Life of William, Earl of Shelburne/Volume 2/Chapter 4

by Edmond George Petty-Fitzmaurice

 

CHAPTER IV

 

THE FIRST NEGOTIATION IN PARIS

 

1782

 

In America, with the exception of New York, Charlestown and a few other posts on the coast, the whole mainland of the Thirteen revolted Colonies by the beginning of 1782 was lost to England. The forces of Spain had overrun West Florida and had captured the Isle of Providence, the Bahamas, and Minorca. The French fleet had taken Granada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Christopher, Nevis, and Monserrat. On the other hand, the English forces had captured St. Lucia, the French establishments in Senegal, the Island of Goree on the coast of Africa, Chandernagore, and the French establishments on the coast of Bengal and Orissa, Pondicherry, Karical, Mahé, and the Comptoir of Surat. From the Dutch they had taken Trincomalee and Negapatam. Such were the chief territorial changes which had resulted from the war. Besides the question how far the peace was to confirm them, there were other matters equally certain to be brought forward in any negotiation between England and the belligerents. Such were the rights of the French fishermen off Newfoundland under the Treaties of Utrecht and of Paris; the clauses of former treaties relating to Dunkirk; and the commercial relations between the two countries. It had never yet been definitely agreed, how far the rejection by the English House of Commons of the eighth and ninth clauses of the Treaty of Utrecht had invalidated the other commercial clauses of that treaty. It was also more than probable that the question of the rights of neutrals would be mentioned, especially if the Northern Powers became parties to the negotiation.

After the peace of Teschen in 1779, Austria, anxious to regain the prestige she had lost on the question of the Bavarian succession, had joined Russia in various attempts at mediating between the belligerent powers. These attempts were renewed in 1780 and 1781, but without result. The Court of Vienna was too intimately bound to that of Paris by family ties, and too much bent on aggressive projects against the Turkish Empire, to care to negotiate with much spirit between the belligerents. The ill-regulated mind of the Empress Catherine was indeed anxious to make the voice of Russia heard in every quarter of the globe; but except as regarded her own aggrandizement in the East, she had no definite ideas, and her plans varied with the varying influence of the favourites who surrounded her throne. Frederic the Great continued to regard England with the aversion which he had constantly exhibited towards her ever since the peace of 1763, and was inclined to cultivate good relations with France through fear of Austria. The refusal by England of any mediation in which the revolted Colonies should be included, had finally alienated her from the Continental Powers and left her bereft of every friend and ally.

It was the opinion of Fox, in keeping with the recent traditions of British diplomacy, that the chief object of the Court of London should be to form alliances with the Northern Powers, and to seek the mediation in our favour of the Empress Catherine with Holland.^[1] He considered France the "natural enemy of England," as he plainly stated as late as 1787 in the debates on the Commercial Treaty with France. The opinion of Shelburne was different. The failure of Chatham's scheme for a grand Northern alliance in 1767, the inconstancy of the Empress Catherine, and the high-handed proceedings of the Three Powers against Poland, made him but little anxious to introduce the Northern Powers into the negotiation. Ultimately he even hoped to revert to the policy of earlier times when, as in the days of Elizabeth, of Cromwell and of Walpole, France was the ally and not the foe of England, and to oppose the alliance of the Western Powers to the aggressive designs and crooked policy of the Northern Courts.^[2] Already in 1769 the idea of such an alliance had crossed his mind; but ancient national jealousies and the policy of Choiseul had rendered it impracticable. In the altered temper of the French nation however he expected to find the lever for a new and more enlightened policy, which Court intrigues and reactionary traditions would be powerless to break. The France of Louis XVI. was in his opinion as different from that of Louis XIV. as the character of the former from that of the latter monarch. Whoever, he said, had travelled in the country knew that public opinion was entirely changed. A spirit of individual as well as general independence prevailed; the rage of serving in armies was abated; men enjoyed consideration independently of any connection with the Court or of the Minister; liberal principles were gradually establishing themselves without regard to the old traditions of the government, and war either for the sake of Court caprices, or additional trade or additional territory, was coming to be regarded as an exploded superstition.^[3]

Such were the views and objects of Shelburne; whether or no he would be able to carry them out, would depend on his own influence in the Cabinet, and the temper shown by Vergennes and the other French Ministers. The recent fall of Necker had put an end to the hope of administrative reform, and the fall of Turgot was fatal to the idea of economic progress. The chances of a peaceful policy prevailing at Versailles were diminished in proportion. The war party, headed by Marshal de Castries and supported by D'Aranda the Spanish Ambassador, held up its head, elated by recent success and ambitious of further glory;^[4] while Vergennes, though too able a Minister to conceal from himself that peace was necessary to his country, was determined to keep his place, and knew, that in order to do so, he could not afford to scout the traditions of Choiseul, which had borne him as their representative into power.

At the moment accordingly that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox, alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne, on the contrary, believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, as the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer.

A.

Stanford's Geographical Establ.

London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd

The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary, in order to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed, following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774.^[5] Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the shores of Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris.

Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht.^[6]

In 1779, when the alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure of M. Gérard, the French envoy, had adopted the following conditions as the ultimatum for peace:

(1) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation for peace.

(2) The Mississippi as their western boundary.

(3) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States with a port below it.

They also passed a resolution to the effect that any interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus belli.

"The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American interests, and their own discretion,"^[7] were in other matters to guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts. As however the war progressed, and French assistance, especially in money, became of greater and greater importance to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and then of Count La Luzerne, his successor.^[8]

On the 25th January 1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United States extended no further west than the limits to which settlements were permitted under the demarcation line of the Proclamation of 1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of the river; that Spain would probably conquer both the Floridas, and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On the 15th February, Congress having considered this communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of La Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. "You are to make the most candid and confidential communications," so his amended instructions ran, "upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America."^[9] As a climax La Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams.

Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects.^[10] The French he hated. He said "they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was."^[11]

Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and also by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to attain their objects by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty which he had negotiated with France, forbidding either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but also on the other powers at war.^[12]

About the period when the Administration of Lord North was tottering to its fall, Lord Cholmondeley, then on his way to England, called upon Franklin, the only member or the American Commission then in Paris, and knowing his previous acquaintance with Shelburne, offered to become the bearer of a letter to him. Franklin foreseeing the probability of a Ministerial change in England, and of Shelburne once more returning to official life, accepted the offer and wrote to Shelburne as follows:

"Lord Cholmondeley having kindly offered to take a letter from me to your Lordship, I embrace the opportunity of assuring you of the continuance of my ancient respect for your talents and virtues, and of congratulating you on the returning good disposition of your country in favour of America, which appears in the late resolutions of the Commons. I am persuaded it will have good effects. I hope it will tend to produce a general peace, which I am sure your Lordship with all good men desires, which I wish to see before I die, and to which I shall with infinite pleasure contribute everything in my power."^[13]

The above letter arriving almost simultaneously with the formation of the Rockingham Cabinet, was shown by Shelburne to his leading colleagues, and they decided, with the evidence before them of the friendly disposition of Franklin, to open an informal negotiation with him.

