use these provisions to justify instructions to state-owned carriers to engage in cyber and economic espionage on behalf of the Chinese government.[1] Further, given the state ownership, it is unlikely that the carriers would protest any such requests by the Chinese government.[2]
3. Chinese State-Owned Carriers Can Facilitate the Chinese Government's Espionage Efforts by Hijacking Data through Their Relationships with U.S. Carriers
Data transported across global networks are vulnerable to interception or interference by hostile actors.[3] The networks were created with minimal security, which allows malicious actors to "target, alter, block, and re-route" communications.[4] As the U.S. government has warned, "the deepening integration of the global telecommunications market has created risks and vulnerabilities in a sector replete with a broad range of malicious activities."<ref>Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA, supra note 56, at 2-3.</ref> The telecommunications industry has been particularly susceptible to cyber espionage.[5] One report estimated that nearly half of telecommunications
- ↑ Cf. 5G: The Impact on National Security, Intellectual Property, and Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2-3 (May 14, 2019) (testimony of Christopher Krebs, Dir., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
- ↑ Cf. Samantha Hoffman & Elsa Kania, Huawei and the Ambiguity of China's Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Laws, Australian Strategic Policy Inst. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/huawei-and-the-ambiguity-of-chinas-intelligence-and-counter-espionage-laws/.
- ↑ See, e.g., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Alert (TA16-250A): The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations (last modified Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-250A ("The advancing capabilities of organized hacker groups and cyber adversaries create an increasing global threat to information systems. . . . For several years now, vulnerable network devices have been the attack-vector of choice and one of the most effective techniques for sophisticated hackers and advanced threat actors."). Cf. 5G: The Impact on National Security, Intellectual Property, and Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (May 14, 2019) (testimony of Christopher Krebs, Dir., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.) ("Risks to mobile communications generally include such activities as call interception and monitoring, user location tracking, attackers seeking financial gain through banking fraud, social engineering, ransomware, identity theft, or theft of the device, services, or any sensitive data. . . . Risks to the mobile Data on 5G networks will flow through interconnected cellular towers, small cells, and mobile devices that may provide malicious actors additional vectors to intercept, manipulate, or destroy critical data. Malicious actors could also introduce device vulnerabilities into the 5G supply chain to compromise unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate critical infrastructure data.").
- ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA, supra note 56, at 10.
- ↑ See, e.g., Critical Infrastructure and Communications Security, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, https://www.fcc.gov/general/critical-infrastructure-and-communications-security ("The number of incidents of documented attacks on computer-based systems and communications systems increases on a daily basis. These range from unsophisticated access attempts by curious hackers to the
espionage-laws/; AMNESTY INT'L, CHINA: SUBMISSION TO THE NPC STANDING COMM.'S LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM. ON THE DRAFT "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LAW” 4–5 (2017).
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