notice before the attack was the Artillery. The C.R.A. 46th Division had under his command nine Brigades of Horse and Field Artillery, and with this force he was ordered to cover the front of attack of both the 46th and 32nd Divisions. Of these Brigades, five were already in position, and the fire from these five was arranged so as to cover the whole front of the attack, the fire from the remaining four, which had to move forward, being superimposed upon the barrage laid down by the former.
Thus, in the event of the failure of these other Brigades to come into action in time, a failure which had to be reckoned with and which might, under adverse circumstances, have been unavoidable, there would be no gaps in the barrage, and the troops, though insufficiently supported, could have advanced to time with a fair prospect of success.
Instructions were at once sent out to all Brigade Commanders to reconnoitre positions well east of the Canal within 2,000 yards of the front line, and to make the necessary arrangements to get their batteries in line and their ammunition dumped ready to open fire on the initial barrage line at zero hour if possible, or as soon afterwards as they could manage.
In this connection it may be interesting to the civilian reader to have some account of the special difficulties of the Artillery under circumstances such as those we are considering. To deal with a particular case, the officer commanding any one of the nine Artillery groups covering the Division in the Battle of Ramicourt received his orders about one hour before dark. His preparations had to be completed and his batteries ready for action by 6.5 a.m. the following day. Positions must be reconnoitred, horses must be brought up from the wagon lines, guns must be got into posi
