SIN
9
SIN
is not a full consent in the case of a sin that is mortal
considered objectively.
Causes of Sin. — Under this head, it is needful to distinguish between the efficient cause, i.e. the agent performing the sinful action, and those other agencies, influences or circumstances, which incite to sin and consequently involve a danger, more or less grave, for one who is ex^josed to them. These inciting causes are exjjlained in special articles on Occasions of Sin and Tempt.\tion. Here we have to consider only the efficient cause or causes of sin. These are interior and exterior. The complete and sufficient cause of sin is the will, which is regulated in its actions by the reason, antl acted upon bj' the sensitive appetites. The principal interior causes of sin are ignorance, infirmity or passion, and malice. Ignorance on the part of the reason, infirmity and passion on the part of the sensitive appetite, and malice on the part of the otU. A sin is from certain malice when the will sins of its own accord and not under the influence of ignorance or passion.
The exterior causes of sin are the devil and man, who move to sin by means of suggestion, persuasion, temptation, and bad example. God is not the cause of sin (Coimc. of Trent., sess. VI, can. vi, in Denz.- Bann., 816). He directs all things to Himself and is the end of all His actions, and could not be the cause of evil without self-contradiction. Of whatever entity there is in sin as an action, He is the cause. The evil will is the cause of the disorder (I-II, Q. Ixxix, a. 2). One sin may be the cause of another inasmuch ;is one sin may be ordained to another as an end. The seven capital sins, so called, may be considered as the source from which other sins proceed. They are sinful propensities which reveal themselves in particular sinful acts. Original sm by reivson of its dire effects is the cause and source of sin in so far as by reason of it our natures are left wounded and incUned to evil. Ignorance, infirmitj', malice, and concupiscence are the consequences of original sin.
Effects of Sill. — The first effect of mortal sin in man is to avert him from his tnie last end, and deprive his soul of sanctifying grace. The sinful act passes, and the sinner is left in a state of habitual aversion from God. The sinful state is voluntary- and imput- able to the sinner, because it necessarily follows from the act of sin he freely placed, and it remains until satisfaction is made (see Penance). This state of sin is called by theologians habitvial sin, not in the sense that habitual sin implies a vicious habit, but in the sense that it signifies a state of aversion from God depending on the preceding actual sin, con- sequently voluntary and imputable. This state of aversion carries with it necessarily in the present order of God's providence the privation of grace and charity by means of which man is ordered to his supernatural end. The privation of grace is the "macula peccati" (St. Thonuus I-II, Q. lx.xxvi), the stain of sin spoken of in Scripture (Jos., xxii, 17; Isaias, iv, 4; 1 Cor., vi, 11). It is not anything positive, a quality or disposition, an obligation to suffer, an extrinsic denomination coming from sin, but is solely the privation of sanctifying grace. There is not a real but only a conceptual distinction between habitual sin {realus cidpce) and the stain of sin (macula peccali). One and the same privation considered as destroying the due order of man to God is habitual sin, considered as depriving the soul of the beauty of grace is the stain or "macula" of sin.
The second effect of sin is to entail the penalty of undergoing suffering (realus pwna). Sin (reatiis culprr) is the cau.se of this oblig.ation (realus pa^iitF). The suffering may be inflicted in tliis life thnmgh the medium of tnedirin.'d punishments, calamities, sick- ness, temporal evils, which tend to withdraw from
sin; or it may be inflicted in the life to come by the
justice of God as vindictive punishment. The
punishments of the future life are jiroportioned
to the sin committed, and it is the obligation of
undergoing this punishment for unrepented sin that
is signified by the "reatus pcenae" of the theologians.
The penalty to be undergone in the future life is
divided into the pain of loss (poena damni) and tlie
pain of sense (poena seiisus). The pain of lo.ss is
the privation of the beatific vision of God in punish-
ment of turning away from Him. The pain of sense
is suffering in punishment of the conversion to some
created thing in place of God. This two-fold pain
in punishment of mortal sin is eternal (I Cor., vi, 9;
Matt., .xxv, 41; Mark, ix, 45). One mortal sin
suffices to incur punishment. (See Hell.) Other
effects of sins are: remorse of conscience (Wistlom,
V, 2-13); an inclination towards evil, as habits are
formed by a repetition of similar acts; a darkening
of the intelligence, a hardening of the will (Matt., xiii,
14-15; Rom., xi, 8); a general vitiating of nature,
which does not however totally destroy tlie substance
and faculties of the soul but merelj- weakens the
right exercise of its faculties.
IV. Venial Sin. — Venial sin is essentially differ- ent from mortal sin. It does not avert us from our true last end, it does not destroy charity, the principle of union with God, nor dei)rive the soul of sanctifying grace, and it is intrinsically reijarable. It is called venial precisely because, considered in its own proper nature, it is pardonable; in itself meriting, not eternal, but temporal jjunishment. It is distinguished from mortal sin on the part of the disorder. By mortal sin man is entirely averted from God, his true last end, and, at Iea,st implicitly, he places his last end in some created thing. By venial sin he is not averted from God, neither does he place his last end in creatures. He remains united with God by charity, but does not tend towards Him as he ought. The true nature of sin as it is contrary to the eternal law, repugnant namely to the pnmarv' end of the law, is found only in mortal sin. Venial sin is only in an imperfect way contrary to the law, since it is not contrary to the primary end of the law, nor does it avert man from the end intended by the law (^St. Thomas, I-II, Q. Ixxxviii, a. 1; and Cajetan, I-II, Q. Ixxxviii, a. 1, for the sense of the prceter legem and contra legem of St. Thomas).
Definition. — Since a voluntary act and its disorder are of the essence of sin, venial sin as it is a voluntary act may be defined as a thought, word, or deed at variance with the law of God. It retards man in the attainment of his last end while not averting him from it. Its disorder consists either in the not fully deliberate choosing of some object prohibited by the law of (lOd, or in the deliberate adhesion to some created object not iis an ultimate end but as a medium, which object does not avert the sinner from God, but is not, however, referable to Him as an end. Man cannot be averted from God except by deliberately placing his last end in .some created thing, and in venial sin he does not adhere to any temporal good, enjoying it as a last end, but as a medium referring it to God not actually but habit- ually inasmuch as he himself is ordered to God by charity. "Ille qui peccat venialiter, inhseret bono temporali non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem, sed ut utens, referens in Deuin non actu sed habitu" (I-II, Q. Ixxxviii, a. 1, .ad .3). For a mortal sin, some createfl good must be adhered to as a last end at least implicitly. This adherence cannot be accomplished by a .semi-deliberate act. By adhering to an object that is at variance with the law of God and yet not destructive of the primary end of the Divine law, a true opposition is not set up between God and that object. The created good is not desired as an end. The sinner is not placed in the
