Life of William, Earl of Shelburne/Volume 2/Chapter 5

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2877921Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, Volume 2 — V. The Administration of Lord ShelburneEdmond George Petty-Fitzmaurice

CHAPTER V

THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD SHELBURNE

1782

On the 2nd of July, Lord Shelburne received the following letter from the King:—

"Lord Shelburne must remember that when in March I was obliged to change my Ministry, I called upon him to form a new one, and proposed his taking the employment of First Lord of the Treasury, which he declined to accommodate Ld Rockingham. The vacancy of that office makes me return to my original idea, and offer it to him on the present occasion, and with the fullest political confidence; indeed he has had an ample sample of it, by my conduct towards him since his return to my service. I desire he will therefore see the Chancellor, the Duke of Grafton, and others, either in or out of office, and collect their opinions fully, that he may be able to state something to me on Wednesday. He is at liberty to mention my intentions with regard to him, and to set forward in forming a plan for my inspection. The letter I wrote this morning and the conversations I have held with him previous to it, are the fullest instructions I can give on the subject. G. R.

"Windsor, July 1, 1782."

The same day Shelburne communicated the royal intentions to the other members of the Cabinet. The Whig party at once objected. The King according to their view was to be a mere phantom or imaginary person, and any proposed arrangement, they said, ought to have proceeded from the recommendation of the King's principal servants. This opinion was shared by all the friends of the deceased minister. It cannot however be considered to have been a constitutional opinion. The King has an undoubted right to choose his own advisers. In practice, indeed, this part of the prerogative has become limited, owing to there generally being some statesman whose position in the country clearly points him out as the successor of an outgoing or deceased Prime Minister. In such cases the King has no difficulty in his choice. When however no such person is clearly indicated by the voice of Parliament and of the nation, the King has to exercise his own discretion, guided by whatever counsel he may think fit to seek. He ought however under no circumstances to submit to the dictation of the remaining ministers, or of any other self-appointed junto. What the Whig aristocracy aimed at in 1782 was to obtain the right of themselves nominating the head of the Administration.

Besides Shelburne, there were three persons who could be looked upon as candidates for the succession to Rockingham: Fox, Grafton, and Richmond. The Whigs themselves did not propose Fox. Grafton by his conduct at the Treasury in 1767 seems to have deprived even his friends of any wish to see him return there. Richmond, owing to his opinions on Parliamentary Reform, was unpopular with the old Whigs. The Whig junto accordingly, after some discussion of the claims of Lord Fitzwilliam and the Duke of Devonshire, put all these candidates aside in favour of the Duke of Portland, who was perhaps wanting in every possible qualification for the important place for which he was designated. "Nobody," says Walpole, "recollected that he had been Lord Chamberlain in Lord Rockingham's First Administration. From that time he had lived in the most stately but most domestic privacy, often in the country, latterly in Burlington House. … His character was unimpeached, but he had never attempted to show any parliamentary abilities, nor had the credit of possessing any; nor did it redound to the honour of his faction, that in such momentous times they could furnish their country with nothing but a succession of mutes." His brief Lord-Lieutenancy in Ireland had not raised his reputation, and men profanely sneered at him as "a fit block to hang Whigs on," as the centre of a gang of "toad-eaters," and as a "heavy breeched Christian" who wanted "a shove."[1] Fortune nevertheless was reserving for him the singular distinction of being twice Prime Minister of England; first as the leader of the narrowest section of the Whig party, and afterwards as chief of the most Tory of Tory Administrations.[2]

Shelburne undertook to convey the wishes of his colleagues to the King. The King however refused to yield to the dictation of the Whigs, whom he described as "the phalanx," and "the leaders of sedition."[3] His determination was communicated by Shelburne to a meeting of the friends of the deceased minister. At this interview, according to Keppel, who was present, Fox "showed himself decided to give no facility to the new arrangement." Once he was brought by Richmond, who greatly disapproved of Fox's conduct,[4] to say, "that if Lord John Cavendish," who was determined in any case to leave the Exchequer, "would accept the seals, he would remain his colleague." Lord Ashburton was very anxious for a complete union, but Burke treated the idea with contempt, saying the Shelburne party did not consist of more than seven or eight persons. Lord Ashburton's reply was Non numeremur, sed ponderemur. Lord John Cavendish however again enacted the part which he had played with such success in 1766, and by a refusal to remain rendered any arrangement impossible. According to Keppel, "the share of power offered by Lord Shelburne, was all that Mr. Fox could desire to assist his management of the House of Commons, and was equal to anything that could in justice be required or with propriety granted."[5] On the 5th of July there was an animated conversation at Court, when Fox peremptorily asked Shelburne if he intended to accept the offer made to him by the King. Shelburne replied that he did, and Fox thereupon went to the King and resigned the seals.[6] He was followed in his resignation by Lord John Cavendish, Lord Althorp, and Mr. Montague, all members of the Treasury Board formed by Lord Rockingham, by Burke and Sheridan, by the Duke of Portland, by Mr. Fitzpatrick, who preferred attaching his fortunes to his friend rather than to his brother-in-law, and by Mr. Lee, the Solicitor-General. Some members also of the Whig connection who held places at Court resigned their appointments, but the resignations fell far short of what Fox had expected, and he and his friends hardly concealed their disappointment. Out of doors their conduct met with little approval or sympathy from a public opinion which at once realized the delight with which the news of the ministerial dissensions would be received in France and Spain.[7] Unwarned however by the first early symptoms of popular disapproval, they resolved to persevere in the course on which they had entered, careless of what means they employed to obtain their ends, and not foreseeing that in another year they would emerge ruined, alike politically and morally, from their death struggle with a Sovereign as unscrupulous as themselves.

. . . . . . . to the eastern Side
Of Paradise so late their happy Seat
Waved over by that flaming Brand, the Gate
With dreadful faces throng'd and fiery Arms
Some natural Tears they dropt, but wiped them soon JSF
Paradise lost The World was all before them where to chuse
Their Place of Rest and Providence their Guide
They Arm in Arm with wandring Steps and slow
Thro' Eden took their solitary Way.

Published 17 July 1782 by Charles Bretheron

New Bond Street

The vacant offices were filled up as follows: Lord Shelburne went to the Treasury, and at once appointed Mr. Pitt Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Orde Secretary to the Treasury.[8] The Seals of the Home and Colonial Department, with the lead in the House of Commons, were given to Thomas Townshend, whose place of Secretary at War was filled by Sir George Yonge. Colonel Barré became Paymaster of the Forces, and Mr. Dundas, a former supporter of Lord North, Treasurer of the Navy. Lord Temple went to Ireland as Lord-Lieutenant, with Mr. William Grenville, afterwards Lord Grenville, as his secretary. The Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, a place of the utmost importance owing to the pending negotiations, was conferred on Lord Grantham, for many years minister at Madrid. His long diplomatic experience was expected to prove of invaluable service. He was living in retirement in Yorkshire, when the news of this appointment reached him.[9] Richmond and Conway retained their former places. Of the old ministers they had proved themselves the most anxious to avoid a rupture. Grafton considered it right to remain, owing to Shelburne having on former occasions yielded the Treasury at his advice to Rockingham. Keppel's sense "of what was due to the country, to the fleet in general, and to the officers he had himself sent on different commands, prevailed over all other considerations," and though personally connected with the Rockinghams, he too stayed in office. Lord Camden from old attachment to Shelburne kept his post as President of the Council, but doubting the stability of the system, expressed a characteristic wish to resign at the end of three months.[10] Mr. Pepper Arden, the friend of Pitt, became Solicitor-General, while the Chancellor and the Attorney-General retained their places; so did Lord Ashburton. The King found himself with an Administration placed upon a broad bottom, but of a decidedly liberal complexion. Of the eleven Ministers who formed the Cabinet, seven were Chathamite Whigs; two had been followers of Rockingham; Lord Grantham had hitherto connected himself with no political party; the Chancellor represented the King.[11]

