degraded from the proper position of a true man, as much so as a lawyer who is arguing, for money, a case which he does not believe in; and the most that can be expected of senators or representatives, under such a system, is, that they should become keen and unscrupulous. How, then, can we expect men of the highest moral stamp to come forward, or, if they do come forward, to retain their places and their honesty both? As mere agents, they would be morally bound to resign, when required to act contrary to their sense of right; and, with the changing majorities, this would be very likely, in the natural course of things, to happen during the term for which they are chosen.[1] Can any one believe that it was intended by the fathers of our country to place senators in such a position as this,—to make them the mere puppets of popular changes? The idea, as applied to a Senate, is ridiculous; and whether applied to the Senate, the House of Representatives, or the Executive, it is destructive of the element of stability, which was chiefly sought in the establishment of a representative form of government, as well as to all true liberty, which can exist only as connected with stability.[2]
- ↑ It follows that, in this view, the chances would be in favor of the senators being forced either to violate their consciences, or to resign very frequently in the ordinary working of the government.
- ↑ We are aware, that there is supposed to be a difference in the position of the senator and of the representative in this respect. The latter has more liberty than the former. He is merely " requested," while the senator is "instructed," to change his vote, by those who have chosen him, and who may, or may not, choose him again, that is, by his masters. The representatives, it seems, are not so completely mastered yet as the senators. This strikes us an extraordinary perversion of the intention of the framers of our Constitution, by which what they intended as the conservative branch of the Legislature has become gradually the most partisan and pliant. It could not be otherwise under the doctrine of "instruction," the most direct and striking effect of which is to destroy the unity of the Senate, leaving two or three struggling fractions, ruled principally by partisan or sectional prejudice.
During the last session, the sectional tyranny in the Senate counteracted the endeavors of the House to do common justice.
We look in vain in the Constitution, or in the writings of its founders, for any distinction in the liberty of the senator and representative to follow his conscience, during the term for which he is chosen. On the other hand, all the arguments in the "Federalist," in chap. 62, 63, and 64, show that more stability was looked for in the Senate than in the House, because the members were to be chosen for a longer term. But what security could this be,
