Japan: Its History, Arts, and Literature/Volume 6/War Appendix
War Appendix
War Appendix
EXPLANATORY SPEECH OF THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The following is an accurate translation of the speech delivered by Baron Komura in the House of Representatives on the 23rd instant:—
Gentlemen:—It is a great honour to me to make a brief statement before this House regarding the course of negotiations between Japan and Russia from the commencement to their termination. These negotiations lasted for more than half a year and are of a most complicated nature. Now I will try to briefly explain to you, gentlemen, the main points of these negotiations.
When, upon the sudden outbreak in North China of the Boxer troubles in 1900, the Powers sent forces to Chihli for the relief of their representatives and nationals, and were taking action in harmonious co-operation, Russia despatched a large army into Manchuria and finally took possession of the whole of that province. She repeatedly declared at the time that this despatch of troops was simply for suppressing the Chinese insurgents, and that she was determined to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, and that consequently her occupation of that province, which was the result of inevitable circumstances, was intended to be merely temporary. Nevertheless, on more than one occasion she tried to induce China to conclude a treaty of a nature tending to impair China's sovereignty and incompatible with the treaty rights of the powers. Accordingly, on each occasion the Imperial Government warned both Russia and China, and Russia finally concluded, in April, 1902, a convention providing for the restoration of Manchuria. In accordance with the stipulation of the convention, Russia commenced to prepare for the restoration, and, in fact, a partial evacuation had already been effected, when in April last year there was a sudden change in her attitude, and not only were the withdrawal of her forces from Manchuria and the restitution of the administration to China suspended, but also various additional conditions were demanded from China. This action is believed to have been due to divided counsels in Russian Government circles regarding the solution of the Manchurian question, and to the subsequent ascendency of the party in favour of permanent occupation.
The development of affairs in Manchuria received the most careful attention at the hands of the Imperial Government. The maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Corea is of the utmost importance to the safety and repose of this Empire and is in fact our traditional policy; while in the event of the absorption of Manchuria by Russia, the separate existence of Corea would be constantly menaced and the firm establishment of peace in the Far East would become impossible. The Imperial Government, therefore, having regard to the future well-being of the Empire, deemed it necessary for consolidating the peace of the Extreme East and for securing the rights and interests of the Empire to open, as soon as possible, negotiations with Russia with a view to a friendly definition of the interests of the two countries in Manchuria and Corea where those interests meet, and thereby to remove every cause of future conflict between Japan and Russia. The Japanese Government, therefore, instructed their Representative at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1903, to bring their wishes to the attention of the Russian Government and to request the latter's concurrence. The Russian Government willingly assented, and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that he had obtained Imperial authority to open negotiations on the subject. Accordingly, on the 12th August last, the Imperial Government presented to the Russian Government, through their Minister at St. Petersburg, as a basis of negotiations, proposals substantially as follows:
1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Corea.
2. Mutual engagement to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China and Corea.
3. Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating inter- ests in Corea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan and Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the above-mentioned inter- ests so far as they do not conflict with the principle of Article I and Article II.
4. Recognition by Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Corea in the interests of reform and good government.
5. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Corean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.
About ten days after the presentation of the proposals of which the above are essential points, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs suddenly suggested the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Tokio. The Imperial Government, however, not only from the consideration that the progress of the negotiations would be facilitated by conducting them at the Russian capital, but also in view of the changes effected in the Russian administrative organization in Manchuria and the erection of a viceroyalty of the Far East, apprehended that the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Tokio would not conduce to a satisfactory understanding. They accordingly repeatedly objected to the proposed transfer, but the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was insistent, assigning as the reason for his attitude the Czar's contemplated trip abroad, etc. Again, when the Imperial Government requested the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to accept in principle our proposals as a basis of negotiation, he only agreed to take them in conjunction with the Russian counter-proposals as such bases. The Imperial Government, deeming it disadvantageous to delay any longer the opening of discussions, agreed at length to transfer the seat of negotiations, and requested the Russian Government to present as soon as possible their counter-proposals. It was not until nearly a month later, the 3rd October, that the said counter-proposals were presented.
In those counter-proposals Russia, while having no objection to engage to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Corea, declined to extend the same engagement to China, and, so far from consenting to recognize the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country, requested Japan to acknowledge Manchuria and its littoral as entirely outside her sphere of interest. She further proposed various restrictions upon Japan's freedom of action in Corea; for instance, while recognizing Japan's right to despatch troops, when necessary, for the protection of her interests in Corea, Russia demanded previous notice in case of such despatch, and she refused to allow Japan to use any portion of Corean territory for strategical purposes. She went so far, in fact, as to propose to establish a neutral zone covering all Corean territory north of the 39th parallel, that is to say, more than one-third of the entire Corean Empire.
But, as the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China in Manchuria is absolutely essential to the preservation of the independence of Corea, and as such maintenance was none other than a principle which had been voluntarily and repeatedly declared by Russia herself, and, moreover as it was considered necessary to keep uninjured the commercial interests of all the Powers concerned, upon the strength of the Russian engagement to respect treaty rights, the Imperial Government decided to maintain to the end their proposal on that subject, and necessary amendments to other Articles were also made. For instance, the imposition of any restriction on Japan in sending troops to Corea should be struck out. A neutral zone, if it was to be created, should be established on both sides of the boundary line between Manchuria and Corea with the same extent either way—i.e., fifty kilometres on each side. With these amendments several interviews took place with Baron Rosen from the 6th October last, and as the result of repeated discussions, in which some of our amendments were accepted while as to others no agreement was arrived at, our definitive amendments were presented to Baron Rosen on the 30th of that month, and the Russian Government were asked to consider them. Although we frequently pressed for an answer, the Russian reply was again greatly delayed and it only reached us on the IIth December. This embodied the 2nd Russian counter-proposals. If the regret of the Imperial Government at such delay was deep, their disappointment at the contents of the reply, when it was received, was still more profound, for in it the clauses relating to Manchuria were completely suppressed, thus restricting the proposed convention entirely to Corea, while on the other hand the original demands regarding the neutral zone and the non-employment of Corean territory for strategical purposes were again revived. But the object of the convention was, as above stated, the removal of all causes of future conflict by a definitive settlement of all questions between the two countries at points where their interests meet, and if Manchuria were placed outside the purview of the arrangement, and a moiety of the problem were thus to remain unsolved, the result would plainly be at variance with the aims for which the negotiations were inaugurated. Consequently, on the 21st of December last, the Imperial Government asked the Government of Russia to reconsider their position on the subject of Manchuria, and again requested, with respect to Corea, the suppression of the restrictions as to the employment of Corean territory, and they also proposed the entire deletion of the clause relating to a neutral zone, as it was considered that, if Russia would not agree to its extension into Manchuria, it would be only fair not to create it in Corea.
The Russian Government gave their reply on the 6th of January, in which they still adhered to their original proposals as regards Corea, and on condition that those proposals were accepted by the Imperial Government they offered to agree to the insertion of a clause stipulating that Russia would not impede the enjoyment by Japan and other Powers of the rights and privileges acquired under existing treaties with China. This at first sight might seem to be a concession on the part of Russia regarding Manchuria, but in reality it was not so, for Russia made it conditional on certain propositions regarding Corea to which Japan could never agree. Again, no stipulations were to be made as to the territorial integrity of Manchuria, and the above-mendoned clause, unaccompanied by assurances concerning territorial integrity, would be practically valueless. Accordingly, the Imperial Government, recognizing the absolute necessity of causing Russia to engage herself to respect the territorial integrity of Manchuria, and finding no margin for further concession in regard to Corea, decided to firmly insist upon their amendments, and once more requested on the 13th January last reconsideration by the Russian Government. They subsequently repeatedly instructed the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg to ask for a reply. The Russian Government, however, did not give any answer, neither did the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his interview with Mr. Kurino held so late as the 31st January, afford even an indication as to the date whereon the reply would be presented.
Upon the whole, while the Imperial Government invariably met Russia in a conciliatory and frank spirit, in the hope of arriving at a speedy solution of the situation by yielding to Russia's wishes so far as they could do so without impairing the vital interests of Japan, Russia always unduly delayed her replies, or proposed such amendments as were altogether inconsistent with the idea of an amicable settlement, thus making the situation more and more complicated. Besides, Russia, while professing peaceful intentions on the one hand, made on the other great naval and military preparations, despatching all her most powerful war vessels to the extreme Orient, and sending military reinforcements, tens of thousands strong, to Manchuria and the neighboring regions. Unusually great activity was shown by her in purchasing and transporting arms, ammunition, stores, and coal to the same region, so that it was placed beyond the range of doubt that Russia had no sincere desire for conciliation, and only aimed at compelling us to yield to her designs by force of arms. Especially towards the end of January the warlike activities of Russia were so far accelerated that, had Japan permitted any further procrastination, the Empire would certainly have been placed in serious danger. Although the Imperial Government entertained a most sincere desire for peace, yet in the face of such circumstances they could not avoid deciding, after a full and careful survey of the situation, to break off the negotiations with Russia and to take all necessary measures for self-defence. Accordingly, on the 5th of February, they issued telegraphic instructions to the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg to announce to the Russian Government that the Imperial Government had terminated negotiations relative to the proposed Russo-Japanese convention; that they would take such independent action as they might deem best to defend and consolidate their menaced position and to protect their established rights and legitimate interests, and that they would sever diplomatic relations with Russia and withdraw their Legation. In accordance with those instructions our Minister at St. Petersburg made the communication on the 6th February last.
Such is, gentlemen, a brief account of the negotiations with Russia. As for the details, the document just presented to the Diet will afford you full information.
CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA
No. 1. Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, July 28th, 1903.
The Japanese Government have observed with close attention the development of affairs in Manchuria, and they view with grave concern the present situation there. So long as there were grounds for hope that Russia would carry out her engagement to China and her assurances to other Powers on the subject of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Japanese Government maintained an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent action of Russia in formulating new demands in Peking and in consolidating rather than relaxing her hold on Manchuria compels belief that she has abandoned the intention of retiring from Manchuria, while her increased activity along the Corean frontier is such as to raise doubts regarding the limits of her ambition. The unrestrained permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a condition of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. Such occupation would be destructive of the principle of equal opportunity and in impairment of the territorial integrity of China. But, what is of still more serious moment to the Japanese Government, Russia stationed on the flank of Corea would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, and in any event it would make Russia the dominant power in Corea. Corea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defence, and Japan consequently considers the independence of Corea absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Japan possesses paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence in Corea, which, having regard to her own security, she cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, any other Power. The Japanese Government have given the matter their most serious consideration and have resolved to approach the Russian Government in a spirit of conciliation and frankness with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time the cause of just and natural anxiety; and, in the estimation of the Japanese Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring about the desired adjustment.
The Japanese Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and discretion, have decided to place these delicate negotiations in your hands. It is the wish of the Japanese Government to place their present invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official footing, and you are accordingly instructed to open the question by presenting to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect:
"The Imperial Japanese Government, believing that the Imperial Russian Government share with them the desire to remove from the relations of the two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, would be glad to enter with the Imperial Russian Government upon examination of the condition of affairs in the Extreme East where their interests meet, with a view to a definition of their respective special interests in those regions. If, as is confidently hoped, this suggestion meets approval in principle, the Imperial Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Imperial Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding."
In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the subject. You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under this instruction; and immediately upon the receipt of an affirmative reply from the Russian Government, the substance of our proposals will be telegraphed to you. No. 2. Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, July 31st, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, August 2nd, 1903.
Your Excellency's telegram of the 28th instant was duly received. In accordance with the instructions contained therein, I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day and, before handing to His Excellency the Note Verbale, I stated substantially as follows:
The condition of affairs in the Far East is becoming more and more complicated, and unless something be done at present with the view of removing all causes of misunderstanding between Japan and Russia, the relations of the two countries will increase in difficulty, entailing nothing but disadvantages to both countries. Under the circumstances, the Imperial Government, fully animated by a spirit of frankness and conciliation, have decided to approach the Imperial Russian Government with a view to arrive at an understanding.
I then handed to him the Note Verbale, saying that I was so instructed. After he had seen it, I expressed my ardent hope that the Russian Government would share the above view in the same spirit. Count Lamsdorff said that he was perfectly satisfied with the decision of the Japanese Government, for, as he had said to me very often, an understanding between the two countries is not only desirable, but is the best policy; should Russia and Japan enter into full understanding, no one would in future attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the two countries. So far as he was concerned, he was, he said, in perfect accord with the view of the Japanese Government; but he wished to see the Emperor on the subject before a definite answer was given. He expects to see the Emperor next Tuesday, and he promised to give me an answer on the following day. He added that the Emperor would surely approve the matter.
No. 3. Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, August 3rd, 1903.
In reference to my telegram of the 28th July, the Japanese Government, after giving most serious consideration to the condition of affairs in those centres where the interests of the two Powers meet, have decided to propose the following as the basis of an understanding between Japan and Russia.
"1.Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Corean Empires and to maintain the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.
"2.Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Corea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article I of this Agreement.
"3.Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Corea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article I of this Agreement.
"Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Corean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang lines.
"4.Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Corea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article II of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.
"5.Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Corea, including necessary military assistance.
"6.This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Corea."
