But to proceed in this reconciling Project with regard to the Doctrine of Liberty and Necessity, the most contentious Question, of Metaphysics, the most contentious Science; it will not require many Words to prove, that all Mankind have ever agreed in theDoctrine
perience which we have, or may have of Liberty or Indifference, in many of our Actions. The Necessity of any Action, whether of Matter or of Mind, is not, properly speaking, a Quality in the Agent, but in any thinking or intelligent Being, who may consider the Action; and it consists chiefly in the Determination of his Thought to infer the Existence of that Action from some preceding Objects, as Liberty, when oppos'd to Necessity, is nothing but the Want of that Determination, and a certain Looseness or Indifference, which we feel, in passing or not passing, from the Idea of one Object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, tho' in reflecting on human Actions we seldom feel such a Looseness or Indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable Certainty from their Motives, and from the Dispositions of the Agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the Actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all resembling Objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employ'd as a demonstrative and even an intuitive Proof of human Liberty. We feel, that our Actions are subject to our Will, on most Occasions; and imagine we feel, that the Will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a Denial of it we are provok'd to try, we feel that it moves easily every Way, and produces an Image of itself, (or a Velleïty, as it is call'd in the Schools) even on that Side, on which it did not settle. This Image, or faint Motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that Time, have been compleated into
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