Page:Aesthetic Papers.djvu/188

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178
Abuse of Representative Government.

nions of the district, so as to place the Legislature as nearly as possible in the position in which it would be, were the voters of the district personally present, with all their ignorance, prejudice, and passion. But this is precisely what the founders of the Constitution wished to avoid, in establishing a representative republic, since, they argued, that it would be more stable and sound than a pure democracy, because the government would not be administered by the people themselves, who are so easily misled by the ruling passions of the hour, but by the choicest spirits, whose wisdom and patriotism would secure them against local and temporary influences, and whose voice would therefore "be more consonant with the public good, than the voice of the people themselves, convened for the purpose."

It is not our intention here to inquire how the perversion of the representative character has gradually been brought about; but merely to call attention to the fact, that it is now complete, and that, without an amendment in this particular, it is in vain to look for a return to the purity of our institutions. If senators feel that they must either resign or vote as instructed by a majority of their State Legislature, whatever may be their own views;—if they forget that they are chosen by the State, not merely to do its bidding, to represent its will at any given moment, like an attorney, but to act under the Constitution for their State, but in the interests of truth and justice as applied to the Union and the world, and with a direct responsibility to their Maker only; if they lose sight of this high duty and this high responsibility, how can they preserve the dignity of the Senate? how can they retain the character of authority, without which government becomes contemptible? It was clearly not the intention of the founders of our Constitution to make senators and representatives directly responsible to the bodies choosing them, as principals whose wishes alone they were to consult; for such a responsibility takes away all character of freedom, whether of thought or act. It degrades the representative, not only morally, but also intellectually; for, if all he has to think of is the opinion and will of his constituents, the newspapers will be his chief study, and the caucus his arbiter of political science. He is