SIN
8
SIN
intense act of volition. Fear, violence, heredity,
temperament and pathological states, in so far as they
an'ect free volition, affect the maUce and imputa-
bility of sin. From the condemnation of the errors
of Baius and Jansenius (Denz.-Bann., 1046, 1066,
1094, 1291-2) it is clear that for an actual personal sin
a knowledge of the law and a personal voluntary act,
free from coercion and necessity, are required. No
mortal sin is committed in a state of invincible igno-
rance or in a half-conscious state. Actual advertence
to the sinfulness of the act is not required, virtual
advertence suffices. It is not necessary that the ex-
plicit intention to offend God and break his law be
present, the full and free consent of the will to an evil
act suffices.
Malice. — The true malice of mortal sin consists in a conscious and voluntary transgression of the eternal law, and implies a contempt of the Divine will, a com- plete turning away from God, our true last end, and a preferring of some created thing to which we subject ourselves. It is an offence offered to God, and an in- jury done Him; not that it effects any change in God, who is immutable by nature, but that the sinner by his act deprives God of the reverence and honor due Him: it is not any lack of malice on the sinner's part, but God's immutability that prevents Him from suffering. As an offence offered to God mortal sin is in a way infinite in its malice, since it is directed against an infinite being, and the gravity of the offence is measured by the dignity of the one offended (St. Thomas, III, Q. i, a. 2, ad 2um). As an act sin is finite, the will of man not being capable of infinite malice. Sin is an offence against Christ Who has redeemed man (Phil., iii, IS); against the Holy Ghost Who sanctifies us (Heb., x, 29), an injury to man himself, causing the spiritual death of the soul, and making man the servant of the devil. The first and primary malice of sin is derived from the object to which the will inordinately tends, and from the ob- ject considered morally, not physically. The end for which the sinner acts and the circumstances which surround the act are also determining factors of its morality. An act which, objectively considered, is morally indifferent, may be rendered good or evil by circumstances, or by the intention of the sinner. An act that is good objectively may be rendered bad, or a new species of good or evil may be added, or a new degree. Circumstances can change the character of a sin to such a degree that it becomes specifically dif- ferent from what it is objectively considered; or they may merely aggravate the sin while not changing its specific character; or they may lessen its gravity. That they may exercise this determining influence two things are necessary: they must contain in them- selves some good or evil, and must be apprehended, at least confusedly, in their moral aspect. The external act, in so far as it is a mere execution of a voluntary efficacious internal act, does not, according to the common Thomistic opinion, add any essential good- ness or malice to the internal sin.
Gravity. — While every mortal sin averts us from out true last end, all mortal sins are not equally grave, as is clear from Scripture (John, xix, 11; Matt., xi, 22; Luke, vi), and also from reason. SirLs are specifically distinguished by their objects, which do not ail equally avert man from his last end. Then again, since sin is not a pure privation, but a mixed one, all sins do not equally destroy the order of reason Spiritual sins, other things being equal, are graver than carnal sins (St. Thomas, "De malo", Q. ii, a. 9; I-II, Q. Ixxiii, a. 5).
Specific and numeric distinction of Sin. — Sins are distinguished specifically by their formally diverse objects; or from their ojjposition to different virtues, or to morally different precepts of the same virtue. Sins that are specifically distinct are also numerically distinct. Sins within the same species are distin-
guished numerically according to the number of com-
plete acts of the will in regard to total objects. A
total object is one which, either in itself or by the
intention of the sinner, forms a complete whole
and is not referred to another action as a part of
the whole. WTien the completed acts of the will
relate to the same object there are as many sins
as there are morally interrupted acts.
Subject causes of Sin. — Since sin is a voluntary act lacking in due rectitude, sin is found, as in a subject, principally in the will. But, since not only acts ehcited by the will are voluntary, but also those that are elicited by other faculties at the command of the will, sin may be found in these faculties in so far as they are subject in their actions to the command of t'ne will, and are instruments of the will, and move under its guidance (I-II, Q. Ixxiv).
The external members of the body cannot be effective principles of sin (I-II, Q. Ixxiv, a. 2 ad Sum). They are mere organs which are set in activity by the soul; they do not initiate action. The appetitive powers on the contrary can be effective principles of sin, for they possess, through their immediate conjunction with the will and their subordination to it, a certain though imperfect liberty (I-II, Q. Ivi, a. 4, ad Sum). The sensual appetites have their own proper sensible objects to which they naturally incline, and since original sin has broken the bond which held them in complete subjection to the will, they may antecede the will in their actions and tend to their own proper objects inordinately. Hence they may be proximate principles of sin when they move inordinatelj' contrary to the dictates of right reason.
It is the right of reason to rule the lower facul- ties, and when the disturbance arises in the sen- sual part the reason may do one of two things: it may either consent to the sensible delectation or it may repress and reject it. If it consents, the sin is no longer one of the sensual part of man, but of the intellect and will, and consequently, if the matter is grave, mortal. If rejected, no sin can be imputed. There can be no sin in the sensual part of man independently of the will. The in- ordinate motions of the sensual appetite which precede the advertence of reason, or which are suffered unwillingly, are not even venial sins. The temp- tations of the flesh not consented to are not sins. Concupiscence, which remains after the gjuilt of original sin is remitted in baptism, is not sinful so long as consent is not given to it (Coun. of Trent., sess. V, can. v). The sensual appetite of itself cannot be the subject of mortal sin, for the reason that it can neither grasp the notion of God as an ultimate end, nor avert us from Him, without which aversion there cannot be mortal sin. The superior reason, whose office it is to occupy itself with Di\-ine things, may be the proximate principle of sin both in regard to its own proper act, to know truth, and as it is directive of the inferior faculties: in regard to its own proper act, in so far as it voluntarily neglects to know what it can and ought to know; in regard to the act by which it directs the inferior faculties, to the ex-tent that it commands inordinate acts or fails to repress them (I-II, Q. Ixxiv, a. 7, •ad 2um).
The will never consents to a sin that is not at the same time a sin of the superior reason as directing badly, by either actually deliberat ing and commanding the con.scnt, or by failing to deliberate and impede the consent of the will when it could and .should do so. The superior reason is the ultimate judge of hu- man acts and has an obligation of deliberating and (lociiling whether the act to be performed is according to the law of God. Venial sin may also be found in the superior reason when it deliberately consents to sins that are venial in their nature, or when there
