TELEOLOGY
474
TELEOLOGY
Armorica, and became the mother of St. Oudaceus,
Teilo's successor. The earhest extant biographies of
the saint are late and uncritical. Educated under
St. Dyfrig or Dubric (q. v.), at Hentland, Here-
fordshire, and under St. Paul the Old or Pauhnus at
Whitland, Carmarthenshire, he subsequently ruled
the monastic school at Llandaff, named after him Ban-
gor Deilo. The story of his visit to Palestine with
SS. David and Padarn (or Paternus) about 518, and
their consecration there as bishops by John III, Pa-
triarch of Jerusalem, is not now generally credited;
but it seems that about that date, when St. Dubric
withdrew to Bardsey, St. Teilo succeeded him at
Llandaff. In 5-17 the "yellow plague" began to rav-
age Wales, and shortly afterwards St. Teilo with many
of his flock crossed to Armorica, where they were hos-
pitably entertained by his friend St. Sampson, Abbot
and Bishop of Dol. After seven years and seven months
Teilo returned to Wales, and is said to have been
elected to the archiepiscopate vacant by the death of
St. David, and to have transferred it from Menevia
(q. V.) to Llandaff (q. v.); but the more general mod-
ern opinion seems to be that in Wales at that epoch
the episcopate was not yet diocesan.
The story of the three bodies of the saint, which were discovered the day after his death, was prob- ably invented to account for the fact that the churches at Llandaff, Llandilo Vawr, and Penally, all claimed to possess his body. Doubtless at his death his relics were widely distributed. To-day they are venerated at Landeleau (Finistere), Plogonnac (Finistere), and Saint Telo (C6tes-du-Nord). Five parish churches in Brittany are dedicated to him (Landeleau, Leuhan, Montertelot, Pledeliac, and Saint Telo) as well as a chapel between Plogonnac and Locronan. The mod- ern Catholic church at Tenby bears the names of " Holyrood and St. Teilo ". The dedication of twelve churches in the present Anglican Diocese of St. Da- vid's, and of six in that of Llandaff, show they owe their origin to this zeal. Borlase argues his connexion with six dedications in Cornwall and Devon. It is stated that he was formally canonized, but no date is given. He is not infrequently represented in Breton churches as riding on a stag. His festival is, or was, kept in Wales and at Saint Telo on 9 February; at Dol, as a double, on 29 November; and in other places in Brit- tany on 2.5 November.
Ada SS., V (Paris, 18(34) . 303; Le Gr.vnd, Sainls de la Britagne, Armorique (Quimper, 1901), 331, 610; Lloyd in Diet. Nat. Biog., a. v.; Gammack in Diet. Christ. Biog. (Londoa. 1911), a. v.; Gu^RlN, Les Petits Botlandistes, XIII (Paris, 1882), 583; Arnold Foster, Church Dediealions, II (London, 1899), 201; Babing- GocLD, Lives of the Saints, II (London, 1897). 238; Stanton, Menology of England and Wales (London, 1887), 60; Evans, Li- ber Landavetisis (London, 1893); Borlase, Age of the Saints (Truro, 1893), 134; Loth, in Annales de Bretagne, IX, X; Rees, Welsh Saints (London, 1836), 2.53.
John B. Wainbwright.
Teleology (from Greek tAos, end, and X6705, sci- ence) is seldom used according to its etymological meaning to denote the branch of philosophy which deals with ends or final causes. It means the doc- trine that there is design, purpose, or finality in the world, that effects are in some manner intentional, and that no complete account of the universe is possible without reference to final causes (for the notion of final cause, see Cause). With mechanism (q. v.) teleology admits the determinism of physical efficient causes. It also acknowledges that the object of sci- entific research is to discover the laws of phenomena, and that any fact is scientifically explained when ade- quate causes are assigned to it, and the conditions of its occurrence arc known. But against mcc-lianism, fcli'dldgy rlaiinsthat tliis determinism, these laws, and the mode of activity of ellicient cau.ses reveiil the ex- istence of a directive principle and of finality in the works of nature. Henc<' the question is not whether there are efficient or final causes, whether, for instance, man sees because he has eyes or has eyes in order to
see. Final causes and efficient causes are not mutu-
ally exclusive. It must be admitted that any result
in nature is to be ascribed to an unbroken chain of
active causes, and the function of the final cause is not
to supply any missing link but to explain how the
activity of efficient causes is directed toward useful re-
sults. Nor can the teleologist be asked to indicate
the end of every activity any more than the mechanist
can be required to indicate the efficient cause of every
phenomenon. Finally the problem does not refer to
conscious and intelhgent finality such as is manifested
in human purposive actions, for it is obvious that in
many of his actions man is guided by the idea of a pre-
conceived plan which he endeavours to realize. Hu-
man works are for something; the house is built to Uve
in; the clock is made to keep time; the machine is con-
structed to perform some work; the statue is carved
to reaUze some ideal; etc. Are we justified in speak-
ing of the works of nature in the same way? When we
speak of ends and purposes in nature do we not attrib-
ute to it that which is distinctly human? Do we not
carry too far the process of personification and anal-
ogy, and thereby incur the reproach of anthropo-
morphism? According to mechanists, because we fore-
see results we falsely conclude that nature strives to
realize them. Ends exist in the mind which studies
nature, not in nature itself. To admit ends is men-
tally to reverse the natural process, to look upon the
effect as a cause, and from it to ascend the causal series
regressively.
I. It is important at first to make a distinction be- tween extrinsic and intrinsic finality. The former consists in reahzing an end which is outside of the be- ing that realizes it, and thus in contributing to the utiUty and welfare of other beings. In this way the mineral is utilized by the plant, and the plant by the animal. Or again the heat of the sun is a condition of growth and development. From this extrinsic finality result the subordination of various beings, and the or- der and harmony of the universe. But while extrin- sic finality seems obvious in several instances many of its details escape us, and it is easy to make a wrong use of it by attributing false or childish ends to every being and event, and by taking a narrow anthropocen- tric view of finality. This abuse of final causes called for the vigorous protests of Bacon ("De Dignitate et AugmentisScientiarum,"III,iv),Descartes("Principia Philosophise", 1, 28; III, 2, 3; "Meditationes", III, IV), Spinoza (Ethica, I, prop. 36, app.). The exclusive consideration of extrinsic ends contributed probably more than any other cause to the discredit into which teleology fell at the time of the Renaissance. Yet, as Voltaire rightly remarks, it is clear that if the nose was not made to wear spectacles, it was made for the sense of smell (Dictionnaire philosophique, s. v. Causes fi- nales). Here Voltaire appeals to the principle of in- trinsic finality which, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is primary, while extrinsic finality is derived and secondary.
Intrinsic finality consists in the fact that every being has within itself a natural tendency whereby its activity is directed towards the perfection of its own nature. "As the influx of the efficient cause con- sists in its own action, so the influx of the final cause consists in its being sought after and desired" (St. Thomas, "De veritate", Q. xxii, a. 2). But this desire or appctilus (see Appetite) is not neces.sarily conscious. St. Thomas does not hesitate to speak of "natural appetite", "natural inclination", and even "intention of nature", to mean that every being has within it.self a directive principle of activity. The final cause is a good which s:Uislirs a tendc^ncy spring- ing immediately from the nat urc {i\. v.) of every being. "By the form which gives it its speitific perfection, everything in nature hasan inclination to itsown opera- tions and toitsown end, which it reaches tlirough these operations. Just as everj'thing is, such also are its
