, in order to protect free speech, it has worked with Universities UK on guidelines that provided advice on a wide range of national security issues, including the protection of values (this guidance is discussed further below). In addition, the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill was introduced in the House of Commons in May 2021 and is making progress. At the time of writing, it was still at Report stage in the House of Commons.
- Nevertheless, the scant response from the Government demonstrates there is still a long way to go before we can stem the tide of Chinese political influence in UK academic institutions bought by Chinese money—money that China uses to control and validate its own political narrative and to shut down criticism. The introduction of the Government's Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill is not—in and of itself—going to solve this systemic problem.
What: Understanding the threat from theft and subversion- As at 2021, HMG still seemed to be at the stage of trying to understand the threat from Chinese students stealing IP from UK Academia, or the Chinese subverting UK research to its own ends, at the most basic level—i.e. what it is they are trying to steal. There was still no comprehensive list of the areas of UK research that need protecting from China.
- The broad areas would appear to be self-evident—those which the Chinese have themselves identified—as the NCSC told the Committee in 2019:
if you look at 'Made in China 2025', there are a set of technologies in there that the Chinese wish to dominate where currently the vast majority of academic research is in the UK.[68]
Yet, in October 2020, the Acting National Security Adviser (NSA) and GCHQ suggested that work was still being done by the Government to identify these areas of sensitivity—or at least to agree a comprehensive list amongst departments. The Acting NSA told the Committee: "We are looking at what more we can do ***, so that we can be clear about where we think the areas of greatest sensitivity are for research."[69]
- Director GCHQ clearly recognised this lack of clarity and the need for action: {{quote|we don't have a joined-up view on the things that we most need to protect ***. So, you know, a particular area of technology that the UK might find or think is very important, linking that to where we are academically the most strong, linking that to how we encourage inward investment, including in research, and then linking that back to our knowledge and understanding of ***, it has to be a whole of system approach and I can see some real positive developments in that, but we are coming from a situation where Chinese involvement at student level and investment level has been welcomed for a number of years ***.[70]
UU. At present, HMG still seems to be trying to understand the threat from Chinese students stealing Intellectual Property from UK Academia, or the Chinese subverting UK research to its own ends, at the most basic level—i.e. what it is they are trying to steal. There is still no comprehensive list of the areas of sensitive UK research that need protecting from China. Identifying these key areas of research must be a priority, and they must be communicated to Academia as a matter of urgency so that protective action can be taken. Unless and until this is done, then the UK is handing China a clear economic advantage over the UK, and indeed the rest of the world.
How: Taking action on economic advantage- In terms of tackling the manipulation of Academia for economic advantage, we were told that the Government was now talking to Academia about the threat. Director GCHQ noted in July 2019 that part of the reason for its new Manchester office "is because of the preponderance of big academic institutions that need to get closer proximity to some of our advice".[71] NCSC later noted that it was now "talking to those universities to say, as a priority, to make sure that they understand what the risks are".[72] In May 2021, a new Research Collaboration Advice Team was established within the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to "promote government advice on security-related topics, such as export controls, cyber security, and protection of intellectual property".[73]
- In December 2020, the DNSA noted the close relationship between the Government and Universities UK in the dissemination of advice to the sector.[74] Universities UK published its guide 'Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues' in October 2020, which drew heavily on resources from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and NCSC. The guide was designed to be used in conjunction with Project DERWENT[75]—which aims to deliver greater awareness and protective security advice around the threat from Hostile State Activity to UK research and innovation—and provides advice on the protection of reputation and values, people, campuses and partnerships.[76]
Project DERWENT/Trusted Research
Project DERWENT aims to deliver greater awareness and protective security advice around the threat from Hostile State Activity (HSA) to UK research and innovation, particularly presented by joint research ventures and academic collaboration. The work aligns with the Cabinet Office-led 'Trading Safely' pillar.
Objectives- To increase understanding and awareness of the threat from HSA to research and innovation posed by academic collaboration and joint research ventures.
- To jointly (between the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the National Cyber Security Centre) develop a package of proportionate protective security measures to make the UK's cutting-edge research and innovation a harder target for HSA.
- To identify and deploy levers which encourage good security behaviour within the sector.
- To enable government departments and other organisations to disseminate advice and guidance products to the sector.