The first attack which the new Ministry had to meet was on the 9th of July, when Mr. Coke called attention to a pension of £3200 to Colonel Barré, which he understood was then passing the offices.[12] This pension was loudly attacked as scandalous and profligate, more especially because coming from ministers pledged to economy. The pension, as was shown during the debate, had received the consent of Rockingham, if indeed the suggestion did not actually originate with him; for Barré himself would have preferred some provision in the line of his profession.[13] The real question however was whether the pension was deserved or not, for the argument that a Ministry pledged to economy is debarred from granting rewards to the persons who deserve them, carries with it its own refutation. The main facts of Barré's case were these. The value of the posts from which he had been dismissed in 1763 were £1500 net money. It was true, as he acknowledged, that he had no right to look upon either the post of Adjutant-General or the governorship of Stirling Castle as tenable for lite; but they were military places, and he had a right to imagine that he would only have been dismissed from them for a military offence; but the fact was notorious that he had been dismissed for his votes in the House of Commons. It was also customary to give a regiment to the Adjutant-General, and his dismissal had entailed upon him the loss of that also. In 1763 he retired on the half-pay of a lieutenant-colonel, £166 a year. In 1770, again owing to his political conduct, a junior officer was promoted over his head; he had remonstrated but in vain; and in consequence gave up his half-pay and retired from the army. Thus he had to leave his profession, and was now in return to enjoy, whenever he should quit his present office, a pension not more than equal to the half-pay annexed to the rank which he would have been filling had he not been driven from his profession; for the real amount of the pension to him after deducting taxes and fees would be £2100. Such were the points which Barré urged. The defence, to borrow Walpole's phrase, may sound "broker like," but will hardly be denied a certain amount of force.[14] Fox said "he considered the pension as a payment for services most honourably performed, and by no means thought it either a lavish or misapplied grant." He then left the subject, and diverged into a defence of his own resignation. His speech was however vague and inconclusive, consisting mainly in charges of a deviation on the part of Shelburne from those principles on which the Administration had been formed. It ended with a fierce denunciation of him and his colleagues as a set of "men of that magnanimity of mind which was superior to the common feelings of humanity, for they thought nothing of promises which they had made; of engagements into which they had entered; of principles which they had maintained; of the system on which they had set out. They were men whom neither promises could bind, nor principles of honour could secure; they would abandon fifty principles for the sake of power, and forget fifty promises when they were no longer necessary to their ends. He had no doubt, but that to secure themselves in the power which they had by the labours of others obtained, they would now strive to strengthen themselves by any means which corruption could procure; and he expected to see that, in a very short time, they would be joined by those men whom that House had precipitated from their seats."

This violent attack called up Conway, who sarcastically declared that beyond small and nice shades of difference, he knew of no disagreements or divisions in the Cabinet; and denied that there had been any departure from the principles on which the Administration had been originally formed. Those principles were: that they should offer to America unlimited and unconditional independence as the basis of a negotiation for peace; that they should establish a system of economy in every department of government; that they should adopt the spirit and carry into execution the provisions of the Bill of Reform introduced into that House by Mr. Burke; that they would annihilate every kind of influence over any part of the legislature; and that they would secure to the Kingdom of Ireland the freedom now settled by Parliament.

Fox replied by again asserting that the differences in the Cabinet arose on questions of the utmost importance. He then in his turn passed on to a sarcastic review of the political conduct of Conway since 1765, accusing him of weakness and want of foresight; forgetful that only a few months had passed since he had himself congratulated Conway on having twice saved his country, once in 1766 at the time of the passing of the Stamp Act and again more recently in 1782.[15] He denied that the present Cabinet was determined to give full, unconditional, and unlimited independence to America; he asserted that Lord Shelburne was anxious to screen from punishment those delinquents who had destroyed the English Empire in the East; he said further that his promises of economy and retrenchment were designedly hypocritical, and that his appointment to the Treasury had consequently entailed his own resignation. The patronage of that place he said, was so great, that whoever rilled it, must have much more power than any other member of the Cabinet. "It was natural to imagine," he went on to say, "in an Administration formed on the principles of the men distinguished by the name of the Rockinghams, that upon the decease of that great man whose virtues, whose nobleness of thinking, and whose firm integrity bound them together, the man would be sought and appointed to succeed him who most resembled him in character, in influence, in popularity such at least were his ideas—and the eyes of all men—were naturally turned to the Duke of Portland." His speech concluded with another fierce invective against the Ministers, and a repetition of his belief that they were capable of coalescing with Lord North. To this attack Conway again replied with much sense and good humour. For the merits, he said, of Lord Rockingham he had the most serious esteem. "But why degrade the living by an ill-timed compliment to the dead? The Earl of Shelburne was not less respectable because his predecessor was a man of uncommon worth. No; there was an instance of merit in Lord Shelburne that it was but justice to mention to the House. He, so far from renewing the old exploded politics, had been able to convince his royal master, that a declaration of American independence was, from the situation of the country, and the necessity of the case, the wisest and most expedient measure that the Government, from the pressure of present circumstances, could possibly adopt. This he observed was a satisfactory reason to his mind that nothing less than such a measure in its utmost latitude was certainly meant by the Cabinet." Fox again rose, and denied all merit to Lord Shelburne in the matter mentioned by Conway. It was mainly to the House of Commons, he said, that any alteration of opinion on the part of the King was owing. He therefore deemed it, if not unfair, at least a poor compliment to the House, to attribute to an individual what was owing to their resolutions. Conway retorted what was perfectly true, and what he had a special right to say, that the independence of America had never been made a question in that House at all.

Fox was supported by Burke and Lord John Cavendish. The speech of the latter was brief and moderate, but Burke surpassed himself in that bad taste which nearly invariably disfigured his speeches when persons and not principles were in question. His speech, which was listened to with the utmost impatience, concluded by his asking Conway, whether if he had lived in the time of Cicero, he would have taken Catiline upon trial for his colleague in the consulship, after he had heard his guilt clearly demonstrated by the great orator? "Would he be co-partner with Borgia in his schemes, after he had read of his accursed principles in Machiavel? He could answer for him he knew he would not. Why then did he adhere to the present man? He meant no offence, but he would speak his honest mind. If Lord Shelburne was not a Catiline or a Borgia in morals, it must not be ascribed to anything but his understanding."[16] Burke would have done well, before uttering these sentiments, to have recollected the discreditable arrangement which when about to leave the Pay Office he had attempted to perpetrate for the benefit of his son.[17] Sir George Yonge and Pitt followed on the ministerial side. The speech of the latter marked the commencement of his long contest with Fox. He said he was bound to believe what the latter had said, but had it not been for his solemn declarations, he would have attributed his resignation to a balk in a struggle for power. His conduct was, in his opinion, influenced by a dislike to men and not to measures; and there appeared to him to be something personal in the business, for if Mr. Fox had such a dislike to the political sentiments of Lord Shelburne, why did he ever accept of him as a colleague, and if he only had suspicions but nothing more, why did he not call a Cabinet council, and become certain, before taking such a hasty step as he had done. He then reiterated what Conway had already said, viz. that it was the intention of the Government to persevere in a policy of peace, economy, and reform. After a few more words from Fox, the debate closed by Mr. Coke withdrawing his motion on the subject of Colonel Barré's pension.

