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Japan: Past and Present/Chapter 12

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4663584Japan: Past and Present — The Dawn of a New AgeEdwin Oldfather Reischauer

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Chapter XII

The Dawn of a New Age

The one thing that can be safely said about the period since August 14, 1945, is that it is the beginning of a new age for Japan. The coming of Perry to Japan in 1853 resulted in profound changes in Japanese life. The much more dramatic coming of General MacArthur to Japan in 1945 may bring equally profound changes. Crushing military defeat, the disruption of normal life caused by eight years of war and the devastation of most of the larger cities of Japan, the crippling of Japanese economy, first by bombs and then by the loss of her colonies, the presence of an army of occupation, the enforced abandonment of militarism and many other major features of the Japanese system, and most of all, the realization that Japan is not a divine land protected by the gods and that the Japanese are not a race of supermen—these factors are having and will continue to have a tremendous impact upon the Japanese people. Inevitably they will produce a new and different Japan. But what this new Japan will be, no one can predict with certainty.

The results of decades of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda will not be easily wiped away. The army and navy have been abolished, war criminals have been tried, and reforms designed to eliminate the political pitfalls of the old order are being made, but changing the mentality of a people is a slower and more difficult task.

The natural resentment of people who have suffered defeat and whose land has been occupied by foreign invaders is not to be overlooked. The tremendous destruction of the physical assets of Japan and the disruption of her economy have resulted in a serious lowering of the standard of living, and this in turn will cause deep-seated unrest. There is much spiritual confusion among the Japanese, for after long being accustomed to close supervision and rigid patterns of thought, they are now witnessing the collapse of their old world and the repudiation of many of its most cherished values. This spiritual confusion may well result in considerable social and political instability.

Despite these problems, however, remarkable progress has been made since the surrender toward the creation of a peaceful and democratic Japan, which is the primary objective of the Allied Powers. The vanquished have joined the victors in this task with amazing good will and trust. The wisdom and justice shown by General MacArthur and his forces, matched by the industry and cooperation of the Japanese, appear to be accomplishing the seemingly impossible—a military occupation satisfactory to the victors and popular with the vanquished.

The most surprising factor in the post-surrender situation has been the freedom of most Japanese from rancor and resentment against the conquerors. This has been in large measure due to the fact that the surrender was made in the name of the emperor. Because the militarists had taught the people to believe blindly in the emperor, he was able not only to assure acceptance of the capitulation by the army as well as by the civilian population, but also, by assuming responsibility for the decision, to free the individual Japanese from any personal sense of shame over defeat or guilt at having surrendered. Learning for the first time the true story of recent events in Japan and the Far East, the average Japanese realized that he had been the dupe of his own army and political leaders. With admirable objectivity, he saw that Japanese militarists, rather than American soldiers, were to blame for Japan’s sorry plight. Unquestionably, many Japanese will never be reconciled to defeat, but the great majority are showing an astonishing readiness to cooperate sincerely with their conquerors and to establish relations of friendship with their former foes.

Another important factor in the rehabilitation of Japan has been the energy and resourcefulness of the people. Under the guidance of the occupying forces, they have set themselves to the rebuilding of their stricken land with determination. Despite a critical food shortage during the late spring and summer of 1946, they have done much to check the forces of economic disintegration, which came as an inevitable aftermath of defeat. The devastated cities of Japan are being rebuilt; attempts are being made to remedy the long-standing ills of a depressed peasantry and the industrial cartel system; and the reappearance of a vigorous labor movement gives promise of continued economic reforms.

Political reform has been the chief focus of interest since the surrender. Here the Japanese have had the advantage of considerable experience in democratic ways. The parliamentary government of the 1920’s was far from perfect, but it did operate with success, and most members of the Japanese electorate are familiar with the meaning and procedures of voting. Liberal elements at the time of the surrender were weaker than they had been in the 1920’s, but among older political leaders and urban intellectuals and white collar workers there remained a solid core of liberal thinkers, who, freed from the restrictions and fears of the old regime, emerged as proponents of a new democratic order in Japan.

Assisted by a sweeping purge of all leaders identified with militarist or ultra-nationalist policies, these men have taken over the government of Japan. Baron Shidehara, who had distinguished himself as a liberal leader in the 1920’s, became Premier in October 1945. He was followed in this post the next May by Yoshida, another leader with the same liberal background. The emperor lent his assistance to a program of reducing the imperial institution to the status of a constitutional monarchy. On New Year’s Day 1946 he issued a rescript denying his own supposed divinity, and he has taken the necessary steps to permit the framing of a new Constitution, designed to make the emperor little more than a symbol of national unity. The mass of Japanese have readily accepted these startling changes, while retaining a loyalty to the throne little impaired by the disastrous outcome of the war.

On April 10, 1946, the first post-war elections for the Diet were held, with the women of Japan voting for the first time in history and winning thirty-nine of the 466 Diet seats. Swinging back to the political trends of the 1920’s, the city dwellers gave a strongly leftist vote. The Socialists, the successors of the pre-war Social Mass Party, won one-fifth of the seats, and the reborn Communist Party, under leaders recently released from prison or returned from exile, received four percent of the total vote. The country as a whole, however, returned to the Diet a large majority of members best described as politically indeterminate rather than definitely conservative or moderate. The vagueness of their political views reflected the confusion and political immaturity of the peasants and the residents of the small towns who had elected them.

Remarkable progress has indeed been made since the surrender toward the creation of a peaceful and democratic Japan, but there is no assurance that progress toward this goal will remain rapid or even steady. The future course of events in Japan depends to a large extent on the success of the principles of democracy and international cooperation elsewhere in the world. And even in Japan there are many questions that becloud the future. What will be the attitude of the demobilized soldier when he recovers from the shock of defeat? Will the brittle glory of militarism again come to have an appeal for the Japanese? What road will the peasants take once they awaken to a realization of their potential political power? Are the Japanese strong enough to endure the long years of economic hardship that lie ahead without seeking refuge in some shallow panacea? And most important of all, can the Japanese masses, so accustomed to believing what they are told, learn in time the healthy skepticism and independence of judgment upon which freedom depends?

Despite these many uncertainties, there is, however, one very good reason for optimism—the adaptability of the Japanese. They are pragmatists, and in the past have shown themselves capable of abandoning old customs and habits of thought when convinced that there was something better. The leaders of the early Meiji period, when they realized that their feudal political and military system was inferior to the nation states and citizen armies of the West, made a startling about-face and did away with feudalism. It now appears that the Japanese are making another abrupt about-face. As in Meiji days, many will undoubtedly be incapable of changing their ways of life and thought, but even among Japanese the one irrefutable argument against the old order will be that militarism and ultra-nationalism led Japan into the worst national disaster she has ever suffered.

No one can yet tell what the new age in Japan will mean in the long run—democracy or authoritarianism; liberalism, fascism, or communism; international cooperation or blind nationalism. The outcome is of concern to the whole world, for the success or failure of the attempt to create a peaceful and democratic Japan inevitably will influence the cause of peace and democracy in other parts of the world. What we do in Japan, both as a nation and as individuals, will undoubtedly have a strong bearing on the eventual outcome there. In this, we have a grave responsibility—one calling for wisdom and understanding. Yet, no matter how long the occupation of Japan may last, the ultimate answer will be written by the Japanese people themselves. We and our allies can choose the initial direction they are to take, but only they can determine where Japan will go.

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