Analysis The Board recognises the fact that Captain Strouse was held in high esteem by his company and was in a position of trust; also, that the keeping of all flight records was left entirely up to him. The Board also recognizes the company's responsibility to maintain adequate records to assure compliance with 11.53(i)[1] of the Civil Air Regulations. In this instance, a review of the record of Captain Strouse would have indicated that his medical examination had been taken as prescribed. However, overdue proficiency checks should have been found.
As previously indicated, Captain Strouse's medical certificate was not current; his last medical examination, required each six months, had been taken some three years previously. As chief pilot of the company, as well as being a company agent responsible for the maintenance of pilot records, Captain Strouse was in a position where he readily could have falsified his own records. The Board believes that if an FAA inspector had asked for Captain Strouse's medical certificate to examine it, during the three years it was not current, the lack of its validity would have been discovered.
Great Sitkin Island was completely obscured by clouds of an orographic formation above the 1,500-foot level. Clouds surrounding the island were in two layers. The upper layer was thin with its top at 7,000 feet and its base somewhat below this level. The lower layer had its top at 4,000 feet and a base at 1,500 feet. Each layer virtually created an overcast condition with very small breaks, if any, in the lower deck. Foth layers converged over Great Sitkin Island resulting in a solid cloud condition. There was no fog, precipitation, or turbulence of any consequence immediately adjacent to the route involved.
Captain Strouse was an experienced DC-4 pilot and had acquired several years of experience flying this route while employed by Reeve Aleutian Airways.
Throughout the flight from Cold Bay to the last reporting point all reporting points were reached approximately when estimated. From this fact it must be concluded that Captain Strouse could have easily computed his position at the time he canceled the flight plan and should have known approximately how far he was from the only obstacle of any proportion along the course. Since Great Sitkin Island 18 5,740 feet in height, and at the time was obscured from the pilot's view by converging cloud layers as well as the orographic formation surrounding the mountain, and since the flight was cruising IFR on top at 4,500 feet, it is obvious that a change of course or altitude had to be made to avoid it. If the captain had elected to continue IR, under the existing weather conditions, he would have had to change course, climb and maintain VFR on top, or request an amended clearance for an altitude assignment of at least 8,000 feet (the minimum en route altitude). To do this would have taken very little extra
- ↑ 41.53(1) QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: (a) No air carrier shall utilize any flight crew member or dispatcher, nor shall any such airman perform the duties authorized by his airman certificate, unless he satisfactorily meets the appropriate requirements of 1.48 etc.
41.48 Certificate. (a) Any pilot serving as pilot in command shall hold a valid airline transport pilot certificate and a rating for the aircraft in which he is to serve,
