Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 9 December 1916
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
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Printed for the use of the Cabinet,December 1916.
SECRET.
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[To be returned to the Secretary, 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.]
WAR CABINET, 1.
Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at the War Office on Saturday, December 9, 1916, at 11.30 A.M.
Present:
The Prime Minister (in the Chair).
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The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.
The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
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The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
The Right Hon. A. Henderson, M.P.
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In attendance:
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The Right Hon. Sir E. Carson, K.C., M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. the Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office.
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Admiral Sir J. R. Jellicoe, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord.
General Sir W. R. Robertson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Secretary.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Dally Jones, Assistant Secretary.
Office of the War Cabinet.1. The War Cabinet decided that their offices should for the present be at Montagu House, which up to now has been occupied by the Shipping Control Committee, and was about to be transfered to the Ministry of Munitions. The Secretary was instructed to place himself in communication with the Office of Works with a view to the immediate transfer of these or other convenient offices to the War Cabinet at the earliest possible date.
Secretariat.2. The War Cabinet discussed the advisability of strengthening the Secretariat of the former War Committee by the addition of a civil side. The question was adjourned for further consideration.
Greece.3. The War Cabinet discussed a telegram, dated the 6th December, 1916, received by His Majesty the King from the King of Greece, and approved, with slight alterations, and subject to the concurrence of Mr. Balfour (who was unable to attend the meeting), a draft reply submitted by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Copies of the telegram from the King of Greece and the reply are attached. (Appendix I.)
The War Cabinet discussed at some length the action to be taken with regard to Greece. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff explained the military aspects of the question. From a military point of view, he said, it was most desirable not to go to war with Greece, but the present position was intolerable, as the concentration of Greek troops at Larissa threatened the flank and rear of the Allied forces based on Salonica. The Greek army, it was true, was not a formidable one. At the present moment, however, from 15,000 to 20,000 men were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Larissa, and these might be raised to a force of from 50,000 to 70,000 men. The Allied forces in the region of Monastir might, in the near future, be in considerable danger if the enemy released troops from the Roumanian front, which he could now do, to attack in Macedonia. It was, therefore, necessary to take immediate action to remove the danger from the Greek forces. His advice was that we should continue to enforce the blockade until the Greeks had withdrawn all their forces from Thessaly to the Morea. His information was to the effect that the Greeks only had wheat for some three weeks' consumption, including the Morea, and six weeks' stock of petroleum, the stocks of coal being sufficient to last to the end of January, or, with great economy, until the middle of February. Most of these stocks were at the Piraeus, and it was desirable that their distribution should not be permitted.
The First Sea Lord pointed out that instructions had been issued to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Eastern Mediterranean to co-operate with the French Commander-in-Chief, and orders had been given him that the mobilisation and concentration of the Greek army towards Larissa should be delayed; that the railway between Larissa and Athens should be attacked by airmen; that ammunition dumps and military stores at Larissa or elsewhere, within reach of aerial attack, should be destroyed by airmen; and that the railway in the vicinity of Mount Olympus, within reach of the sea, should be destroyed by air attack or gun-fire; but that General Sarrail's consent must first be obtained. Unless instructions were sent to the contrary, action might be taken at any moment in execution of these orders.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that instructions had been given to General Milne to assist the Vice-Admiral in any way he could.
The Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out the risk that General Sarrail might take such action as would drive us into war at once with Greece. He said that the Greek Government had made a protest against the Allied blockade, and he advised that we should give the Greeks clearly to understand that the blockade would not be removed until they had given reparation for the unjustifiable attack on the Allied troops in Athens. He read a draft reply to the Greek protest, which was discussed.
The War Cabinet were generally averse at this stage to any minor operations, such as raids by aircraft against the Greek communications, which, on the one hand, would only inflict temporary damage, and on the other hand, would actually constitute acts of war. They decided on the following action:—
(b.) Any movement of troops from the Morea northwards would be regarded as an act of war.
