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CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE

In the beginning of April I advised the Allies to recognize the Bolsheviks de facto (not de jure) so that they could peacefully work in Russia as soon as possible. At that time the Bolsheviks still kept their agreement with us. Five months elapsed since that time. When the Allies did not send to Russia economic and administrative assistance, the Germans and Austrians exploited this fact, told the Bolsheviks the Allies could not and would not help, and so gained the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks, in the meantime, and the Germans are losing in Russia their prestige, because of their defeats in the West. Under these conditions action in Russia is again made easier.

Dr. Masaryk then discusses the degree of Allied help necessary in Russia and expresses the opinion that it will be necessary for the Japanese to send a larger contingent, probably two divisions. As for the military and political function of the Czechoslovak army, he says:

The military quality of our army is generally recognized: they are not only brave, but also intelligent (every individual knows what he is fighting for), and they maintained discipline throughout the terrible events in Russia not only after the revolution, but also under the old regime.

From the military point of view it must be the duty of the Allies to make the most effective use of such a military force. Naturally war against Austria-Hungary and Germany is the chief objective of

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