It was first proposed to send Mr. Hodgson a London merchant, intimately acquainted with Franklin.^[14] Ultimately the choice of the Cabinet fell upon Mr. Richard Oswald of Auchencruive, a well-known Scotch merchant in the city of London. He had originally become known as a contractor during the Seven Years' War. Being dissatisfied with the manner in which his business was done, he went to Germany himself, and acted as Commissary General of the army of the Duke of Brunswick. In 1759 he purchased the estate of Auchencruive in Ayrshire, and marrying Miss Mary Ramsay he became through her possessed of extensive estates in America and the West Indies.^[15] Owing to his connection with those countries he had already been frequently consulted by the Government during the war. In 1777 he had visited Paris, and made acquaintance with both Vergennes and Franklin. He was known as holding very liberal views on economic and commercial questions, being a disciple of Adam Smith, to whom he owed his introduction to the new Secretary of State.^[16]

He left England with a letter from Shelburne to Franklin, which ran as follows:—

"I find myself returned to nearly the same situation, which you remember me to have occupied nineteen years ago, and should be very glad to talk to you, as I did then and afterwards in 1767, upon the means of promoting the happiness of mankind; a subject much more agreeable to my nature than the best concerted plans for spreading misery and devastation. I have had a high opinion of the compass of your mind and of your foresight. I have often been beholden to both, and shall be glad to be so again, so far as is compatible with your situation. Your letter discovering the same disposition has made me send to you Mr. Oswald.

"I have had a longer acquaintance with him, than even I have had the pleasure to have with you. I believe him an honest man, and after consulting some of our common friends, I have thought him the fittest for the purpose. He is a practical man, and conversant in those negotiations which are most interesting to mankind. This has made me prefer him to any of our speculative friends, or to any person of higher rank. He is fully apprized of my mind, and you may give full credit to every thing he assures you of. At the same time if any other channel occurs to you, I am ready to embrace it. I wish to retain the same simplicity and good faith which subsisted between us in transactions of less importance."^[17]

With this letter Oswald arrived in Paris on the 12th of April, and immediately informed Franklin that the new Ministry was sincerely desirous of peace; but he intimated that if France should insist upon humiliating terms, England would continue the war, her resources not being exhausted. Franklin replied "That America was ready to treat, but only in concert with France, and that as Mr. Jay, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Laurens were all absent from Paris, nothing of importance could be done in the affair." At the same time he offered to introduce Oswald to Vergennes, an invitation which Oswald accepted;^[18] and a meeting accordingly took place between the English emissary and the French minister on the 17th of April.

Oswald not having any command over the French language, Rayneval, Chief of the Première Direction of the Foreign Office, acted as interpreter. The French minister told Oswald that the engagements of his royal master were such as to prevent him treating alone; the treaty must therefore be general, not partial; if the parties intended to avail themselves of the mediation recently proposed by the Northern Powers, they might treat at Vienna; otherwise at Paris: the King his master was however anxious to meet the wishes of the King of England on this subject. He also added that as the foundation of a good and durable peace should be laid in justice, he should have several demands to make of "justice" from England, whenever a treaty was entered upon. "Of this," he said, "I give you previous notice": at the same time he did not specify what these demands would be, and when Oswald attempted to obtain from him some general propositions to take back to England, he refused on the ground that France could do nothing without consulting all her allies, which she was not then in a position to do. As they returned to Versailles, Oswald again took occasion to impress upon Franklin that if England were driven to extremities by unreasonable demands on the part of France, the whole nation, which was now divided on the subject of the war, would unite as one man to continue it, and that resistance would be carried on with the energy of desperation.^[19]

Next day there was some further conversation between Franklin and Oswald, previous to the departure of the latter for England. Franklin considered the opportunity favourable for putting forward the idea of the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia to the United States. In a previous conversation with Oswald, the latter had maintained the opinion, in which indeed he was not singular, that the cession of those countries by France in 1763 had materially hastened the outbreak of a rebellion, and had thereby been injurious to England. Franklin now insisted on the dangers which their retention might cause, amongst which he specified the temptation it would offer to the United States to strengthen their union with France, instead of cultivating those friendly relations which he believed were now heartily desired by England and were certainly his own wish. He also alluded to the necessity of England treating America with generosity. "The party," he said, "which had been the aggressors, and had cruelly treated the other, should show some marks of concern for what was passed, and some disposition to make reparation." He spoke all the time from a paper, which Oswald asked if he might see. Franklin after a little delay acceded. Oswald having read it, requested leave to take it back with him to England. To this also Franklin agreed, and at the same time gave Oswald a letter for Shelburne, congratulating him on his choice of a negotiator, and stating that he desired no other channel of communication between them.^[20]

Hardly however had Oswald left for England with the paper in his possession before Franklin regretted his weakness in permitting it to go out of his hands. "On reflection," he says, "I was not pleased with my having hinted a reparation to the Tories for their forfeited estates." The paper itself, which was to have consequences but little foreseen at the moment by either Franklin or Oswald, ran as follows:—

 

To make a peace durable, what may give occasion for future wars, should, if practicable, be removed.

The Territory of the United States and that of Canada by long extended frontiers touch each other.

The settlers on the frontiers of the American provinces are generally the most disorderly of the people, who being far removed from the eye and control of their respective governments, are most bold in committing offences against neighbours, and are for ever occasioning complaints, and furnishing matter for fresh differences between their states.

By the late debates in Parliament and public writings, it appears that Britain desires a reconciliation with the Americans. It is a sweet word. It means much more than a mere peace, and it is heartily to be wished for. Nations make a peace whenever they are both weary of making war. But if one of them has made war upon the other unjustly, and has wantonly and unnecessarily done it great injuries, and refuses reparation; though there may for the present be peace, the resentment of those injuries will remain, and will break out again in vengeance, when occasions offer. Those occasions will be watched for by one side, feared by the other; and the peace will never be secure; nor can any cordiality exist between them.

Many houses and villages have been burnt in America by the English and their allies the Indians. I do not know that the Americans will insist on reparation. Perhaps they may. But would it not be better for England to offer it? Nothing would have a greater tendency to conciliate. And much of the future commerce and returning intercourse between the two countries may depend on the reconciliation. Would not the advantage of reconciliation by such means be greater than the expense?

If then a way can be proposed which may tend to efface the memory of injuries, at the same time that it takes away the occasions of fresh quarrels and mischief, will it not be worth considering, especially if it can be done not only without expense but be a means of saving?

Britain possesses Canada. Her chief advantage from that possession consists in the trade for peltry. Her expenses in governing and defending that settlement must be considerable. It might be humiliating to her to give it up on the demand of America. Perhaps America will not demand it. Some of her political rulers may consider the fear of such a neighbour as a means of keeping the thirteen States more united among themselves, and more attentive to military discipline. But in the mind of the people in general, would it not have an excellent effect if Britain should voluntarily offer to give up that province; though on these conditions; that she should in all times coming have and enjoy the right of free trade thither unincumbered with any duties whatsoever; that so much of the waste lands there shall be sold as will raise a sum sufficient to pay for the houses burnt by the British troops and their Indians, and also to indemnify the Royalists for the confiscation of their estates.

 

This is mere conversation matter between Mr. O. and Mr. F., as the former is not empowered to make propositions, and the latter cannot make any without the concurrence of his colleagues.^[21]

 

Oswald, returning to England, at once communicated the result of his interview with Vergennes and Franklin to the Cabinet. The determination of the two representatives of France and America to stand by one another was evident, and the Cabinet accordingly resolved that the moment was come when it was necessary, in order to avoid yet greater difficulties, to contemplate the probability of having to acknowledge the independence of America. It was hoped however that by making the concession of this important point to France, and thereby flattering her vanity, they might be able to obtain more favourable terms from that power than they might otherwise be able to obtain, and they accordingly determined to act in that direction. Shelburne however did not expect that much would result from this manner of proceeding, or that France would be satisfied with the concession of American independence alone.

The paper of notes was communicated by Oswald to Shelburne, and was at his desire left with him for one night. Nobody else except Lord Ashburton was allowed to see it. At the time that Oswald accepted the paper from the hands of Franklin, he did not possess the formal character of a negotiator, nor had he any official commission. Franklin gave him the paper of notes "not as a proposition during a negotiation, but as a suggestion, or matter for consideration; the paper was treated as confidential, and Franklin evidently did not intend that it should go further than Shelburne himself."^[22] There was nothing either in the contents of the paper or in the manner in which it came into his hands which rendered it incumbent on Shelburne to communicate it to his colleagues, and he thought best not to send any formal answer to it.