(c.) The blockade would be continued until we obtained reparation for the acts already committed, and guarantees for the future.
Copies of the instructions to the British Minister in Athens to be sent simultaneously to Paris, Rome, and Petrograd.
The British Minister at Athens should be instructed that he should make a communication to the Greek Government as soon as his colleagues received their instructions.
(2.) The Admiralty to send instructions to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Eastern Mediterranean, not to take any action, such as the destruction of bridges or railways, or otherwise to commit any act of war apart from the blockade, until he receives further instructions.
(3.) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff to send a corresponding communication to the General Officer Commanding the British Expeditionary Force in the Balkans.
Propaganda.4. Sir Edward Carson read a letter from Rome, which had been communicated to him, regarding the harm done by the anti-Venezelist propaganda in Italy.
The War Cabinet decided that the whole question of British propaganda was one which would require consideration at an early date.
The American Exchanges. Attended for the Question:—
The Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of England.
Sir Robert Chalmers, K.C.B.
Sir John Bradbury, K.C.B.5. Sir Robert Chalmers explained to the War Cabinet the present position as regards the American Exchanges. He said that, in September 1916, the Treasury had appointed a Committee, under Lord Reading, to confer with French delegates on this subject, and the British representatives had first investigated our own position. They had found that we were spending 60 million dollars a week in the United States of America. This included an estimate of 12 million dollars utilised for the purpose of maintaining the Exchange. The maintenance of the Exchange was an essential pivot of the finances of the Entente Powers. The remaining 48 millions, which estimate has been confirmed by the experience of October and November was utilised as payment for the purchase of different commodities required by the Admiralty, the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions, or the Allies, and including sugar, &c. It had been found that loans to the extent of 1,500 million dollars would be required before the end of March next. Messrs. Morgan, Grenfell, and Co., who acted as our agents in New York, had been somewhat staggered by the amount, but had said that we must strain every nerve to obtain the money, and had advised a second loan in November on the basis of collateral security, as we had in the summer got beyond the point where British credit could carry a loan without collateral. This second loan had been negotiated on this basis. It had then been hoped to obtain a straight loan in the United States in January, when money gets easier. We had raised 300 million dollars on our November collateral loan, but we had spent this, and now had a debt of 175 million dollars outstanding on short money in the United States of America. When we obtained our last collateral loan we were looking forward to a straight loan of 500 millions in January, when suddenly the whole situation was changed by the issue of the Federal Reserve Board's announcement to banks. The representative of Messrs. Morgan, Grenfell, and Co. in New York then advised us that we had, as it were, to begin at the beginning again, and gradually build up our position, they advised that nothing could be raised in the form of a straight loan in January, or until the effect of the Federal Reserve Board's announcement had worn off. We were, therefore, left at the moment with a prospective weekly expenditure of somewhere near 50 million dollars, in addition to the Exchange. The amount required, however, to maintain the Exchange, instead of remaining at 12 millions, as estimated last September, had been gradually rising, and last week had reached 64 million dollars. For this week the total had reached 76 million dollars. Sir Robert Chalmers, however, was able to congratulate the War Cabinet on the fact that the amount required daily had dropped in the last two days from 17 million dollars - first to 8 million and then 4 million dollars. However the amount required for the maintenance of the Exchange was still very far in excess of the 12 million dollars estimated by the Treasury Committee. In the absence of loans the only way to balance the Exchange was either to take less in goods, or give more, that is to say, in gold or in American securities.
Mr. Bonar Law explained that the question on which he wished to have the decision of the War Cabinet was whether we were to send a telegram to the Allies asking them to restrict purchases in the United States of America, as had been contemplated by the Governor of the Bank of England.
The Governor of the Bank of England said that the proposed telegram, the despatch of which had been advised by the Exchange Committee, was now rather out of date. He had consulted the Exchange Committee that morning, and their view had modified a little in accordance with the improved Exchange situation.