In handing the foregoing project to Count Lamsdorff, you will say that it is presented for the consideration of the Russian Government in the firm belief that it may be found to serve as a basis upon which to construct satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments, and you will assure Count Lamsdorff that any amendment or suggestion he may find it necessary to offer will receive the immediate and friendly consideration of the Japanese Government. It will not be necessary for you to say much in elucidation of the separate items of the project as they are very largely self-explanatory; but you might point out that the project taken as a whole will be found to be but little more than the logical and essential development and extension of the principles already recognized by the two Governments, or of conditions embodied in the engagements which the project is designed to supplant.
The foregoing instruction is sent to you in anticipation that the answer to the Note Verbale presented by you will be favourable; but you will not act on that instruction until you receive further instructions, which will be given after you have communicated to me the answer to the Note Verbale.
No. 4.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, August 5th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, 6th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff says he is authorized by the Emperor to open negotiations with me on the subject of the Note Verbale.
No. 5.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, 6th, 1903.
In reference to your telegrams dated the 31st ultimo and 5th instant, you will state to Count Lamsdorff that the Imperial Government fully appreciate the friendly spirit with which the Russian Government received the proposal of the Japanese Government to enter upon negotiations with regard to an understanding between the two countries, and then present at once the project to the Russian Government in accordance with instructions contained in my telegram of the 3rd instant.
No. 6.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, August 12th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, 14th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff, being now very much occupied, could not receive me until to-day, when I handed to His Excellency the proposed project in English in accordance with your instructions. I added that the longer the conclusion of an accord is postponed the more difficult will it become, as the condition of affairs in the Far East is now getting more and more complicated. I asked him to hasten the matter as much as possible. He said he would examine the project with care.
No. 7.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, August 24th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, August 25th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff received me yesterday by special arrangement, and I asked his views, as well as the attitude of the Russian Government regarding our proposals, adding that the Japanese Government are now impatiently waiting for a reply. He said that he had studied the project seriously, but that the Emperor having been absent over a week on account of the manœuvres, he had been unable to take any steps in the matter; but he asked my opinion about transferring the negotiations to Tokio, as there were many details which would have to be referred to Admiral Alexieff. I said to him that the Japanese Government having confided the matter to me, I should prefer to proceed with it, but that I was willing to communicate his opinion to you.
He stated that he has already sent copy of our project to Port Arthur with the view of obtaining the opinion of Admiral Alexieff. After such conversation, he said the question of Japanese railway enterprise in Manchuria would be difficult, but upon all other points perhaps the Russian Government would be able to come to an understanding. I said that in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding, mutual concessions as well as a spirit of conciliation are necessary and that the Japanese Government would be prepared to give favourable consideration if any suggestions should be made by Count Lamsdorff.
No. 8. Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, August 26th, 1903.
In reference to your telegram of the 24th instant, you will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government would prefer to continue negotiations in St. Petersburg, believing that by so doing, the work will be greatly facilitated. You can add that there are no details to be considered in connection with pending negotiations which require local knowledge, and that the Japanese Government, having placed the negotiation in your hand, would dislike to make any change. You will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government are anxiously awaiting a definite reply from his Government to their proposals, and you will continue to use every endeavour to obtain from him such a reply as soon as possible.
No. 9.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, August 27th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, August 28th, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day on the subject of your telegram dated the 26th instant. He said he had audience of the Emperor last Tuesday, and was told that His Majesty desires very much the early conclusion of an entente satisfactory for both countries, and expressed his wish to conduct the negotiations at Tokio so as to expedite the matter. Then Count Lamsdorff added that the Emperor is to leave here for the country next Monday, and then for foreign countries for some time, and at the same time the Ministers concerned would be absent from St. Petersburg. Consequently, negotiations in Tokio would be much the easier and quicker way of concluding the matter. I said, referring to my conversation with Count Lamsdorff of the 23rd instant, that the proposed understanding involved mostly questions of principles and politics rather than details, and consequently that the continuation of negotiations at St. Petersburg would be proper and at the same time the quickest way to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. He repeated what he had just said and insisted upon his proposition.
Under the circumstances, I think it hardly possible to change the course now proposed by Count Lamsdorff under authority of the Emperor. I also think that negotiations at Tokio would entail many disadvantageous consequences; and definite instruction for the further course is awaited.
No. 10. Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, August 29th, 1903.
In reference to your telegram of the 27th instant, you will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government still think that negotiation will be facilitated if continued in St. Petersburg since the negotiations relate to principles and not details; and you will add that he and you having been duly authorized in the matter and the proposals of Japan having been presented to him, the Japanese Government had supposed that the seat of negotiation had been agreed to. You will accordingly urge upon Count Lamsdorff the desire of Japanese Government to continue the negotiations in St. Petersburg, and express a hope that his Government will reconsider the question. You will also say that the Japanese Government presume they are justified in assuming from the proposal to transfer negotiations to Tokio, that our proposals are in principle acceptable to the Russian Government as the basis of negotiations.
No. 11.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, August 31st, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, September 2nd, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day and explained fully the purport of your telegram of the 29th instant. The substance of his reply is as follows:
He said that the negotiations relate to principles, but principles must be decided upon examination of local and practical questions. Accordingly the Russian Government desired to transfer the discussions to Tokio on account of the necessity of consultation with Admiral Alexieff, and also to manifest a sense of deference to Japan as the proposal had been made by her, and that the acceptance of the proposal at St. Petersburg does not signify that the seat of negotiations should be at the same place. He added that the proposal to transfer the negotiations to Tokio does not necessarily mean that our proposals are acceptable to the Russian Government, as bases for negotiations could not be determined without reference to practical questions, concerning which Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff have much better knowledge than he himself.
I urged as my opinion that this being the most important question of high politics between our two countries, perhaps the Emperor had much to decide, and consequently it would be very convenient if the negotiations were conducted at St. Petersburg, and wished his serious reconsideration of the question of transfer as such reconsideration is much desired by the Japanese Government. I objected also to the suggestion of transfer on the ground that the question relates to principles as well as to the direction of international political concerns which may not be within the powers conferred upon Admiral Alexieff. If I remember rightly, I said, I understand that his authority is limited to mere questions of local administration. He said that on this question Admiral Alexieff would only be consulted and decide nothing, and added that he, Count Lamsdorff, is also desirous to settle the question as quickly as possible, and that is the reason why he suggested the transfer. The Russian Counter-Proposals are being prepared by persons having local knowledge, consequently the transfer of negotiations to Tokio would expedite the matter. Should the negotiations be conducted at St. Petersburg, he would be obliged to attend to the matter personally with me; but this autumn he has to be long absent from the city on account of his attendance upon the Emperor. In case of his journey to Vienna and Rome, he may also visit a certain foreign country and would be liable to be frequently interrupted in the negotiations. But in case of negotiations at Tokio, he could direct them by telegraph and telegrams from Tokio could always follow him wherever he might happen to be; besides, he said, as we know very well, the Russian way of conducting business here is not very expeditious. At the conclusion, he said he is to have audience of the Emperor to-day, and will explain to him the reasons why an early understanding between the two countries is desirable as mentioned by me; and he promised to repeat to His Majesty the special desire of the Japanese Government to conduct the negotiations at St. Petersburg; but he added that no change of view on the subject could be expected.
No. 12. Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, Septembre 2nd, 1903.
In reference to your telegram of the 31st ultimo, you will say to Count Lamsdorff that it being the acknowledged desire of both Powers to arrive at an understanding as soon as possible, the Japanese Government fear that discussions would be greatly protracted if the negotiations were now to be transferred to Tokio without some accepted basis for negotiations; and you will add that the Japanese Government, having presented their proposals in concrete form to the Russian Government, believe that negotiations, wherever conducted, would be greatly facilitated if the Russian Government were primarily to announce whether such proposals can in principle be accepted as the basis for negotiations. The Japanese Government do not understand that the acceptance of those proposals as such basis would exclude amendments that might be regarded as necessary. On the contrary, such acceptance would merely fix a definite point of departure, which is desirable in all negotiations and very important in the present case. You will use every endeavour to secure the desired announcement from the Russian Government.
No. 13Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
St. Petersburg, September 5th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, September 5th, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff yesterday. With the view of preventing any misunderstanding about the sense of the instruction contained in your telegram of the 2nd instant, and also with the view of impressing upon the Russian Government the feeling of importance placed by the Japanese Government on the matter, I prepared a Note Verbale which I handed to him. We then had a rather prolonged discussion on the question. The substance of his remarks is as follows:
According to his experience of 40 years in the Foreign Office, negotiations of an international character had always been conducted on the proposals of one Power together with the reply of the other, and it was not usual to accept the proposition of one Power as the sole basis of negotiations. Baron Rosen had already been commanded by the Emperor to study seriously the proposition of the Japanese Government, and at the same time to prepare and elaborate Counter-Proposals in consultation with Admiral Alexieff, and, if the Japanese Government were willing to enter into negotiation, to commence immediately the pour-parlers adopting the propositions of the Japanese Government and the Russian Counter-Proposals as the basis of negotiations. I said during the discussion that if the Russian Government were really animated by a desire to enter into a satisfactory arrangement with Japan, I should deem it highly necessary that the Russian Government should instruct their negotiators to adopt as the basis the Japanese proposals, or at least the essential principles thereof, so as to facilitate the attainment of the object of the negotiation, for I am inclined to doubt if Admiral Alexieff is disposed to enter into negotiations with Japan in a spirit of conciliation, which is of prime necessity in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. He said that when he received our project there were only two courses open for Russia to take, either to reject our proposals or to enter into negotiations on them. The Russian Government have adopted the latter course; this does not, however, signify acceptance of our project in its entirety or in principle; but having agreed to the proposition to enter into an entente, they have decided to examine the propositions and to prepare Counter-Proposals so that the two might be used as the basis of negotiations. Besides he said that in our project there are certain clauses which could not be reconciled with Russian interests, and others which require modifications; and he could not say that the Russian Government accepted our proposals even in principle as basis, but only in conjunction with their Counter-Proposals.
Having exhausted every effort for the attainment of the desire of the Japanese Government, I am now fully convinced that it will not be possible to change the course proposed by Count Lamsdorff; and I think that there is no other way for Japan but to agree to his suggestion. Count Lamsdorff is to leave here on the 10th instant for Darmstadt to attend the Emperor of Russia.
No. 14Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, September 9th, 1903.
In reference to your telegram of the 5th instant, you are hereby instructed to inform Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government consent to transfer negotiations to Tokio, and you will add that the Japanese Government trust that instructions to the Russian Minister at Tokio are of such a character as to enable him to present the Russian Counter-Proposals without delay and to proceed immediately with the negotiations.
No. 15.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, September 9th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, September 10th, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day. He said Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff have already been instructed by telegraph, by order of the Emperor, to prepare the Counter-Proposals as quickly as possible, and to commence negotiations at the earliest date, and he does not think it necessary to repeat the same instructions.
No. 16.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, September 24th, 1903.
Baron Rosen left Tokio on the 22nd instant for Port Arthur. Previously to his departure, he called on me and told me that he had been instructed under Imperial order some time ago to hold himself ready to start at once for Port Arthur, whenever necessity might arise to do so, in order to expedite the preparation of the Russian Counter-Proposals between Admiral Alexieff and himself, and that he had just received from the Admiral a request to repair to Port Arthur for personal consultation on the subject. He added that he expected to come back within about eleven days.
No. 17.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 5th, 1903.
Baron Rosen came back to Tokio on the 3rd instant. He called on me on the same day and handed to me the following as the Russian Counter-Proposals, which, he said was sanctioned by the Emperor of Russia, upon joint presentation by Admiral Alexieff and himself:—
1.Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire.
2.Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Corea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire without infringing the stipulations of Article I.
3.Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article I.
4.Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Corea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
5.Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Corea for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.
6.Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Corea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops.
7.Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
8.This agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Corea.
No. 18.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 8th, 1903.
In reference to my telegram of the 5th instant, I have begun discussion with the Russian Minister to Japan taking our proposals and the Russian Counter-Proposals as the basis and with a view to secure, if possible, the recognition by Russia of the fundamental principles laid down in our proposals.
No. 19.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 16th, 1903.
In reference to my telegram of the 8th instant, negotiations are now going on between Baron Rosen and myself regarding the following proposals, which I had presented as amendment to the Russian Counter-Proposals:—
Article II. Insert the phrase "including military assistance" between "assistance" and "to Corea." Change the word "civil" into "internal."
Article III.Insert the phrase "the development of" between "impede" and "the commercial." "Undertakings" to be changed into "activities," and "taken" into "to be taken" and "them" into "those interests."
Article IV.Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article or for the purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications.
Article VI.Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Corea-Manchuria frontier extending . . . . . . kilometres on each side, into which neutral zone neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops without the consent of the other.
Article VII.To be struck out and replaced by the following three Articles:—
VII.Engagement on the part of Russia to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Manchuria, and not to interfere with Japan's commercial freedom in Manchuria.
VIII.Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of the preceding Article.
IX.Mutual Engagement not to impede the connection of the Corean railway and the East China railway when those railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu.
Article VIIIof the Russian Counter-Proposals to be numbered Article X.
No. 20.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 22nd, 1903.
The result of discussions between Baron Rosen and my- self on our amendments to the Russian Counter-Proposals is as follows:—
Amendments to Articles II and VI accepted ad referendum, Article III accepted, and Article IV reserved for further discussion. It is in Article VII of our amendment to Article VII of the Russian Counter-Proposals that no agreement could be reached, each insisting on the impossibility of accepting the other's proposition. The contention of the Russian Minister is:—1st, that the Russian Article VII is the only compensation to Russia for the concessions to be made by her in respect of Corea; and 2nd, that admission of the Japanese amendments on this point would be contrary to the principle always insisted on by Russia that the question concerning Manchuria is one exclusively for Russia and China, admitting of no interference on the part of any third power.
