Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/41

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effectively extends indefinitely.[1] A carrier can install, replace, or make other changes to its operations and equipment, so long as it does not impair the adequacy or quality of service provided.[2] A carrier can also use its international Section 214 authorization to demonstrate legitimacy of its operations in seeking interconnections with U.S. or other foreign carriers.[3] This means that a foreign carrier can operate for years, if not decades, at a time, without regard to the evolving global environment.

The FCC can revoke authorizations,[4] but the FCC has never done so under a national security standard.[5] The Subcommittee reviewed some FCC revocation decisions, which were based on the carrier discontinuing operations, ceasing to pay annual fees, or failing to file required reports, either with the FCC or Team Telecom.[6] One Team Telecom official suggested to the Subcommittee that, especially where a foreign carrier is servicing a large number of customers, the FCC may be hesitant to revoke an authorization because of the potential customer harm.[7]


  1. See 47 U.S.C. § 159(a); 47 C.F.R. § 63.20; Fees, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/fees.
  2. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a).
  3. See In the Matter of China Mobile Int'l (USA) Inc., FCC No. 19-38, 34 FCC Red 3361, 3377, ¶33 n.98 (May 10, 2019) (finding that Section 214 authorization would allow China Mobile USA to request interconnection with the networks of other Section 214-authorized U.S. common carriers).
  4. While there is no provision of the U.S. Code or the FCC's regulations that specifically provides for the revocation of international Section 214 authorizations, the FCC's prior revocation decisions generally cite to authority under 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) ("The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."). See, e.g., In the Matter of IP To Go, LLC, 81 Fed. Reg. 91933 (Dec. 2016); In the Matter of Redes Modernas de la Frontera SA de CV, 81 Fed. Reg. 91932 (Dec. 2016); In the Matter of JuBe Communications LLC, 81 Fed. Reg. 55199 (Aug. 2016).
  5. See Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020). Although no decision has been reached, as described further below, the FCC recently ordered Chinese government-controlled carriers with international Section 214 authorizations to show cause why their authorizations should not be revoked. In the orders, the FCC highlighted national security concerns as a reason revocation may be warranted. See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Scrutinizes Four Chinese Government-Controlled Entities Providing Telecommunications Services in the U.S. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-scrutinizes-four-chinese-government-controlled-telecom-entities.
  6. Typically, Team Telecom alerts the FCC that the authorized carrier is failing to comply with the commitments outlined in the security agreement. Most instances reviewed by the Subcommittee involved a carrier that was no longer doing business in the United States and therefore was not filing the requisite information. Team Telecom recommended that the FCC terminate the authorization. The FCC first conducted its own lengthy review process, which included providing notice, allowing the applicant to respond to the allegations, and comply with the mitigation agreement. See, e.g., In the Matter of IP To Go, LLC, 81 Fed. Reg. 91933 (Dec. 2016); In the Matter of Redes Modernas de la Frontera SA de CV, 81 Fed. Reg. 91932 (Dec. 2016); In the Matter of JuBe Communications LLC, 81 Fed. Reg. 55199 (Aug. 2016).
  7. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).

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