In the House of Lords the proceedings were less excited. Richmond made a speech of a character similar to that of Conway. Shelburne then rose, and after thanking Richmond for his support, said that it was from his measures, not from his promises, that he expected to derive support; and if they should not be found to deserve it, he would not repine at not finding it. He lamented as much as any man the loss of Lord Rockingham; he lamented also the loss the Cabinet must sustain by the retreat of Mr. Fox and Lord John Cavendish, on account of the splendour of the abilities of the one, and the unimpeached integrity of the other: but still he would not think so ill of the other eight ministers who remained in the Council, as to suppose that they were not as attached to principle, and as zealous in the support of it, as either Mr. Fox or Lord John Cavendish; and consequently he said the public might rest satisfied, that while they continued in office, there would be no departure from those great principles which had formed the basis of the Administration. And here, he continued, he wished to observe, that he was bound to those principles, only because he thought them just and expedient: for he did not go into the Cabinet, as the avowed supporter of any man, or body of men; he had taken a share in the Administration of the country, merely as a member of the community, who had been chosen for that purpose by his Sovereign; he stood uncommitted to any man; and, though it had been insinuated that he had fomented divisions for the purpose of creating an opportunity to gratify his own ambition, he would publicly declare, that he had sacrificed the very situation he now held, to his desire of preserving harmony and unanimity in the Council; and though the office of First Lord of the Treasury was most certainly within his grasp when the first arrangements were forming, he sacrificed that object, which appeared to be so desirable to others, and joined the rest of His Majesty's new ministers in soliciting and pressing Lord Rockingham to accept that employment. It was true, he said, that his principles differed in some respects from those of some of his colleagues; but when they pleaded consistency, it was but fair that he should stand upon his consistency as firmly as they did upon theirs; and it would have been very singular indeed, if he should have given up to them all those constitutional ideas which for seventeen years he had imbibed from his master in politics, the Earl of Chatham; who had always declared, "that this country ought not to be governed by any party or faction, and that if it was to be so governed, the Constitution must necessarily expire." With these principles he declared he had always acted; they were not newly taken up for ambitious purposes; the House might recollect a particular expression that he had used some time ago, when speaking of party: he declared that "he never would consent that the King of England should be a King of the Mahrattas, among whom it was a custom for a certain number of great lords to elect a Peishwa, who was the creature of an aristocracy, and was vested with the plenitude of power, while the King was, in fact, nothing more than a royal pageant, or puppet." These being his principles, it was, he said, natural for him to stand up for the prerogative of the Crown, and insist upon the King's right to appoint his own servants. If the power which others wished to assume, of vesting in the Cabinet the right of appointing to all places, and filling up all vacancies, should once be established, the King must then resemble the King of the Mahrattas, who had nothing of sovereignty but the name: in that case the monarchical part of the Constitution would be absorbed by the aristocracy, and the famed Constitution of England would be no more. It was his adherence to these principles he declared that had drawn upon him some recent attacks, and fastened upon him the imputation of designs which he had never harboured: it was nothing but this adherence to consistency that had caused the late separation in the Cabinet; he would appeal to the members of that Cabinet: for though much had since been insinuated relative to an alteration in his opinions as to the independence of America, yet those ministers could all vouch, that in the Cabinet no reason of that nature or complexion had been assigned for the late resignations, nor had been even hinted to the King. His own appointment to the Treasury, the importance of the patronage attaching to which was grossly exaggerated, he believed to be the sole cause of the resignations. His opinion on the subject of American independence was still the same; he had declared it often, and he would repeat it now; it had ever been his opinion, that the independence of America would be a dreadful blow to the greatness of this country; and that when it should be established, "the sun of England might be said to have set": he had therefore always laboured to prevent so fatal a misfortune from befalling his country; he had used every effort in public and in private, in England and out of it, to guard it from so dreadful a disaster: but now the fatal necessity of seeing it fall upon the country was in full view; and to necessity he was obliged to give way.[18] But while he felt the necessity of giving way to unavoidable misfortunes, he was free to say, that it was his firm opinion that the melancholy event had been hastened by the rash and precipitate advice that had been so frequently given by some people, some years ago, to acknowledge an independence, which then might have been destroyed in the bud. It had been insinuated elsewhere, he said, that were his principles relative to American independence known, the people of America would be backward to treat with him for peace; but he had learned enough from the information received during the last two months, to know that there was no man with whom the Americans would more willingly treat than with himself. As to the steps that had been already taken towards a peace with America, he entreated their lordships to give him credit when he assured them, that the principle laid down relative to peace with America at any rate, and which had been correctly stated by the Duke of Richmond, had not in the smallest degree been departed from: the despatches upon that subject must remain secret for the present; but the day would come when the publication of them could not be attended with any injury to the public: to that day he looked with an earnest anxiety; and he was convinced, both they and the public would then be satisfied that the insinuations thrown out, relative to a change of system towards America, were totally without foundation.

The language of despondency, he declared in conclusion, which had been so often held, had never, in his opinion, been productive of any good; he would have the world know, that though this country should have received a fatal blow by the independence of America, still there was a determination to improve every opportunity, and to make the most vigorous exertions to prevent the Court of France from being in a situation to dictate the terms of peace; the sun of England would set with the loss of America; but it was his resolution to improve the twilight, and to prepare for the rising of England's sun again.[19]

Fox: "Ah! what I've found you out, have I? Who arm'd the high Priests & the People? Who betray'd his Mas—" Shelburne: "Ha! Ha! - poor Gunpowder's vexed! - He, He, He! - Shan't have the Bag I tell you, Old Goosetooth!"

Pubd Augt 14th 1782 by Eh D'Achery St James's Street

"GUY-VAUX & JUDAS-ISCARIOT"

Dialogues of the Dead: Page 1782.