Our contention is:—1st, that Japan does not ask for any concession from Russia with respect to Manchuria, her proposal being simply to have confirmed in the Agreement the principle which has been voluntarily and repeatedly declared by Russia; and 2nd, that Japan possesses in Manchuria her treaty rights and commercial interests, and she must obtain from Russia a guarantee for the security of those rights and interests as well as of the independence of Corea which would be constantly menaced by Russia's definitive occupation of Manchuria.
No. 21.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 29th, 1903.
In reference to my telegram of the 22nd instant, as the result of further discussions, the amendment on Article IV was finally accepted ad referendum. Regarding Article VI, my proposal of fixing the extent of the neutral zone at 50 kilometres on each side of the frontier was accepted ad referendum. As to Article VII, no agreement could yet be reached.
No. 22.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, October 30th, 1903.
I presented to Baron Rosen on the 30th instant the following as definite amendments of the Imperial Government to the Russian Counter-Proposals:—
1.Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Corean Empires.
2.Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give to Corea advice and assistance, including military assistance, tending to improve the administration of the Corean Empire.
3.Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the development of the commercial and industrial activities of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting those interests.
4.Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article or for the purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications.
5.Engagement on the part of Japan not to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.
6.Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Corea-Manchurian frontier extending 50 kilometres on each side, into which neutral zone neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops without the consent of the other.
7.Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interest, and recognition by Russia that Corea is outside her sphere of special interest.
8.Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests.
9.Engagement on the part of Japan not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Russia in virtue of her treaty engagements with Corea, and engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of her treaty engagements with China.
10.Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Corean railway and the East-China railway when those railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu.
11.This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between Japan and Russia respecting Corea.
No. 23.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, November 1st, 1903.
Baron Rosen called on me October 31st and stated that the definite proposals which I presented to him as amendments to the Russian proposals as reported in my telegram of the 30th October were beyond his instructions, and that he would, November 1st, telegraph the full text of the said proposals to his Government and ask for further instructions. Accordingly you are instructed to see as soon as possible the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Count Lamsdorff, and say to him that in preparing the proposals in question, the Japanese Government did not fail to take into full consideration the wishes of the Russian Government. You will inform him that in proposing a joint engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China equally with Corea, the Japanese Government were merely asking a reaffirmation of declarations already spontaneously made by Russia, and when it is considered that Russia is prepared to make such an engagement respecting Corea, the reason for excluding China is not understood. The Japanese Government are prepared to admit that the Manchurian question, so far as it does not affect their rights and interests, is purely a Russo-Chinese question; but Japan has extensive and important rights and interests in that region, and the Japanese Government think that in declaring that Manchuria is outside their sphere of special interest, they are at least entitled to ask for a correlative engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of her treaty engagements with China. You will in addition point out that the invitation of the Japanese Government, which originated the present negotiations, had in view a definition of the special interest of Japan and Russia in those regions of the Far East where the interests of the two Powers meet. The Japanese Government could not have anticipated that the Russian Government, in accepting that invitation, would wish—as might be inferred from Article VII of their Counter-Proposals—to restrict the proposed definition exclusively to the region in which Japan possesses special interests.
No. 24.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, November 3rd, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, November 3rd, 1903.
I saw the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd November. He said, as his personal opinion, that Japan is making the same demands only in different form, and that those demands are too great. I asked in what respects the Japanese Government are considered to be demanding too much, and I added that we do not ask anything more than the recognition of existing treaty rights and immunities of Japan in Manchuria. He then stated that Baron Rosen had said nothing on the subject. The only difficulty, he said, is the connection of the Corean and Manchurian railways. To my question whether there are no other difficulties, he answered that the railway question is the only difficulty, although it had been accepted ad referendum; and in conclusion I asked him to use his best influence for the satisfactory solution of the question, as the Japanese Government are fully animated by the spirit of conciliation, and I urged him to advise Count Lamsdorff in the same sense, and if possible to approach the Emperor of Russia on the question. He said that he is willing to do so, and added that Count Lamsdorff will return at the end of this week.
No. 25.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, November 13th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, November 13th, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff November 12th, and asked whether he had received a copy of the telegram which I had handed to Prince Obolensky and whether any action had been taken in the matter. He answered that he had submitted the telegram to the Emperor, and that before his departure from Darmstadt, he sent under an Imperial order instructions to Baron Rosen to continue negotiations with the Japanese Government. I asked him whether it is on the basis of our last proposal that Baron Rosen was instructed to go on negotiating. Count Lamsdorff said that Baron Rosen had been ordered by the Emperor to examine our last proposal with Admiral Alexieff and to make modification if necessary, and added that at this moment Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff must be engaged in the preparation of Counter-Proposals. I remarked to Count Lamsdorff that according to the view of Prince Obolensky, the connection of Corean and Manchurian railways is the question that divides the two Governments; but the Japanese Government having subsequently modified the article relating to the question, I cannot believe that it is the principal point on which an agreement cannot be established. Count Lamsdorff replied that he thinks for his part that it is the Manchurian question which divides the two parties, as he had said from the very beginning the Russian Government consider always that this question is a question exclusively between Russia and China, and it must be reserved to his Government to take all proper measures to safeguard their very considerable interests in Manchuria by means of an arrangement with China. I explained to him that Japan is ever ready to recognize the special and considerable interests which Russia has in Manchuria, and that she has no intention whatever of trespassing upon them, but that Japan has a perfect right to demand that the independence and territorial integrity of China shall be respected and the rights and the interests of Japan in that region shall be formally guaranteed. Count Lamsdorff answered that the objection relates to the form rather than the substance of the proposal. In Manchuria other Powers also have rights and interests, and Russia cannot enter into special arrangement with each of those Powers regarding Manchuria. I observed that should the Russian Government be in accord with Japan in principle, it is deeply to be regretted that an understanding cannot be reached, merely because of failure to find a suitable formula by which to bring the two Governments to an arrangement, and that I could not but ardently ask him to use his influence to bring about a satisfactory solution according to the principles already admitted by Russia.
No. 26.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, November 21st, 1903.
Baron Rosen informed me November 20th, that he received a telegram November 14th from Admiral Alexieff to the effect that Admiral Alexieff had already forwarded the Counter-Proposals to St. Petersburg. Baron Rosen added that he had not yet received any instructions on the subject of the Counter-Proposals. Consequently you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and after explaining to him Baron Rosen's statements as above, you will say that the Japanese Government are anxious to proceed with the negotiations with all possible expedition; and you will urge him to exert his influence to secure the early dispatch of instructions to Baron Rosen in order that the negotiations may be resumed and concluded without delay.
No. 27.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, November 22nd, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, November 23rd, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff on the 22nd November. He said that the modifications are already in the hands of the Emperor; but on account of the illness of the Empress, the former does not attend to any business affairs; hence the delay. I asked him to use his best endeavours to obtain the earliest possible Imperial order on the question. He said in reply that it will be better for me to write him a note giving the purport of instructions I have received from you; then he will immediately send it to the Emperor. At the end of the conversation I asked whether it is not possible for me to get some information about the modifications proposed by Admiral Alexieff. He seemed rather puzzled to give a direct answer; but he said that the Russian Government are ready to enter into immediate agreement with Japan regarding Corea, even making large concessions, but as to Manchuria, Russia once took possession of the country by right of conquest; nevertheless, she is willing to restore it to China, but with certain guarantees assuring security to the enormous interests which Russia has in Manchuria. While China is still insisting upon her refusal to give such guarantees, it is not possible for Russia to come to any arrangement with a third Power respecting Manchuria, as the question is exclusively between the two countries concerned. Then I said that if I accurately judge the nature of our proposition, it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to interfere with direct negotiations between the two Governments concerned, as may be seen from the first part of Article VII of our last proposition; but we only wish the independence and integrity of China, as repeatedly declared on the part of Russia, and security for our important interests in that province. This is not for the purpose of interfering with the affairs of the two Powers concerned, but only to prevent misunderstanding between Russia and Japan regarding the province where both powers have some interest; and I added that if in principle such an entente could in some form or other be arrived at perhaps even negotiations between Russia and China might be more easily carried out. He thereupon repeated his request for me to write him a note as above mentioned, and that I should add my own opinion in it, and that he would immediately send it to the Emperor. He told me that he expects to have audience on the 25th November at Skernevice and that the note could be sent to him towards this evening. I judge from the tone of Count Lamsdorff's conversation that the modifications proposed by Admiral Alexieff will not be favourable to our proposition regarding China and Manchuria.
No. 28.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, November 28th, 1903.
You report in your telegram of November 22nd that Count Lamsdorff expected to have audience of the Emperor on the 25th instant. Accordingly you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible and ask him what action has been taken regarding further instructions to Baron Rosen.
No. 29.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, November 27th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, November 28th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff told me he did not see the Emperor November 25th, on account of the sickness of the Empress. Interior inflammation of her right ear has necessitated an operation. He said that he immediately despatched to the Emperor my note mentioned in my telegram of November 22nd.
No. 30.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, December 1st, 1903.
The Japanese Government have from the first attached the highest importance to a speedy solution of the questions which form at this time the subject of negotiations between Japan and Russia. It seemed to them that in a matter of such vital moment as that which engages the attention of the Cabinets of Tokio and St. Petersburg, a quick conclusion was only second in importance to a satisfactory conclusion. Consistently with that view the Japanese Government have at all times during the progress of the negotiations made it a special point to give prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian Government. The negotiations have now been pending for no less than four months, and they have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can with certainty be predicted. In these circumstances the Japanese Government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation for which the delays in negotiations are largely responsible. You are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible and place the foregoing considerations before him in such form and manner as to make your representations as impressive as possible. You will add that the Japanese Government believe they are rendering service to the general interest in thus frankly explaining to the Russian Government the actual state of things.
No. 31.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, December 2nd, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, December 3rd, 1903.
I heard that the Russian Government are still repeatedly communicating with Admiral Alexieff.
No. 32.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, December 4th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, December 4th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff received me on the night of December 3rd. I handed him a French translation of your telegram of December 1st, together with a letter which I addressed to him expressing fully the pressing situation under which the Japanese Government are now laboring. He said that the question requires consideration still, and he is in communication with Admiral Alexieff; but the Emperor is to return December 5th, and he said that he will fully explain the urgency of the matter on the occasion of his audience on the following Tuesday. He thinks he will then be able to send instructions to Baron Rosen. To my question whether it is not possible for him to have audience at an earlier date, he said that Saturday is the fete of Crown Prince, no business is transacted on Sunday, and he will be occupied with other affairs on Monday. He promised to let me know the result of his audience next Wednedsay.
No. 33.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, December 9th, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, December 10th, 1903.
Count Lamsdorff told me December 9th that an Imperial order had been sent yesterday to Admiral Alexieff and Baron Rosen to continue the negotiations in accordance with the Counter-Proposals of Admiral Alexieff, but that the Japanese propositions have been fully considered. I asked whether he could inform me of the nature of the propositions on which Baron Rosen is authorized to continue the negotiations. He said that they will be officially communicated within two or three days through Baron Rosen to the Japanese Government.
No. 34.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, December I2th, 1903.
Baron Rosen called on me December 11th and, under instructions of his Government, officially presented to me the following Counter-Proposals of the Russian Government in reply to our definitive amendments as stated in my telegram of October 30th:—
1.Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire.
2.Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to assist Corea with advice tending to improve the civil administration.
3.Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Corea, nor the adoption of measures for the pro- tection of those interests.
4.Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding article, or for the purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders capable of creating international complications.
5.Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Corean territory for strategical purposes, and not to undertake on the Corean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.
6.Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Corea to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of which neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops.
7.Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Corean and East China Railways, when those railways shall have been extended to the Yalu.
8.Abrogation of all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Corea.
No. 35.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, December 21st, 1903.
In an interview with the Russian Minister, December 21st, I pointed out the fundamental difference in territorial compass between Japan's original proposals and Russia's new Counter-Proposals, and after fully explaining the reasons which induced the Japanese Government to believe it to be desirable in the general interest to include in the proposed understanding all regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires meet, I expressed the hope that the Russian Government would reconsider their position regarding that branch of the question. I also informed him fully respecting the amendments which Japanese Government consider it necessary to introduce into Russia's new Counter-Proposals. Accordingly, in order to remove every possibility of misunderstanding on the part of Russia respecting the attitude of the Japanese Government, you are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect:—
"The Imperial Government have examined with great care and attention the new Russian Counter-Proposals of the 11th instant. They regret to find that the Imperial Russian Government did not see their way in those proposals to give to the compass of the suggested understanding the same territorial extension as was deemed essential by Japan. The Imperial Government, in their original invitation to the Imperial Russian Government in August last, endeavoured to make it entirely clear that they desired, with a view to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding, to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires meet, and they cannot bring themselves to the conviction that a full realization of that desire can be expected if a large and important portion of those regions is wholly excluded from consideration. Accordingly, the Imperial Government feel constrained to ask the Imperial Russian Government to reconsider their position on the subject, and they hope that the Russian Government will be able to see their way to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the question. The Imperial Government also find it necessary to ask for the following amendments to the new Russian Counter-Proposals:—
"a.Article II to read: 'Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give Corea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of the Corean Empire.'
