care nor such violence offered, nor such diseases can happen, as can cause the period of human life to fall short of that time, nor such care nor physic be used, as to prolong it beyond that time. But though these cannot so fall out, as to shorten or prolong the period of human life, yet being necessary causes in the chain of causes to bring human life to the period fixed, or to cause it not to exceed that time, they must as necessarily precede that effect, as other causes do their proper effects, and consequently when used or neglected serve all the ends and purposes that can be hoped for or feared from use of any means, or the neglect of any means whatsoever. For example, let it be fixed and necessary for the river Nile annually to overflow, the means to cause it to overflow must no less necessarily precede. And as it would be absurd to argue that if the overflowing of the Nile was annually fixed and necessary, it would overflow, though the necessary means to make it overflow did not precede, so it is no less absurd to argue from the fixed period of human life, against the necessary means to bring it to its fixed period, or to cause it not to exceed that period.
V. Fifthly, it is asked how a man can act against his conscience, and how a man’s conscience can accuse him if he knows he acts necessarily, and also does what he thinks best when he commits any sin.
I reply, that conscience being a man’s own opinion of his actions with relation to some rule, he may at the time of doing an action contrary to that rule, know that he breaks that rule, and consequently act with reluctance, though not sufficient to hinder the action. But after the action is over he may not only judge his action to be contrary to that rule; but by the absence of the pleasure of the sin, and by finding himself obnoxious to shame, or believing himself liable to punishment, he may really accuse himself, that is, he may condemn himself for having done it, be sorry he has done it, and wish it undone because of the consequences that attend it.
