position had become very obscure indeed, and had to be cleared up, on one portion of our front at any rate, by a retreat to positions well behind those held by us at the conclusion of the morning's attack.
When the orders for attack were received from the IX Corps, the situation on the front held by the 32nd Division was anything but clear, and reliable information could not be obtained as to the exact position of our own front-line troops and those of the enemy. It was decided, therefore, to attack from a line some distance behind our reported front line, in order to make certain that the forming-up of our troops should not be interfered with by contact with enemy patrols. The selection of a forming-up line which could be located and on which the troops could be disposed in the darkness of the early morning might have been a matter of extreme difficulty. The problem was in this instance solved, however, by the presence of the Joncourt-Sequehart Road, a well-marked feature running parallel to the whole front of attack and, providentially, only a few hundred yards in front of the line held by the enemy. Guides from all units were therefore selected, shown the road and the approaches to it, and sent back to lead their units to their appointed places on this line. The actual forming-up line was taped out some 200 yards in front of this road and approximately parallel to it.
To allow latitude for any possible short shooting or incorrect disposition of the attacking troops, the initial barrage line was laid down some 200 yards in advance of the forming-up line. Here it was to wait six minutes before lifting, in order to permit the Infantry to redistribute themselves under its shelter before moving forward against the first objective.
Perhaps the arm most affected by the shortness of