"b.Article V to read: 'Mutual engagement not to undertake on the Corean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea;' and
"c.Article VI to be suppressed.
"As the principal part of these amendments cannot be said to be in excess of the modifications which were agreed to ad referendum at Tokio, and as the Imperial Government consider those changes indispensable, it is hoped that they will receive the ready agreement of the Imperial Russian Government."
In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will say that I have spoken to Baron Rosen in a similar sense, and you will also express the desire for an early response.
No. 36.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, December 23rd, 1903.
(Telegram.)Received, December 24th, 1903.
Upon receipt of your telegraphic instructions, I saw Count Lamsdorff December 23rd at 2 p.m. He told me he had received a telegram from Baron Rosen, stating that the latter had had an interview with you, and that particulars would follow, but such particulars had not been received yet by him. When I handed him the Note Verbale, he said that he would study it together with report from Baron Rosen, and that he would do his best to send the Russian answer at the earliest possible date; but he added that he would have to communicate with Admiral Alexieff. In conclusion, I stated to him that under the present circumstances it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an entente, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.
No. 37.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, January 1st, 1903.
(Telegram.)January 1nd, 1903.
I saw Count Lamsdorff January 1st, and asked whether any action had been taken regarding our last propositions. He said they had been fully considered; and he asked me to assure you that Baron Rosen will soon be instructed to proceed with the negotiations in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and he added that he saw no reason why we could not arrive at an entente.
No. 38.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 7th, 1904.
Baron Rosen handed to me January 6th the following reply of the Russian Government to our last propositions of December 21st last:—
"Having no objection to the amendments to Article II of the Russian Counter-Proposals as proposed by the Imperial Japanese Government, the Imperial Government considers it necessary:
"1.To maintain the original wording of Article V which had already been agreed to by the Imperial Japanese Government, that is to say, 'mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Corea for strategical purposes, not to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.'
"2.To maintain Article VI concerning a neutral zone (this for the very purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government has likewise in view, that is to say, to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings in the future; a similar zone, for example, exists between the Russian and British possessions in central Asia).
"In case the above conditions are agreed to, the Imperial Government would be prepared to include in the projected agreement an Article of the following tenor:
"Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being outside her sphere of interests, whilst Russia, within the limits of that province, will not impede Japan, nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements."
No. 38.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 13th, 1904.
You are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect which, you will say, is intended to confirm to him the views of the Imperial Government communicated by me to Baron Rosen on the 13th January:—
The Imperial Government, in order to arrive at a pacific solution of the pending questions, and to firmly establish the basis of good relation between Japan and Russia, and in addition with a view to protect the rights and interests of Japan, have given most careful and serious consideration to the reply of the Imperial Russian Government which was delivered by His Excellency Baron Rosen on the 6th instant. They have finally come to the conclusion that the following modifications are necessary, i.e:—
1.Suppression of the first clause of Article V of the Russian Counter-Proposals (presented to the Japanese Government through Baron Rosen, December nth) that is to say, "not to use any part of Corean territory for strategical purposes."
2.Suppression of the whole Article (VI) concerning establishment of a neutral zone.
3.The Russian proposal concerning Manchuria to be agreed to with the following modifications:
a. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest and an engagement on the part of Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.
b.Russia within the limits of Manchuria will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under the existing treaties with China.
c.Recognition by Russia of Corea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest.
4.Addition of an Article to the following effect: Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests.
The grounds for these amendments having been frequently and fully explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not think it necessary to repeat the explanations. It is sufficient here to express their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Imperial Russian Government.
It should be further remarked that the suppression of the clause excluding the establishment of settlements in Manchuria is desired because it conflicts with stipulations of the new Commercial Treaty between Japan and China. In this respect, however, Japan will be satisfied if she receives equal treatment with another Power which has already acquired similar rights in regard to settlements in Manchuria. The statement in the Russian reply that the Japanese Government have agreed to the original wording of Article V of the Russian Counter-Proposals is erroneous, no such agreement ever having been expressed by the Imperial Government.
The above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is expected that they will be received with the same spirit at the hands of the Imperial Russian Government; and the Imperial Government further hope for an early reply from the Imperial Russian Government, since further delay in the solution of the question will be extremely disadvantageous to the two countries.
No. 40.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 23rd, 1904.
You are instructed to sound Count Lamsdorff respecting the probable nature of Russia's reply to our last note and when the reply will be delivered.
No. 41.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, January 25th, 1904.
(Telegram.)Received, January 25th, 1904.
In reference to your telegram of 23 rd instant, I saw Count Lamsdorff January 24th and asked his views in regard to our last proposals and also how soon the Russian answer could be given. He was not inclined to enter into details, but said that there are certain points to which he could not agree. He expects to lay his views before the Emperor next Tuesday, January 26th, and he hopes to be able to send an answer before long.
M. de Hartwig, whom I saw this afternoon, told me that the Department of Foreign Affairs is yet in communication with Admiral Alexieff, and he cannot say how soon an answer can be sent to Japan.
No. 42.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 26th, 1904.
As the situation admits of no indefinite delay in the settlement of the questions involved, you will seek an interview with Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him as an instruction from your Government that in the opinion of the Imperial Government a further prolongation of the present state of things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it is their earnest hope that they will be honoured with an early reply, and that they wish to know at what time they may expect to receive the reply.
No. 43.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, January 26th, 1904.
(Telegram.)Received, January 27th, 1904.
In reference to your telegram of the 26th instant, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Ministers of War, Marine and other authorities concerned are to meet on the 28th January for the consideration of the question, and that their decision will be submitted to the Emperor for sanction, and he remarked that it had been the intention of Admiral Alexieff to come here; but that that idea was now abandoned, and his opinion will soon be received by telegraph. Under these circumstances, he says, he is unable to give the exact date when the reply will be given; but he can say it will not be much delayed. He said that he had received reports from official sources to the effect that Japan had sent a considerable number of troops, munitions, and war materials to Corea, and asked me whether I could give any explanation regarding it. I simply answered that I knew nothing of such facts, and regretted not being able to give him any explanation. He added that such action on the part of Japan causes a very bad impression, while the two Governments are engaged seriously in such important negotiations. Telegraph me for my information whether the reports are true, and if so, the details.
No. 44.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 28th, 1904.
In reference to your telegram of 26th instant, you will see Count Lamsdorff at an early opportunity and say to him that you have been authorized to deny positively the statement that Japan has sent to Corea a considerable number of troops, munitions, and war materials. As a matter of fact, no troops have recently been sent to Corea nor any ammunitions have been sent beyond the amount required for the ordinary use of the Japanese troops stationed in Corea. You will then ask him whether the report that Russian troops are being concentrated on the Corean frontier is true, and if so, that such military movement is to be highly deprecated. Finally, you will ask him whether he is not able to acquaint you, for your own information, with the nature of the decision taken at the proposed conference of the Ministers on the 28th January, and whether he can indicate the approximate date on which the Russian reply is to be given.
No. 45.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, January 28th, 1904.
(Telegram.)Received, January 29th, 1904.
Count Lamsdorff is satisfied with the explanation contained in your telegram of to-day. As to the question regarding the concentration of Russian troops near the Yalu, he does not believe it to be true, and he remarked that such newspaper reports are very regrettable. I tried to obtain information about the decision of to-day's meeting. He said that it is not possible for him to say anything concerning it as it will not be sent to the Emperor, and that until the respective Ministers have been received by the Emperor respecting the question, nothing can be said definitely. He stated that the Grand Duke Alexieff and the Minister of Marine are to be received in audience next Monday, and the Minister of War and himself on Tuesday; and he thinks an answer will be sent to Admiral Alexieff on the latter day. I pointed out the urgent necessity to accelerate the despatch of an answer as much as possible, because further prolongation of the present condition is not only undesirable but rather dangerous. I added that all the while the world is loud with rumours and that I hoped he would take special steps so as to have an answer sent at an earlier date than mentioned. He replied that he knows the existing condition of things very well, but that the dates of audience being fixed as above mentioned, it is not now possible to change them; and he repeated that he will do his best to send the reply next Tuesday.
No. 46.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, January 30th, 1904.
In reference to your telegram of January 28th, you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him substantially in the following sense:—
"Having reported to your Government that the Russian Government would probably give a reply on next Tuesday you have been instructed to say to Count Lamsdorff that being fully convinced of the serious disadvantage to the two Powers concerned of the further prolongation of the present situation, the Imperial Government hoped that they might be able to receive the reply of the Russian Government earlier than the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff. As it, however, appears that the receipt of the reply at an earlier date is not possible, the Imperial Government wish to know whether they will be honoured with the reply at the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff, namely, next Tuesday, or if it is not possible, what will be the exact date on which the reply is to be given."
If Count Lamsdorff specifies the day on which the reply is to be given, you will see him on that day and ask him to acquaint you with the exact nature of the reply.
No. 47.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
Petersburg, February 1st, 1904.
(Telegram.)Received, February 1st, 1904.
Regarding your telegram of the 30th January, I saw Count Lamsdorff in the evening January 31st. He says he appreciates fully the gravity of the present situation, and is certainly desirous to send an answer as quickly as possible; but the question is a very serious one, and is not to be lightly dealt with. In addition, the opinions of the Ministers concerned and Admiral Alexieff had to be brought into harmony; hence the natural delay. As to the date of sending an answer, he says, it is not possible for him to give the exact date as it entirely depends upon the decision of the Emperor, though he will not fail to use his efforts to hurry the matter.
No. 48.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, February 5th, 1904.2.15 p.m.
Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending negotiations and to take such independent action as they may deem necessary to defend their menaced position and to protect their rights and interests. Accordingly you are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff, immediately upon receipt of this telegram, a signed note to the following effect:—
"The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the following communications:—
"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Corea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Corea insecure.
"The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government by means of inadmissible amendments of Japan's proposals respecting Corea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the Peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria which is seriously menaced by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.
"In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the depending negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the Extreme East, the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.
"In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests.
"The Undersigned, etc., etc."
No. 49.Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino
(Telegram.)Tokio, February 5th, 1904.2.15 p.m.
You are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff a signed note to the following effect simultaneously with the note mentioned in my previous telegram:—
"The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to acquaint His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias that the Imperial Government of Japan, having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation with a view to the removal from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government of every cause for future complications, and finding that their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the Extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due, have resolved to sever their diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian Government which for the reason named have ceased to possess any value.
"In further fulfilment of the command of his Government, the Undersigned has also the honour to announce to His Excellency Count Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St. Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial Legation on . . . . . . date.
"The Undersigned, etc., etc."
No. 50.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, February 5th, 1904.5.05 a.m.
(Telegram.)Received, February 5th, 1904.5.15 p.m.
In compliance with the request of Count Lamsdorff, I went to see him at 8 p.m. February 4th. He told me that the substance of the Russian answer had been just sent to Admiral Alexieff, to be transmitted to Baron Rosen. He added that Admiral Alexieff may happen to introduce some changes so as to meet local circumstances; but in all probability there will be no such changes. He then stated as his own opinion that Russia desires the principle of independence and integrity of Corea and also, of necessity, the free passage of the Corean Straits. Though Russia is willing to make every possible concession, she does not desire to see Corea utilized for strategic purposes against Russia, and believes it useful for the consolidation of good relations with Japan to establish by common accord a buffer region between confines of direct influence and action of the two countries in the Far East. The above is expressed entirely as his personal opinion, and I cannot say whether the same is the substance of the above-mentioned answer, though it seems to be very probable.
No. 51.Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura
Petersburg, February 6th, 1904.5.57p.m.
(Telegram.)Received, February 7th, 1904.5.45 a.m.