After hearing the gist of the telegram which it had been proposed to send, the War Cabinet decided that, in view of the improved Exchange situation, to send the telegram would alarm the Allies unnecessarily.
They further decided that, at the earliest possible date, a conference should be arranged with the representatives of Russia, France, and Italy. This conference should include, not only the Chancellor of the Exchequer and corresponding Ministers of the Allies, but also the heads of the Governments, and should be held in Paris. The initiative for arranging the conference should rest with the Chancellor of the Exchequer as soon as he considers it convenient.
6. The War Cabinet decided that the policy of curtailing orders in the United States of America, which has been pursued during the last few days, should be continued without making any announcement.
The Balkans.
Attended for this Question:
Vice-Admiral Sir H. F. Oliver, K.C.B., M.V.O., Chief of the War Staff, Admiralty.7. The Chief of the Imperial General drew attention to the proposal of the French Government that two additional divisions should be sent to Salonica by France and England respectively. According to the latest decision, he said, the Allied forces based on Salonica were to be raised to a total of twenty-one and a half divisions exclusive of the one and a half divisions which Italy had been asked to send, and the additional British division involved in the increase had already arrived. Both the British and French forces at Salonica, however, still required many drafts, which had been delayed owing to transport considerations.
The new proposal, he said, had two objects:-
- (i.) To meet the Greek menace.
- (ii.) To meet a probable big attack by the Germans.
As regards the first, the reinforcements could probably not reach Salonica for some two months, and hence would not arrive in time to meet the situation in regard to Greece. As regards the second object, the additional divisions proposed were not enough to enable the Allied forces to hold their present very extended line against such reinforcements as the enemy might send down. He estimated that the enemy might bring fifteen divisions, raising his total force to thirty-five divisions. The utilisation of these larger forces was possible because the Germans now had a new line of approach through Rustchuk, Adrianople, and Dedeagatch. He pointed out that the communications of the Allies, being by sea, could not compete with the superior communications of the enemy by land. Our forces would not be adequate to cope with a great attack by the enemy against our present front. The Allied forces based on Salonica were now strung out on a 200-mile line. They consisted largely of poor troops, and included many nationalities. The Serbians, who had fought well, were to a great extent exhausted. Owing to the defeat of the Roumanians and the attitude of Greece, the situation in the Balkans had undergone a complete change, and the plan agreed at the Chantilly Conference, to knock out Bulgaria by simultaneous operations from the Danube and Salonica, was now out of the question. Sir William Robertson summed up his advice as follows:—
- "None of the objects for which we went to and remain in the Balkans can be attained. It is impossible to maintain and employ there a sufficient force to exert a decisive effect on the war in our favour. We ought therefore to withdraw altogether from the country, but as this proposal is probably not practicable for the moment for political reasons, we should, at the most, definitely adopt the policy of holding Salonica defensively. It would be incurring an undue risk to attempt to defend it in the position now occupied by the Allied forces, even if the latter were strengthened by another four divisions, having regard to the possible strength of the enemy attack and the Greek menace. It would obviously be a disadvantage to withdraw from the present position, but to withdraw would be far preferable to being driven back, as that might lead to a real disaster. General Sarrail should therefore decide when to withdraw, being guided by the developments of the situation. Meanwhile, steps should be taken at once to select and prepare a defensive and an appropriate line for covering Salonica and protecting the left flank, so that the troops may be leisurely and smoothly withdrawn to it when the occasion arises."
Sir William Robertson considered that the force at present at Salonica should amply suffice to hold a suitable shorter line against any attack that could be brought against it, provided that adequate measures are taken in time to prepare and occupy it, and that the troops are properly commanded. He added, however, that the whole question was difficult and complicated because a foreign General, over whom we had no control, was in command; that he had no confidence in General Sarrail's ability as a Commander; and in general that he had considerable misgivings, because of his ignorance as to General Sarrail's real attitude and that of the French Government.
