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time and this should not have been a deciding factor because the airplane was to remain overnight in Adak and no other uses were scheduled for it. Captain Strouse did not elect to take any of the above courses of action, but instead decided to cancel his IPR flight plan and proceed VFR. At the time this decision was made, the aircraft was computed to be approximately 35 nautical miles from its destination and about 9 nautical miles from Great Sitkin Island. Due to the lack of precise information, it is not definitely known what the cloud coverage was where the descent was begun; however, it is believed that it was slightly better than that in close proximity to Great Sıtkın Island. It is logical to assume that a pilot with this captain's experience and background would not deliberately descend into a solid cloud condition after stating that he was going to proceed VFR. He must have thought that he could descend to a safe altitude below the clouds in accordance with visual flight rules and proceed in this manner to his destination.
Conclusion Since the aircraft was apparently in the clouds just prior to impact, the Board concludes that the pilot for reasons unknown, did not continue to maintain visual reference to the extent necessary to navigate successfully through hazardous terrain.
The Board further concludes that the pilot did not know his exact position when he began the descent and thought he was either to the right or left of course or beyond the mountain.
It cannot definitely be determined to what degree, if any, the cerebrovascular disease from which the captain suffered contributed to this accident. However, the fact that poor judgment is one of the results of this disease, it is possible that this may have caused him to attempt to proceed visually under conditions in which better judgment would have caused him to be more cautious.
In any event the Board must conclude that the failure to maintain flight over hazardous terrain, in accordance with visual flight rules, was not compatible with the degree of judgment expected of an airline pilot. The company has taken the following corrective action: All approaches into Adak are to be made in accordance with instrument flight rules. Photographic copies of each pilot's medical certificates are to be made upon the pilot's receipt of the certificate and placed in the file.
Probable Cause
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to maintain flight in accordance with visual flight rules during a descent over hazardous terrain.
BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD:
/s/ WHITNEY GILLILAND
Chairman
/s/ CHAN Gurney
Vice Chairman
/s/ G. JOSEPH MINETTI
Member
/s/ Alan s. BOYD
Member
/s/ J. S. BRAGDON
Member
