establishing operations abroad in an effort to acquire technology and new markets.[1]
C. The United States Government Has Highlighted National Security Concerns Associated with Chinese State-Owned Carriers Operating within the United States
In recent years, the U.S. government has highlighted national security concerns raised by China's state-owned telecom carriers operating in the United States. The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center ("NCSC") notes that foreign telecom companies are often subject to foreign state influence because they "provide valuable services that often require access to the physical and logical control points of the computers and networks they support."[2] Chinese state-owned companies are subject to an added layer of state influence in that they must comply with strict laws regardless of where they operate.[3] These laws underscore the concern that the Chinese government may use state-owned carriers to assist in its cyber and economic espionage activities, particularly those targeted at the United States.[4]
This section discusses the Chinese government's history of cyber and economic espionage efforts against the United States. It then discusses some of the recent laws the Chinese government has enacted by which it could force companies to comply with Chinese government requests to assist in cyber and economic espionage efforts. Finally, this section discusses how a Chinese carrier might assist the Chinese government-through disrupting and rerouting internet and communications data. These "hijacking" efforts are possible because Chinese carriers have established operations in the United States and built interconnections with U.S. carriers.
- ↑ Cf. Dr. Daouda Cissé, "Going Global" in Growth Markets—Chinese Investments in Telecommunications in Africa, Stellenbosch Univ. Centre for Chinese Studies (2012).
- ↑ Nat'l Counterintelligence & Sec. Ctr., Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace 14 (2018).
- ↑ See, e.g., National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic, Art. 7 (adopted June 27, 2017), http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_National_IntelligenceLaw.pdf (discussed infra).
- ↑ See generally Redacted Executive Branch Recommendation to Deny China Mobile International (USA) Inc.'s Application for an International Section 214 Authorization, FCC No. ITC-214-20110901-00289, at 7 (filed July 2, 2018), https://licensing.fcc.gov/myibfs/download.do?attachment_key=1444739 [hereinafter Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA]; Redacted Executive Branch Recommendation to Revoke and Terminate China Telecom's International Section 214 Common Carrier Authorizations, FCC Nos. ITC-214-20010613-00346, ITC-214-20020716-00371, ITC-T/C-20070725-00285 (Apr. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA].
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