On the 23rd of April the Cabinet agreed to the following minute: "It is humbly submitted to His Majesty that Mr. Oswald shall return to Paris with authority to name Paris as the place, and to settle with Dr. Franklin the most convenient time for setting on foot a negotiation for a general peace, and to represent to him that the principal points in contemplation are, the allowance of independence to America upon Great Britain's being restored to the situation she was placed in by the treaty of 1763, and that Mr. Fox shall submit to the consideration of the King a proper person to make a similar communication to M. de Vergennes." The person selected by Mr. Fox in conformity with the above resolution was Mr. Thomas Grenville, brother of Lord Temple and son of Mr. George Grenville. The wits of the town, however friendly to Fox and Mr. Grenville, pointed out that it was part of the irony of events that the son of the author of the Stamp Act should be the chosen mediator of the peace which was to terminate the war.^[23]

Fox suspected Shelburne of wishing to keep the negotiations not only with America but with France also in his own hands. In this however he was mistaken.^[24] The King had indeed suggested to Shelburne that Oswald "might be a useful check on that part of the negotiation which was in other hands."^[25] To this suggestion however Shelburne paid no attention, and he carefully concealed it from Oswald. Nobody could in any case have been more unfit both by character and habits for engaging in a diplomatic intrigue than Oswald, whose simplicity of mind and straightforwardness of character struck all who knew him, nor had Shelburne himself any wish to intrigue against Fox, as appears from the following episode.

Mr. Thomas Walpole was at this time in Paris, having been sent thither by Fox to negotiate with the French Government, in regard to the questions arising in respect of the property of British merchants at St. Eustatia, which had been recaptured by French privateers after the capture of the island by Rodney. He seems to have considered himself Commissioner designate to the French Government, and thought himself aggrieved by the mission of Oswald, as he subsequently did by that of Grenville, and accused Shelburne of intriguing against him. Being informed of his feelings, Shelburne at once sent explanations on the subject to Oswald. "It has reached me," he writes, "that Mr. Walpole esteems himself much injured by your going to Paris, and that he conceives it was a measure of mine intended to take the present negotiation with the court of France out of his hands, which he conceives to have been previously commenced through his channel by Mr. Fox. I must desire that you will have the goodness to call upon Mr. Walpole, and explain to him distinctly, how very little foundation there is for so unjust a suspicion, as I know of no such intercourse. Mr. Fox declares, he considered what had passed between him and Mr. Walpole of a mere private nature, not sufficiently material to mention to the King or the Cabinet, and will write to Mr. Walpole to explain this distinctly to him. But if you find the least suspicion of this kind has reached Dr. Franklin or M. le Comte de Vergennes, I desire this matter may be clearly explained to both. I have too much friendship for Dr. Franklin and too much respect for the character of M. le Comte de Vergennes, with which I am perfectly acquainted, to be so indifferent to the good opinion of either, as to suffer them to believe me capable of an intrigue, where I have both professed and observed a direct opposite conduct. In truth I hold it in such perfect contempt, that however proud I may be to serve the King in my present station or in any other, and however anxious I may be to serve my country, I should not hesitate a moment about retiring from any situation which required such services. But I must do the King the justice to say, that his Majesty abhors them, and I need not tell you, that it is my fixed principle that no country in any moment can be advantaged by them."^[26]

Before leaving England Oswald was instructed to show a copy of the Cabinet minutes of April the 23rd to Franklin, but to leave no copy with him; he was further to insist in the strongest manner, that if America was to be independent, she must be so of the whole world, and not attempt any connection, secret, tacit, or ostensible with France, and to declare that if the negotiation broke off, all the rights of England to America were to stand as before. He was also to tell Franklin that the statement contained in the private paper, that he did not know whether the Americans intended to make claims of indemnification, was not an open course of proceeding, the American Commissioners being already invested with full powers; and in any case that no such reparation could be thought of.

He was also further told to recollect that a great blow might shortly be expected to be struck in the West Indies, whither Admiral Rodney had sailed with a fleet of forty ships; that the reinforcements to De Grasse would probably be intercepted, and that a naval victory might settle a great deal. It does not appear that Shelburne shared in the violent dislike for Rodney which distinguished his colleagues, and led about this time to his recall. Rodney had caused great alarm by the wholesale confiscation of property, British as well as foreign, which had accompanied the capture of St. Eustatia, and the Whig Opposition had joined in the clamour raised against him as a cloak to their dislike to his appointment, which was rightly attributed to the favour of the King. Oswald was also directed to "tell Franklin candidly and confidentially Lord Shelburne's situation with the King; that he was sent for to form the Ministry; that he would make no use of his situation, but to keep his word with mankind; that he was under as little apprehension of being deceived himself, as unwilling to deceive others; in short that he knew the bottom to be sound;" and lastly he was told not to conceal from Franklin that Shelburne had reluctantly come into the idea of the complete independence of America; that he had wished for a federal union between the two countries; but that having been forced by circumstances to abandon his plan he would loyally try to carry through the other.^[27]

The paper of instructions to Oswald in which the above points were set out, concluded thus:—

 

It is reasonable to expect a free trade, unencumbered with duties, to every part of America.

Make early and strict conditions, not only to secure all debts whatever due to British subjects, but likewise to restore the Loyalists to a full enjoyment of their rights and privileges. And their indemnification to be considered. Lord Shelburne will never give up the Loyalists. The Penn family have been sadly used, and Lord Shelburne is personally interested for them, and thinks it his duty to be so for all.

The private paper desires Canada for three reasons:—

1st. By way of reparation.—Answer. No reparation can be heard of.

2nd. To prevent future wars.—Answer. It is to be hoped that some more friendly method will be found.

3rd. Loyalists, as a fund of indemnification to them.—Answer. No independence to be acknowledged without their being taken care of. A compensation expected for New York, Charlestown, and Savannah. Penobscot to be always kept.^[28]

 

Such were the instructions with which Oswald left England. He was also the bearer of a letter from Shelburne to Franklin which ran as follows:

"I have received much satisfaction in being assured by you, that the qualifications of wisdom and integrity, which induced me to make choice of Mr. Oswald, as the fittest instrument for the renewal of our friendly intercourse, have also recommended him so effectually to your approbation and esteem. I most heartily wish that the influence of this first communication of our mutual sentiments may be extended to a happy conclusion of all our public differences.

"The candour with which M. le Comte de Vergennes expresses his most Christian Majesty's sentiments and wishes on the subject of a speedy pacification, is a pleasing omen of its accomplishment. His Majesty is not less decided in the same sentiments and wishes, and it confirms his Majesty's Ministers in their intention to act in like manner, as most consonant to the true dignity of a great nation.

"In consequence of these reciprocal advantages, Mr. Oswald is sent back to Paris, for the purpose of arranging and settling with you the preliminaries of time and place: and, I have the pleasure to tell you, that Mr. Laurens is already discharged from those engagements which he entered into, when he was admitted to bail.

"It is also determined that Mr. Fox, from whose department that communication is necessarily to proceed, shall send a proper person, who may confer and settle immediately with M. de Vergennes the further measures and proceedings which may be judged proper to adopt, towards advancing the prosecution of this important business. In the meantime Mr. Oswald is instructed to communicate to you my thoughts upon the principal objects to be settled.

