SIN
SIN
cannot be a deliberate transgression of the Divine
law. Jansenius, in his "'Augustinus", taught that
according to the present powers of man some of God's
precepts are impossible of fulfilment, even to the
just who strive to fulfil them, and he further taught
that grace by means of which the fulfilment becomes
possible is wanting even to the just. His funda-
mental error consists in teaching that the will is not
free but is necessarily drawn cither by concupiscence
or grace. Infernal liberty is not required for merit or
demerit. Liberty from coercion suffices. Christ did
not die for all men. Baius taught a semi-Lutheran
doctrine. Liberty is not entirely destroyed, but is so
weakened that without grace it can do nothing but
sin. True liberty is not required for sin. A bad
act committed involuntarily renders man responsible
(propositions 50-51 in Denzinger-Bannwart, "En-
chiridion", nn. 10.50-1). All acts done without
charity are mortal sins and merit damnation because
they proceed from concupiscence. This doctrine de-
nies that sin is a voluntarj' transgression of Divine
law. If man is not free, a precept is meaningless as
far as he is concerned.
Philosophical Sin. — Those who would construct a moral system independent of God and his law dis- tinguish between theological and philosophical sin. Philosophical sin is a morally bad act which violates the natural order of reason, not the Divine law. Theological sin is a transgression of the eternal law. Those who are of atheistic tendencies and contend for this distinction, either deny the existence of God or maintam that He exercises no providence in regard to human acts. This position is destructive of sin in the theological sense, as God and His law, reward and punishment, are done away with. Those who admit the existence of God, His law, human liberty and responsibility, and still contend for a distinction be- tween philosophical and theological sin, maintain that in the present order of God's providence there are morallj' bad acts, which, while violating the order of reason, are not offensive to God, and they base their contention on this that the sinner can be ignorant of the existence of God, or not actually think of Him and His law when he acts. Without the knowledge of God and consideration of Him, it is impossible to offend Him. This doctrine was censured as scanda- lous, temerarious, and erroneous by Alexander VIII (24 Aug., 1690) in his condemnation of the following proposition: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act not in agreement with rational nature and right reason, theological and mortal sin is a free transgres- sion of the Divine law. However grievous it may be, philosophical sin in one who is either ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is indeed a grievous sin, but not an offense to God, nor a mortal sin di.s- solving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment" (Denzinger-Bannwart, 1290).
This proposition is condemned because it does not distinguish between vincible and invincible igno- rance, and further supposes invincible ignorance of God to be sufficiently common, in.stead of only meta- physically possible, and because in the present flis- pensation of (Sod's jirovidence we are clearly taught m Scripture that (!od will inmish all evil coming from the free will of man (Rom., ii, .5-11). There is no morally bad act that does not include a transgression of Divine law. From the fact that an action is con- ceived of as morally evil it is conceived of as pro- hibited. A prohibition is unintelligible without the notion of some one prohibiting. The one prohibiting in this case and binding the conscience of man can be only God, Who alone has power over man's free will and actions, so that from the fact that any act is per- ceived to be morally bad and prohibited by conscience, God and His law are perceived at least confusedly, and a wilful transgression of the dictate of conscience is necessarily also a transgression of God's law. Car-
dinal de Lugo (De incamat., disp. 5, lect. 3) admits
the possibility of philosophical sin in those who are
inculpably ignorant of God, but he holds that it does
not actually occur, because in the present order of
God's providence there cannot be invincible igno-
ranr e of God and His law. This teaching does not
necessarily fall under the condemnation of Alexander
VIII, but it is commonly rejected by theologians for
the reason that, a dictate of conscience necessarily in-
volves a knowledge of the Divine law as a principle of
morality.
Conditions of Mortal Sin: Knowledge, Free Will, Grave Matter. — Contrary to • the teaching of Baius (prop. 46, Denzinger-Bannwart, 1046) and the Re- formers, a sin must be a voluntary act. Those ac- tions alone are properly called human or moral actions which proceed from the human will deliberately acting with knowledge of the end for which it acts. Man differs from all irrational creatures in this precisely that he is master of his actions by virtue of his reason and free will (I-II, Q. i, a. 1). Since sin is a human act wanting in due rectitude, it must have, in so far as it is a human act, the essential constituents of a human act. The intellect must perceive and judge of the morality of the act, and the will must freely elect. For a deliberate mortal sin there must be full advertence on the part of the intellect and full con- sent on the part of the will in a grave matter. An involuntarj' transgression of the law even in a grave matter is not a formal but a material sin. The gravity of the matter is judged from the teaching of Scripture, the definitions of councils and popes, and also from reason. Those sins .are judged to be mortal which contain in themselves some grave disorder in regard to God, our neighbour, ourselves, or society. Some sins admit of no lightness of matter, as for ex- ample, blasphemy, hatred of God; they are always mortal (ex loto genere sua), unless rendered venial by want of full advertence on the part of the intellect or full consent on the part of the will. Other sins admit lightness of matter: they are grave sins (ex genero suo) in as much as their matter in itself is sufficient to con- stitute a grave sin without the addition of any other matter, but is of such a nature that in a given case, owing to its smallness, the sin may be venial, e. g. theft.
Imputnhility. — That the act of the sinner may be imputed to him it is not necessary that the object which tenninates and specifies his act should be di- rectly willed as an end or means. It suffices that it be willed indirectly or in its cause, i. e. if the sinner foresees, at least confusedly, that it will follow from the act which he freely performs or from his omission of an act. When the cause produces a twofold effect, one of which is directly willed, the other indirectly, the effect which follows indirectly is morally imput- .'| able to the sinner when these three conditions are verified : first, the sinner must foresee at least con- fusedly the evil effects which follow on the cause he ' places; second, he must be able to refrain from placing the cau.se; third, he must be under the obligation of preventing the evil effect. Error and ignorance in regard to the object or circumstances of the act to be phaced, affect the judgment of the intellect and conse- quently the morality and imputability of the act. Invincible ignorance excuses entirely from sin. Vin- cible ignorance does not, although it renders the act less free (see Ignoran'Ce). The passions, while they di.sturb the judgment of the intellect, more directly affect the will, .\nteccdent pa-ssion incrca-ses the in- tensity of the act, the object is more intensely desired, although less freely, and the disturbance caused by the passions may be so great as to render a free judg- ment impossible, the agent being for the moment beside himself (1-11, t^. vi, a. 7, lul .3um). Conse- quent jjassion, which arises from a command of the will, does not lessen liberty, but is rather a sign of an
