are, by their very Nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some Cause in the Characters and Disposition of the Person, who perform'd them, they can neither redound to his Honour, if good, nor Infamy, if evil. The Actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the Rules of Morality and Religion: But the Person is not responsible for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that Nature behind them, 'tis impossible he can, upon their Account, become the Object of Punishment or Vengeance. According to the Principle therefore, which denies Necessity, and consequently Causes, a Man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid Crimes, as at the first Moment of his Birth, nor is his Character any way concern'd in his Actions; since they are not deriv'd from it, and the Wickedness of the one can never be us'd as a Proof of the Depravity of the other.
Men are not blam'd for such Actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the Consequences. Why? but because the Principles of these Actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are less blam'd for such evil Actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately, than from such as proceed from Thought and Deliberation.For