"Transports are actually preparing for the purpose of conveying your prisoners to America, to be there exchanged, and we trust that you will learn that due attention has not been wanting to their accommodation and good treatment."^[29]

After reading the above letter Franklin informed Oswald of the passage in which he was referred to Oswald for the sentiments of Shelburne. In reply Oswald once more acquainted Franklin of the unanimous disposition of the Ministry to peace, and added that a good deal of confidence was reposed in the character enjoyed by Franklin for open dealing, and that it was believed in England that he still retained some affection and regard for the mother country, which it was hoped might appear on this occasion. He then, after detailing the views of Shelburne in conformity with his instructions, proceeded to mention the paper of notes, and informed Franklin of what had recently passed on that subject. At the same time while returning the paper he expressed his own personal conviction that it had nevertheless made an impression, and that if the matter were not given an undue prominence during the early stages of the negotiation, a settlement satisfactory to America might still be ultimately arrived at, in regard to the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia.

In conclusion he acquainted Franklin that as the new business to be now brought forward related to a general peace, it was consequently in the department of Fox, and he was accordingly directed to announce another agent "to regulate the circumstantials," and that this agent was not himself, but Mr. Thomas Grenville. The same information was also communicated to Vergennes. Several conversations followed on the 6th of May and the following days, between Oswald, Franklin, and the French minister, but nothing of importance passed; indeed Oswald was so reticent that Franklin wondered at his having been sent back to Paris, especially as Mr. Grenville was so soon to follow.^[30]

On the 8th of May Mr. Grenville arrived, and the following day, at a meeting with Franklin and Vergennes, intimated that if England granted independence to America she would expect France to restore the conquered English islands, with the exception of Miquelon and St. Pierre on the coast of Newfoundland. As the original object of the war was the independence of America, it was supposed in England, he said, that France would be contented with the concession of it. To this Vergennes demurred. "As to our being satisfied," he said, "with the original object of the war, look back to the conduct of your nation in former wars. In the last war, for example, what was the object? It was the disputed right to some waste lands on the Ohio, and the frontier of Nova Scotia; did you content yourselves with the recovery of those lands? No, you retained at the peace all Canada, all Louisiana, all Florida, Grenada, and other West India Islands, and the greater part of the Northern fisheries; with all your conquests in Africa and the East Indies."

The French minister then reiterated his intentions of only negotiating conjointly with America, and altogether declined to look upon the independence of the latter country as a cession or favour to France, or as in any manner to be considered as the valuable consideration given by England for a favourable treaty to France; on that subject England must negotiate with America directly. He concluded by saying that his Royal Master looked chiefly to justice and his own dignity, and by these he would stand unalterably. Grenville left the meeting much dejected, and at once communicated the result to Fox.^[31]

On the 14th of May Oswald returned to England. The suddenness of his departure surprised Franklin, who wished him to remain, as he thought his presence likely to be useful. "I hoped," he writes to Shelburne, "that Mr. Oswald would have remained here some time, but his affairs, it seems, recal him sooner than he imagined. I hope he will return again, as I esteem him more, the more I am acquainted with him, and believe his moderation, prudent counsels, and sound judgment may contribute much, not only to the speedy conclusion of a peace, but to the framing such a peace as may be firm and longlasting."^[32] The King had a similar wish. "Mr. Oswald's correspondence," he wrote to Shelburne, "carries the marks of coming from a man of sense. As Dr. Franklin wishes he should remain at Paris and as M. de Vergennes has intimated as much, I should think it best not to let him at least at present come home."^[33]

On the 18th of May the Cabinet had agreed to the following minute:—"It is humbly submitted to your Majesty that your Majesty will be pleased to direct Mr. Fox to order full powers to be given to Mr. Grenville to treat and conclude at Paris, and also to direct Mr. Fox to instruct Mr. Grenville to make propositions of peace to the belligerent powers, upon the basis of independence to the Thirteen colonies in North America and of the Treaty of Paris; and in case of such proposition not being accepted, to call upon M. de Vergennes to make some proposition on his part, which Mr. Grenville will of course report to Mr. Fox."^[34] The same evening the news arrived of the great naval victory which Rodney had gained on the 12th of April and of the capture of De Grasse himself, the co-operation of whose fleet with the American land forces had been the efficient cause of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. Such co-operation would in future be difficult, if not impossible. The universal joy in England was only tempered by the indignation felt against the politicians who had wished to replace him. A few days earlier the news of the capture of Ceylon, the principal Dutch settlement, had also arrived. Fortune seemed to smile once more on the flag of Great Britain. The Ministry were now more than ever inclined to persevere in their policy of separating France from America, and while conceding independence to the latter, to refuse to yield to the arrogant pretensions of the Power whose navy they had just destroyed. On the 23rd of May accordingly the Cabinet agreed to take Vergennes at his word and to instruct Grenville, in negotiating with France, to propose the acknowledgment by England of the independence of America "in the first instance,"^[35] i.e. that England should negotiate with America directly, instead of through France, as first proposed. "Independence was to be the dreadful price offered to America" for peace, said the King;^[36] and he was only brought to accede to the plan of the Cabinet by the persuasions of Shelburne, who explained that the object of it was either to obtain a general peace thereby, or else to separate the Americans from their allies.^[37]

"On Mr. Oswald's return," says the Duke of Grafton, "it was Mr. Fox's wish to have placed the whole negotiation with any of the Powers at war into the hands of Mr. Grenville; but the Cabinet decided that, as the Doctor desired Mr. Oswald's return, to whom he had spoken with openness and freedom, it would be impolitic not to comply with a request of this nature. Besides it was not yet fully known in what light our offers to treat might be received by the French Ministry. The line of our proposals was independence for America, and the restitution of matters to the state in which they stood on the Treaty of Paris; and these were to be considered as the basis of the negotiation."^[38]

Oswald however could not as yet receive the formal character of a negotiator, as the Enabling Bill which removed the penalties imposed by previous statutes on persons communicating with the revolted colonists had not yet passed into law. It was the intention of Fox, though as yet unknown to his colleagues, whenever the question of the appointment of an Envoy came before the Cabinet, to claim that the minute of the 23rd of May recognized the independence of the United States, and ipso facto transferred the negotiation from the Colonial to the Foreign Department, i.e. from the department of Shelburne to his own.^[39] Such however was not the view of Shelburne. To the minute of the 23rd of May he did not attach the same meaning as Fox; and he intended that whoever might ultimately be the negotiator with America, were it Grenville, Oswald, or any one else, should act in direct communication with him. Meanwhile, suspecting that the intention of Fox was to quarrel, he wrote to him as follows:—"I am just now writing to Mr. Oswald, and instruct him of course to remain at Paris as Dr. Franklin desires, till he has orders to return. I likewise desire him to communicate freely to Mr. Grenville whatever may be of use to him, taking it for granted that you will instruct Mr. Grenville to apprize him of the power sent him, and of such other matters as may be useful in governing his intercourse with Dr. Franklin and the other American Commissioners, that it may not be supposed in France that there is or can be any difference among us upon the great subjects of Peace and War."^[40]

 

To Oswald himself he at the same time wrote as follows: "Mr. Grenville will, I make no doubt, acquaint you of the powers sent him by the present messenger, together with all such other matters as may be necessary to govern your intercourse with Doctor Franklin, and with the other American Commissioners, which you will continue to cultivate by all fair and honourable means, avoiding to give jealousy to the Court of France. It is His Majesty's pleasure, that you should furnish Mr. Grenville any lights which may occur to you in the course of your communication with any of these gentlemen, which may be useful to him, in his transactions with the French Ministers, or those of any of the other Powers of Europe who may be about to enter into the proposed negotiation, and I must recommend to you to omit no opportunity of letting it be understood that there subsists the strictest union in His Majesty's Council upon the great subject of peace and war.

