SIN
6
SIN
generally by theologians and is primarily a definition
of actual mortal sin. It explains well the material
and formal elements of sin. The words "dictum vel
factum vel concupitum" denote the material element
of sin, a human act: "contra legem seternam", the
formal element. The act is bad because it trans-
gresses the Divine law. St. Ambrose (De paradiso,
viii) defines sin as a "prevarication of the Divine
law". The definition of St. Augustine strictly con-
sidered, i. e. as sin averts us from our true ultimate
end, does not comprehend venial sin, but in as much
as venial sin is in a manner contrary to the Divine
law, although not averting us from our last end, it may
be said to be included in the definition as it stands.
While primarily a definition of sins of commission,
sins of omission may be included in the definition be-
cause they presuppose some positive act (St. Thomas,
I-II, Q. ixxi, a. .5) and negation and affirmation are
reduced to the same genus. Sins that violate the
human or the natural law are also included, for what
is contrary to the human or natural law is also con-
trary to the Divine law, in as much as every just
human law is derived from the Divine law, and is not
just unless it is in conformity with the Divine law.
Biblical Description of Sin. — In the Old Testament sin is set forth as an act of disobedience (Gen., ii, 16-17; iii, 11; Is., i, 2-4; Jer., ii, 32); as an insult to God (Num., xxvii, 14); as something detested and punished by God (Gen., iii, 14-19, Gen., iv, 9-16); as injurious to the sinner (Tob., xii, 10) ; to be e.xpiated by penance (Ps. 1, 19). In the New Testament it is clearly taught in St. Paul that sin is a transgression of the law (Rom., ii, 23; v, 12-20); a servitude from which we are liberated by grace (Rom., vi, 16-18); a disobedience (Heb., ii, 2) punished by God (Heb., x, 26-31). St. John describes sin as an offence to God, a disorder of the will (John, xii, 43), an iniquity (I John, iii, 4-10). Christ in many of his utterances teaches the nature and extent of sin. He came to promulgate a new law more perfect than the old, which would extend to the ordering not only of ex- ternal but also of internal acts to a degree unknown before, and, in His Sermon on the Mount, he con- demns as sinful many acts which were judged honest and righteous by the doctors and teachers of the Old Law. He denounces in a special manner hypocrisy and scandal, infidelity and the sin against the Holy Ghost. In particular he teaches that sins come from the heart (Matt., xv, 19-20).
" Systems which Deny Sin or Distort its True Notion. — All systems, religious and ethical, which either deny, on the one hand, the existence of a personal creator and lawgiver distinct from and superior to his crea- tion, or, on the other, the existence of free will and responsibility in man, distort or destroy the true biblico-theological notion of sin. In the beginning of the Christian era the Gnostics, although their doc- trines varied in details, denied the existence of a per- sonal creator. The idea of sin in the Catholic sense is not contained in their system. There is no sin for them, unless it be the sin of ignorance, no necessity for an atonement; Jesus is not God (see Gnosticism). Manichajism (q. v.) with its two eternal principles, good and e\'il, at periietual war with each other, is also destructive of the true notion of sin. All evil, and consequently sin, is from the principle of evil. The Christian concept of God as a lawgiver is de- stroyed. Sin is not a conscious voluntary act of dis- obeiticnce to the Divine will. Pantheistic systems which deny the distinction between God and His creation make sin impossible. If man and God are one, man is not responsible to anyone for his acts, morality is destroyed. If he is his own rule of action, he caiiiiot deviate from right ;is St. Thoniius teaches
(I, (^. Ixiii, a. 1). The identification of God and the world by Pantheism (([. v.) leaves no place for sin. There must be some law to which man is subject,
superior to and distinct from him, which can he
obeyed and transgressed, before sin can enter into his
acts. This law must be the mandate of a superior,
because the notions of superiority and subjection are
correlative. This superior can be only God, who
alone is the author and lord of man. Materialism,
denying as it does the spirituality and the immor-
tality of the soul, the existence of any spirit whatso-
ever, and consequently of God, does not admit sin.
There is no free will, everything is determined by
the inflexible laws of motion. "Virtue" and "vice"
are meaningless qualifications of action. Positivism
places man's last end in some sensible good. His
supreme law of action is to seek the maximum of
pleasure. Egotism or altruism is the supreme norm
and criterion of the Positivistic sj'stems, not the
eternal law of God as revealed by Him, and dictated
by conscience. For the materialistic evolutionists
man is but a highly-developed animal, conscience a
product of evolution. Evolution has revolutionized
morality, sin is no more.
Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" having re- jected all the essential notions of true morality, namely, liberty, the soul, God and a future life, at- tempted in his "Critique of the Practical Reason" to restore them in the measure in which they are neces- sary for morality. The practical rea.son, he tells us, imposes on us the idea of law and dutj'. The funda- mental principle of the morality of Kant is "duty for duty's sake", not God and His law. Duty cannot be conceived of alone as an independent thing. It car- ries with it certain postulates, the first of whicn is liberty. "I ought, therefore I can", is his doctrine. Man by virtue of his practical reason has a con- sciousness of moral obligation (categorical impera- tive). This consciousness supposes three things: free will, the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, otherwise man would not be capable of fulfilling his obligations, there would be no sufficient sanction for the Divine law, no reward or pum.shment in a future life. Kant's moral system labours m obscurities and contradictions and is destructive of much that per- tains to the teaching of Christ. Personal dignity is the supreme rule of man's actions. The notion of sin as opposed to God is suppressed. According to the teaching of materialistic Zionism, now so widespread, there is, and can be, no free will. According to this doctrine but one thing exists and this one being pro- duces all phenomena, thought included; we are but puppets in its hands, carried hither and thither as it wills, and finally are cast back into nothingness. There is no place for good and evil, a free observance or a wilful transgression of law, in such a system. Sin in the true sense is impossible. Without law and liberty and a personal God there is no sin.
That God exists and can be known from His visible creation, that He has revealed the decrees of His eternal will to man, and is distinct from His crea- tion (Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 17S2, 17S5, 1701), are matters of Catholic faith and teach- ing. Man is a created being endowed with free will (ibid, 793), which fact can be proved from Scripture and reason (ibid., 1041-1650). The Council of Trent declares in Sess. VT, c. i (ibid., 793) that man by reason of the prevarication of Adam has lost his primeval innocence, and that while free will remains, its powers are lessened (see Original Sin).
Prolc.'itnnt Errors. — Luther and Calvin taught as their fundamental error that no free will j)roperly so called remained in man after the fall of our first parents; that the fulfillment of God's precepts is im- possible even with the assistance of grace, and that man in all his actions sins. Grace is not an interior gift, but .something external. To .some sin is not imputed, because the>- are co\ered as with a cloak by the merits of Christ. Faith alone saves, there is no necessity for good works. Sin iu Luther's doctrine
