POSITIVISM
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POSITIVISM
being", as the object of its veneration and cult.
We shall give a brief historical sketch of Positivism,
an exposition of its fundamental principles, and
a criticism of them.
I. History of Positivism. — The founder of Posi- tivism was Augusta Comte (b. at Montpellier, 19 Jan., 1798; d. at Paris, 5 Sept., 1857). He entered the Ecnle polytechniqiw at Paris in 1814, was a dis- ciple of Saint-Simon until 1824, and began to publish his course of philosophy in 1826. About this period he became temporarily deranged (1826-27). After recovering, he was appointed instructor (1832-52) and examiner in mathematics (1837-44) at the Ecole polylechnique, giving meanwhile a course of public lectures on astronomy. The unhappiness of his married life and his strange infatuation for Mme Clotilde de Vaux (1845-46) greatly influenced his naturally sentimental character. He realized that mere intellectual development is insufficient for life, and, having presented Postivism as the scien- tific doctrine and method, he aimed at making it a religion, the religion of humanity. Comte's chief works are his "Cours de philosophic positive" [6 vols.: Philosophie mathematique (1830), astrono- mique et physique (1835), chimique et biologique (1838), partie dogmatique de la philosophie sociale (1839), partie historique (1840), complement de la philosophie sociale et conclusions (1842); translated by Harriet Martineau (London, 1853) ] and his "Cours de poUtique positive" (3 vols., Paris, 1815- 54). Various influences concurred to form Comte's system of thought : the Empiricism of Locke and the Scepticism of Hume, the Sensism of the eighteenth centurj- and the Criticism of Kant, the Mysticism of the Middle Ages, the Traditionalism of De Maistre and de Bonald, and the Philanthropy of Saint- Simon. He maintains as a law manifested by his- torj' that every science passes through three suc- cessive stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive; that the positive stage, which re- jects the validity of metaphysical speculation, the existence of final causes, and the knowableness of the absolute, and confines itself to the study of experi- mental facts and their relations, represents the per- fection of human knowledge. Classifying the sciences according to their degree of increasing com- plexity, he reduces them to six in the following order: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistrj', biologj', and sociologj'. Religion has for its object the "great being" (humanity), the "great medium" (world- space), and the "great fetich" (the earth), which form the positivist trinity. This religion has its hierarchical priesthood, its positive dogmas, its organized cult, and even its calendar on the model of Cathohcism (cf. Comte, "Catechisme positiviste").
At the death of Comte, a division arose among the Positivists, the dissident group being formed with Littre as its leader, and the orthodox group under the direction of Pierre Laffitte. Emile Littre (q. v.) accepted Positivism in its scientific aspect: for him Positivism was essentially a method, viz. that method which limits human knowledge to the study of ex- perimental facts and neither affirms nor denies any- thing concerning what may exist outside of experience. He rejected as unreal the religious organization and cult of Positivism. He considered all religions from the philosophical point of view, to be equally vain, while he confessed that, from the historical point of view, Catholicism was superior to all other religions. The true end of man, he maintained, was to work for the progress of humanity by studying it (science and education), loving it (religion), beautifying it (fine arts), and enriching it (industry). The official suc- cessor of Comte and leader of the orthodox group of Postivists was Pierre Laffitte, who became professor of the general history of sciences in the College de France in 1892. He maintained both the scientific
and the religious teaching of Positivism with its cult,
sacraments, and ceremonies. Other orthodox groups
were formed in England with Harrison as its leader
and Congreve, Elhot, Hutton, Morrison etc. as its
chief adherents; in Sweden with A. Nystrom. An
active and influential group was also founded in
Brazil and Chile with Benjamin Constant and Miguel
Lemos as leaders, and a temple of humanity was built
at Rio Janeiro in 1891. The principles of Positivism
as a philosophical system were accepted and applied
in England by J. Stuart Mill, who had been in cor-
respondence with Comte (cf. "Lettres d'Aug. Comte
a John Stuart Mill, 1841-1844", Paris, 1877),
Spencer, Bain, Lewes, Maudsley, Sully, Romanes,
Huxley, Tyndall etc.; in France by Taine, Ribot,
de Roberty etc. ; in Germany by Dilhring, Avenarius
etc. Thus, the principles and spirit of Positivism
pervaded the scientific and philosophical thought of
the nineteenth century and exercised a pernicious
influence in every sphere. They had their practical
consequences in the systems of positive or so-called
scientific morality and utilitarianism in ethics, of
neutrality and naturalism in religion.
Principles of Positivism. — The fundamental principle of Positivism is, as already said, that sense experience is the only object of human knowledge as well as its sole and supreme criterion. Hence ab- stract notions or general ideas are nothing more than collective notions; judgments are mere empirical colligations of facts. Reasoning includes induction and the syllogism: induction has for its conclusion a proposition which contains nothing more than the collection of a certain number of sense experiences, and the syllogism, taking this conclusion as its major proposition, is necessarily sterile or even results in a vicious circle. Thus, according to Positivism, science cannot be, as Aristotle conceived it, the knowledge of things through their ultimate causes, since mate- rial and formal causes are unknowable, final causes illasions, and efficient causes simply invariable ante- cedents, while metaphysics, imder any form, is ille- gitimate. Positivism is thus a continuation of crude Empiricism, Associationism, and Nominalism. The arguments advanced by Positivism, besides the as- sertion that sense experiences are the only object of human knowledge, are chiefly two: the first is that psychological analysis shows that all human knowl- edge can be ultimately reduced to sense experiences and empirical associations; the second, insisted upon by Comte, is historical, and is based on his famous "law of the three stages", according to which the human mind in its progress is supposed to have been successively influenced by theo'ogical preoccupations and metaphysical speculation, and to have finally reached at the present time the positive stage, which marks, according to Comte, its full and perfect de- velopment (cf. "Cours de philosophie positive", II, 15 sqq.).
Criticism. — Positivism asserts that sense expe- riences are the only object of human knowledge, but does not prove its assertion. It is true that all our knowledge has its starting point in sense experience, but it is not proved that knowledge stops there. Positivism fails to demonstrate that, above particular facts and contingent relations, there are not abstract notions, general laws, universal and necessary prin- ciples, or that we cannot know them. Nor does it prove that material and corporeal things constitute the whole order of existing beings, and that our knowl- edge is limited to them. Concrete beings and in- dividual relations are not only perceptible by our senses, but they have also their causes and laws of exi.stence and "constitution; they are intelUgible. These causes and laws pass beyond the particularness and contingency of individual facts, and are elements as fundamentally real as the individual facts which they produce and control. They cannot be per-
