terizes familiar or recognized perceptions, must we not assume that the consciousness of a well-regulated motor accompaniment, of an organized motor reaction, is here the foundation of the sense of familiarity? At the basis of recognition there would thus be a phenomenon of a motor order.
To recognize a common object is mainly to know how to use it. This is so true that early observers gave the name apraxia to that failure of recognition which we call psychic blindness.[1] But to know how to use a thing is to sketch out the movements which adapt themselves to it; it is to take a certain attitude, or at least to have a tendency to do so through what the Germans call motor impulses (Bewegungsantriebe). The habit of using the object has, then, resulted in organizing together movements and perceptions; and the consciousness of these nascent movements, which follow perception after the manner of a reflex, must be here also at the bottom of recognition.
There is no perception which is not prolonged into movement. Ribot[2] and Maudsley[3] long since drew attention to this point. The training of
- ↑ Kussmaul, Die Störugen der Sprache, p. 181. Allen Starr, Apraxia and Aphasia (Medical Record, Oct. 27, 1888).—Cf. Laquer, Zur Localisation der Sensorischen Aphasie (Neurolog. Centralblatt, June 15, 1888), and Dodds, On some central affections of vision (Brain, 1885).
- ↑ Les mouvements, et leur importance psychologique (Revue Philosophique, 1879, vol. viii, p. 271 et seq.).—Cf. Psychologie de l'attention, Paris, 1889, p. 75.
- ↑ Physiology of Mind, p. 206 et seq.