In reference to your two telegrams of yesterday's date, I presented to Count Lamsdorff to-day at 4 p.m. the notes as instructed. I shall withdraw from here with my staff and students on the 10th instant.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
| July | 1903 |
| 28. | Opening of diplomatic negotiations between Russia and Japan regarding Korea and Manchuria. |
| February | 1904 |
| 6. | Diplomatic relations broken off. |
| 7. | Japan seized Masanpho, Korea, capturing there the Russian torpedo boat Rasboynik. |
| 8. | Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur, disabling the battleships Czarevitch and Retvizan and the cruiser Pallada, which were beached. The cruisers Novik, Askold, Diana, and Poltava were damaged below the water line but afterwards repaired, as were the battleships. |
| 9. | Attack on Port Arthur by Japanese warships; the Russian fleet was driven into the harbor, the battleship Poltava and cruisers Novik, Askold, and Diana being injured. |
| In Chemulpo harbor, Korea, a Japanese squadron sunk the Russian cruiser Variag, killing and wounding 53 of her crew. The torpedo gunboat Korietz was blown up at the same time by the Russians. | |
| 10. | Japan formally declares war. |
| 11. | United States declares neutrality. |
| Japanese merchantman sunk by Vladivostock fleet. | |
| 12. | Russian minister leaves Seoul guarded by Japanese troops. |
| China proclaims her neutrality. | |
| 13. | Russian torpedo transport Yenisei blown up by accidental contact with mines in Talien Bay; officers and crew, numbering 95, were lost. |
| 14. | Torpedo attack on Port Arthur fleet, in which two Russian ships were damaged. Russian cruiser Boyarin sunk by mines and her officers and crew, numbering 197, lost. |
| 16. | Japanese fleet bombarded Port Arthur. |
| Japan landing troops at Wonsan and Chemulpo, Korea. | |
| Russian army concentrating at Harbin. | |
| Viceroy Alexieff leaves Port Arthur. | |
| 17. | Admiral Makaroff supersedes Admiral Starck. |
| Fifty million dollar loan taken up in Japan. | |
| 19. | Twenty-five hundred Japanese troops landed at Plaksin Bay, East Korea; movement toward the west checked by snows in the mountains later. |
| 20. | Japanese fleet bombarded Port Arthur. |
| Cossacks cross the Yalu in Corea. | |
| Russian account of diplomatic negotiations published. | |
| 21. | Kuropatkin appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Manchuria. |
| 22. | Count Lamsdorff issues an explanatory circular to the Powers, charging Japan with violating international law in regard to Corea. |
| 23. | Japanese-Corean treaty signed at Seoul, Japan guaranteeing "the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean empire." |
| 24. | First Japanese attempt to block Port Arthur channel by sending in four old steamers loaded with stone; the plan failed. |
| Thirty thousand Japanese troops deployed between Seoul and Ping-Yang. | |
| 25. | Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur repulsed. |
| Viceroy Alexieff, in proclamation, warns Chinese to aid Russia or be exterminated as robbers. | |
| Russians cut Anju-Ping-Yang telegraph lines. |
| 26. | First land action of the war. Troops in touch at Ping-Yang, Corea. |
| 29. | Japan seizes one of the Elliot Islands, belonging to China, for a naval base. |
| 2. | Both Japan and Russia issue statements, the former saying Russia did not want peace, the latter that she could not safely evacuate Manchuria at the time pledged. |
| 4. | More than 20,000 Japanese troops landed at Chinampo, Corea. |
| Japan gives Russia the lie relating to the latter's charge of Japanese violation of international law in Corea. | |
| 6. | Japanese warships shelled Vladivostock at long range, doing little damage; Russian forts did not reply. |
| 7. | China grants exequaturs for American consuls at Moukden and Antung. |
| 8. | Vladivostock again bombarded without effect. |
| 9. | Admiral Makaroff made a sortie from Port Arthur late at night with six torpedo boats, one of which was lost. The Japanese also lost a torpedo boat. |
| 12. | Kuropatkin leaves St. Petersburg for the front. |
| 16. | Russian torpedo boat Skorri sunk by mines at Port Arthur. |
| 22. | Japanese fleet again bombarded Port Arthur. Second attempt to block the channel fails. |
| 23. | Japanese and Russians in touch at Pakchen, Korea. |
| 27. | Russian torpedo boat Stilni disabled by Japanese shell at Port Arthur; 7 killed, 12 wounded. |
| Kuropatkin arrives at Moukden. | |
| 31. | State of siege declared in the Port Arthur district. |
| 3. | Russians abandon Wiju, Korea, and retire across the Yalu into Manchuria. |
| 4. | Japanese occupy Wiju. |
| 7. | Japanese supply ships enter the Yalu. |
| 8-9. | Skirmishing along the Yalu. |
| 12. | Japanese naval vessels strew mines outside of Port Arthur. |
| 13. | Russian battleship Petropavlovsk sunk by Japanese mine off Port Arthur. Admiral Makaroff with officers and crew to the number of 674 being drowned. |
| Russian battleship Pallada seriously damaged by Japanese mine at same time and place. | |
| Russian torpedo boat Besztrashni sunk by fire of Japanese the same day. | |
| 14. | The battleship Pobieda, while manœuvring off Port Arthur, struck a mine and was badly damaged. |
| 15. | Kasuga and Nisshin bombard Port Arthur by high-angle fire from Pigeon Bay. |
| 22. | Russian launch blown up while laying mines at Port Arthur; 21 men lost. |
| 23. | Japanese advanced guard crosses the Yalu. |
| 25. | Russian Vladivostock squadron entered the harbor of Wonsan, Korea, and sunk a Japanese merchant steamer. |
| 27. | The Japanese transport Kinshiu Maru was sunk by the Russian Vladivostock squadron in the Sea of Japan; 78 drowned; 210 taken prisoners. |
| 27. | Third Japanese attempt to block the channel at Port Arthur fails. |
| Fighting on the Yalu begins. |
29-30 and May 1.Battle of the Yalu. The first Japanese Army, under Kuroki, forces the crossing of the Yalu near Wiju, defeats Russians under Sassulitch at Kuliencheng and Hamatan, with a loss of about 4,000 men on both sides, and captures 28 guns.
|
| 4. | In a fourth desperate attempt the Japanese sunk five merchant ships at the entrance to the inner harbor of Port Arthur, but did not seal the Port. |
| Second Japanese Army sails from Chinampo. | |
| Admiral Hosoya with first fleet of transports appears off Pitsewo, in Liao-Tung Peninsula. | |
| 6. | Japanese army under Oku began landing at Pitsewo. |
| 7. | Japanese army cut the railroad and telegraphic communications with Port Arthur at Polandien. |
| 10. | Cossacks unsuccessfully attack Anju. |
| 12. | The Russians destroyed deep-water piers at Dalny. |
| Japanese bombard Talien. | |
| Japanese torpedo boat No. 48 blown up while removing Russian mines from Kerr Bay; seven of crew killed, seven wounded. | |
| Japanese six per cent sterling loan of $50,000,000 issued in London and New York at 9312. | |
| 13. | Russian five per cent external loan of $150,000,000 issued by Banque de Paris group. |
| 14. | Japanese cruiser Miyako blown up while removing mines in Kerr Bay; 8 of crew killed. |
| 15. | Japanese battleship Hatsuse sunk by striking submerged Russian mine outside Port Arthur, and 480 officers and men killed Battleship Yashima also was sunk by a Russian mine. Japanese cruiser Yoshino rammed and sunk by sister ship, Kasuga, off Port Arthur, and 232 officers and men drowned. |
| 16. | Japanese Second Army moves on Kin-Chow. |
| 17. | Japanese torpedo boat destroyer Skalasuki sunk off Port Arthur. Gunboat Oshima sunk in collision while cooperating with Japanese army. |
| 19. | Japanese Third Army lands at Takushan. |
| 20. | Russian cruiser Bogatyr ran on the rocks near Vladivostock; afterwards pulled off and docked. |
| 24. | Japanese bombard Port Arthur. |
| 26. | Kin-Chow captured by Japanese, and Russians driven from a strong position at Nanshan in all day battle; Japanese lost 4,304 killed and wounded; Russians reported total casualties of 730. |
| 30. | Japanese occupied Dalny, securing much valuable property; docks blocked by sunken ships. |
| Japanese defeat mixed Russian force at Lichaton, nine miles north of Polondien, with losses of 73; Russian loss unknown. |
| 3. | Russian diversion in favor of Port Arthur; 20,000 troops moving south from Kai-Chow under command of Stalkelberg. |
| 4. | Russian gunboat sunk while removing mines from Port Arthur roadstead. |
| 7. | Russians driven from Samaltsa and Sin- Yen after hotly contested battles. |
| 11. | Japanese blockade New Chawng. |
| 14. | The Russian destroyer flotilla makes a sortie from Port Arthur, but is driven back by Togo. |
| 14, | 15, 16.Battle of Vafangow (Telisse) results in decisive victory for Japanese. Total Russian casualties 3,426; Japanese 1,193. |
| Russians lose 16 guns and retire on Kaiping. | |
| 15. | Vladivostock squadron sinks two Japanese transports, the Hitachi and Izuni, and disables the Sado, in Sea of Japan. |
| 16. | Vladivostock squadron captures the Allanton, bound from Muroran to Singapore. |
| 18, | 25.Generals Kuroki and Oku advancing to form juncture of armies for joint attack on Russian main army. Constant skirmishes mark movement. |
| 23. | Russian fleet made sortie from Port Arthur, and after declining battle with Togo's fleet, was attacked in outer harbor by Japanese torpedo boats. Togo's report that one battleship was sunk, and one, together with large cruiser, damaged, was not borne out by later news. |
| Kuropatkin takes command of the Russian army in person. | |
| 26. | The two armies face to face, Russians holding the line Kai-Chow, Tashichiao, Liao-Yang. Japanese south of Kai-Chow, Lienshan-kuan, Sa matse. |
| Japanese approach Port Arthur from the land side, and capture Hsitaushan and Kenshan. | |
| Japanese captured Russian positions at Gum-San-Shan, ten miles northeast of Port Arthur. | |
| 27. | General Kuroki's army captured Fenshui, Motien, and Dalin passes, giving them access to the valley of the Liao. |
| 28. | Japanese Sixth Division lands at Kerr Bay. |
| 30. | Vladivostock squadron bombards Wonsan Korea. |
| 1. | Vladivostock squadron eludes Admiral Kammura near Tsu Shima. |
| 3. | Russians defeated in battle at Langtse Pass, west of Motien Pass, with loss of 210. |
| 4. | Japanese captured Miao-Tsui Fort, with eight guns, four miles northeast of Port Arthur. |
| General Fock made sortie from Port Arthur, driving back the Japanese line west of the town. | |
| Russian attack on Japanese in Motien Pass repulsed, with loss of 200 men; Japanese loss 60. | |
| 5. | Japanese gunboat Kaimon sunk by mine outside Talien Bay; 22 of crew lost. |
| 4-6. | The St. Petersburg and Smolensk, cruisers of the Russian volunteer fleet, pass the Bosphorus under the commercial flag. |
| 5-7. | Sortie from Port Arthur reported to have recaptured positions on northeast with heavy loss to Japanese. |
| 6. | Marshal Oyama, commander-in-chief, leaves Tokio for the front. |
| 9. | Japanese, under Oku, capture Kai-Chow, after three days' fighting. |
| 11. | British steamships Menelaus and Crewe Hall stopped south of Jiddah by Russian volunteer cruiser St. Petersburg. |
| 13. | Japanese occupy Yin Kow, and move towards New Chwang; Nodzu's army occupied Simuchen, 20 miles east of Hai-Cheng. |
| British steamer Malacca stopped by St. Petersburg in Red Sea and taken back to Suez. | |
| 14. | Announcement that the Baltic fleet will sail for the Far East. |
| 15. | Steamship Priz Heinrich stopped by Smolensk and mails seized. |
| 16. | British steamship Hipsang sunk by Russian destroyer in Gulf of Pechili. |
| 17. | Attack by General Count Keller on the Motien position fails. |
| 18. | Germany protests against the Russian seizure of mails from the Heinrich. |
| Japanese cruiser Haiyen sunk by mine in Pigeon Bay; 250 drowned. | |
| 19. | Steamship Scandia stopped in Red Sea and taken back to Suez. |
| Preliminary Japanese attack on Liao-Yang repulsed. | |
| 20. | Vladivostock squadron passes Tsugaru Straits into the Pacific, pursued by Japanese torpedo flotilla. |
| British ambassador in St. Petersburg makes formal protest against the seizure of the Malacca, and requests her immediate release. | |
| 21. | Russia says she will release the Malacca if wrongfully seized. |
| 24. | Order issued recalling the Russian volunteer cruisers Smolensk and St. Petersburg, their war status being questioned. |
| Russians begin evacuation of New Chwang. | |
| Japanese pushing Russians out of their positions south of Liao-Yang. | |
| British steamer Knight Commander sunk by Vladivostock squadron off Idzu. | |
| British steamer Formosa seized in the Red Sea and taken back to Suez. | |
| Japanese torpedo three Russian destroyers outside Port Arthur. | |
| 27. | Japanese, under General Oku, after severe fighting, drive the Russians back from their positions at Tashichiao. |
| Japanese occupy New Chwang. | |
| 26- | 30.Japanese capture Wolf Hill at Port Arthur after severe fighting. General Stoessel retreats towards Port Arthur. |
| 27. | Steamer Malacca released at Algiers. |
| 28. | M. von Plehve, Russian minister of the interior, assassinated by a bomb at St. Petersburg. |
| 31. | Japanese advance all along the line. Russians driven in on Hai-Cheng and other positions south of Liao-Yang. |
| 1. | Sortie of torpedo boats from Port Arthur. |
| 2. | Hai-Cheng evacuated by the Russians. |
| 3. | Japanese occupy Hai-Cheng. |
| 5. | Sea and land attack on Port Arthur, Green and Christ Hills, north and northeast of the city, taken. |
| 7. | Japanese land troops in Louisa Bay, west of Port Arthur. |
| 10. | Sortie by the Port Arthur fleet. Admiral Togo attacks and disperses ships, seriously damaging five battleships. Admiral Witoft killed. Russian vessels take refuge in the neutral ports—the Czarevitch at Tsingtay, the Askold and Grozsovoi at Shanghai, the Diana at Szigon, and the Ryeshitelni at Che Foo—but the majority are driven back into Port Arthur. |
| 11. | A Russian destroyer stranded twenty miles east of Wei-Hai-Wei. |
| Lord Lansdowne makes a statement in the House of Lords with regard to contraband. | |
| 12. | Japanese violate Chinese neutrality by entering the harbor of Che Foo and cutting out the Russian destroyer Ryeshitelni. |
| Son born to the czar. | |
| 12. | Admiral Rojestvensky assumes command of the Baltic fleet. |
| 14. | Vladivostock fleet met forty miles northeast of Tsu Islands and defeated by the Japanese fleet under Kamimura. The Rurik sunk, and the Rossia and Gromoboi escaped badly damaged. The captain and all of the superior officers of the Rurik perished. The Japanese rescued 601 of the crew, of whom 177 were wounded. |
| Russia protests to China against the seizure of the Ryeshitelni by the Japanese. China demanded the restoration of the vessel. | |
| 15. | Japanese attack Ulgolvala Mountain, near Louisa Bay, but are repulsed with great loss. |
| 16. | General Nogi demands the surrender of Port Arthur, offering safe conduct for non-combatants. |
| Russian fleet attempts another sortie from Port Arthur. | |
| 17. | General Stoessel refuses to surrender Port Arthur or to accept safe conduct for non-combatants. |