"I am sorry to observe that the French Minister gives very little reason to expect that his Court is likely to make good their professions, which they made thro' so many channels, of a desire of peace upon terms becoming this country to accept; upon the strength of which Doctor Franklin invited the negotiation. I have that entire confidence in Doctor Franklin's integrity and strict honour, that if the Court of France have other views, and that they have been throwing out false lures to support the appearance of moderation throughout Europe, and in the hope of misleading and the chance of dividing us, I am satisfied he must have been himself deceived; and in such a case, I trust that if this shall be proved in the course of the present negotiation, he will consider himself and his constituents freed from the ties which will appear to have been founded upon no ideas of common interest. We shall however, I hope, speedily ascertain the real purposes of France by their conduct in the future progress of this negotiation, which the King will not suffer to go into any length. In the meantime you will govern your conversation with the American Commissioners with all possible prudence, collecting their sentiments and every other information which you conceive may hereafter prove useful, and I have His Majesty's commands to acquaint you, that it is his pleasure you should continue at Paris, till you receive his orders to return, of which you will acquaint Doctor Franklin and Monsr. Le Comte de Vergennes."^[41]

He wrote also to General Carleton and Admiral Digby, the heads of the army and the fleet in America, as follows:—

"His Majesty has been induced to give a striking proof of his royal magnanimity and disinterested wish for the restoration of peace, by commanding His Majesty's Ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, 'that the independence of America should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general peace.'

"I have given a confidential information to you of these particulars, that you may take such measures as shall appear to you most advisable for making a direct communication of the substance of the same, either immediately to Congress, or through the medium of General Washington, or in any other manner which you may think most likely to impress the well-disposed parts of America with the fairness and liberality of His Majesty's proceedings in such great and spontaneous concessions.

"The advantages which we may expect from such concessions are, that America, once apprized of the King's disposition to acknowledge the independence of the Thirteen States, and of the disinclination in the French Court to terminate the war, must see that it is from this moment to be carried on with a view of negotiating points, in which she can have no concern, whether they regard France, or Spain and Holland at the desire of France; but some of which, on the contrary, may be in future manifestly injurious to the interests of America herself; that if the negotiation is broken off, it will undoubtedly be for the sake of those Powers, and not America, whose object is accomplished the instant she accepts of an independence, which is not merely held out to her in the way of negotiation by the executive power, but a distinct unconditional offer, arising out of the resolutions of Parliament, and therefore warranted by the sense of the nation at large.

"These facts being made notorious, it is scarce conceivable that America, composed as she is, will continue to make efforts under French direction, and protract the distresses and calamities which it is well known that war has subjected her to. It is to be presumed, that from that moment she will look with jealousy on the French troops in that country, who may from allies become dangerous enemies.

"If however any particular States, men, or description of men, should continue against the general inclination of the continent, devoted to France, this communication will surely detect their views, expose their motives, and deprive them of their influence in all matters of general concern and exertion. You will, however, take particular care in your manner of conducting yourselves, not only that there should not be the smallest room for suspicions of our good faith and sincerity, but that we have no view in it of causing dissensions among the colonies, or even of separating America from France upon terms inconsistent with her own honour. You must therefore convince them, that the great object of this country is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the noblest terms and by the noblest means."^[42]

Before leaving England Oswald had a final interview with Shelburne and Ashburton, at which the exact meaning of the Cabinet minute of the 23rd of May was explained to him, viz. that independence was to be the price of peace.^[43] At the close of the interview Shelburne gave Oswald the following paper of notes, as a guide to him in his conversations with Franklin:—

 

1. I am ready to correspond more particularly with Dr. Franklin if wished.

2. The Enabling Act is passing with the insertion of commissioners recommended by Mr. Oswald, and on our part commissioners will be named, or any character given to Mr. Oswald, which Dr. Franklin and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of things between Great Britain and America, which Dr. Franklin very properly says requires to be treated in a very different manner from the peace between Great Britain and France, who have been always at enmity with each other.

3. An establishment for the Loyalists must always be upon Mr. Oswald's mind, as it is uppermost in Lord Shelburne's, besides other steps in their favour, to influence the several States to agree to a fair restoration or compensation for whatever confiscations have taken place.^[44]

 

With these instructions Oswald left England in the last days of May. He was also the bearer of letters from Fox,^[45] who had already sent Grenville instructions relating not only to France and her European partners in the war, but to America as well.^[46] Following the directions of his chief Grenville now claimed the right of negotiating with the American Commissioners. The omission of Spain from his full power he attributed to the fact of his not having been as yet able to extract anything as to the views of D'Aranda the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, which he would communicate to the English Government. D'Aranda in fact had refused to speak on the subject of peace, till he had received powers from his Government, which had not arrived, for Spain was waiting for the result of the final assault on Gibraltar. Nor as yet had Grenville been able to extract anything out of M. Berkenrode, the Dutch minister, as to the views of the States-General. It consequently seemed natural to him that no mention should as yet be made of Holland. The omission of America he attributed in a conversation with Franklin to his power having been carelessly copied from that given to Mr. Stanley when the latter went over to negotiate with France before the peace of 1763. Vergennes however was not so easily satisfied. He suspected that the effect of the great naval victory of Rodney over De Grasse had been to create an indisposition in England to peace with France, and that England was attempting to separate France from America; but he also knew that the national spirit in France had not been awed by the great disaster in the West Indies, and that the most strenuous efforts were being made, with every prospect of success, to replace the fleet which had been lost, and again render it possible to send succours across the Atlantic. He now told Grenville his suspicions in very plain terms, and repeated that the interests of France and America were indissoluble; that the treaties must go hand in hand; and be all signed the same day. In this declaration he was supported by Franklin, who furnished Grenville with a copy of the treaty between the two countries in order that he might see the contents of it.^[47] Grenville at once sent a courier to London, asking for an extension of his powers, sufficient to enable him to negotiate with all the Powers at war, and on the 1st of June informed Franklin confidentially of the resolution arrived at by the Cabinet on the 23rd of May, hoping thereby to shake the union between France and America. His announcement however seemed to produce no effect, and Franklin he observed was very reserved to him in manner.

Franklin had not unnaturally been led by Grenville to suppose that sooner or later he would be the sole negotiator. The first thing necessary, he said in their interview on the 1st of June, was that Grenville should procure full powers; the next that they should assemble the plenipotentiaries of all the Powers at war, and proceed to business.^[48] On the 31st of May however Oswald arrived in Paris. He at once delivered the letters of which he was the bearer to Grenville and to Franklin. With the latter he was unable to obtain an immediate interview for the purposes of business, and it was not till the 3rd of June that they met. Oswald then informed Franklin that during his stay in England he had had conversations both with the Prime Minister and the two Secretaries of State; that their desire of peace remained unabated, although he considered that in some respects they were too much elated by Lord Rodney's victory, which he had advised them not to rate too high. He then proceeded to confess to Franklin with the utmost frankness, that peace was absolutely necessary to England; at the same time, he repeated the observation which he had made during his previous visit to Paris, that if the Allies made exorbitant demands, the war would become a struggle for life and death on the part of England, and that even the payments of the interest on the National Debt might be stopped in order to furnish means for the defence of the country. He concluded by saying: "Our enemies may now do what they please with us; they have the ball at their feet, and we hope they will show their moderation and their magnanimity." He then mentioned more than once that the English Ministers, more especially Shelburne, reckoned in no small degree on the good sense of Franklin to extricate their country from the terrible position in which it was placed.^[49]

Franklin in reply alluded to the omission of the colonies from Grenville's commission. Oswald told him the deficiency would no doubt be supplied in due time, since in the meanwhile they had been assured that "His Majesty had agreed to grant independence in the first instance." The Doctor said he was glad of it, and supposed that more could not be done until the Act depending in Parliament was passed.^[50] Oswald then explained that the words in his paper of instructions, "insertion of commissioners recommended by Mr. Oswald," related to his having advised an express mention in the Bill of the Commissioners appointed by Congress.