The War Cabinet decided that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should communicate his views to General Joffre. In doing so, he should state that the situation in the Balkans caused considerable anxiety to the War Cabinet, who wished to have a meeting between the French naval and military authorities, but that, as a preliminary to this meeting, the War Cabinet consider it essential that the views of the local naval and military authorities should be obtained, and especially that General Sarrail should report explicitly on the whole situation.
8. The War Cabinet were advised by Lord Curzon, as former President of the Shipping Control Committee, that it was extremely doubtful whether the necessary shipping could be found for the proposed additional divisions.
The First Sea Lord undertook that the Admiralty would examine this question before the Conference referred to above.
The Shipping Director.9. The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that Sir Joseph Maclay was to be appointed Shipping Director. At the outset he was to take the presidency of the Shipping Control Committee, but was to have extended powers, as to which he would himself report, after examination.
The War Cabinet directed their Secretary to invite the Admiralty and the Board of Trade to give Sir Joseph Maclay every possible facility and assistance.
Press Communiqués of War Cabinet Meetings.10. The Secretary was directed to issue a communiqué to the Press after the first meeting following the confirmation of new Ministers in their offices, to the effect that the War Cabinet had met, and would continue to meet every week-day, so that no further announcements would be necessary.
The Arab Revolt.
Rabegh.
Attended for this Question:
The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Secretary of State for India.11. The War Cabinet discussed at considerable length the question of the expediency of sending a British force to Rabegh.
Rabegh is a small port, situated on the main road from Medina to Mecca. Although there are alternative routes inland they are badly supplied with water, and, so far as information is available it seems probable that the Turkish force at Medina can only march south to Mecca, with the object of ousting the Sherif, by the road which passes through Rabegh. A considerable quantity of stores, supplied by the Allies to the Sherif, including a number of aeroplanes, is concentrated at Rabegh, which consequently possesses considerable strategical importance.
There has for some time been much conflict of opinion as to the desirability of sending troops to defend this place.
The military view, which was explained to the War Cabinet by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, is that to send troops to Rabegh is to divert them from more important theatres from which they cannot be spared; that we cannot judge of the extent of the commitment; that even if we send the troops with the object merely of providing a passive defence of Rabegh, it will be very difficult for them to avoid going to the assistance of their Allies who may be suffering defeat a few miles distant - in fact, the troops might be compelled to do so in their own interest; that it is dangerous to send too small a force, which might be exterminated, and that two infantry brigades, with the necessary auxiliary arms, and the administrative services, amounting to about 15,000 men, is the smallest force which it would be safe to send; that the climate is very bad, and the water supply quite inadequate; that the troops now in Egypt are urgently required for the operations about to be undertaken in the near future in the direction of El Arish, and that the exploitation of this operation will be frustrated by the withdrawal of troops to Rabegh; and finally, that Egypt holds our only reserves to meet eventualities in the East, the situation in Macedonia is serious and sea communications between England and the East are difficult and precarious. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is, for the above reasons, very strongly against embarking on another campaign, notwithstanding the political arguments to the contrary.
The political view, which was laid before the War Cabinet by Lord Curzon and Mr. Chamberlain, is that we cannot allow the Sherif to be overwhelmed; one small State after another that has, willingly or unwillingly, espoused the cause of the Allies has been shattered; it is particularly important not to allow the downfall of the Sherif, as the effect on our prestige throughout the East would be disastrous; if the cause of the Sherif is allowed to collapse, the probable result will be still larger demands on our military forces for dealing with the difficult situation which may be precipitated in various parts of the East.
