VI. Sixthly, it is objected, that if all events are necessary, it was as impossible (for example) for Julius Caesar not to have died in the Senate, as it is impossible for two and two to make six. But who will say the former was as impossible as the latter is, when we can conceive it possible for Julius Caesar to have died any where else as well as in the Senate, and impossible to conceive two and two ever to make six?
To which I answer, that I do allow that if all events are necessary, it was impossible for Julius Caesar not to have died in the Senate, as it is impossible for two and two to make six, and will add, that it is no more possible to conceive the death of Julius Caessr to have happened any where else but in the Senate, than that two and two should make six. For whoever does conceive his death possible any where else, supposes other circumstances preceding his death than did precede his death. Whereas, let them suppose all the same circumstances to come up to pass that did precede his death, and then it will be impossible to conceive (if they think justly) his death could have come to pass any where else, as they conceive it impossible for two and two to make six. I observe also, that to suppose other circumstances of any action possible than those that precede it, is to suppose a contradiction or impossibility, for as all actions have their particular circumstances, so every circumstance proceding an action is as impossible not to have come to pass by virtue of the causes preceding that circumstance, as that two and two should make six.
The opinions of the learned concerning Liberty, etc.
Having as I hope proved the truth of what I have advanced, and answered the most material objections that can be urged against me; it will perhaps not be improper to give some account of the sentiments of the learned in relation to my subject, and confirm by
