Doctrine of Liberty as well as in that of Necessity, and that the whole Dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by Liberty, when apply'd to voluntary Actions? We cannot surely mean, that Actions have so little Connexion with Motives, Inclinations, and Circumstances, that the one does not follow, with a certain Degree of Uniformity, from the other, and that the one affords no Inference, from which we can conclude the Existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged Matters of Fact. By Liberty, then, we can only mean, a Power of acting or not acting, according to the Determinations of the Will; that is, if we chuse to remain at rest, we may; if we chuse to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical Liberty is universally allow'd to belong to every Body, who is not a Prisoner, and in Chains. Here then is no Subject of Dispute.
What-
the Thing itself; because, should that be a deny'd, we find, upon a second Trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical Desire of showing Liberty is here the Motive of our Actions. And it seems certain, that however we may imagine we feel a Liberty within ourselves, a Spectator can commonly infer our Actions from our Motives and Character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every Circumstance of our Situation and Temper, and the most secret Springs of our Complexion and Disposition. Now this is the very Essence of Necessity, according to the foregoing Doctrine.