Franklin next observed that the estates of the Loyalists had been confiscated by laws of particular states and not by Congress; Congress therefore had no power whatever to interfere in the matter; that if anybody was to compensate them for their losses, it was the business of England and not of America, and that in any case America possessed counter claims against them for their ravages, which would more than balance their estimated losses.

Oswald told Franklin that personally he agreed with him, and he also mentioned that he not only had not concealed his opinion when in England, but had also urged the cession of Canada during an interview with Rockingham, Shelburne, and Fox. The two former, he said, spoke reservedly on the point; but in his opinion did not seem very averse to it. Fox, however, seemed startled at the proposition.

They then proceeded to the article of the note containing the following words: "On our part commissioners will be named, or any character given to Mr. Oswald which Dr. Franklin and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of things between Great Britain and America." Oswald explained that he had no personal wishes of his own either of honour or profit; he thought Mr. Grenville perfectly capable of carrying on the affair, but that he was himself willing, if Franklin thought that he could be of use in the matter, to serve in any character or manner which might be deemed advisable.

"Dr. Franklin," says Oswald, in his account of the interview, "then said he thought the best way to come at a general peace was to treat separately with each party, and under distinct commissions to one and the same or different persons. By this method many difficulties, which must arise in discussing a variety of subjects, not strictly relative to each other, under the same commission, and to which all the several parties are called, would be in a great measure avoided. And then at last there would only remain to consolidate those several settlements into one genuine and conclusive treaty of pacification, which upon inquiry I found he understood to be the indispensable mode of a final accommodation. He explained as to the commissions, that there might be one to treat with France, one for the Colonies, one for Spain, and he added, one for Holland, if it should be thought proper."^[51] Franklin then went on to say that the great knowledge of America already possessed by Oswald rendered him peculiarly fit to be the negotiator on behalf of England with America. Oswald replied that the idea so far met his own views, as owing to his ignorance of the French language, he had no wish to meddle with the rest of the negotiations.^[52]

The conversation having closed, Oswald at once communicated the results of it to Shelburne, who resolved to recommend the appointment of separate negotiators, and the appointment of Oswald, as soon as the Enabling Bill was passed into law.^[53]

On the 4th of June Grenville and Oswald had an interview, when the latter, in conformity with his instructions, conveyed the same information to his brother negotiator which he had imparted to Franklin the previous day, and the nature of Franklin's replies.^[54] He also told him what had previously passed on the subject of Canada, including the existence of Franklin's Paper of Notes, which he considered it right and desirable should be known to Grenville. The latter at once rushed at the conclusion that Oswald had communicated his projected appointment as Commissioner in the interview with Franklin on the 31st of May, and that this was the cause of the reserve with which Franklin had treated him on the 1st of June. It has however already been shown, that it was not till the 3rd of June, two days after and not the day before the interview of Grenville with Franklin, that the projected appointment of Oswald as Commissioner was communicated to Franklin. Acting under this misapprehension, and knowing that Fox claimed the right of negotiating with America, Grenville wrote a confidential letter to his principal, stating that on the part of Shelburne there existed an evident intention of encroaching upon Fox's province. His letter concluded by requesting that he might himself be recalled, and some Whig peer, such as Lord Fitzwilliam, of sufficient eminence to render the association with him of Oswald impossible, might be appointed in his place.^[55] Fox, at the moment that this communication reached him, was already in a humour but too inclined to take offence. Since the first formation of the Cabinet he had expected to rule supreme over it. "His advice however prevailed less often than might have been expected from talents so superior," and as it appears that it was the opinion of Shelburne which was preferred to his, he never ceased complaining of what he called the "aggressions" of the latter. Shelburne on the other hand complained bitterly of "the hasty mode of proceeding of Fox, who, as he freely told both Grafton and Camden, had the intention of forcing on a rupture.^[56] "I do not choose," the King said, "to harbour ungrounded suspicions, but it has the appearance as if the many grievances broached were meant to offend Lord Shelburne, and perhaps have thrown him off his guard; but I know he is too well aware of their arts to be ever surprised by them."^[57]

Every Cabinet made the differences between the two Secretaries of State more marked. Their colleagues vainly endeavoured, by protests and advice impartially tendered to both, to stave off the final separation, which they began to see was inevitable. Such was the condition of the Ministry when the letter of Grenville arrived. Fox immediately replied by asking for further proofs of the "duplicity of conduct" of Shelburne. "I have taken upon me," he writes, "to show your letter to Lord Rockingham and Lord John Cavendish, who are all as full of indignation at its contents as one might reasonably expect honest men to be. We are now perfectly resolved to come to an explanation upon the business, if it is possible so to do without betraying any confidence reposed in me by you, or in you by others. The two principal points which occur are the paper relative to Canada, of which I had never heard till I received your letter, and the intended investment of Mr. Oswald with full powers, which was certainly meant for the purpose of diverting Franklin's confidence from you into another channel. With these two points we wish to charge Lord Shelburne directly; but pressing as the thing is, and interesting as it is both to our situations and to the affairs of the public, which I fear are irretrievably injured by this intrigue, and which must be ruined if it is suffered to go on, we are resolved not to stir a step till we hear again from you, and know precisely how far we are at liberty to make use of what you have discovered. If this matter should produce a rupture, and consequently become more or less the subject of public discussion, I am sensible the Canada paper cannot be mentioned by name; but might it not be said that we had discovered that Shelburne had withheld from our knowledge matters of importance to the negotiation? And, with respect to the other point, might it not be said, without betraying anybody, that while the King had one avowed and authorized minister at Paris, measures were taken for lessening his credit, and for obstructing his inquiries, by announcing a new intended commission, of which the Cabinet here had never been apprised? Do, pray, my dear Grenville, consider the incredible importance of this business in every view, and write me word precisely how far you can authorise us to make use of your intelligence. It is more than possible, that before this reaches you, many other circumstances may have occurred which may afford further proofs of this duplicity of conduct, and if they have, I am sure they will not have escaped your observation. If this should be the case, you will see the necessity of acquainting me with them as soon as possible. You see what is our object, and you can easily judge what sort of evidence will be most useful to us. When the object is attained, that is, when the duplicity is proved, to what consequences we ought to drive, whether to an absolute rupture, or merely to the recal of Oswald and the simplification of this negotiation, is a point that may be afterwards considered. I own I incline to the more decisive measure, and so, I think, do those with whom I must act in concert."^[58]

Two points are definitely raised in the above letter: the Canada paper, and Shelburne's intention to appoint Oswald to be Commissioner to treat with America. The first of these has already been discussed. As regards the second, it is to be observed in the first place that the informal negotiations with America had hitherto been carried on by Oswald in the same way as those with France had been carried on by Grenville; and just as the latter had ended in the formal appointment of Grenville as plenipotentiary, nothing was more natural than for the former to lead up to the appointment of Oswald. "I apprehended," Grenville wrote in reply to Fox, "that Lord Shelburne might have already expressed such an intention to the rest of the King's Ministers, upon the ground of the American share of this business, which ground, in the present stage of it, I thought possibly you had not found it easy to object to. In this idea you will find that I have written, and in this idea it was that Lord Fitzwilliam's appointment occurred to me, not to prevent a clandestine negotiation, but to unite a separated one."^[59]

The position of Shelburne as Secretary of State clearly entitled him to negotiate with America. This was perfectly understood by Vergennes. "Mr. Oswald," he says, "was the envoy of Lord Shelburne. He has no commission for me, because that Secretary of State had America and Ireland in his department, while Mr. Fox is charged with the affairs of Europe."^[60] The presence of Oswald in Paris was perfectly well known to the French Court, to the English Cabinet, to Fox himself, and to Franklin.