The following day Fox protested loudly against the assertion made by Shelburne that the recent resignations were in reality owing to the manner in which the Treasury had been filled, and wrote to Shelburne to complain. Shelburne it would seem did not attach any importance to the previous announcements made by Fox of his intention to resign. "You must be sensible," he wrote in reply to the out-going Secretary of State, "that Sunday was not the only Cabinet Council at which you talked of resignation, and that you particularly desired that what passed then, should not be mentioned to the King, which it accordingly never has been by me. Subsequently to Lord Rockingham's death in every conversation I had the honour to have with you, the deliberation turned singly on the succession to the Treasury, without reference to any public point whatever. As to adverting to what has passed either in the Cabinet or in the closet I hold both highly improper, but the impropriety lies with those who make the appeal."[20]

Parliament rose on the 11th of July; and Shelburne, who in order to be constantly near London had hired the villa at Streatham, once the residence of the Thrales,[21] was able to give his undivided attention to the negotiations at Paris. Thither he despatched Benjamin Vaughan, the political economist,[22] an intimate friend of Franklin, to give private assurances to the latter that the change of Administration brought with it no change of policy. To Oswald himself, who did not anticipate that the point of independence once conceded, any difficult points would arise on the American negotiation, Shelburne wrote that he hoped to receive early assurances that his confidence in the sincerity and good faith of Franklin had not been misplaced and that he would concur in rendering effectual the great work in which their hearts and wishes were so equally interested. "I beg him to believe," the letter concluded, "that I can have no idea or design in acting towards him and his associates, but in the most liberal and honourable manner.[23]

On the 9th of July Franklin communicated to Oswald the outline of the conditions which he considered might form the basis of the treaty of peace. These conditions fell into two classes: the necessary and the advisable. The first were as follows:—

1. Independence full and complete in every sense, and all troops to be withdrawn.

2. A settlement of the boundaries of the Thirteen States.

3. A confinement of the boundaries of Canada, to at least what they were before the Quebec Act, if not to still narrower limits.

4. A freedom of fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland and elsewhere as well for fish as whales.

The advisable articles were as follows:—

1. To indemnify many people who had been ruined by the destruction of towns. "The whole," Franklin said, "might not exceed five or six hundred thousand pounds. However, though it was a large sum it would not be ill bestowed, as it would conciliate the resentment of a multitude of poor sufferers, who could have no other remedy, and who, without some relief, would keep up a spirit of secret revenge and animosity for a long time to come against Great Britain: whereas a voluntary offer of such reparation would diffuse an universal calm and conciliation over the whole country."

2. Some sort of acknowledgment by Act of Parliament, or otherwise, of the error of England in distressing the Colonies, as she had done. "A few words of that kind," Franklin said, "would do more good than people could imagine."

3. The ships and trade of the States to be received and have the same privileges in Britain and Ireland as British ships and trade.

4. The cession of Canada and Nova Scotia.

At the close of the interview at which the above conditions were communicated to Oswald, Franklin distinctly intimated that nothing could be done in the treaty for the Loyalists, as their property had been confiscated by laws of particular States over which Congress had no authority, and he drew back from the suggestion which he had himself made in a previous conversation, that the cession of the back lands of Canada might be accompanied by a stipulation in their favour. As to the difference between the grant of independence by a separate public act and the expression of it in the clauses of the treaty, he did not seem to Oswald to attach much importance, so long as it was expressly included in the commission to be given to Oswald. At the same time he distinctly intimated that Independence full, complete, and unconditional, would alone satisfy his principals.[24]

Hardly however had Oswald conveyed the above information to Shelburne, and followed it up by an expression of his own belief that Franklin was anxious for a settlement without allowing himself to be hampered by any particular attention to the views of France, before he had to write again to warn Shelburne that the whole negotiation was imperilled by the conduct of Grenville. When Fox resigned, Grenville thought fit to resign also, though Shelburne had been anxious that he should remain at his post. Mr. Fitzherbert, English Minister at Brussels, was appointed his successor in Paris. Before leaving Paris however Fox's Envoy shot a Parthian dart behind him, spreading abroad a report that it was not the intention of Shelburne to grant independence to America, and consequently that the negotiation would fail.[25] His language made Franklin demand that some express acknowledgment should be given independently of the treaty itself of the recognition by England of the independence of the United States.[26] "Until it is made," he wrote to Oswald, "and the treaty formally begun, propositions and discussions seem on consideration to be untimely."

On receiving this intelligence from Oswald, Shelburne at once wrote as follows:—

"I know the correctness of my own conduct, and that it can stand every test. A French minister might not so easily be brought to understand the conduct of others. But those with whom you have particularly to treat, know too much of the parties incident to our Constitution, and of the violence and inveteracy occasioned by personal disappointment, to be easily misled by false assertions or newspaper comments. I need only appeal to your own knowledge. However, as you may not wish it to rest entirely upon that, I have obtained His Majesty's leave to send you my dispatch to Sir Guy Carleton and Vice-Admiral Digby dated so long ago as the 5th June,[27] and Mr. Fox's letter to M. Simolin of the 28th June, and you are at liberty to communicate to Dr. Franklin such parts of both, as may be sufficient to satisfy his mind, that there never have been two opinions since you were sent to Paris, upon the most unequivocal acknowledgment of American independence to the full extent of the resolutions of the province of Maryland enclosed to you by Dr. Franklin. But to put this matter out of all possibility of doubt, a commission will be immediately forwarded to you, containing full powers to treat and to conclude, with instructions from the Minister who has succeeded to the department which I lately held, to make the independency of the colonies the basis and preliminary of the treaty now depending and so far advanced, that hoping, as I do with you, that the articles called advisable will be dropped and those called necessary alone retained as the ground of discussion, it may be speedily concluded.

"I have only to add on this subject, that these powers which have been prepared since the 21st June, were begun upon within twenty-four hours of the passing of the Act, and completely finished in four days following, and have been since delayed owing to its being asserted that your continuance at Paris prejudiced everything that was depending, which required that they should be entrusted exclusively to Mr. Grenville. You know best the truth of this assertion.

"You very well know I have never made a secret of the deep concern I feel in the separation of countries united by blood, by principles, habits, and every tie short of territorial proximity. But you very well know that I have long since given it up, decidedly though reluctantly, and the same motives which made me perhaps the last to give up all hope of reunion, make me most anxious if it is given up, that it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all future risk of enmity, and lay the foundation of a new connection better adapted to the present temper and interests of both countries. In this view, I go further with Dr. Franklin perhaps than he is aware of, and farther perhaps than the professed advocates of independence are prepared to admit. My private opinion would lead me to go a great way for Federal Union; but is either country ripe for it? If not means must be left to advance it.

"You will find the Ministry united in full possession of the King's confidence, and thoroughly disposed to peace, if it can be obtained upon reasonable terms; if not, determined to have recourse to every means of rousing the Kingdom to the most determined efforts. The liberal spirit which has taken place in our domestic government, new plans which are offering every day for augmenting the navy, the national spirit which must result from ill treatment and oppression, the open and weak parts of some of our enemies who have large and distant dominions as well as ourselves to pay for, will I am sure produce greater effects than our enemies imagine; but the public expectation will be proportionably raised, distant expeditions relied upon, and peace rendered more difficult than ever.