| American and British ambassadors protest against Russia's ruling that food is contraband of war. | |
| 18. | Japan refuses to give up the Ryeshitelni. |
| Attack on Port Arthur renewed. | |
| Russian gunboat Otvajni sunk by mine off Liao-to-shan. | |
| Japan protests against prolonged stay of Russian ships Askold and Grozsovoi at Shanghai. |
| 19. | First general attack on Port Arthur begun; siege mortars in operation. |
| 20. | Japan issues a statement in defence of her cutting out of the Ryeshitelni. |
| Russian cruiser Novik, which escaped from Port Arthur, August 10, caught off Korsakovsk, Sakhalin, and driven ashore. | |
| Riglung trenches at Port Arthur captured by Japanese and retaken by Russians. | |
| 21. | Japanese driven out of East Keekwan Fort, Port Arthur, by Russian sortie. |
| 22. | East and West Panlungshon forts, Port Arthur, taken by Japanese. |
| Russian battleship Sevastopol damaged by a mine. | |
| Left flank of Kuroki's army closes in on Lao-Yan. | |
| 23. | Japanese make desperate assaults on Wnatai and the north fort east of Keekwan Mountain, Port Arthur, but are driven back. |
| 24. | Early morning assault on the Keekwan forts repulsed by the Russians with great slaughter. Japanese losses in the six days of the first general assault on Port Arthur exceed 14,000 men. The operation as a whole was a failure, though the Japanese succeeded in holding on to one point of value—Banjusan Fort. |
| Russian cruisers Askold and Grozsovoi ordered dismantled by the czar. | |
| 25. | Japanese army begins its general advance on Liao-Yang. |
| 26. | Japanese centre takes Kung-Chang, southeast of Liao-Yang, and the left wing attacks Anshanshan. |
| Japanese drive Russians out of positions on Pigeon Bay, west of Port Arthur. | |
| 28. | Japanese capture parade ground northwest of Port Arthur. |
| Kuroki advances right wing of the Japanese army and gets in touch with centre and left before Liao-Yang. | |
| 29- | 30.Japanese bombard Russian positions at Liao-Yang and make infantry attacks, but make no material impression on the defence. |
| 31. | Second and Third Japanese Armies resume their attack and make progress in the direction of Hsin-li-tun and Shou-Shan. |
| 1. | Russians driven out of their works at these points, and Russian right and centre fall back towards river line. First Army carries Mankayama Hill. |
| 2-3. | Oku's and Nodzu's armies continue their attacks. |
| 3. | Kuropatkin orders a general retreat. |
| Japanese torpedo boat destroyer Hayatori sunk by mine off Port Arthur. |
| 4. | Russian rearguard, after delaying Japanese for two days, finally evacuates Liao-Yang. |
| The Japanese enter Liao-Yang at 3 a.m. Russia loses 14,000 and Japan 17,500 men in this movement. | |
| 4-5. | Russian army in retreat fights rearguard actions. Kuroki occupies Yental coal mines. |
| 6. | British cruiser Forte notifies the St. Petersburg and Smolensk of the czar's orders to desist from interfering with neutral shipping. |
| 7. | Kuropatkin arrives at Moukden. |
| 13. | Vladivostock Prize Court orders release of British steamer Calchas, but confiscates its cargo of flour and cotton. |
| 16. | Russia recognizes distinction between absolute and conditional contrabrand. |
| 18. | Japanese armored gunboat Hei-yen strikes a mine and sinks. |
| 19- | 20.Capture of Fort Kuropatkin and the Sueiszeying redoubts at Port Arthur. |
| 20. | Capture of Namaokayana. |
| 21. | Japanese obtain a footing on 203-Metre Hill but are subsequently obliged to retire. |
| 25. | Russian imperial rescript appointing General Gripenberg to command Second Manchurian Army. |
| 26. | Railway around Lake Baikal opened. |
| 29. | Japan introduces new military system, making men who have passed into the territorial army eligible for foreign service for 1712 years. |
Battle of the Shakhe River
| 2. | Kuropatkin issues an order of the day, declaring the Manchurian Army to be strong enough to begin a forward movement. |
| 9. | Russians cross the Taitse and attack the Japanese First Army. |
| 10- | 11.Severe fighting at Penshui. |
| 12, | 13, 14.Heavy fighting all along the line. Russians driven back over the Shakhe. Russian loss exceeding 33,000 and the Japanese nearly 16,000. |
| 15. | Baltic fleet sails from Libau. |
| 16. | Japanese capture Hachimakeyama (near Ehrlungshan), Port Arthur. |
| 17. | Baltic fleet anchors off the Danish coast. |
| 20. | Baltic fleet proceeds to the North Sea. |
| 21- | 22.Baltic fleet, at midnight, fires on Hull fishing fleet. One vessel sunk, two fishermen killed. |
| 22. | The Supreme Prize Court in St. Petersburg releases the Allanton. |
| 24. | Urgent representations addressed by the British to the Russian Government in regard to North Sea incident. Preliminary orders for mutual support and cooperation sent to the British Mediterranean, Channel and home fleets. |
| 25. | The czar sends a message to King Edward expressing his extreme regret. |
| 26. | Baltic fleet arrives at Vigo. |
| Japanese seize trenches on the Ehrlungshan glacis, Port Arthur. | |
| 28. | Premier Balfour at Southampton announces that an International Commission of Inquiry is to be constituted, in accordance with the provisions of The Hague Convention, to inquire into the North Sea affair. |
| Four Russian officers of the Baltic fleet left behind at Vigo. | |
| 30. | Baltic fleet begins to arrive at Tangier. |
| 31. | Japanese gain possession of the glacis crests of Ehrlungshan, Sungshushan, and the North Fort of East Keekwanshan, at Port Arthur. |
| 2. | Sir Charles Hardinge submits the British proposals for the constitution of the North Sea Commission of Inquiry. |
| 4. | British Foreign Office issues statement on contraband. |
| 5. | Russia accepts the draft proposals of Great Britain, but difficulties are subsequently raised. |
| Baltic fleet leaves Tangier. | |
| General Linevitch appointed to command First and General Kaulbars appointed to command Third Manchurian Army. | |
| 6. | Japanese gunboat Atago wrecked off Port Arthur. |
| 10. | Admiral Alexieff arrives in St. Petersburg. |
| Admiral Folkersam's division of the Baltic fleet at Suda Bay. | |
| 12. | Admiral Rojestvensky at Dakar. |
| 14. | Japanese six per cent sterling loan (second series) for $50,000,000 issued in London and New York at 9012. |
| 15. | Board of Trade inquiry on North Sea incident opened at Hull. |
| 16. | Russian destroyer Raxtoropni blown up by her commander at Che Foo. |
| 17. | Supplementary division of the Baltic fleet leaves Libau. |
| 24. | Admiral Folkersam's first division of the Baltic fleet arrives at Port Said. |
| 25. | Anglo-Russian Convention, agreeing to submit the North Sea incident to an International Commission of inquiry, signed in St. Petersburg. |
| Attention drawn to the voyage of the torpedo boat Caroline from the Thames to Libau. | |
| 26. | Confiscation of the Cheltenham confirmed in St. Petersburg. |
| Rojestvensky at Baboon (French Congo). | |
| 27. | Fölkersam's divisions leave Suez. |
| 28. | Letter published from Lord Lansdowne to the Chamber of Shipping, setting forth the view of the Foreign Office as to the supply of British coal to the Russian fleet. British colliers for Russian fleet subject to confiscation. |
| 26. | Capture of 203-Metre Hill. Russians lose 3,000 men, Japanese possible 12,000. |
| Japanese cruiser Sai Yen sunk by mine off Port Arthur. |
| 2. | Folkersam's division passes Perim. |
| Crews of Russian warships give trouble at Shanghai. | |
| 3. | Supreme Prize Court at St. Petersburg reverses decision of Vladivostock tribunal as to Thea (sinking declared not justified) and Arabia (cargo of flour now declared not to be contraband). |
| Guns of Japanese naval brigade open fire on Russian ships in Port Arthur. | |
| 5. | The Russian naval headquarters staff in St. Petersburg admits that crusier Aurora was struck by Russian shells on night of October 21. |
| Fölkersam's division coaling at the Musha Islands. | |
| 6. | Japanese occupy Akasayama, Port Arthur. |
| Rojestvensky at Great Fish Bay. | |
| 11. | Rojestvensky at Angra Pequena. |
| 12. | Cruiser Takasago sunk by mine off Port Arthur. |
| 12- | 15.Torpedo attacks on the Sevastopol in outer harbor of Port Arthur. |
| 18. | Tungkeekwanshan Fort taken. |
| 19. | Rojestvensky passes Cape Town. |
| Japanese seize the British steamer Nigretia bound for Vladivostock. | |
| 22. | Japanese occupy Hon-san-yang-tau, near Pigeon Bay. |
| Japanese squadron reported off Singapore. | |
| North Sea Commission of Inquiry meets in Paris and adjourns to January 9. | |
| 22- | 25.Japanese dislodge several Russian outposts at Port Arthur. |
| 24. | Admiral Togo reduces the blockading squadron. |
| 28. | Capture of Ehrlungshan. |
| 31. | Capture Sungshooshan. |
Surrender of Port Arthur
| 1. | General Stoessel proposes and General Nogi accepts surrender of Port Arthur. |
| Four Russian destroyers escape to Che-Foo. | |
| Rojestvensky arrives at Ile Sainte Marie, off Madagascar. | |
| 2. | Port Arthur capitulation agreement signed. |
| 3. | Flökersam's division of the Baltic fleet arrives at Passandava Bay, Madagascar. |
| 4. | Itszshan and other forts delivered to Japanese as guarantee of capitulation. |
| 5. | Meeting of Nogi and Stoessel. |
| Official report by General Nogi places the surrendered garrison at 32,207 prisoners and over 15,000 sick and wounded. | |
| 6. | Prisoners march out of Port Arthur. |
| 8. | Supplementary division of Baltic fleet leaves Suda Bay. |
| 9. | International Commission of Inquiry into North Sea incident resumes its sittings. |
| 10. | Supplementary squadron of Baltic fleet (Admiral Botrovosky) at Port Said. |
| 11- | 12.General Mishchenko makes a raid to the south from the Moukden front; attacks old New Chwang and cuts railroad line, but is forced to retire. |
| 12. | $78,000,000 of a Russian 412 per cent loan of $125,000,000 issued in Berlin. Remainder was to be issued later. |
| General Nogi announces capture of 546 guns and 82,670 rounds of gun ammunition at Port Arthur. | |
| 13. | Baltic fleet at Diego Suarez |
| Admiral Botrovsky's squadron leaves Suez. | |
| Russian circular note presented to Powers, protesting against alleged infractions of Chinese neutrality. | |
| 18. | Admiral Botrovsky's squadron at Jibuti. |
| 19. | First public sitting of Commission of Inquiry in Paris. |
| 22. | Strike riots in St. Petersburg. Troops fire on populace. |
| 25- | 29.Battle of Heikon-Tai. Russians cross the Hun and attack the Japanese left wing. Heavy fighting, at the conclusion of which the Russians are forced to retire. Japanese losses 9,000 killed and wounded. Russian losses over 10,000. |
| 31. | Japanese statement denies the charges in the Russian circular respecting alleged infractions of Chinese neutrality. |
| 7. | British steamer Eastry, for Vladivostock, with coal, captured off Hokkaido by Japanese. |
| 15. | Third Baltic squadron (Admiral Nebogatoff) leaves Libau. |
| 19. | Japanese Army crosses the Ta. |
| 23. | Kawamura's army opens the battle of Moukden on the east. |
| 24. | Kuroki's army begins to operate on the centre. |
| 26. | Report of North Sea Inquiry Commission holds Russia financially responsible for damage to the British fishing fleet, but says Russia was justified in believing that the fleet was in danger. |
| 27. | Nodzu's army of the centre begins three days' cannonade of the Russian positions. |
| 28. | Oku's army of the west begins to advance. Kawamura's army occupies Machunton. |
| 1. | Nogi's army of the west enters Sinmintin. |
| 2-6. | Nodzu's army dislodges Russians from outworks south of the Shakhe. |
| 5. | Kuroki's army forces the left of the Russian intrenchments on the Shakhe. |
| 6. | Oku's progress checked by the Russians. |
| 7. | Kuropatkin orders a retreat. |
| 8. | Nogi cuts the railway north of Moukden. |
| 10. | Kawamura's army carries Fushun position. Japanese enter Moukden. |
| 16. | Japanese enter Tie Pass. |
| 17. | Kuropatkin is relieved of his command and succeeded by Linevitch. |
| Baltic fleet leaves Nossi Be. | |
| 19. | Japanese occupy Kaiyaun. |
| 20. | Russia, having failed to raise a new loan in France, announces a new internal loan of $10,000,000. |
| Kuropatkin assumes command of First Army under Linevitch. | |
| 21. | Japanese occupy Chang-Tu. |
| 24. | Admiral Nebogatoff at Port Said. |
| 29. | New Japanese 412 per cent sterling loan of $50,000,000 placed in London and New York. |
| 2. | Japanese driven out of Ni-shin-kay, 33 miles northeast of Kaiyuan. |
| 3-4. | Russian force driven out of Tsulushu, 20 miles north of Chang-tu. |
| 8. | Baltic fleet sighted off Singapore. |
| 12. | Russian force defeated at Erhlohu by Japanese advancing on Hai-lung line. |
| 12 | -14.Rojestvensky arrives in Kamranh Bay. |
| 14. | Japanese occupy Ying-Ching, east of Moukden. |
| 15. | Japanese occupy Tung-hwa, 50 miles east of Shingking. |
| 18. | Growing indignation in Japan at reported violations of French neutrality. |
| 20. | Japanese minister in Paris calls M. Delcasse's attention to the reported stay of Russian vessels in Kamranh Bay. |
| M. Delcasse tenders his resignation. | |
| 21. | Statement by M. Rouvier that the French government meant to respect absolutely neutrality between the belligerents, and had given precise orders to all its agents in the Far East. |
| 22. | M. Delcasse's resignation withdrawn. Rojestvensky leaves Kamranh Bay. |
| 24. | Russian attack on Chang-tu and Kaiyuan repulsed. |
| Rojestvensky returns to Kamranh Bay. | |
| 26. | Rojestvensky again leaves Kamranh Bay. |
| 27. | Nebogatoff reported off Penang. |
| 1. | Japanese reach Tiao-yu-tai, 28 miles north of Tunghwa. |
| United States Government urges upon China the advisability of enforcing so far as possible the neutrality of Chinese harbors. | |
| Russian fleet at Port Dayet, 40 miles north of Kamranh Bay. | |
| 2. | Russian fleet reported at Honkohe Bay. |
| 4. | Japanese minister in Paris asks for explanation concerning news received by his government as to violation of neutrality in Indo-Chinese waters. |
| 5. | Four Russian torpedo boats burn a Japanese sailing vessel off Hokkaido. |
| Nebogatoff passes Singapore. | |
| 8. | Publication of French semi-official note denying charges of breach of neutrality. |
| 9. | Rojestvensky leaves Honkohe Bay. |
| Nebogatoff off Cape St. James. | |
| Two Russian cruisers sighted off Aomori, on the north coast of Nippon. | |
| Russians repulsed at Ying-pien-mun. | |
| 12. | Rojestvensky returns to Honkohe Bay. |
| 13. | Martial law proclaimed throughout Formosa. |
| 14. | The Baltic fleet leaves Honkohe Bay for the north. |
| 15. | The Japanese Government vetoes the export of coal to Indo-China. |
| 17. | Admiral Birileff appointed to the command of the naval forces in the Pacific. |
| 18- | 25.Desultory fighting in Manchuria. Japanese successes. |
27-28.Baltic fleet drawing up to Tsushima is sighted by the Japanese. Battle of the Sea of Japan begins at about 2 p.m. on May 27. On that day and the next Togo destroys the Baltic fleet, captures Rojestvensky and Nebogatoff. Eight thousand prisoners taken, and many killed or drowned.