The Government's approach will focus on the departments and private sector organisations that fund and set the strategic direction for research and innovation, in order to influence and inform the sector. This approach is also driven by an understanding that the threat message is likely to be better received by those involved with research and innovation if it is delivered through a variety of routes, including those responsible for sponsorship, funding and strategic direction.
Project DERWENT also aims to engage directly with Academia to develop protective security guidance and threat briefings, which are tailored for the sector. Given the broad range of academic relationships, the project aims to deliver a core script, in order to ensure a consistent message from those who engage with organisations involved in research and innovation.[77]
- While Project DERWENT certainly has worthy aims, we nevertheless must come back to the fact that, from the evidence given to this Inquiry, HMG is still not clear which areas of research and collaboration it is trying to protect from China. That, surely, must be the first step, to communicate to academic institutions a comprehensive list of the areas of greatest research sensitivity. Unless, and until, this is done, then China is able to direct and collaborate on—unfettered—research that provides it with an economic advantage.
- Furthermore, it is clear that, even if the areas could be agreed upon, the Intelligence Community acknowledge that the Government has little leverage in this area to prevent Chinese research or collaboration. In July 2019, NCSC told the Committee:
at the moment Government has no way of stopping a university collaborating with a Chinese Professor or a Chinese company.[78]
This was echoed in December 2020 by the DNSA, who noted that engagement with Academia could be challenging, given that it "highly prizes its independence".[79]
- Perhaps the only area that is ahead of this rather bleak picture is those academic posts ***. These posts are subject to more stringent vetting controls than other posts.[80] In 2019, DI told the Committee that it was undertaking a programme of work to *** university degree courses that could potentially be utilised for Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes.[81] The Academic Technology Approval Scheme, which students had to apply to in advance of starting such courses, has now been expanded to cover courses which could potentially be utilised for developing Advanced Conventional Military Technology.[82]
The Academic Technology Approval Scheme
The UK has not explicitly banned any Chinese students or researchers from applying to its academic or research institutions. However, since 2007, the UK has operated the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) to "address transfers of sensitive knowledge through postgraduate study".[83] ATAS certificates may be issued to prospective post-graduate students and researchers after an assessment of their previous publications and studies, previous employment, arrangements for funding, declarations by referees and vetting of their personal details.[84]
The scheme was originally designed to protect the transfer of knowledge that could be used to construct or deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction. The scheme was broadened to include Advanced Conventional Military Technology in September 2020, and to "cover researchers with access to proliferation sensitive information in universities and research institutes" in May 2021.
While we were informed that the latter change was "not a China specific measure and relates solely to research",[85] the initial change was widely reported to be in response to concerns over Chinese nationals.[86] Indeed, the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) told the Committee in December 2020 that the September 2020 change had been informed by the results of a June 2019 pilot, which demonstrated the disproportionate scale of the threat posed by Chinese students. Of the students examined under the pilot, *** of those refused had been Chinese (the other *** were from "the rest of the world", so a wide geographical spread). CDI explained that the pilot had refused *** out of the *** Chinese students who had been looked at, meaning that ***% of those Chinese students who had had their activity examined had been refused.
He told the Committee:
that pilot showed the scale of the problem and therefore the [changes] that have been brought in since October now give us the opportunity to be more rigorous in our approach around ATAS, both in terms of its scope so it's more than just Weapons of Mass Destruction and associated technology, it now includes advanced conventional weapons … ***.[87]
VV. Unlike other countries, such as the United States (US), the UK has taken no preventative action. This is particularly concerning, as US restrictions on Chinese students will make UK institutions more attractive to those seeking to gain Intellectual Property and expertise. The Research Collaboration Advice Team should submit a quarterly report on the progress and outcomes of its work to the State Threats Unit in the Home Office to ensure there is cross-government awareness of the scale of the issue.
WW. It is clear that the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is an effective tool. Once the Government has identified the sensitive areas of research that need protecting from China, consideration should be given to ensuring that ATAS certificates are required for foreign nationals undertaking post-graduate study in UK institutions in those areas. Furthermore, we recommend that ATAS be expanded to cover postgraduate doctoral study.
XX. Tackling the threat in relation to Academia could have been an example of the Fusion Doctrine working seamlessly—with each policy department clearly contributing to an overall goal. But, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the ball is being dropped on security. Policy departments still do not have the understanding needed and have no plan to tackle it.