One objection to the landing of troops in the Hedjaz is the religious difficulty that non-Moslems are not permitted in that country. Reports have been received to the effect that the native troops would dissolve if they found themselves supported by European forces, and therefore that the despatch of the force would defeat its own object. On the other hand, other reports state that in the last resort they would welcome assistance, and the Sherif himself has asked for it. The Indian Govenment are averse from sending Christian troops to the Hedjaz under any circumstances, but Mr. Chamberlain informed the War Cabinet that at the present time his Military and Political Advisers at the India Office have come to the conclusion that this is a less evil than the collapse of the Sherif.
The question is complicated by the fact that the French had offered to send infantry, but have not yet communicated what troops they proposed to send, or the date at which they could arrive.
The War Cabinet had before them a number of telegrams containing the views of the Sirdar, who holds that neither British nor French brigades should be sent to Rabegh except in the last resort, but that preparations fo landing troops in case of emergency should be made, and a brigade be sent if necessary to prevent the capture of Mecca by the Turks. Lord Curzon and Mr. Chamberlain agreed with him, provided that there was still time to prepare a proper defensive position before the Turks could arrive.
The news contained in the latest telegrams is to the effect that a movement of the Turkish troops from Medina towards the coast has been made, but it is impossible as yet to judge whether they intend to attack Yenbo or Rabegh.
- The War Cabinet decided on the following action:-
(b.) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff should direct the General Officer Commanding the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to prepare a brigade for the use of the Sirdar if ordered.
(c.) The Foreign Office should direct the Sirdar to take any action possible with a view to the preparation of a military position at Rabegh, in readiness for occupation by the Allied forces on their arrival. (d.) Pending a reply from the French Government, the Admiralty should examine into the question of water supply at Rabegh.
(Initialled)D. Ll. G.
- 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.
- December 9, 1916.
Note.
APPENDIX I.
Telegram from Sir. F. Elliot.
Athens, December 6, 1916.
The King of Greece has requested me to forward the following to His Majesty the King:-
"Devant les graves événements qui se sont déroulés ces jours-ci à Athénes, le Roi est désireaux que votre Majesté connaise toute la vérité.
"Il possède des preuvres irréfutables qu'un mouvement séditieux se préparait dans la capitale par certains meneurs du parti vénizéliste, lesquels, profitant du débarquement des Alliés, ont en effet jeté le désordre et semé la terreur parmi les habitants afin de se rendre maîtres de la ville et y ramener M. Vénizélos en triomphe. Dan la maison de M. Vénizélos, ainsi que dans plusieurs maisons vénizélistes, on a trouvé des dépôts, d'armes, de munitions et de bombes, des cartouches dum-dum et d'autres engins, sans compter ces milliers de brassards et emblèmes. Deux automobiles appartenant au service d'informations anglo-français se trouvaient prétes à donner l'ordre du soulèvement. Le mouvement éclata à trois heures de l'après-midi par des coups de feu qui partirent simultanément de plusieurs maisons contre les patrouilles qui faisaient le service d'ordre dans les rues. Dans ces conditions Sa Majesté estime qu'elle ne pouvait agir autrement que de (group undecypherable) -ir avec la plus grande fermeté. Elle avait donné l'ordre à ses troupes de se tenir sur la défensive à l'égard des forces débarquées par l'Amiral d'Artige, et sans préjuger la question difficile à déterminer de l'initiative de l'attaque, elle ne pouvait tolérer une situation aussi menaçante principalement du fait de l'ennemi intérieur. Sa Majesté déplore plus que personne le sang si inutilement versé des deux côtés; elle-même s'est trouvée en péril lorsque l'Amiral a fait bombardé le Stade, voisin du Palais, et que plusieurs obus de l'escadre sont tombés dans le jardin Royal même.
