quarrell, but not with either the Counsels or Works of God, but rather with the Opinions of ignorant and mistaken men.
Chap. VI.
1. That the sense of his Argument from the idea of God in the first posture, is not simply That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but, That this Idea being true does exhibite to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him. 2. That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence. 3 . That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction. 4. The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible. 5. The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself 6. That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary exiftence included therein, as we do in the idea of God. 7. That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals are to be supposed, not proved to be true.
1. And now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, it will be easie to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully & cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which because it seems very witty to me as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words, the tenour whereof runs thus:
If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God, from necessary Existence being comprehended in his Idea or Notion, is unconcluding. How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.
But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were; as for instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.
But I answer briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case: because we argue God does exist, not because the Idea of him is true, and if he did exist he would necessarily exist; for conditional necessary Existence,Antidote, Book 1. ch. 8. sect. 1, 2. as being less perfect then absolute necessary Existence, cannot belong to a Being absolutely Perfect: but because this true Idea, without any If or And, does suggest to our Natural Faculties, That necessary Existence being involved in his Idea alone, the like not happening in any other Idea beside, without any more a-do, he doth of himself absolutely and really Exist.