"Let it be well understood that no offer on our part is now wanting to prevent this series of calamities by an immediate reconciliation."[28]

Actuated by these feelings Shelburne proceeded to instruct the Attorney-General to draw up a commission for Oswald, who was accordingly empowered "to treat, consult, and conclude, with any Commissioner or Commissioners named or to be named by the said Colonies or plantations, and any body or bodies corporate or politic, or any Assembly or Assemblies, or description of men, or any person or persons whatsoever, a peace or truce with the said Colonies or plantations, or any of them, or any part or parts thereof."[29] Oswald went to Paris accompanied by Caleb Whitefoord as Secretary to the Commission. Whitefoord, who was of an old Scotch family, had known Franklin when living in Craven Street, and became intimate with him. Like Oswald he was in commerce, but had also acquired reputation as a wit and littérateur. Burke sneered at the appointments as those of a "mere merchant" and a diseur de bons mots.[30]

Oswald received instructions from Shelburne, the fourth article of which said: "In case you find the American Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms short of independence, you are to declare to them that you have our authority to make that concession, our earnest wish for peace disposing us to purchase it at the price of acceding to the complete independence of the Thirteen States."[31] He was directed in his negotiations to claim as a matter of absolute justice all debts incurred to the subjects of Great Britain before 1775, and the interposition of Congress with the several provinces to procure an ample satisfaction upon this point; to demand the restitution of the confiscated property of the Loyalists, or an indemnification; to claim New York, which was still in possession of the English troops, and the ungranted domains in each province as a possible means of obtaining this indemnification; to do everything in his power to prevent the United States entering into any binding connection with any other Power; to propose an unreserved system of naturalization as the foundation of a future amicable connection; to act in perfect cordiality with the envoy sent to negotiate with the European belligerents; and if necessary to dispose the American Commissioners towards a separate negotiation.[32]

On seeing the commission of Oswald, Franklin at first said "it would do."[33] Jay, who had been in Paris since the 23rd of June, but owing to a severe illness had hitherto been unable to take any share in the negotiations, was not so easily satisfied. He absolutely refused to have any concern in a negotiation in which the United States were not treated as an independent nation; believing that until their independence was recognized they would be at the mercy of France and Spain, who would barter their rights with England for concessions to themselves. He was mainly induced to take this step by a conversation he had recently had with D'Aranda, who had traced a line on a map showing him what he considered would be the proper boundaries of the United States.[34]

Vergennes, who was not anxious to see the American negotiation make any progress, almost simultaneously informed Fitzherbert that until a preliminary recognition of American independence was given, he would refuse to take any further step in the negotiation; and Franklin, following his lead, joined his colleague in asking for a change in Oswald's commission, insisting that a certification of American independence should be given, and stating that until then, he would refuse to take any further step in the negotiation; thereby confirming the truth of what Oswald had already told Shelburne, that France would seize every opportunity of delaying a general pacification. Franklin also intimated, in order to alarm Oswald, that he was about to sign a treaty of commerce and alliance with Spain, containing clauses in regard to the conclusion of peace, of a character similar to those in the treaty with France.[35]

From the 11th to the 17th of August did Oswald go backwards and forwards between the American Commissioners. Jay insisted that independence ought to have been granted by Act of Parliament, and an order given for the withdrawal of all troops, previous to any proposal for a treaty; and he insisted that a certificate should be given of the grant by a Proclamation, or a Patent under the Great Seal. In vain did Oswald point out that the constitutional character of any such proceeding as that proposed might be called in question in England, and discussions arise which would only add to the existing difficulties. Jay replied by passing in review the whole conduct of England to America, going so far as even to constitute himself the apologist of the French, and to assert that they had been very hardly treated in the last war. Oswald with much force pointed out that that war had been undertaken solely for the benefit of the American Colonies, and that the treaty which concluded it had been dictated from a regard to their supposed interests. Jay however remained obdurate.[36] "We have little to expect from him," wrote Oswald to Shelburne, "in the way of indulgence." It afforded but small consolation that Franklin told him that Jay "was a lawyer, and might think of things that did not occur to those who were not lawyers," for as Oswald observed, that would be the very reason why in all probability a great share of the business would be assigned to him. Oswald at length asked Jay if he would be satisfied with such an alteration in his commission as would imply that the clause in the treaty recognizing independence should be made independent of the others.[37] Jay said he would, and suggested further that the words "we do hereby in pursuance of our royal word for ourselves and our successors, recognize the said Thirteen Colonies as free and independent States" be inserted in it. "The American Commissioners," Oswald wrote to Shelburne, "will not move a step until the independence is acknowledged, and till the Americans are contented, Mr. Fitzherbert cannot proceed."[38]

Jay suspected Vergennes of being the secret cause of the refusal by England of a preliminary recognition of American independence, and of plotting with Fitzherbert in order to exclude the New England fishermen from the Newfoundland fishery and to keep the valley of the Ohio for England; nor was he far from the truth in regard to the ideas of the French minister. What Vergennes aimed at, was to delay the whole negotiation and to keep up the American alliance and the war, in order first to extort Gibraltar from England, and afterwards obtain some express acknowledgment of the Spanish claim to the Mississippi and of the French claim to the fisheries, by the threat of a refusal of further supplies to the Americans.[39]

On hearing of the difficulty which had sprung up in Paris, the Cabinet decided on rejecting Oswald's proposal, but in order to facilitate matters, expressed their willingness to accept the " necessary articles "of Franklin as the basis of the negotiation, thereby at once removing all Jay's apprehensions on the question of the boundaries and the fisheries, but explaining at the same time that the limits of Canada would under no circumstances be made narrower than under the Proclamation of 1763, and that the right of drying fish on the shores of Newfoundland would not be conceded to the American fishermen. The despatch in which Townshend communicated these points to Oswald concluded by saying, "His Majesty is pleased, for the salutary purposes of precluding all further delay and embarrassment of negotiation, to waive any stipulation by the treaty for the undoubted rights of the merchants whose debts accrued before the year 1775 and also for the claims of the refugees for compensation for their losses; as Dr. Franklin declares himself unauthorized to conclude upon that subject: yet His Majesty is well founded it is hoped in his expectation, that the several Colonies will unite in an equitable determination of points upon which the future opinion of the world, with respect to their justice and humanity, will so obviously depend. But if, after having pressed this plan of treaty to the utmost, you should find the American Commissioners determined not to proceed unless the independence be irrevocably acknowledged, without reference to the final settlement of the rest of the treaty, you are to endeavour to obtain from them a declaration, that if this point of independence were settled, they would be satisfied, as far as relates to America, with such farther concessions as are contained in the four articles as above stated. You are then, but in the very last resort, to inform them, in manifestation of the King's most earnest desire to remove every impediment to peace, that His Majesty is willing, without waiting for the other branches of the negotiation, to recommend to his Parliament to enable him forthwith to acknowledge the independence of the Thirteen united Colonies, absolutely and irrevocably; and not depending upon the event of any other part of a treaty. But upon the whole, it is His Majesty's express command, that you do exert your greatest address to the purpose of prevailing upon the American Commissioners to proceed in the treaty, and to admit the article of independence as a part, or as one only of the other articles which you are hereby empowered to conclude."[40]

It now became impossible for Jay to deny the good faith of the English Ministers. He received almost simultaneously a further proof of the designs of France and Spain in the shape of an elaborate memorandum from Rayneval, showing the nullity of the right of the United States to the valley of the Mississippi;[41] and of a despatch from M. de Marbois, the French chargé d'affaires at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, recently communicated to him by means of one of the agents in the employment of the English Government, the secret service money of which was well expended. The despatch strongly condemned the pretensions of New England to the Newfoundland fisheries.[42] A despatch had also been intercepted from Vergennes to M. de Lucerne instructing him to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any attack by Washington's army on Canada; and the papers captured with Mr. Laurens showed how anxious the Spanish Government was to prevent the valley of the Mississippi or any portion of it falling into the hands of the American colonists. Nor did either Vergennes or D'Aranda appear to have much confidence in the stability of the American Congress. The effect on Jay was instantaneous. To the arguments of Rayneval, who he ascertained was leaving France for England upon a secret mission under the assumed name of Castel, he turned a deaf ear,[43] and without the knowledge or consent of Franklin, he induced Benjamin Vaughan to return to England, in order to tell Shelburne to beware of Rayneval, and to express on his behalf the opinion that the obvious interest of England was to put an end to the alliance between America and France, while as regarded the question of Independence he agreed to waive his demand of a previous and absolute acknowledgment, provided that the commission to Oswald instead of speaking of the Colonies and plantations naming them one by one should denominate them the 13 United States of America.[44]

