POSITIVISM
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POSITIVISM
ccived by our senses, but why can they not be ex-
plained by our intelligence? Again, immaterial
beings cannot be perceived by sense experience, it is
true, but their existence is not contradictory to our
intelligence, and, if their existence is required as a
cause and a condition of the actual existence of ma-
terial things, they certainly exist. We can infer their
existence and know something of their nature. They
cannot indeed be known in the same way as material
things, but this is no reason for declaring them
unknowable to our intelligence (see Agnosticism;
Analogy). According to Positivism, our abstract
concepts or general ideas are mere collective rep-
resentations of the experimental order — for example,
the idea of "man" is a kind of blended image of all
the men observed in our experience. This is a funda-
mental error. Every image bears indi\'idual charac-
ters; an image of man is always an image of a par-
ticular man and can represent only that one man.
What is called a collective image is nothing more
than a collection of divers images succeeding one
another, each representing an individual and concrete
object, as may be seen by attentive observation.
An idea, on the contrary, abstracts from any concrete
determination, and may be applied identically to
an indefinite number of objects of the same class.
Collective images are more or less confused, and are
the more so as the collection represented is larger;
an idea remains always clear. There are objects
which we cannot imagine (e. g. a mjTiagon, a sub-
stance, a principle), and which we can nevertheless
distinctly conceive. Nor is the general idea a name
substituted as a sign for all the individual objects of
the same class, as stated by Taine (De I'lntelligence,
I, 26). If a certain perception, saj's Taine, always
coincides with or follows another perception (e. g.
the perception of smoke and that of fire, the smell
of a sweet odour and the sight of a rose), then the one
becomes the sign of the other in such a way that,
when we perceive one, we instinctively anticipate the
presence of the other. So it is, Taine adds, with
our general ideas. When we have perceived a num-
ber of different trees, there remains in our memory
a certain image made up of the characters common to
all trees, namely the image of a trunk with branches.
We call it "tree", and this word becomes the ex-
elusive sign of the class "tree"; it evokes the image
of the individual objects of that class as the percep-
tion of every one of these evokes the image of the sign
substituted for the whole class.
Cardinal Mercier rightly remarks that this theory rests upon a confusion between experimental analogy and abstraction (Crit^riologie gen6rale, 1, III, c. iii, § 2, pp. 237 sqq.). Ex-perLmental analogy plays indeed a large part in our practical life, and is an important factor in the education of our senses (cf. St. Thomas, "Anal, post.", II, xv). But it should be remarked that experimental analogy is limited to the indi\ddual objects observed, to particular and similar objects; its generality is essentially relative. Again, the words which designate the objects cor- respond to the characters of these objects, and we cannot speak of "abstract names" when only in- dividual objects are given. Such is not the case with our general ideas. They are the result of an abstrac- tion, not of a mere perception of individual objects, however numerous; they are the conception of a type applicable in its unity and identity to an indefinite number of the objects of which it is the type. They thus have a generality without limit and independent of any concrete determination. If the words which signify them can be the .sign of all the individual ob- jects of the same class, it is becau.se that same class has fust Ix-cn conceived in its type; the.se names are abslrail lircause they .signify an abstract concept, llciii-c mere experience is in.sufficient to account for our general ideas. A careful study of Tainc's theory
and the illustrations given shows that the ap-
parent plausibiUty of this theory comes precisely
from the fact that Taine unconsciously introduces
and employs abstraction. Again, Positivism, and
this is the point especially developed by John Stuart
Mill (following Hume), maintains that what we call
"necessary truths" (even mathematical truths,
axioms, principles) are merely the result of experience,
a generahzation of our experiences. We are con-
scious, e. g. that we cannot at the same time affirm
and deny a certain proposition, that one state of mind
excludes the other; then we generalize our observa-
tion and express as a general principle that a proposi-
tion cannot be true and false at the same time.
Such a principle is simply the result of a subjective
necessity based on experience. Now, it is true that
experience furnishes us with the matter out of which
our judgments are formed, and with the occasion to
formulate them. But mere experience does not af-
ford either the proof or the confirmation of our certi-
tude concerning their truth. If it were so, our cer-
titude should increase with every new experience,
and such is not the case, and we could not account for
the absolute character of this certitude in all men,
nor for the identical application of this certitude to
the same propositions by all men. In reality we
affirm the truth and necessity of a proposition, not
because we cannot subjectively deny it or conceive
its contradictory, but because of its objective e\i-
dence, which is the manifestation of the absolute,
universal, and objective truth of the proposition,
the source of our certitude, and the reason of the
subjective necessity in us.
As to the so-called "law of the three stages", it is not borne out by a careful study of history. It is true that we meet with certain epochs more par- ticularly characterized by the influence of faith, or metaphysical tendencies, or enthusiasm for natural science. But even then we do not see that these characteristics realize the order expressed in Comte's law. Aristotle was a close student of natural science, while after him the neo-Platonic School was almost exclusively given to metaphysical speculation. In the sixteenth centurj' there was a great revival of ex- , perimental sciences; yet it was followed by the meta- physical speculation of the German idealistic school. The nineteenth century beheld a wonderful develop- ment of the natural sciences, but we are now witness- ing a revival of the study of metaphysics. Nor is it true that these divers tendencies cannot exist during the same epoch. Aristotle was a metaphysician as well as a scientist. Even in the Middle Ages, which are so generally considered as exclusively given to a priori metaphysics, observation and experiment had a large place, as is shown by the works of Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus. St. Thomas himself manifests a remarkably keen spirit of psychological observation in his "Commentaries" and in his "Summa theologica", especially in his admirable treatise on the passions. Finally, we see a harmo- nious combination of faith, metaphysical reasoning, and experimental observation in such men as Kepler, Descartes, Leibniz, Paschal etc. The so-called "law of the three stages" is a gratuitous assumption, not a law of history.
The positivist reUgion is a logical consequence of the principles of Positivism. In reaUty human reason can prove the existence of a personal God and of His providence, and the moral necessity of revelation, while history proves the existence of such a revelation. The establishment of a religion by Posit i\'ism simply shows that for man religion is a necessity.
RoBI.NET, Notice sur I'amre el la vie d'A. Comte (Paris, ISCO); Te3l<imenld'A. Cainle (Paris, 1884) ; Mill,^. Comte and Posilirism (London, 1867, 18821 ; Care, LiUr6 et le posilimsme (Paris, 1883); Cairo, The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte (Glasgow, 1885) ; Laohent, La philos. de Stuart Mill (Paris, 1886) ; Gruber, AComie.der Begrunder d. Positivismus (Freibxirg, 1889) ; Idem,
