Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/32

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Law, all citizens and organizations are required to "obey [ ] . . . provisions of the Constitution, laws, and regulations regarding national security," "provid[e] conditions to facilitate national security efforts and other assistance," "provid[e] public security organs, state security organs or relevant military organs with necessary support and assistance," and "keep[ ] state secrets they learn of confidential."[1] The 2014 Counter-Espionage Law similarly provides that, during the course of a counter-espionage investigation, "relevant organizations and individuals shall truthfully provide information and must not refuse."[2]

Chinese companies operating in the United States have denied that they are bound by Chinese law.[3] Government officials and other commentators, however, point to the broad language of the laws to argue otherwise: the laws contain no geographic limitation and require that all organizations and citizens comply with requests from the Chinese government.[4] Further, while the laws are limited to "national security," "intelligence," and "counter-espionage" activities, these concepts are not defined.[5] Thus, commentators argue that the Chinese government could



    Limited ("CTCL") has acknowledged that the 2017 Cybersecurity Law could require it to be subject to a "security review," which would be organized and conducted by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and would "focus on the security and controllability of network products and services." China Telecom Corp. Ltd. Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2019 (Form 20-F), Comm. File 1-31517, at 30 (filed Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1191255/000119312520123302/d851335d20f.htm [hereinafter China Telecom FY2019 Form 20-F].

  1. National Security Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 77(1), (4)–(6) (adopted July 1, 2015), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en.
  2. See Counter-Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 22 (adopted Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/anti-espionage/.
  3. See, e.g., Samantha Hoffman & Elsa Kania, Huawei and the Ambiguity of China's Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Laws, Australian Strategy Policy Inst. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/huawei-and-the-ambiguity-of-chinas-intelligence-and-counter-espionage-laws/.
  4. See National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic, Art. 7 (adopted June 27, 2017), http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_National IntelligenceLaw.pdf; 5G: The Impact on National Security, Intellectual Property, and Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (May 14, 2019) (testimony of Christopher Krebs, Dir., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.) ("Chinese laws on national security and cybersecurity provide the Chinese government with a legal basis to compel technology companies . . . to cooperate with Chinese security services."). See also Yuan Yang, Is Huawei Compelled by Chinese Law to Help with Espionage, Fin. Times (Mar. 4, 2019); Amnesty Int'l, China: Submission to the NPC Standing Comm.'s Legislative Affairs Comm. on the Draft "National Intelligence Law" 4-5 (2017).
  5. See Gov't of Canada, China's Intelligence Law & the Country's Future Intelligence Competitions, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry/chinas-intelligence-law-and-the-countrys-future-intelligence-competitions.html; Yuan Yang, Yuan Yang, Is Huawei Compelled by Chinese Law to Help with Espionage, Fin. Times (Mar. 4, 2019); Samantha Hoffman & Elsa Kania, Huawei and the Ambiguity of China's Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Laws, Australian Strategy Policy Inst. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/huawei-and-the-ambiguity-of-chinas-intelligence-and-counter-

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