"This would set the whole machine in motion," said Jay, whose influence from this time forward predominated over that of Franklin. Oswald wrote that the French Court evidently wished the Colonies might not be satisfied, and that Lafayette was always "going about the Commissioners," as one of the latter had himself informed him. "M. de Vergennes," he went on to say, "has sent an agent over to London on some particular negotiation, it is thought in favour of Spain. That Court wishes to have the whole of the country from West Florida of a certain width quite up to Canada, so as to have both banks of the Mississippi clear, and would wish to have such a cession from England, before a cession of the Colonies takes place. The Spaniards have the whole French tide, and would gladly complete it by patches from the English pretensions, which they could not hope for, once we have agreed with the Colonies."[45]

At the end of the month of August, De Grasse, who was a prisoner in England, having been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis, returned to France. He had seen Shelburne before leaving England. Taking advantage of a conversation with him, on arriving in Paris he showed some notes to Vergennes for which he claimed a semi-official character, and represented them as containing Shelburne's views on the terms of peace with France. Vergennes however suspected the authenticity of the claim put forward by De Grasse; and for this reason, and in order to sound the general situation, he had determined to send Rayneval to London.

When Rayneval arrived, George III. took a strong objection to his quiet and unpretentious appearance, believing it to be part of the stock-in-trade of Vergennes. "The art of M. de Vergennes, is so well known," he wrote to Shelburne, "that I cannot think he would have sent him if he was an inoffensive man of business, but that he has chosen him for having that appearance, while armed with cunning; which will be more dangerous if under so specious a garb."[46]

Several long interviews took place between this formidable envoy and Shelburne, who was accompanied by Grantham. In these Shelburne told Rayneval, that he would trust him as he would M. de Vergennes himself; that he desired to borrow the words attributed to the latter, "un paix stable non platrée"; that he confessed that he had opposed American independence, as long as it was possible to do so; that it was even now a bitter pill to swallow; but that he must submit to his fate; that except upon that topic, he had as yet given no reply to the propositions of M. de Grasse; at the same time he perfectly understood that the concession of American independence alone would not satisfy France, as Mr. Fox had supposed. There ought to be no difficulty, he added, as to the cession of St. Lucia and Dominica, nor as to the rights of the French fishermen off Newfoundland, the abrogation of the clauses in former treaties relating to Dunkirk, the claims of the French on the coast of Africa, and the settlement of the commercial relations of the two countries on a liberal footing, such as had been aimed at by the eighth and ninth clauses of the Treaty of Utrecht. It must however, he explained, be distinctly understood, that England would admit no claim of sovereignty on the part of France over any part of the Island of Newfoundland, or the establishment of any post, civil or military, within its limits; and upon this point Grantham insisted with an earnestness which, as Rayneval wrote to Vergennes, was unusual in him.[47] Senegal also was not under any circumstances to be held to include the settlements on the Gambia, and England would not surrender Trincomalee. Shelburne also expressed a hope that France would not exercise the right of restoring the fortifications of Dunkirk, as English pride would not suffer "a pistol to be pointed at the mouth of the Thames"; and he also expressed a belief that the abrogation of the clauses of previous treaties on that subject ought to be couched in terms such as would spare the just susceptibilities of the King of England;[48] it would require an Act of Parliament to enable the English Ministry to negotiate a liberal commercial treaty, and the treaty of Peace between the two countries could consequently touch on that question in but very general terms. On none of these points did the negotiators foresee any obstacle which further pourparlers could not easily remove; and it was not until they arrived at the article of India that any material difference of opinion arose. Rayneval demanded that France should be restored to the position in which she stood in 1754. Shelburne firmly refused to entertain any such proposal. To enfranchise Dunkirk, to cede what France asked for on the coast of Africa and off Newfoundland, to allow the fortification of Chandernagore, was he said as much as any English Minister would dare to propose; more was impossible. A further discussion of the question led Rayneval to qualify his demands, and it was agreed that, more especially as the propositions now being advanced by the French Minister were all to be considered as having an unofficial character, the ultimate settlement of the French Establishments in India might be safely left to be settled at Versailles.

On the question of the doctrines contained in the declaration of the Armed Neutrality, Shelburne announced that he would under no circumstances make any concession, and this led to a declaration of his views on the proposed mediation of the Northern Courts. He declared that England had no need of their interference; that he could not conceive what the Kaunitzs and the Potemkins could understand about the affairs of Western Europe, considering the great difficulty which Western statesmen had in understanding the affairs of the North. He went on to tell Rayneval that he set no value whatever on the alliance of the Northern Courts; that he was astonished that they should be allowed to play any part at all; that he was of opinion that France and England being reconciled, should after the peace unite their interests in such a manner as to become the arbiters of the peace of Europe. In support of this position he told the French Envoy that when formerly Secretary of State he had wished to agree with France to hold a firm and decisive language to Russia and Prussia, and thereby prevent a dismemberment of Poland; but this had been rendered impossible by international enmities. He added that he was especially doubtful of the sincerity of Kaunitz.[49] He ended by saying that there were only three people whose agreement was necessary to secure peace, himself, his interlocutor, and Vergennes.

Thus far the interviews between the negotiators had been satisfactory. Agreement however became more difficult when the Spanish claims, as to which Rayneval at first professed to have no information, came on the tapis. The French Envoy, after a considerable amount of fencing, told Shelburne that Gibraltar was as dear to the King of Spain as life itself, and that if the cession of it were refused, peace would be impossible. Shelburne replied that Gibraltar would no doubt be in the negotiation, what it was in the sea, "a rock"; that he did not believe that the English nation would suffer any minister to surrender it; that such had been the opinion of Mr. Fox, with whom he had discussed the question, since when he had not talked about it; in any case if it were ceded, it would only be in exchange for an adequate equivalent, and Rayneval having suggested that Oran and Mazalquivir would afford such an equivalent, Shelburne refused the proposition altogether, and said that nothing less than Majorca or large cessions in the West Indies would satisfy him. Rayneval demurring to this idea, Shelburne said that his answer on the subject of Gibraltar must be a decided non possumus and that the responsibility of the continuance of the war would rest with Spain, and with Spain alone. In this declaration Grantham joined in unmistakable terms. Again and again did Rayneval return to the charge, urging the claims of Spain, yet always professing the utmost desire on the part of Vergennes and of Louis XVI. himself for peace. Shelburne replied that it was in the power of France to make peace; for himself if put to it he said he would continue the war without hesitation, although sincerely desirous of putting an end to it and forming an alliance between France and England; but he firmly declared he would conclude a peace only upon honourable terms.

