Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/31

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2. Chinese State-Owned Companies are Subject to Control by the Chinese Government

China "enlist[s] the support of a broad range of actors spread throughout its government and industrial base" to carry out its strategic goals.[1] The Director of National Intelligence recently expressed concern about China's potential use of "Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms . . . ."[2] In recent filings with the FCC, Team Telecom officials warned that Chinese telecommunications carriers, among other state-owned entities, are subject to control by the Chinese government because the entities must comply with strict national security laws.[3]

The Chinese government has enacted multiple laws obligating Chinese citizens and companies to support, assist, and cooperate in the government's intelligence and national security efforts.[4] The National Intelligence Law of 2017, for example, requires that all "organization [s] or citizen [s] shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work known [sic] to the public."[5] The law also reserves the right for the state intelligence services to commandeer the communications equipment and other facilities of organizations and government organs.[6] The Chinese Cybersecurity Law of 2016, which became effective in June 2017, similarly provides that "network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to public security organs . . . ."[7] Under the 2015 National Security

  1. ↑ Nat'l Counterintelligence & Sec. Ctr., Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace 14 (2018).
  2. ↑ Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community Statement for the Record to the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence 4 (Jan. 29, 2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence).
  3. ↑ See generally Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA, supra note 56; Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 38-40 (Apr. 9, 2020).
  4. ↑ See National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic, Art. 7 (adopted June 27, 2017), http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_National IntelligenceLaw.pdf. See also Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense, LawFare Blog (July 20, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense. Other relevant Chinese laws obligating citizens and organizations to assist in "national security" efforts include the laws on Counterespionage (2014), National Security (2015), Counterterrorism (2015), and Cybersecurity (2016).
  5. ↑ National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic, Art. 7 (adopted June 27, 2017), http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_National IntelligenceLaw.pdf.
  6. ↑ See id. at Art. 17 ("According to the needs of the work, according to the relevant national regulations, the staff of the national intelligence work agency may preferentially use or legally requisition the means of transport, communication tools, sites and buildings of relevant organs, organizations and individuals . . . .").
  7. ↑ Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 28 (effective June 1, 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/. The law also requires "critical information infrastructure operators purchasing network products and services that might impact national security" to comply with a Government-led national security review. See id. at Arts. 35, 49. China Telecom Corporation

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