|
| 5. | British steamer Ikhona sunk by Russian cruiser Terek. |
| British ship St. Kilda sunk by Russian cruiser Dnieper. | |
| 8. | President Roosevelt sends identic despatch to Japanese and Russian Governments urging them to negotiate for peace. |
| 9. | Escaped Russian cruisers are interned at Manila. |
| 10. | Japan agrees to President Roosevelt's proposition to appoint peace envoys to meet similar agents of Russia. |
| 12. | Russia also accepts the proposal of the President. |
| Russian fours rose in St. Petersburg on rumors of peace. | |
| China plans new navy, largely on Japanese advice. | |
| The President receives Russia's formal note, accepting peace plan. | |
| 14. | Russian official statement on the reply to President Roosevelt gazetted in St. Petersburg. |
| Witte gives pessimistic interview on peace, published in the Slovo. | |
| France orders Russian cruiser Kulan out of Indo-China waters. | |
| 15. | Washington selected as place of the Peace Conference. |
| President Roosevelt said to be trying to secure an armistice. | |
| Japan's official reply to President's note given out in Washington. | |
| 16. | Britain makes strong protest to Russia against sinking of British commercial steamers. |
| Japanese take Sumiencheng, but are driven out by the Russians. | |
| 19. | Czar receives deputation from Moscow Zemstvo Congress, presenting very radical address; reply seems in harmony with demands. |
| British ambassador at St. Petersburg asks payment for the St. Kilda, and prevention of further similar action. | |
| Japanese minister informs President that Mikado's peace envoys can reach Washington early in August. | |
| 21. | Stoessel's surrender of Port Arthur said to have been found justified by Russian commission. |
| Twenty-two killed, one hundred wounded by attack of Cossacks on Socialist procession in Lodz. | |
| 22. | Governor of Moscow posts notices of mobilization. |
| 23. | Russian minister of interior repudiates liberal interpretation of czar's response to Zemstvo delegation. |
| One hundred and thirty killed in rioting at Lodz; great disorder for three days. | |
| Declared in British House of Commons that Japan has not ordered foreigners to leave Port Arthur. | |
| 24. | Russian admiral at Manila granted parole for his men and liberal terms for repairs. |
| 26. | Five hundred and sixty-one dead in Lodz revolts of preceding week. |
| Premier Balfour announces that Russian cruisers have been ordered to spare British shipping. | |
| 27. | Crew of Russian Black Sea battleship mutiny and murder several officers. |
| Strike riots begin in Odessa. | |
| 28. | Russia announces acceptance of first ten days in August for meeting of peace envoys. |
| Japanese warships reported off Vladivostock. | |
| Mutiny of Russian sailors at Libau; riots in Odessa continue; crew of Kniaz Potemkin aids strikers. | |
| Czar declares state of war in Odessa; Japanese political parties declare that any peace to be made must be lasting. | |
| 29. | Said that Russia has ordered mobilization of over 100,000 men for immediate use in Far East. |
| 30. | Mutiny of sailors at Cronstadt. |
| 1. | Japanese right begins sharp attack east of railway in Manchuria. |
| Russian cruiser Terck interned at Batavia. |
| 2. | President Roosevelt announces that Muravieff and Rosen will be Russian peace envoys, Komura and Takahira the Japanese. |
| 3. | Small mutiny at Cronstadt. |
| 5. | Mutineers on the Potemkin declare a rebellion. |
| 6. | Armistice refused by Japan until substance of her terms is accepted by Russia. |
| Japanese foreign loan of $150,000,000 412 per cent 5-20 years placed: to issue at 90—divided equally among Germany, England and America. | |
| 7. | Baron Rosen, new Russian ambassador, reaches Washington. |
| 8. | Mutineers on Kniaz Potemkin surrender to Roumania as deserters; sink the warship at Kustenji. |
| Japanese envoys set sail for America. Tokio reports gradual advance to north by armies in Manchuria. | |
| China appeals to Powers for share in peace conference. | |
| Japanese land on island of Sakhalin. | |
| 9. | Count Cassini leaves Washington, after seven years' service. |
| 10. | Portsmouth, N. H., Navy Yard agreed upon by Russia and Japan as scene of peace negotiations. |
| 11. | Kniaz Potemkin, with loyal crew, sails for Sebastopol. |
| Shuvaloff, prefect of Moscow police, assassinated. | |
| 12. | Japanese loan heavily oversubscribed. |
| 13. | Sergius Witte appointed senior Russian peace envoy, in response to severe criticism of Muravieff. |
| Twenty-four leaders of Odessa riots hanged. | |
| 17. | Witte gives out interview, to general effect that Russia will not accept humiliating terms of peace. |
| 19. | Zemstvo Congress meets in Moscow, in spite of police prohibition. |
| 20. | Japanese army under Hasegawa advancing through north Korea against Vladivostock. |
| 21. | China's identic note, that she will not recognize peace terms in which she is not consulted, received at Washington. |
| Mr. Witte arrives in Paris. | |
| 24. | Japanese dislodge Russians from two positions south of Tumen River. |
| Czar and kaiser meet off Swedish coast. | |
| Kastries, on Siberian mainland, seized by the Japanese. | |
| 25. | Baron Komura, and rest of Japan's peace mission, arrive in New York. |
| Russian army said to be using part of Mongolia for military purposes. | |
| Plan of Russian Assembly said to be more liberal than Bouligan scheme. | |
| Japanese take Alexandrovsk, chief town of Sakhalin. | |
| 26. | St. Petersburg marshals of nobility adopt Moscow Zemstvo programme of reforms. |
| 27. | Baron Komura informally received by the President. |
| Witte sails from Cherbourg. | |
| 28. | Witte gives pessimistic interview, transmitted by wireless from his steamer; says Russia will be reasonable with regard to peace terms. |
| 30. | Czar declares that he will never conclude a "shameful peace." |
| Final surrender of Russians in Sakhalin. | |
| Civil administration in Sakhalin decreed by Japanese. | |
| 31. | Famine in great part of Russia announced as certain. |
| 1. | Reported that czar will decree an Assembly on August 12, birthday of the czarevitch. |
| 2. | Report that Witte is arranging a Russian loan through French and American bankers. |
| Bureau of Council of Ministers takes over consideration of Bouligan plan for Assembly. | |
| 3. | Russian force south of Tumen River reported to be 22,000 strong. |
| 4. | Mr. Witte informally presented to the President at Oyster Bay. |
| President receives unofficial envoys from Korea, who ask protection for their country. | |
| Two Englishmen fined for furnishing passports to Russian terrorists. | |
| 5. | Russian and Japanese peace envoys formally received by the President at Oyster Bay, and presented to each other. The missions set sail for Portsmouth, N. H., the Japanese on the Dolphin, the Russians on the Mayflower, escorted by cruiser Galveston. |
| 6. | The Dolphin, with the Russian peace mission, puts in at Newport, R. I., and Mr. Witte goes to Boston by train; rest of mission remains on board, waiting, with the Mayflower, for fog to lift. |
| 7. | Mr. Witte spends day in Boston, going to Portsmouth at night. Mayflower and Dolphin sail from Newport. |
| Russia decides on issuance of $10,000,000 internal loan. | |
| 8. | Peace envoys received by United States and New Hampshire authorities, and installed at Hotel Wentworth. |
| Russians reported fortifying mouth of the Amur River. | |
| Japanese land at Imperator, on Siberian coast. |
| 9. | Peace missions meet at Portsmouth. Mr. Witte presents his credentials, but Baron Komura's are not at hand; he summarizes them verbally. |
| Czar approves remodelled scheme for popular assembly. | |
| 10. | Credentials of peace plenipotentiaries formally exchanged and found satisfactory. Mr. Witte's powers said to be unlimited; Baron Komura's not so full. |
| Japanese envoys present to Russian mission a set of twelve conditions or principles essential to peace treaty. | |
| Japanese warships sent to Kamchatka and Okhotsk. | |
| 12. | Russian envoys make reply to Japanese terms; supposed to refuse indemnity and cession of Sakhalin. |
| Japanese, in reply, propose verbal discussion of conditions, one at a time. | |
| 14. | Conference agrees upon Article I, supposed to provide for recognizing Japan's preponderance in Korea; Article II, providing for evacuation of Manchuria by both belligerents, mutual pledge to respect territorial integrity of China and maintain the "open door"; Article III, providing for the restoration of Chinese rule in Manchuria. |
| Mr. Witte receives delegation of Jewish bankers and others. | |
| 15. | Conference agrees on Article IV, concerning Russian lease of the Liao-Tung; discusses and records views on Article V, the cession of Sakhalin, and lays it aside for later reference. Agree on Article VI. |
| Congress of peasants at Moscow passes resolutions demanding reforms | |
| 16. | Conference agrees on Articles VII and VIII, giving |
| Japan control of Chinese Eastern Railroad to near Harbin, leaving the rest to Russia. | |
| 17. | Conference considers Article IX, indemnity, but reaches no agreement; Article X, on surrender of Russian warships interned in neutral ports, refused by Witte. |
| 18. | Article XI, limitation on Russia's naval power in Far East, produces disagreement; Article XII, on Russian Pacific fisheries, accepted unanimously. |
| Conference adjourns to August 22 at 3 p.m. | |
| 19. | Czar issues manifesto decreeing establishment of representative popular assembly in Russia. |
The Interned Russian Ships
The Russian naval ships interned in neutral ports are, one battleship, six cruisers, one gunboat, and eleven torpedo boat destroyers. They are:
Battleship
Czarevitch, 12,900 tons, interned in Kiao-Chow Bay.
Cruisers
Diana, 6,700 tons, interned at Saigon.
Askold, 5,900 tons, interned at Shanghai.
Aurora, 6,700 tons, interned at Manila.
Oleg, 6,600 tons, interned at Manila.
Zemtchug, 3,100 tons, interned at Manila.
Lena, 10,000, interned at San Francisco.
Gunboats
Mandjur, 1,200 tons, interned at Shanghai.
The eleven torpedo boat destroyers are interned at various Chinese ports.