On the 3rd of June previous to the reply of Franklin the appointment of Oswald was a mere intention; whether it was to become more depended solely on the wishes of Franklin, of which Shelburne was as yet uninformed. There is no reason to suppose that if Franklin had objected to the appointment of separate Commissioners, the whole negotiation would not have been entrusted to Grenville, who however according to the view of Shelburne would have had to correspond with both Secretaries of State, according to that of Fox with the Foreign Office alone.

The Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton, which at this period are written in a spirit far from favourable to Shelburne, contain no allusion whatever to any duplicity of conduct on his part in regard to the appointment of Oswald as Commissioner with formal full powers to treat. But it was of this appointment that Fox, founding his case on the Minute of the 23rd of May, complained. To this does the whole question when closely examined narrow itself down.

On the 15th of June, Grenville received an amended copy of his full powers. The instrument was in the same terms as its predecessor, except that after the power to treat with the King of France or his Ministers, the words "and any other Prince or State" were added. Armed with this instrument, Grenville formally declared to Vergennes, that he was authorized to acknowledge the independence of America in the first instance and to offer to France the treaty of 1763 as the basis for negotiation. Vergennes recognizing at once the object of the English Government, and understanding the position in which he was placed, coldly replied that he would send a written answer to Fox.

Grenville next visited Franklin, and under his amended powers claimed the right of negotiating with America. To this Franklin distinctly demurred.^[61] He asked Grenville if the Enabling Act was passed. Grenville replied in the negative. Franklin thereupon said "that though the Americans considered themselves as a distinct independent Power or State, yet as the British Government had always hitherto affected to consider them only as rebellious subjects, and as the Enabling Act was not yet passed, he did not think it could be fairly supposed that the English Court intended by the general words "any other Prince or State" to include a people whom they did not allow to be a State, and that therefore he doubted the sufficiency of Grenville's credentials for treating with America, though they might be good for Spain and Holland.

Grenville himself was doubtful. "I have already," he writes to Fox, "felt myself under some embarrassment respecting Mr. Franklin, not seeing precisely how far the expression of "Princes and States" in the full power can apply to America, till the independence is acknowledged, and knowing that he finds and expresses much doubt about it himself, and some disposition to ask a more explicit description."^[62]

Meanwhile an explanation was being come to in England.^[63] It was decided that the negotiations with America were in the department of Shelburne, those with the other belligerents in that of Fox. "It is well," the King writes, "that the omission of Mr. Grenville in the American commission will create no more words; certainly it is every way highly proper he should not be mixed in that business. … Lord Shelburne will certainly act very properly in directing Mr. Oswald not to hazard opinions on parts of the peace, as to which he cannot have had any ministerial information, but being employed he may be supposed not to speak without foundation."^[64]

Shelburne accordingly wrote to Oswald that he was to be careful not to give any cause of offence to Grenville. "I thank your Lordship," Mr. Oswald replied, "for the caution with respect to affairs under Mr. Grenville's direction. It would have been quite wrong in me to meddle with it in any shape, and so cautious was I, that I scarce asked him any question as to the progress of his affairs, thinking it sufficient if by an intercourse with Dr. Franklin, I could help to bring on a settlement with the Colonies, upon which I always believed a conclusion with the other parties would in a great measure depend, both as to despatch and conditions. Even in this business, I had scarce taken any step since my last coming over in the end of May. It was impossible to do so, as Mr. Franklin seemed to attend to the expectation and issue of Mr. Grenville's powers and instructions; which he said were imperfect at first, and not completed at last to his satisfaction with respect to them. So that the Doctor did not incline to talk of business to me, and I had nothing to write, even if I had known the times when Mr. Grenville's couriers were despatched. The situation was not agreeable, but I could not help it. And I believe the Doctor was not pleased, although he said little to me on the subject."^[65]

The formal reply of Vergennes to the proposals of the Cabinet now arrived in England. It was ambiguous in tone and to the effect that "in any new treaty which should refer to that in 1763, instead of saying that the Treaty of Paris should stand good, except in certain specified articles, he would rather express it, that the Treaty of Paris should be annulled, except in certain specified articles."^[66] The variations in the treaty were so little particularized that it was evident that delay was intended by the Court of France and that the variations were purposely undefined. Such, as Grafton relates, was the opinion of the Cabinet, which at once resolved to continue to show a bold front towards France, and to persevere in the attempt of separating America from France by the offer of independence, and of using the grant of independence as the valuable consideration for favourable terms from the States.^[67] They also resolved at a Cabinet meeting on the 26th of June, though probably contrary to Shelburne's views, to make another attempt at conciliating the Court of St. Petersburg, and Fox was instructed to acquaint M. Simolin that England, without "formerly admitting" the Armed Neutrality, was willing to make the principles of her Imperial Majesty's declaration of the 28th of February 1780 the basis of a treaty between the two countries, on condition that Russia obtained the neutrality of Holland.^[68]

The question of the American negotiation was next brought forward. The Enabling Act was now passed, and Shelburne at once proposed to his colleagues to appoint Oswald as separate Commissioner. This proposition was immediately opposed by Fox, who claimed the right of conducting the negotiation himself. "We adopted Dr. Franklin's idea," writes Shelburne to Oswald, "of the best method to come at a general pacification, by treating separately with each party," and the powers for Oswald as Commissioner were at once prepared.^[69] Fox however demanded the recall of Oswald, saying that his presence in Paris prejudiced everything, and on the 30th June he moved "that the independence of America should be granted even without a treaty for a peace." His object was evident. Were the independence of America to be formally recognized either by Act of Parliament, or by a proclamation under the Great Seal—assuming either of these courses to have been constitutionally possible—America would at once have passed from the department of Shelburne into his own. The Cabinet again decided against him. "The majority was for a treaty accompanying the surrender of the claim; but that it was also advisable that independence should in the first instance be allowed as the basis to treat on. This decision not coming up to Mr. Fox's ideas, he declared that his part was taken to quit his office."^[70]

While these events were passing, Lord Rockingham, who for some time past had been in failing health, was dying. "Should he fall," Horace Walpole wrote to Mason, "there would be a new scene indeed."^[71] The most sedulous attempts had been made to conceal the danger of his condition from the world. "Lord Shelburne," said the King on being informed of the decision of the Cabinet, "must see I am certain, with no small degree of resentment, the total ignorance that those who have governed Lord Rockingham cautiously try to keep both me and him in, as to the desperate state of that Lord, which certainly is with a view to some arrangement of their own. I am apprised that Lord Shelburne, though he has gone great lengths at the expense of his opinion in giving way as to American independence, if it can effect peace, would think he received advice in which his character was not attended to, if he intended to give up that, without the price set on it which alone could make this kingdom consent to it. Besides he must see that the great success of Lord Rodney's engagement has again roused the nation so far that the peace which would have been acquiesced in three months ago, would now be matter of complaint. From the language of Mr. Fitzpatrick it should seem that Lord Shelburne has no chance of being able to coalesce with Mr. Fox; it may not be necessary to remove him at once, but if Lord Shelburne accepts the Head of the Treasury, and is succeeded by Mr. Pitt as Secretary for the Home Department and British Dominions, then it will be seen how far he will submit to it. The quarrelling with the rest of the party, as a party, would not be wise. If they can be got to remain, it would be advisable; but it would not be right, if only to be attained by Lord Shelburne's being placed in the shoes of Lord Rockingham, that is the head of a party, when in reality he would be the slave of it. He must be the Minister placed on a broad bottom."^[72]

In the evening of the same day on which the above letter was written, Lord Rockingham died. He had held office and power for barely three months; and at the moment of his death his colleagues were already divided by serious differences and suspicions on three great public questions; the negotiations with America, the mediation of the Northern Powers, and the condition of Ireland. But more important than any difference of opinion on particular questions was the incompatibility of temper between the two Secretaries of State which was patent to their colleagues.^[73]