They then proceeded to speak about America. Here Rayneval played into the hands of English Ministers, by expressing a strong opinion against the American claims to the Newfoundland fishery and to the Valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio. "As to boundaries," he said, following the line of argument in the Memorandum which he had handed to Jay, "the British Minister will find in the negotiations of 1754 relative to the Ohio, the boundaries which England, then the sovereign of the thirteen United States, thought proper to assign to them."[50] These opinions were carefully noted by Shelburne and Grantham. The conversation then became general. "I have been sincerely touched," said Shelburne addressing the French Envoy, "by all you have told me of the character of the King of France, of his principles of justice and moderation, and of his love for peace. Believing your estimate of his character to be correct, I desire not only to contribute to a pacification between our respective nations and sovereigns, but also to restore those cordial relations upon which their future happiness depends. Not only are they not natural enemies, as men have hitherto vainly supposed, but they have interests which ought to bring them together. There was once a time when a cannon shot could not be fired in Europe without the consent of France and England, but now the Northern Powers aspire to act independently of us. Thus by our determination to injure one another we have both lost our position. Let us change principles so erroneous; let us unite; let us agree; and we shall dictate terms to the rest of Europe. You are not so blind in France as not to be convinced that on the one hand the policy of the Empire is unnatural, and that Russia wishes to play a part and has views equally unsuitable to the interests of France as of England. If we agree, we shall resume our ancient place, and put a stop to all violent changes in Europe." "There is," he continued, "another object which forms part of my policy: the destruction of commercial monopoly. I regard it as an odious invention, though the English nation more than any other is tainted with it. But this idea needs time and skill, because it is diametrically opposed to the catechism of the English merchants. I shall bestow my most serious attention upon it, and I flatter myself that I shall be able to come to an understanding with your Court on the subject, as well as upon a union in policy." He then went on to tell the French Minister of the difficulties he had had in bringing round the King to his views on these and other subjects. The previous Ministers, he said, had never spoken to the King except to tell him of his greatness and power; they had always elevated him above all the greatest monarchs and the greatest ministers of the world, and had told him that his resources were infinite and that a short war would be sufficient to destroy the power of France. These ideas were strongly rooted in the mind of the King, and it was no easy task to eradicate them. He believed however that he had already succeeded to a considerable extent in doing so.

In a final interview, before Rayneval left England, Shelburne recapitulated the main points on which he had insisted in their previous interviews; his own desire of peace, and the obstacles interposed by Spain. "If the war is to be continued," he said, "I shall leave no stone unturned in order to carry it on with vigour. I shall seek alliances everywhere; I shall offer territorial cessions and commercial advantages in every direction in order to gain allies for England and to stir up a Continental war. Let the King of France reflect on the consequences. In one way or another I am determined to put an end to the present crisis. I have told the King and the Cabinet that as an English Minister I have only three courses before me, to make war à outrance, to conclude a peace, or to resign." Rayneval expressed his cordial wishes for the second alternative. "I cannot," he wrote to Vergennes, in reporting the result of his interviews before he started on his return to France, "sufficiently express my satisfaction at my reception by Lord Shelburne and the marks of confidence shewn me by him. They are the result of his friendly disposition towards France. They leave nothing to wish for, and I hope will have no slight influence on the negotiation. … Lord Shelburne is not ignorant of the suspicions which have been and probably still are entertained in France as to his straightforwardness, and he feels them the more, in proportion as he believes that he has not deserved them. I venture to be of the same opinion, and if I say so, it is because I consider that my personal acquaintance and conversations with Lord Shelburne have placed me in a position to know him perfectly. Unless I am entirely mistaken he is a Minister of noble views and character, proud and determined, yet with the most winning manners. He takes a broad view of affairs and hates petty details. He is not obstinate in discussion, but you must convince him; still, in more than one instance, I have observed that sentiment more than reason has influenced his mind. I may add that his friends and entourage do him honour. There is not an intriguer or doubtful character among them. A man such as I have described is not ordinarily either false or captious, and I venture to say that Lord Shelburne is neither the one nor the other, whatever persons may say who imagine that they know him, but imagine wrongly."[51]

Benjamin Vaughan had arrived, almost simultaneously with Rayneval. It became clear to the Cabinet that a profound feud had sprung up between the Americans and their European allies, and that all they had to do was to avail themselves of it. They at once decided to accept the American proposition as to the terms of the commission to Oswald. Lord Ashburton gave it as his opinion that the alteration came within the terms of the Enabling Act.[52] The grant of a large body of seamen by the Irish Parliament came at this moment—if rather unexpectedly—to strengthen the British fleet, and the American Commissioners were on their part well able to realize that the destruction of De Grasse's fleet prevented France sending any further reinforcements across the Atlantic. The moment was favourable, they recognized, for shaking off dependence on France as well as on England. The new commission was at once made out and despatched to Paris by Vaughan. "Having said and done everything," Shelburne wrote to Oswald, "which has been desired, there is nothing for me to trouble you with, except to add that we have put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man, in the American Commissioners. It is now to be seen how far they or America are to be depended upon. I will not detain you with enumerating the difficulties which have occurred. There never was greater risk run. I hope the public will be the gainer, else our heads must answer for it, and deservedly."[53]

It remained to be seen whether the separation thus successfully accomplished of the two negotiations could be maintained, and what effect it would have on the tone of France and Spain.

