without solicitation, he was appointed a paymaster
in the U. S. army by President Taylor in 1849. He
served as paymaster for more than five years, mak-
ing six tours, and travelling more than 4,000 miles
annually on the Indian frontier of Texas. In 1855
President Pierce appointed him colonel of the 2d
(now 5th) cavalry, a new regiment, which he or-
ganized. Robert E. Lee was lieutenant-colonel,
and George H. Thomas and William J. Hardee
were the majors. Gen. Scott called Gen. Johnston's
appointment "a god-send to the army and the
country." He remained in command of his regi-
ment and the Department of Texas until ordered,
in 1857, to the command of the expedition to re-
store order among the Mormons in Utah, who
were in open revolt against the National govern-
ment. In his conduct of affairs there he won
great reputation for energy and wisdom. By a
forced march of 920 miles in twenty-seven days,
over bad roads, he reached his little array of 1,100
men, to find it lost in the defiles of the Rocky
mountains, with the snow a foot deep and the
thermometer 16° below zero, their supplies cut off
by the hostile Mormons, their starving teams their
sole food, and sage-brush their only fuel. By an
extraordinary display of vigor and prudence he
got the army safely into winter-quarters, and be-
fore spring had virtually put an end to the rebel-
lion without actual collision, solely by the exercise
of moral force. Col. Johnston was bre vetted
brigadier-general, and was retained in command in
Utah until 29 Feb., 1860. He spent 1860 in Ken-
tucky until 21 Dec, when he sailed for California,
to take command of the Department of the Pacific.
Gen. Johnston witnessed the culmination of " the irrepressible conflict " in secession, and the pros- pect of war, with unalloyed grief. He was a Union man from both principle and interest, and the highest posts in the United States army were within easy reach of his ambition. He believed the south had a grievance, but did not believe se- cession was the remedy. Still, his heart was with his state, and he resigned his commission, 9 April. 1861, as soon as he heard of the secession of Texas. Regarding his command as a sacred trust, he con- cealed his resignation until he could be relieved. He remained in California until June. After a rapid march through the deserts of Arizona and Texas, he reached Richmond about 1 Sept., and was appointed at once to the command of all the country west of the Atlantic states and north of the Gulf states. When he arrived at Nashville, 14 Sept., 1861, he found only 21.000 available troops east of the Mississippi. Gen. Leonidas Polk had 11,000 at Columbus, Ky., Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer had about 4,000 raw levies at Cumber- land gap, and there were 4,000 armed men in camps of instruction in middle Tennessee. Ten- nessee was open to an advance by the National forces, and, for both military and political reasons. Gen. Johnston resolved on a bold course, and oc- cupied Bowling Green, Ky., with his 4,000 avail- able troops, under Gen. Simon B. Buckner. This place he strongly fortified, and vainly appealed to the Confederate government and state govern- ments for troops and arms. He was enabled to hold the National army in check until January, 1862, during which time a single engagement of note occurred, the battle of Belmont, in which Gen. Grant suffered a reverse by the Confederates under Gens. Polk and Pillow. On 19 Jan.. Gen. Critten- den, commanding the small army defending east Tennessee, contrary to his instructions, attacked the National forces, under Gen. George H. Thomas, at Fishing creek. His repulse was converted into a route, and Johnston's right flank was thus turned. Gen. Johnston wrote to his government : " To suppose, with the facilities of movement by water which the well-filled rivers of the Ohio, Cumber- land, and Tennessee give for active operations, that they [the National forces] will suspend them in Tennessee and Kentucky during the winter months, is a delusion. All the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defence of Tennessee." As he had to take the risk somewhere, and these were positions less immediately vital than Bowling Green and Columbus, he took it there. On 6 Feb., 1862, Gen. Grant and Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote moved upon Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and, after a few hours' fighting, the fort was surren- dered. The Confederate troops, about 4,000, re- tired to Fort Donelson. The Tennessee river was now open for the National navy and armies to Gen. Johnston's left flank and rear, and he began a retreat, intending to cover Nashville and the line of the Cumberland if possible, and if not, then to fall back behind the line of the Tennessee. He de- termined to defend Nashville at Donelson, and placed 17,000 troops there under Gens. Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. to meet Grant's impending attack. For himself he reserved the more difficult task of covering Nashville. He was cheered on the arrival of the rear of his army at Nashville on 15 Feb. by a telegram from his generals at Donel- son announcing a brilliant victory, but before daylight next morning he was informed that the fort would be surrendered. (See Grant. Ulysses S.) Amid the utmost popular demoralization and rage, a blind fury directed against himself, Gen. Johnston preserved his equanimity and fell back to Murfreesboro. where he reorganized his troops.
He had given Gen. Beauregard the command of west Tennessee when Fort Henry fell, with large discretionary power, and had advised him of his plan to unite their forces when possible. He now sent his stores and munitions by the railroad, and marched to Decatur, Ala., and thence moved by rail to Corinth, Miss. This was the key of the defence of the railroad system in the Mississippi valley, and the Confederate government re-enforced him with Bragg's army from Pensacola, 10,000 strong, and 5.000 men from Louisiana, so that on 24 March he had concentrated 50,000 men at Corinth, 40,000 of whom were effectives. It was Gen. Johnston's purpose to attack Grant's forces in detail. He was delayed some time reorganizing Beauregard's forces, but held himself ready to attack as soon as he should hear of Buell's approach. This intelligence reached him late at night on 2 April, and he began his march next day, hoping to assail Grant unprepared. Heavy rains delayed the march of his troops over twenty miles of bad roads, through a wooded and unknown country, so that, instead of being in position to attack on Friday afternoon, a full day was lost, and his troops were not up until the afternoon of the 5th. Then, in an informal council of war, his second in command, Gen. Beauregard, strenuously protested against an attack, and urged a retreat to Corinth. Gen. Johnston listened, and replied: " Gentlemen, we will attack at daylight." Turning to his staff officer, he said : " 1 would fight them if they were a million." Gen. Beauregard twice renewed his protests, but Gen. Johnston, on Sunday morning, as he was mounting his horse to ride forward, gave this final reply : " The battle has opened. It is now too late to change our dispositions." Gen. Johnston said to a soldier friend early in the battle : " We must this day conquer or perish " ; and to all about him : " To-night we will