The following table of casualties and captures during the war was prepared by the Tokio correspondent of the London Times. It is not entirely accurate, in some cases it being quite plain that he reached his total of Russian casualties by multiplying the numbers of dead the Japanese alleged they found on a field by the figure he had determined upon as the ratio of wounded to killed. But in spite of its bias the table gives facts that form a valuable addition to the chronological review:
| Name and date of battle | Japanese | Russian |
| Yalu, May 1 | 1,039 | 2,398[1] |
| Shisanlitai, May 16 | 146 | 300[2] |
| Nanshan, May 26 | 4,207 | 3,370[3] |
| Telisz, June 1 | 1,163 | 9,270[4] |
| Fenshwiling, June 27 | 171 | 450[5] |
| Kaiping, July 8 | 153 | (?)250 |
| Motienling, July 17 | 299 | 1,000[2] |
| Kiaotao, July 19 | 423 | 1,000[2] |
| Tashichiao, July 25 | 1,077 | 2,000[2] |
| Tomuchung, July 31 | 860 | 4,250[6] |
| Yushulingtsz and Yangtszling, August 1 | 946 | 2,000[2] |
| Liao-Yang, September 4 | 17,613 | 25,000[2] |
| Shaho, September 14 | 15,879 | 69,201 |
| Forty-six skirmishes | 7,000 | 7,000 |
| Skirmishes after Shaho | 200 | 395 |
| New Chwang, January 14 | 250 | 500[2] |
| Heikautai, January 26 to 29 | 8,000 | 10,000[2] |
| Skirmishes between Heikautai and Moukden battle |
650 | 1,525 |
| Moukden battle, February 19 to March 16 | 52,500 | 152,500 |
| Changtu skirmishes, April 3 to June 22 | 100 | 390[2] |
| Fakumun skirmishes, April 3 to June 22 | 50 | 340 |
| Kaiyuan skirmishes, April 3 to June 22 | 75 | 800 |
| Yingeching skirmishes, April 3 to June 22 | 70 | 600[2] |
| Weiyuanpaumun, Changtu and Ranging, June 16 | 215 | 240[2] |
| Port Arthur | 50,000 | 20,000[2] |
| Naval casualties | 3,670 | 6,000[2] |
| Totals | 166,756 | 320,779 |
| Prisoners | 646 | 67,701 |
| Grand totals | 167,402 | 388,480 |
of the Russian naval squadrons in Far Eastern waters since the war commenced may be shown as follows in tabular form:
| Engaged | Sunk | Captured | Interned | Remaining | ||||||
Nature of Vessel |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
Battle- ships |
15 | 180,980 | 12 | 144,958 | 2 | 23,110 | 1 | 12,912 | . . | . . . . . . |
Armored cruisers |
7 | 63,533 | 5 | 38,979 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 2 | 24,554 |
Sea going
coast defence iron-clads |
3 | 13,212 | 1 | 4,126 | 2 | 9,086 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . |
| Cruisers | 13 | 65,416 | 6 | 26,341 | . . | . . . . . . | 5 | 29,115 | 2 | 9,960 |
Other kinds,
excluding converted cruisers |
21 | 76,793 | 14 | 25,222 | 1 | 11,700 | 2 | 11,449 | *4 | 28,422 |
| Destroyers | 24 | 10,290 | 6 | 5,666 | 2 | 590 | 11 | 3,334 | 2 | 700 |
| Totals | 83 | 410,224 | 57 | 245,292 | 7 | 44,476 | 19 | 56,810 | 10 | 63,636 |
In this table torpedo boats, special service steamers, as well as converted cruisers, are not included, and the asterisk indicates that the number to which it is attached comprises some vessels whose fate is uncertain. Further, under the heading, "captured," only vessels taken in fight are shown, not those subsequently raised and added to the Japanese navy. The broad result is very striking; out of a total of 83 ships, with a displacement of 410,224 tons, sent by Russia into the war zone, only ten, with a displacement of 63,636 tons, remain in her fighting line. She has lost 73, representing 346,588 tons.
If a similar table is compiled for the Japanese navy the result is as follows:
| Engaged | Sunk | Captured | Interned | Remaining | ||||||
Nature of Vessel |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
No. | Displace- ment |
| Battleships | 6 | 86,299 | 2 | 27,757 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 4 | 58,452 |
Armored cruisers |
8 | 74,178 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 8 | 74,178 |
Sea going
coast defence cruisers |
2 | 11,112 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 2 | 11,112 |
| Cruisers | 20 | 68,481 | 4 | 12,733 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 16 | 55,748 |
| Other kinds | 18 | 26,689 | 4 | 4,797 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 14 | 21,892 |
| Destroyers | 22 | 7,425 | 2 | 738 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 20 | 6,687 |
| Totals | 76 | 274,184 | 12 | 46,025 | . . | . . . . . . | . . | . . . . . . | 64 | 228,159 |
From this table, also, torpedo boats, special service steamers and converted cruisers are omitted. Comparison of the two tables shows several striking facts. The first is that the Japanese force of 76 vessels, with a displacement of 274,184 tons, has sunk or captured 64 ships, with a displacement of 289,778 tons. It is true that this includes the ships which the besiegers' guns at Port Arthur helped to disable, but, on the other hand, it was solely by the indefatigable exertions of the Japanese fleet that these ships were driven into Port Arthur and held prisoners there. Another important point is that, whereas the Japanese have lost 12 ships, with a total displacement of 46,025 tons, they have captured and added to their navy seven vessels representing 44,486 tons. Nor is this all. Already at Port Arthur the battle ship Peresviet (12,674 tons) and the armored cruiser Bayan (7,800 tons) have been raised, and at Chemulpo the protected cruiser Variag (6,500 tons). Other ships will also be raised, but even with the addition of these three the Japanese navy will emerge from the fight with a displacement 25,435 tons greater than it had when the war commenced, whereas the Russian navy has been virtually annihilated.
In order to make this comparison complete it is necessary to consider the captures of non-combatant ships made by the two navies. The record for the Japanese navy is this:
Prizes Made by the Japanese Navy
N.B.—When not described as a sailing ship, steamer is to be understood.
| Ship's Name and Nationality | Tonnage | |
| 1. | Ekaterinoslav, Russia | 5,627 |
| 2. | Moukden, Russia | 1,567 |
| 3. | Russia, Russia | 2,312 |
| 4. | Argun, Russia | 2,458 |
| 5. | Manjuria, Russia | 6,193 |
| 6. | Alexander, Russia | 261 |
| 7. | Resnick (sailing ship), Russia | 87 |
| 8. | Nicolai, Russia | 123 |
| 9. | Mikhael, Russia | 3,461 |
| 10. | Kotic, Russia | 400 |
| 11. | Juliade, Russia | ?. . |
| 12. | Manchuria, Russia | 2,937 |
| 13. | Bobrick (sailing ship), Russia | 125 |
| 14. | Nadejuta, Russia | 68 |
| 15. | Thalia, Russia | ?. . |
| 16. | George, France | 179 |
| 17. | Fuhping, Germany | 1,393 |
| 18. | Veteran, Germany | 1,199 |
| 19. | Nigretia, England | 2,368 |
| 20. | King Arthur, England | 1,416 |
| 21. | Rosalie, England | 4,370 |
| 22. | Redington, England | 4,421 |
| 23. | Wilhelmina, Holland | 4,295 |
| 24. | Bawtry, England | 2,407 |
| 25. | Oakley, England | 3,798 |
| 26. | Burmah, Austria | 3,071 |
| 27. | M. S. Dollar, America | 4,216 |
| 28. | Wyefield, England | 3,235 |
| 29. | Siam, Austria | 3,160 |
| 30. | Palos, Germany | 2,398 |
| 31. | Apollo, England | 3,829 |
| 32. | Scotsman, England | 1,677 |
| 33. | Silvania, England | 4,187 |
| 34. | Powderham, England | 3,019 |
| 35. | Severus, Germany | 3,307 |
| 36. | Romulus, Germany | 2,630 |
| 37. | Easby Abbey, England | 2,963 |
| Ship's Name and Nationality | Tonnage | |
| 38. | Vegga, Sweden | 2,562 |
| 39. | Venus, England | 3,558 |
| 40. | Aphrodite, England | 3,949 |
| 41. | Tacoma, America | 2,812 |
| 42. | Harbarton, England | 3,256 |
| 44. | Henry Blockow, Norway | 1,006 |
| 45. | Quang Nam, France | 1,431 |
| Total | 107,929 | |
| Ship's Name and Cargo | Date of capture 1904 | |
| 1. | Ekaterinoslav, arms and ammunition | Feb.6 |
| 2. | Moukden, rice and provisions | "6 |
| 3. | Russia, none | "7 |
| 4. | Argun, various | "7 |
| 5. | Manjuria, arms, rice, etc | "9 |
| 6. | Alexander, whale's flesh | "10 |
| 7. | Resnick, salt | "10 |
| 8. | Nicolai, Korean cash | "10 |
| 9. | Nikhael, iron bars, etc | "10 |
| 10. | Kotic, iron bars, etc | "10 |
| 11. | Juliade, none | "17 |
| 12. | Manchuria, provisions | "17 |
| 13. | Bobrick, none | "17 |
| 14. | Nadejuta, none | "17 |
| 15. | Thalia, none | Mar.13 |
| 16. | George, none | Aug.19 |
| 17. | Fuhping, arms and ammunition | Oct.12 |
| 18. | Veteran, furs, leather, etc | Nov.19 |
| 19. | Nigretia, kerosene | Dec.19 |
| 20. | King Arthur, none | "19 |
| 1905 | ||
| 21. | Rosalie, Cardiff coal | Jan.11 |
| 23. | Wilhelmina, Cardiff coal | "16 |
| 24. | Bawtry, foodstuffs | "17 |
| 26. | Burmah, Cardiff coal | "25 |
| 27. | M. S. Dollar, forage | "27 |
| 28. | Wyefield, various | "30 |
| Ship's Name and Cargo | Date of capture 1904 | |
| 29. | Siam, Cardiff coal | Jan.31 |
| 30. | Palos, shipbuilding materials and foodstuffs | Feb.10 |
| 31. | Apollo, Cardiff coal | "14 |
| 32. | Scotsman, rice | "14 |
| 33. | Silvania, Cardiff coal | "19 |
| 34. | Powderham, Cardiff coal | "19 |
| 35. | Severus, Cardiff coal | "23 |
| 36. | Romulus, Cardiff coal | "25 |
| 37. | Easby Abbey, Cardiff coal | "27 |
| 38. | Vegga, Cardiff coal | Mar.3 |
| 39. | Venus, Cardiff coal | " 4 |
| 40. | Aphrodite, Cardiff coal | (?) |
| 41. | Tacoma, Cardiff coal | "14 |
| 42. | Harbarton, Cardiff coal | "11 |
| 43. | Industrie, various | "20 |
| 44. | Henry Blockow, Cardiff coal | Apr. 7 |
| 45. | Quang Nam, various | May5 |
In addition to the above, eight steamers were captured, but were released on examination. It may also be noted that the hospital ship Orel, taken in the battle of the Sea of Japan, has been declared a prize of war, and that three steamers have been raised—namely, the Sungari at Chemulpo and the Angara and Kazan at Port Arthur. Thus far, therefore, there have been added to the Japanese mercantile marine 59 vessels with an aggregate displacement of over 110,000 tons.
The Russian List
The list of vessels captured or destroyed by the fleet follows:
| Name and Kind of Vessel | Displacement | Date of Sinking 1904 |
| Naga-no-ura Maru, steamer | 1,084 | Feb.11 |
| Hanyei Haru, steamer | 75 | Mar.26 |
| Goyo Maru, steamer | 600 | April25 |
| Hagino-ura Maru, steamer | 600 | "25 |
| Yamata Maru, sailing ship | 198 | June16 |
| Name and Kind of Vessel | Displacement | Date of Sinking 1904 |
| Ansei Maru, sailing ship | 105 | June16 |
| Seiyei Maru, sailing ship | ? 100 | "16 |
| Seisho Maru, sailing ship | 122 | " 30 |
| Koun Maru, steamer | 57 | " 30 |
| Kita Maru, sailing ship | 140 | July 19 |
| Takashima Maru, steamer | 318 | " 20 |
| Hokusei Maru, sailing ship | 91 | " 20 |
| Fukuju Maru, sailing ship | 121 | " 24 |
| Jizai Maru, sailing ship | 199 | " 24 |
| Hakutsu Maru, sailing ship | 91 | " 24 |
Those 15 ships have an average of 234 tons, a figure sufficiently suggestive of the nature of the craft upon which the Russian cruisers preyed. The list must be supplemented by a number of little fishing boats, some driven by stress of weather upon Russian coasts, but all with one exception destroyed. There are 12 of these boats recorded, but others are believed to have shared their fate:
| Name and place of Register | Fate |
| Chotoku Maru, Hakodate | Unknown |
| Ryozen Maru, Hakodate | " |
| Kaichi Maru, Noto | Burned |
| Kifuku Maru, Kaga | " |
| Sumiyoshi Maru, Hakodate | " |
| Chosho Maru, Tokio | " |
| Yeisho Maru, Tokio | " |
| Yeihu Maru, Tokio | " |
| Yeiju Maru, Tokio | " |
| Kaikei Maru, Totomi | " |
| Kwantsu Maru, Totomi | " |
| Kayetsu Maru, Hakodate | Captured |