  1. Walpole, Journals, ii. 547, 548. Correspondence, viii. 253, 261, 351.
  2. With true instinct, Horace Walpole saw that if Shelburne was to be put aside, Fox should be Rockingham's successor. "I have been called a republican," he writes to Lady Ossory; "but if never a republican quite, I never approached in thought, wish, or inclination to an aristocracy. … I never admired Lord Rockingham; shall his self-appointed executors tell me that I am to take the oaths to Lord Fitzwilliam? My Whiggism is not confined to the Peak of Derbyshire."—Correspondence, viii. 246-247.
  3. The King to Shelburne, July 9th, 1782.
  4. The King to Shelburne, July 4th, 1782. Autobiography of Grafton, 327.
  5. Autobiography of Grafton, 227. Memorials of Fox, i. 435-437. Life of the Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, 45, 47. Nicholls' Recollections, i. 98.
  6. Memorials of Fox, i. 435-437. The King to Shelburne, July 3rd, 4th, 1782. On the evening of the 5th at 6 o'clock Horace Walpole writes to Lord Harcourt: "The Prince of Wales dined with Mr. Fox yesterday by previous engagement; they drank royally. Charles went thence to Brook's, stayed till four in the morning, and it being so early finished the evening at White's with Lord Weymouth, 'and the evening and the morning and the next day were the first day.'"—Correspondence, viii. 245.
  7. Walpole, Journals, ii. 552. Correspondence, viii. 252.
  8. Lord Shelburne offered to make Dr. Price his Private Secretary, but he refused, saying the minister might as well have proposed to make him Master of the Horse.
  9. Lord Grantham to Sir J. Harris, July 28th, 1782. The King to Shelburne, July 9th, 1782.
  10. Autobiography of Grafton, 325.
  11. The Cabinet was thus composed of eleven persons with the addition subsequently of the Duke of Rutland. This number was at the time considered unusually large. "In that supreme Administration Board there were," says Bentham, "three grades of power distinguished by appropriate denominations: the Cabinet simply; the Cabinet with the circulation; and the Cabinet with the circulation and the Post Office. By the circulation was meant the privilege of a key to the box in which the foreign despatches, with or without other documents of the day, went its rounds; by the Post Office, the power of ordering the letters of individuals to be opened at the Post Office. Such is the information given by that minister (Lord Shelburne) to the author of these pages when present at the opening of one of these receptacles and reading of the contents."—Bentham, Works, ix. 218.
  12. For an account of this debate see the Parliamentary History, xxiii. 152.
  13. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 195. Rockingham to Shelburne, March 1782. Memorandum on the formation of the Ministry. Lord Rockingham's own words are, "Col. Barry, Treasurer of the Navy, with an increased salary in proportion to all former advantages being cut off. The extra increased salary to be made out to Col. Barry for his life."
  14. See as to Barré's dismissal and loss of office and salary in 1763, Vol. I. pp. 212-215.
  15. During the debates which immediately preceded the fall of the Ministry of Lord North.
  16. The Rev. William Mason, writing to Horace Walpole, January 18th, 1783, says, "I think that Burke's mad obloquy against Lord Shelburne, and those virulent pamphlets in which he certainly must have had a hand, will do more to fix him in his office than anything else. By coming into Yorkshire to Lord Fitzwilliam's last summer, and there wrangling with various of his Lordship's guests about Parliamentary Reform, he in like manner indisposed several gentlemen of property and consequence against that noble lord." Correspondence, viii. 317.
  17. Walpole, Journals, ii. 554, who speaks of Burke's "frantic proposals." Memorials of Fox, i. 451.
  18. See supra, p. 14. Speech on March 5th, 1778.
  19. See Parliamentary History, xxiii. 188-196, 200, 201.
  20. Shelburne to Fox, July 1782.
  21. Autobiography of Mme. Piozzi, i. 105, ed. 1861.
  22. Vaughan was born in 1751 in Jamaica, the son of Samuel Vaughan, a merchant. He became acquainted with Shelburne through Benjamin Horne, the brother of John Home Tooke. He studied at Cambridge, where being a Unitarian, he was unable to take a degree. He also studied law at the Temple. Subsequently he returned to mercantile pursuits. Vaughan's wife was Sarah Manning, the aunt of Cardinal Manning. Vaughan studied mercantile questions theoretically as well as practically, and became a recognized authority as a political economist.
  23. Shelburne to Oswald, June 30th, 1782. Oswald to Shelburne, July 10th, 11th.
  24. Oswald to Shelburne, July 10th, 1782.
  25. Oswald to Shelburne, July 10th, 11th, 12th, 1782. Franklin to Oswald, July 12th, 1782.
  26. Franklin to Oswald, July 12th. Oswald to Shelburne, July 12th, 1782.
  27. See Life of Jay, ii. 459, and supra, p. 135.
  28. Shelburne to Oswald, July 27th, 1782.
  29. Commission to Oswald, July 25th, 1782.
  30. Whitefoord Papers, Introduction, p. xxiii., published in 1898. Caleb Whitefoord obtained considerable reputation by his Cross Readings, formed by reading two columns of a newspaper onwards, whereby the strongest connections were brought about. (See Boswell's Johnson, iv. 322; and article "Caleb Whitefoord" in the Dictionary of National Biography.
  31. Instructions to Oswald, July 31st, 1782.
  32. Instructions from the King to Oswald, July 31st, 1782.
  33. Life of Jay, i. 142-144. Works of Adams, iii. 299.
  34. Life of Jay, ii. 472.
  35. Oswald to Shelburne, July 10th, 11th, 12th. Oswald to Townshend, August 5th. Fitzherbert to Shelburne, August 17th. The King to Shelburne, August 25th, 1782.
  36. Oswald to Shelburne and Townshend, August 17th. Minutes of his conversations with the American Commissioners, August 11th, 13th, 15th.
  37. Oswald to Townshend, August 17th, 21st, 1782.
  38. Life of Jay, i. 462. Oswald to Shelburne, August 18th, 1782.
  39. Life of Jay, i. 144, 145.
  40. Townshend to Oswald, September 1st, 1782.
  41. Joseph-Matthias Gérard de Rayneval was chief of the première direction of the French Foreign Office. He was born in 1736, and became premier commis in 1774. This place he held until 1792, when he was dismissed by General Dumouriez during his short tenure of the Foreign Office just before the fall of Louis XVI. (See Masson, Le Departement des Affaires Étrangères pendant la Revolution, 21, 148.) He was the brother of Conrad Alexandre Gérard, minister to the revolted colonies. The covering letter from Rayneval to Jay containing the memorandum speaks of it as containing his personal ideas, and the writers who have underrated the importance of this memorandum are under the necessity of supposing that it was communicated to Jay by Rayneval à l'insu of his official chief, Vergcnnes. (See the subject discussed in Mr. John Jay's "Address delivered to the New York Historical Society," 101.)
  42. "There are some judicious persons to whom one may speak of giving up the fisheries and the lands of the west for the sake of peace." Marbois to Vergennes, March 13th, 1782; Lansdowne House MSS. See Life of Jay, i. 144-145, where the date is wrongly given as March 31st, and i. 490-494, where the text is printed and the date correctly given; ibid. ii. 476, where the text of Rayneval's memorandum is printed; Fitzherbert to Shelburne, December 4th, 26th, 1782; Vergennes to La Lucerne, September 4th, 1781; Knox Papers, Historical MSS. Commission Reports; Various Papers, vi. 200.
  43. Life of Jay, i. 147; ii. 480. Rayneval to Shelburne, September 10th, 1782.
  44. Shelburne to Oswald, September 3rd. B. Vaughan to Franklin, July 10th. Franklin to Vaughan, July 11th. Oswald to Townshend and Shelburne, September 10th, 11th, 1782. Vaughan to Shelburne, September 12th, 1782.
  45. Oswald to Shelburne, September 11th, 1782.
  46. The King to Shelburne, September 14th, 1782.
  47. "I am very fearful my newness and caution may be misinterpreted and my necessary reserve may be called ministerial. Indeed I know I was thought when I wrote from Spain to be dry." Lord Grantham to Sir James Harris, July 28th, 1782. Malmesiury Correspondence, i. 455.
  48. Admiral Lord Hawke subsequently stated that Dunkirk could not be made really formidable to this country. See infra, p. 239.
  49. In a letter of the 27th July 1782 to Sir James Harris, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Shelburne expressed himself as follows: "We are ready to make every sacrifice provided the Empress once agrees to commit herself. You must imagine when I say this that we look for something more than words in our actual situation. We wish to avoid the mediation, because we have no confidence in the Court of Vienna, and are ignorant of the private connection which appears to have taken place between the Imperial Courts." Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, i. 453-454.
  50. On the 14th of October 1782 Vergennes had written to La Luzerne at Philadelphia as follows: "Moreover I do not see by what title the Americans can form pretensions on Lake Ontario. These lands belong to the savages or are a dependency of Canada. In either case the United States have no right to them whatever. It has been pretty nearly demonstrated that to the south of the Ohio their limits are the mountains following the shed of the waters, and that everything to the north of the mountain range, especially the lakes, formerly made a part of Canada." Bancroft, x. 582; "Address delivered before the New York Historical Society," November 27th, 1883, by Mr. John Jay, 212, note, where other passages to the same effect are given from the despatches of Vergennes. See also Life of John Jay, by Mr. William Jay, ii. 477.
  51. Rayneval to Vergennes, September 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 1782.
  52. Ashburton to Shelburne, September 18th, 1782. Townshend to Oswald, September 20th, 1782. Shelburne to Oswald, September 23rd, 1782. Walpole Correspondence, viii. 230.
  53. Shelburne to Oswald, September 23rd, 1782.