"Quoi qu'il en soit, le Roi tient à ce que votre Majesté soit persuadée qu'il ne nourrit aucun dessein contre l'Entente. Il me prie de déclarer solenneliement à votre Majesté qu'il ne prendra jamais les armes contre les Puissances de l'Entente, à moins qui celles ci ne conduisent elles-mêmes à un acte de désespoir en rompant avec la Gréce de leur propre gré et en lui déclarant la guerre. Ces éventualités pourraient se produire sous la poussée de l'opinion en Angleterre et en France. Le Roi prie, en conséquence, instamment votre Majesté de reconnaître le bien-fondé de ses arguments et la loyauté absolue qui ont dicté ces (group omitted), afin que votre Majesté s'entremette dans ce sens, d'accord avec le Gouvernement italien, auprès du Cabinet de Paris avec tout le poids et l'influence qu'elle possède, pour l'éclairer sur la situation réelle et prévenir des événements, qui (group omitted, ?auront) pour effet de porter une atteinte sérieuse aux intérêts de l'Entente et provoquer peut-être la ruine de la Gréce à l'avenir.
Le présent telegramme a été lu et approuvé par le Roi.
Reply to Telegram from Sir. F. Elliot.
Athens, December 11, 1916.
Your telegram, Private and Secret, of the 6th December.
Please communicate following message from His Majesty to King of Greece:-
(R.) "I have received your Majesty's telegram of the 6th December. The recent events that have occurred in Greece have caused me deep pain and concern. I am unaware of the conspiracy to which you refer, but I know that no agents of the Allied Powers were connected with anything of the kind. The Allied Powers have, from the outset, confined their demands upon Greece to the observance of a benevolent neutrality. Unfortunately this condition has not been observed. Not only have the proceedings of your Majesty's Government been open to grave objections, but the Allied Powers have received indubitable proof of action on the part of the Greek Government, both damaging in their naval and military interests and of direct assistance to the enemy's forces.
"This made it necessary for them, in the interests of their own safety, to ask for certain material guarantees, in the justifiability of which, it is only fair to observe, your Majesty had given reason to believe that you were disposed to agree. When, however, difficulties arose with your Majesty's Government in regard to the execution of those guarantees, the Allied Powers saw themselves obliged to order certain formal measures at Athens in the nature of a military demonstration, in order that the Greek Government should realise that the demand of the Allies was serious. Your Majesty was fully informed beforehand of the nature and scope of those measures, and gave to the Allied Commander, two days before the demonstration was to take place, a written assurance of the maintenance of public order. Relying on this assurance, small detachments of Allied troops were landed, only to be met by an unsuspected and unprovoked attack by Greek troops, posted for this purpose by the Greek Government.
"I take note of your Majesty's assurance that you deplore the useless bloodshed, and I note with satisfaction your declaration that you harbour no designs against the Allied Powers and will never attack them. But my Government can only take a very serious view of the events resulting in the death of my gallant troops. These events have aroused a feeling of deep and widespread indignation among my people; a feeling intensified by accounts received from many including neutral sources of the treatment to which Venizelists in Greece are now being subjected. Your Majesty will understand that the demands which, in conjunction with the Allied Powers, my Government must now make, will include reparations for the unprovoked attack made by your troops and guarantees for the future."
APPENDIX II.
Telegram to Sir. F. Elliot (Athens), December 9, 1916.
Recent events in Athens have proved conclusively that neither the King nor the Greek Government have sufficient control over the Greek army to prevent Greek forces becoming a menace to peace and a danger to the Allied armies in Macedonia.
Under these circumstances the Governments of the Allied Powers are constrained to demand, for the security of their forces from attack, that the Greek troops now stationed in Northern Greece be immediately removed to the Morea, and that the evacuation commence within twenty four hours and proceed as rapidly as possible. They further demand that any movements of Greek troops from the Morea to Northern Greece be immediately suspended. Failure to comply with these two demands will be regarded by the Allies as an act of hostility on the part of the Greek Govenment.
The blockade of the Greek coast will be maintained until full reparation has been given for the recent unprovoked attack by the Greek forces upon the troops of the Allies at Athens, together with satisfactory guarantees for the future.
You should make a formal communication to the Greek Government in the above terms as soon as your colleagues have received similar instructions.
PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.—23/12/1916.