 

1. Fox to Harris, June 29th, 1782, and Correspondence of C. J. Fox, i. 331-333. Diary of the Earl of Malmesbury y i. 455. Bentham in 1789 makes the following note of a conversation with Lord Lansdowne on the above subject. "Lord Lansdowne in order to gain the Empress was for offering to accede to the Armed Neutrality, but conditionally—on condition of her mediating in our favour with Holland. Fox carried it against him in the Cabinet to have the offer unconditional. … Fox to gain credit with the Empress gave her to understand what had passed on that occasion in the Cabinet. (Bentham, Works, x. 214.)
2. The tortuous conduct of the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin may be traced in the Malmesbury Correspondence, i. 421 et seq. Of the former Sir James Harris writes to Mr. Fox on the 20th of May 1782. "Instability and levity have been its marked features since I have resided here" (i. 438), and he asks himself whether Count Goertz, the Prussian Ambassador, may not be "a most excellent comedian" (i. 444).
3. Parliamentary History, xxvi. 554.
4. Don Abarca de Bolea, Count d'Aranda, born in 1719; was Ambassador to France from 1766 to 1784. He was Prime Minister for a short time in 1791. He died in 1799.
5. Life of Jay, i. 144; ii. 476-480.
6. Ibid. ii. 472-477.
7. Life of Jay, i. 125-126.
8. Conrad Alexandre Gérard, brother of Joseph-Matthias Gérard de Rayneval (see pp. 174-177).
9. Life of Jay, i. 124-129, 134.
10. Ibid. i. 120, 143, 144.
11. Works of Adams, iii. 303. Life of Jay, i. 153, 154; ii. 126, 127.
12. La Luzerne to the Congress, November 23rd, 1781. Vergennes to La Luzerne, January 28th, 1782. Life of Jay, i. 134.
13. Franklin to Shelburne, March 22nd, 1782; Works, viii. 460.
14. Rockingham to Shelburne, April 1782.
15. There is no authority for the statement in the Cornwallis Correspondence (i. 135, note), that Miss Mary Ramsay was the heroine of Burns's song:

    "O wat ye wha's in yonder town."

    The "Lucy" of the above song was the first wife of another Mr. Richard Oswald, and the daughter of Mr. Wynne Johnston. The marriage took place in 1793, and she died at Lisbon in 1797. Mr. Richard Oswald, the Commissioner, died in 1784 (see infra, p. 287). Whether he had met Franklin before his visit to Paris in 1782 is doubtful. Caleb Whitefoord, who accompanied him, says positively that Oswald and Franklin had not previously met; but Oswald in his Journal speaks of an earlier interview in 1777, and of reminding Franklin of it. (Whitefoord Papers, 193; Franklin's Works, viii. 461; Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Administrations of Great Britain, 82).

16. Sir G. C. Lewis, Administrations of Great Britain, 81.
17. Shelburne to Franklin, April 6th, 1782; Franklin's Works, viii. 461.
18. Franklin's Private Journal for 1782; Works, viii. 463.
19. Franklin's Private Journal, 1782; Works, viii. 464.
20. Franklin to Shelburne, April 18th, 1782; Works, viii. 465.
21. Lansdowne House MSS., and Franklin's Works, viii. 470-472.
22. See the observations of Sir G. C. Lewis. Administrations of Gt. Britain, 45.
23. Walpole Correspondence, viii. 222.
24. The evidence on this point is as follows: On April 28th Fox writes to Mr. Fitzpatrick, "Upon the pretence of the business having begun with the American ministers, Shelburne had a great mind if I had consented to have kept even this negotiation in his own hands." On the same day however Shelburne writes to Franklin, "It is also determined that Mr. Fox, from whose department that communication is necessarily to proceed, shall send a proper person." Shelburne to Franklin, April 28th, 1782; Franklin's Works, viii. 483.
25. The King to Shelburne, April 27th, 1782.
26. Shelburne to Oswald, May 21st, 1782; Grenville to Fox, May 10th, 1782, Memorials of Fox, i. 349.
27. Lansdowne House MSS.
28. Lansdowne House MSS.
29. Shelburne to Franklin, April 28th, 1782. Franklin's Works, viii. 483. Mr. Laurens was exchanged for Lord Cornwallis.
30. Diary of Franklin, May 1782. Works, xiii. 486.
31. Diary of Franklin, 1782. Grenville to Fox, May 10th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 347.
32. Franklin to Shelburne, Paris, May 13th, 1782. Works, viii. 496.
33. The King to Shelburne, May 14th, 1782.
34. Memorials of Fox, i. 351.
35. Memorials of Fox, i. 357.
36. The King to Shelburne, May 25th, 1782.
37. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 166-167, July 9th, 1782. Conway's Speech, July 1782.
38. Autobiography of Grafton, 318-319.
39. Memorials of Fox, i. 439.
40. Shelburne to Fox, May 25th, 1782.
41. Shelburne to Oswald, May 25th, 1782.
42. Life of Jay, ii. 459.
43. The King to Shelburne, May 25th, 1782.
44. Lansdowne House MSS.
45. Oswald's Diary, May 31st, 1782.
46. Grenville to Fox, June 16th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 379.
47. Diary of Franklin, May 1782. Works, viii. 512-513.
48. Diary of Franklin, May 1782. Works, viii. 516-520.
49. Diary of Franklin, June 1782. Works, viii. 524.
50. Oswald to Shelburne, June 9th, 1782.
51. Oswald to Shelburne, June 9th, 1782.
52. Diary of Franklin, June 1782. Works, viii. 528. Diary of Oswald, June 3rd, 1782.
53. Oswald to Shelburne, June 9th, 1782. Shelburne to Oswald, July 10th. The Enabling Act, 22 George III. c. 46.
54. Grenville to Fox, June 4th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 359. Oswald to Shelburne, June 9th, 1782.
55. Grenville to Fox, June 4th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 359.
56. Autobiography of Grafton, 318-320.
57. The King to Shelburne, June 1st, 1782.
58. Fox to Grenville, June 10th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 366.
59. Grenville to Fox, June 16th, 1782. Memorials of Fox, i. 375.
60. Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie, vii. 333.
61. Diary of Franklin, June 1782. Works, viii. 541-543.
62. Grenville to Fox, June 21st, 1782.
63. In the events which follow a strong resemblance will be found to the collision which took place in 1724 between the two Secretaries of State, Lord Townshend and Lord Carteret, when Lord Townshend sent Horace Walpole the elder to Paris on a special mission, where Sir Luke Schaub was Ambassador and reported to Lord Carteret. The result was the recall of Schaub and the retirement of Lord Carteret, though he was certainly not the offender (see Lord Stanhope's History of England, ed. 1853, ii. 86 et seq.). Schaub was by birth a Swiss subject, who had entered the English service. There is a portrait of him in the Museum at Bâle.
64. The King to Shelburne, June 17th, June 22nd, 1782.
65. Oswald to Shelburne, July 11th, 1782.
66. Grenville to Fox, June 21st, 1782. Diary of Franklin, June 15th, 1782. Works, viii. 541-544.
67. Autobiography of Grafton, 339-340.
68. Memorials of Fox, i. 331-333. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 321-323.
69. Shelburne to Oswald, July 10th, 27th, 1782.
70. Lansdowne House MSS. Cabinet Minutes. Memorials of Fox, i. 435. Autobiography of Grafton, 321-323.
71. Walpole to Mason, June 25th, 1782. Correspondence, viii. 236.
72. The King to Shelburne, July 1st, 1782.
73. Autobiography of Grafton, 330.