YY. This must change: there must be an effective cross-government approach to Academia, with clear responsibility and accountability for countering this multifaceted threat. In the meantime, China is on hand to collect—and exploit—all that the UK's best and brightest achieve as the UK knowingly lets it fall between the cracks.
- ↑ Written evidence—NSS, 31 January 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Higher Education funding in England', House of Commons Library, 19 November 2021.
- ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
- ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
- ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
- ↑ 'Number of international students at UK universities jumps', Financial Times, 16 January 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, February 2019.
- ↑ Written evidenc—HMG, 14 September 2020.
- ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
- ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
- ↑ Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019. Professor Tsang has himself been denied a visa by China in the past.
- ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.
- ↑ 'Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China's Growing Political Influence in Europe', Benner et al, Global Public Policy Institute, February 2018.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
- ↑ 'China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad', Human Rights Watch, 21 March 2019.
- ↑ 'Hong Kong crisis: Beat Edinburgh University student to death, Chinese students told', The Times, 26 November 2019.
- ↑ 'Beijing is backing attacks against us, say Hong Kong students in Scotland', The Times, 28 November 2019.
- ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
- ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
- ↑ We note that MI5 issued an espionage alert on an individual working in think tanks and Academia who was in regular contact with Chinese intelligence officers. ('Joint Address by MI5 and FBI Heads', www.mi5.gov.uk/news/speech-by-mi5-and-fbi, 6 July 2022.)
- ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—***, February 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
- ↑ US Presidential Proclamation 10043 of May 29, 2020.
- ↑ 'Suspension of Entry as Non-immigrants of Certain Students and Researchers From the People's Republic of China', Federal Register, 4 June 2020.
- ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
- ↑ 'China: A New World Order—Episode 3: IP Theft', BBC, 12 September 2019.
- ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
- ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
- ↑ 'China hushes up scheme to recruit overseas scientists', Financial Times, 10 January 2019.
- ↑ 'The China Threat: Chinese Talent Plans Encourage Trade Secret Theft, Economic Espionage', FBI website, accessed 26 April 2023.
- ↑ 'Threats to the US Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans', US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 18 November 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ www.gov.uk/guidance/controls-on-dual-use-goods
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
- ↑ 'Graphene partnership could deliver next generation of aircraft', press release by the University of Manchester, 7 December 2015.
- ↑ 'Inadvertently arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities', Civitas, February 2021.
- ↑ 'Chances of hypersonic travel heat up with new materials discovery', press release by the University of Manchester, 6 July 2017.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ 'How the West's research aids China's military', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 30 October 2018.
- ↑ Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 July 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ 'UK Universities to stick with Huawei despite Oxford University's decision to suspend funding', CityAM.com, 18 January 2019.
- ↑ 'A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2019, First Special Report of Session 2019-21', House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 February 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
- ↑ Now the Business and Trade Committee, as of 26 April 2023.
- ↑ The Government's Fusion Doctrine aims "to deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals". (HMG, National Security Capability Review, March 2018.)
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
- ↑ 'Universities to comply with free speech duties or face sanction', Department for Education, Office for Students, 12 May 2021.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Dedicated government team to protect researchers' work from hostile activity', GOV.UK, 25 May 2021, [https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dedicated-government-team-to-protect-researchers-work-from-hostile-activity www.gov.uk/government/news/dedicated-government-team-to-protect-researchers-work-from-hostile-activity]
- ↑ Oral evidence, NSS—*** December 2020.
- ↑ In some instances in this Report, we have substituted an ISC-specific code word where it has been necessary to refer to the name of an operation or project, in order to protect classified information. No significance is intended by, nor should be inferred from, the matching of code words to real operation names. The ISC code words have no operational significance.
- ↑ 'Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues', Universities UK, 15 October 2020, [https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2020/managing-risks-in-internationalisation.pdf www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2020/managing-risks-in-internationalisation.pdf
- ↑ Written evidence—***, CPNI and NCSC.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
- ↑ Written evidence—DI, 31 July 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** October 2020; GOV.UK guidance on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (accessed 20 October 2020).
- ↑ 'Student Vetting: The UK’s Academic Technology Approval Scheme', Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, February 2015.
- ↑ 'Guidance on how to apply for an ATAS certificate', Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 14 May 2021.
- ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 2 February 2021.
- ↑ 'Chinese students face ban amid security fears', The Times, 1 October 2020.
- ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.