Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/42

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B. Team Telecom Assessed National Security and Law Enforcement Risks, but It Historically Operated in an Ad Hoc Manner

As described above, the FCC seeks input from a variety of Executive Branch agencies on the national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns implicated by a foreign carrier's Section 214 application.[1] DOJ, DHS, and DOD—until recently referred to as Team Telecom—focused on assessing national security and law enforcement risks.[2] DOJ's National Security Division's Foreign Investment Review Section served as the unofficial group lead for Team Telecom on Section 214 applications and coordinated among internal DOJ component parts and other Team Telecom members.[3]

Despite the long history of Team Telecom, it historically operated in an ad hoc manner. Team Telecom was not established in statute; it operated only at the request of the FCC.[4] Further, Team Telecom had no formal procedures, policies, or guidelines governing its review of Section 214 applications. This informality resulted in protracted review periods and a process FCC commissioners described as "broken,"[5] and an "inextricable black hole" that provided "no clarity for [the] future."[6] It also limited the actions Team Telecom could take to address identified national security or law enforcement risks. Team Telecom could recommend that the FCC approve or deny applications by foreign-owned entities.[7] Team Telecom


  1. 1997 FCC Foreign Participation Order, supra note 147, at ¶63; FCC Proposed Executive Branch Review Reform, supra note 154, at ¶6. See also Executive Branch Recommendation re China Mobile USA, supra note 56, at 2.
  2. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019); Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 12. Other agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy are responsible for assessing other concerns raised by the Section 214 application. See FCC Proposed Executive Branch Review Reform, supra note 154, at n.16. Team Telecom works closely with the agencies to prepare a single recommendation on behalf of the Executive Branch, which is filed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, a part of the Department of Commerce. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019). The Subcommittee's investigation focused on Team Telecom's processes. The Subcommittee, however, recognizes the important role played by the other agencies in evaluating risks associated with foreign carriers.
  3. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019). Team Telecom also reviewed other applications at the request of the FCC, such as applications to operate submarine cable landing sites. For those applications, DHS's Office of Policy usually served as the lead coordinating agency. See id; Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020).
  4. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019); Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020).
  5. See FCC PROPOSED EXECUTIVE BRANCH REVIEW REFORM, supra note 154 (statement, Ajit Pai, Commissioner, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n).
  6. See Michael O'Reilly, Team Telecom Reviews Need More Structure, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Sept. 18, 2015).
  7. Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019). Cf. FCC-PSI-003792–93 ("Executive Branch agencies have the opportunity to offer advice to the FCC regarding any foreign applicant seeking a

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